330 lines
28 KiB
Markdown
330 lines
28 KiB
Markdown
# Status
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Truthful implementation/verification matrix. Vocabulary:
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- **Implemented** — code exists.
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- **Unit tested** — covered by automated tests that run on any host.
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- **VM verified** — exercised in the disposable QEMU/OVMF VM.
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- **Hardware verified** — exercised on real hardware.
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- **Not verified** — do not claim it works.
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## Proven baseline (do not regress)
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A complete installation in a disposable UEFI VM, booted with the ISO detached:
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```
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QEMU + OVMF (UEFI)
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30 GiB qcow2, virtio-blk (/dev/vda); live ISO at /dev/sr0
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GPT: 1 GiB FAT32 ESP + LUKS2 remainder
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Btrfs: @ @home @var @snapshots @swap
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Gentoo systemd stage3 (default/linux/amd64/23.0/systemd)
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systemd-boot + BLS entry + dracut initramfs
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LUKS2 passphrase unlock at boot
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systemd PID 1, login, networking
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systemctl is-system-running = running; 0 failed units
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```
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Boot timing (Rust installer): 1.378 s kernel + 5.238 s initrd + 4.114 s
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userspace = 10.730 s.
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The committed VM harness (`installer/tests/vm/serial-driver.py` +
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`install.sh`) drives the **static Rust binary**; the Bash installer is no longer
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on the install path (Bash migration Phase 2, see
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`docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`).
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A second harness (`installer/tests/vm/appliance-driver.py` +
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`appliance-guest.sh`) drives the Debian-Live appliance ISO. On 2026-09-21 it
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produced `INSTALL-RC=0`, `NO_SECRET_LEAK`, and a detached boot
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(`systemd`, running, 0 failed units) whose Btrfs history contains the installer's
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coordinated `@` + `@var` **initial known-good** snapshot and a snapshot-based
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recovery boot entry (see `docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`). `sys undo` is
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VM-verified by the rollback acceptance gate
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(`serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386`, PASS=11 FAIL=0): snapshot →
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`app-misc/hello` install (package DB changed) → `sys undo <id>` → detached
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reboot with the package DB restored, the root break marker gone, `/home`
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preserved, systemd running, and the snapshot-based recovery entry present.
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Booting that recovery entry offline remains a manual gate.
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## Matrix
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| Area | Implemented | Unit tested | VM verified | Hardware verified |
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|------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------------|
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| Config (TOML + legacy), validation | yes | yes | yes | n/a |
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| Hardware/disk discovery, protection | yes | yes | yes | no |
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| Install plan + destructive preview | yes | yes | yes | n/a |
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| Destructive authorization (ERASE) | yes | yes | yes | n/a |
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| GPT partitioning + ESP | yes | yes | yes | no |
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| LUKS2 format/open/close | yes | yes | yes | no |
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| Btrfs subvolumes + swapfile | yes | yes | yes | no |
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| fstab / crypttab generation | yes | yes | yes | no |
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| stage3 fetch + verify (pinned SHA-256 or signed DIGESTS) + extract | yes | yes (both paths; every failure branch incl. missing verifier/key/DIGESTS/entry, nonzero exit, cannot-start) | yes (pinned path; unpinned path needs the live-image key) | n/a |
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| stage3 trust anchor (fixed provisioned key) | yes | yes (`release_key_path` ignores `PHOEBUS_GENTOO_RELEASE_KEY`; test-only injection only via explicit `verify_digests_with_key`) | no (unpinned VM proof needs a rebuilt live ISO + disposable install; host-level Good-signature check of the real DIGESTS noted below, not VM evidence) | n/a |
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| Portage config + sync + getuto | yes | yes | yes | n/a |
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| Signed Gentoo binary install | yes | yes | yes | n/a |
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| Source package compilation | yes | yes | yes | n/a |
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| Kernel install + dracut initramfs | yes | yes | yes | no |
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| systemd-boot + BLS | yes | yes | yes | no |
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| Boot default pins the real kernel (not recovery) | yes | yes | yes | no |
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| Recovery BLS entry (rescue.target) | yes | yes | boots (not default) | no |
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| Users, passwords, sudo | yes | yes | yes | n/a |
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| Locale/timezone/keymap/services | yes | yes | yes | n/a |
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| Rust VM boot parity | yes | yes | yes | no |
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| Rust TUI | yes | yes | smoke test | no |
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| Typed GUI bridge (`--gui-bridge`) | yes | yes (dry-run) | live VM + full journey | n/a |
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| Graphical welcome + install wizard (Quickshell) | yes | yes | live graphical VM + full GUI journey | no |
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| Phoebus brand system (SVG + tokens) | yes | yes | live VM | n/a |
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| Desktop profile (Mango + DarkMaterial) | yes | yes | live VM + installed | no |
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| Desktop session script (socket wait, polkit, cleanup) | yes | yes | functional test (stubs) | no |
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| PipeWire/WirePlumber | yes | no | headless (`wpctl`) | no |
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| Flatpak + flathub | yes | no | installed + remote | no |
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| XWayland / polkit agent / kitty / wofi | yes | no | installed, not launched | no |
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| Package policy + measured history | yes | yes | yes (326 entries) | no |
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| Background update preparation | yes | yes | yes (fetch; buildpkgonly skipped) | no |
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| Btrfs snapshots + history | yes | yes | yes | no |
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| Coordinated snapshot sets (`@` + `@var`) | yes | yes | no | no |
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| Btrfs rollback (`sys undo`) | yes | yes | yes (rollback acceptance `serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386` PASS=11 FAIL=0) | no |
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| Recovery/known-good BLS entry | yes | yes | present + snapshot-based (asserted in the rollback run; selecting it offline with no network/model is a distinct manual acceptance gate with its own procedure and evidence, see `docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`) | no |
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| Snapshot retention + free-space gate | yes | yes | no | no |
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| AI typed proposals + evidence review | yes | yes | fixture end-to-end | n/a |
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| AI guided install (DeepSeek/OpenAI) | yes | yes | fixture path only (no live call) | n/a |
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| AI privacy boundary (facts only) | yes | yes | no | n/a |
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| AI OS sandbox (systemd hardened unit) | yes | yes | no | no |
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| Installed assistant (`sys ask`) | yes | yes | fixture path only (no live call) | n/a |
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| Resolved package effects + approval binding (carried through execution) | yes | yes (empty vs unestablished; drift + prior-step allowance) | no | n/a |
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| Privileged approval ledger (replacement/replay/concurrency/interruption) | yes | yes (privileged entry point) | no | n/a |
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| Canonical digest recomputed at the privileged boundary (all plan kinds) | yes | yes (adversarial: swapped action resealed, every kind) | no | n/a |
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| Per-step effect binding into the approval digest (contents + aggregate) | yes | yes (adversarial: step_effects swap rejected; legit multi-step validates) | no | n/a |
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| Stable approval identity (replay after presentation edit/reseal) | yes | yes (summary/other fields/identical id/concurrent/new-id) | no | n/a |
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| Live-safe monotonic recovery (owner liveness, immutable terminal) | yes | yes (live vs abandoned, reconcile/finish race) | no | n/a |
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| Personal preferences + alert state (user-owned, system-default precedence) | yes | yes (save/reload/isolation/precedence/failure) | yes (installed VM: saved to user config, exit 0) | no |
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| Personal write ownership (elevated chown, symlink refusal, cross-uid refusal) | yes | yes (ownership-fixer seam + CLI refusal) | no | no |
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| Personal preference does not need the root-owned system transaction log | yes | yes (CLI regression: read-only transaction dir) | yes (installed VM acceptance) | n/a |
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| Installed `sys` acceptance matrix (read-only/failure) | yes | yes | yes (installed VM: `PASS=38 FAIL=0`, catalogue + regression group) | no |
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| Portage config readable for non-root queries (`normalize_config_permissions`) | yes | yes (modes + keyring exclusion) | yes (fresh VM install: 0755/0644 out of the box; non-root `search` returns 3 results, `updates` reports 10) | no |
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| Privileged catalogue mutations (install/remove/depclean/cache/apply updates, alternate-root) | yes | yes (unit) | yes (fresh installed VM via root: 7/7 PASS) | no |
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| Rollback acceptance (snapshot -> change -> `sys undo` -> detached verify) | yes | yes | yes (`serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386` PASS=11 FAIL=0 on a fresh disposable clone: package DB changed then restored, root marker gone, `/home` survives, boot running, no secret leak) | no |
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| Privileged `--broker` plan execution + replay rejection in a VM (pkexec path) | yes | yes (privileged entry point) | yes (non-root `pkexec` with a terminal polkit agent: cancelled auth, broker JSON success, replay rejected; required the shipped policy + wheel-admin rule) | n/a |
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| Cache-cleanup preview is non-destructive (real `eclean`/`nix-store`) | yes | yes (preview uses `--pretend --deep` / `--print-dead`; sorted bound items) | yes (real `eclean`: upstream preview, cancelled approval, approved run, drift refusal, failed cleaner; user data preserved) | n/a |
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| Reverse-dependency inspection includes installed targets | yes | yes (self-reference compares the dependent, not the target) | yes (real `sys-libs/glibc`, `sys-libs/zlib` dependents) | n/a |
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| Transaction log (outcomes, protective snapshots) | yes | yes | read-only in installed VM; write path needs root | no |
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| Flatpak/Nix bounded typed actions | yes | yes | no | no |
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| Shared hardware-aware source selection (all lanes) | yes | yes | no | no |
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| Snap lane (detect/install/list/remove/refresh/connections) | yes (reviewed first-use setup) | yes (incl. exact revisions and confinement) | partial (VM: Portage snapd, active socket, `hello-world` install/list/refresh/remove; partial confinement; refresh had no newer revision; connections not exercised) | no |
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| AppImage lane (import/acquire/integrity/desktop/remove) | yes | yes | yes (VM: acquire with pinned SHA, list, launch fixture, remove; tampered SHA refused) | no |
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| Custom ebuild overlay (stage/approve/build/remove) | yes | yes | yes (VM: stage → build/install → VDB+file present → remove) | no |
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| `sys` installed into the target + verified in chroot | yes | yes (unit) | yes (detached boot verified) | no |
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| AI-first install workflow (`sys install`, `sys ask`) | yes | yes | explicit-backend journey; AI-selected not run | no |
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| Bounded AI investigation (typed read-only evidence) | yes | yes | read-only actions on a booted VM | no |
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| Deterministic proposal validation (fabrication/stale/ambiguous/duplicate) | yes | yes | no | no |
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| Explicit backend install flags (no fallback) | yes | yes | yes (Portage install + remove, history) | no |
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| No-model unqualified install refuses and offers commands | yes | yes | yes (matrix case) | no |
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| Install transaction begin/finish + verification | yes | yes | yes (install verified; durable across reboot) | no |
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| Installed config loaded (`/etc/phoebus/install.toml`) | yes | no | install writes it; `sys` reads it on the installed system | no |
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| `sys` consistent target-root execution | yes | yes | no | no |
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| `sys` validation at the execution boundary | yes | yes | no | n/a |
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| `sys ask` truthful failure (nonzero, stop, record) | yes | yes | no | n/a |
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| Unified package search (`sys search`, all lanes, `--legacy`) | yes | yes (cross-lane; unavailable/failed/empty distinguished; source filter) | no | no |
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| Installed-package inventory (`sys list`, all lanes, `--legacy`) | yes | yes (VDB/Flatpak/Snap/AppImage; **Nix active-profile packages** vs generations/store; custom ebuild never double-counted) | yes (VM read-only group) | no |
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| Package information (`sys info`, `--legacy`) | yes | yes (installed/available, version/deps/size/provenance; ambiguity flagged) | yes (VM read-only group) | no |
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| Cross-source update check/apply (`sys updates`, `apply updates`) | yes | yes (exact per-source transactions with full Flatpak commits/snap revisions, pinned and revalidated; manual/project-specific refused) | Flatpak verified in VM (reviewed ref+commit, pinned update, verified); direct Snap refresh with no newer revision VM-verified, exact Snap apply-updates transaction unit-tested only; Portage verified | no |
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| Nix active-profile inventory (`sys list --nix`) | yes | yes (manifest v1/v2/v3; scope; generations vs store) | yes (NIX_ENABLED=yes install: real `nodejs-slim` profile listed and filtered; a re-run correctly reported a dangling profile) | no |
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| Catalogue maintenance (`depclean`, `clean cache`, `owners`, `deps`/`rdeps`) | yes | yes (structured depclean effects; cache-cleanup dry-run review + failure propagation; VDB dependency metadata) | yes (VM: depclean + cache-cleanup journeys; deps read-only) | no |
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| AI-default catalogue routing (source flags constrain, never bypass) | yes | yes (investigation loop, full backend classification + optional-backend rewrite, fallback offers exact `--legacy` command) | yes (read-only routing cases) | no |
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| Alternate-root catalogue/update/maintenance rooting | yes | yes (chroot for Portage/Flatpak/Nix; Snap refused; recording-runner no-host-command tests) | yes (VM: alternate-root Snap refused) | no |
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| Service start/stop/restart + flatpak/nix/snapshot commands | yes | yes | no | no |
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| Desktop session helpers (DMS bar/launcher/lock/idle) | yes | yes | functional test (stubs) | no |
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| Mango + DankMaterialShell profile | yes | yes | live VM yes; installed desktop_install yes (174 pkgs) | no |
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| Mango is the canonical desktop | yes | yes | live VM yes; installed default session configured | no |
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| greetd login (Mango + DarkMaterial) | yes | yes | yes (tuigreet verified on detached boot) | no |
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| Live desktop ISO (Mango + DMS) | yes | guards tested | graphical VM + GUI journey + detached boot | no |
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| Live welcome autostart + duplicate prevention | yes | guards tested | live graphical VM | no |
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| Welcome primary action keyboard-focus | yes | guards tested | live graphical VM | no |
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| VM harness disk safety + structured results | yes | yes (16 tests) | n/a | n/a |
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| Target disk revalidation before partition | yes | yes | no | n/a |
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| Bridge replay/concurrency + input bounds | yes | yes | no | n/a |
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| Provider transport endpoint/size hardening | yes | yes | no | n/a |
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| `TargetRoot` symlink-escape guard | yes | yes | n/a | n/a |
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| OpenCode server capability probe | yes | yes | real host probe + auth + policy | n/a |
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| OpenCode proposal adapter (real inference) | yes | yes | real model (`deepseek-v4-flash`) | n/a |
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| OpenCode in GUI / CLI / `sys ask` | yes | yes | GUI AI step + `sys ask` live | n/a |
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| OpenCode full graphical install | yes | yes | yes (12 stages, 174 packages, detached boot) | n/a |
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| GUI readiness refresh / AI revalidation / keyboard nav | yes | yes (Rust) | VM harness regressions | n/a |
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| Mandatory AI requires a validated interaction | yes | yes | bridge + CLI | n/a |
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| GURU packaging (scoped keywords) | yes | yes | no (build/install unverified) | no |
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| Release gates + atomic publish | yes | yes (executable: every gate names a real harness mode; `--execute` runs each command in its own process and reports Passed/Failed/NotRun from evidence; invalid commands, isolation, failed-gate and publish refusal covered) | no (no end-to-end candidate: VM/graphical/model gates need a runner; unconfigured host reports 0 passed / 0 failed / 6 NotRun with exact missing prerequisites) | n/a |
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| `sys` verbs | yes | yes | yes | no |
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| OpenCode pinned bootstrap | yes | yes | no | n/a |
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| Release manifest/verify | yes | yes (host CLI: manifest, verify, tampered-artifact refusal) | no | n/a |
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| NVIDIA PCI device classification + branch/flavor policy | yes | yes | no | no |
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| NVIDIA installed Gentoo integration (Portage/modprobe/dracut/initramfs) | yes | yes | no | no |
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| NVIDIA live ISO payload (bundled modules/firmware/userspace) | yes | yes (verifier + guards) | no | no |
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| NVIDIA kernel/module/initramfs update coordination (`@module-rebuild`) | yes | yes | no | no |
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| NVIDIA live GPU decision + real nouveau fallback | yes | yes (fixtures + CLI) | no | no |
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| Live GUI broker scoped sudoers (no `NOPASSWD: ALL`) | yes | yes (`visudo`) | no | n/a |
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| Rollback acceptance harness mode | yes | yes (bash -n/unit + vacuous-pass guards) | yes (destructive gate `serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386` PASS=11 FAIL=0; root-marker creation is mandatory and asserted present before undo, absent after the detached reboot) | no |
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| Desktop assistant GUI (`phoebus-assistant`) | yes | yes | yes (live VM layout) | no |
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| Desktop assistant JSON-RPC bridge (`sys --assistant-bridge`) | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | n/a |
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| AI-first administration contract (`sys install`, `please`, `ask`) | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | no |
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| Deterministic `--legacy` administration (fail-closed source choice) | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | n/a |
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| Audited action execution (`--legacy`/`--broker` enforcement) | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | n/a |
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| Nix attribute verification probe | yes | yes | no | n/a |
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| Portage binary binhost verification + compile abort guard | yes | yes | no | n/a |
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| Cross-source application ownership & user data preservation | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | no |
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| Unified multi-source update management | yes | yes | no | no |
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| Quiet proactive assistance monitor & deduplicated alerting | yes | yes | no | no |
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| User preference profiles & project environment mappings | yes | yes | no | n/a |
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| Shared administration service layer (`service::*`) & PreparedPlan staging | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | n/a |
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| Authoritative privileged validation boundary (integrity/root/uid/state/claim) | yes | yes | no (needs an authenticated VM boot) | n/a |
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| Protected per-user plan storage, atomic claim, tamper/traversal rejection | yes | yes | no (needs an authenticated VM boot) | n/a |
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| Plan digests, target-root/uid binding, TTL, replay & concurrent-claim protection | yes | yes | no | n/a |
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| Truthful transaction outcomes (failure/verify-fail/refusal/interruption) | yes | yes | no | n/a |
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| AI-first removal (deterministic discovery underneath; `--legacy` bypasses) | yes | yes | no | n/a |
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| GUI plan review card for every plan type; prepared ≠ completed | yes | no (QML) | no (needs graphical VM) | no |
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| Shared provider/credential handling (`ai_setup::*`) for CLI and GUI | yes | yes | no (no live credential) | n/a |
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| Contextual conversation continuity (`conversation::*`) | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | n/a |
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| Conversation-history privacy (minimized, redacted, 0600, bounded, clearable) | yes | yes | no | n/a |
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| Target desktop QML assets & Polkit policy provisioning | yes | yes | yes (live VM layout) | no |
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| Desktop assistant unprivileged execution & Polkit elevation | yes | yes | yes (live VM layout) | no |
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| UKI / Secure Boot | no (deferred; `uki`/`secureboot = true` rejected at validation) | no (rejection + truthful plan rendering covered) | no | no |
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## Known limitations
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- **Desktop graphical session** was verified with the *headless* wlroots
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backend because the serial-only VM has no logind seat. The DRM path and a
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real VT login are not yet exercised. `phoebus-session` is written by the
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installer for that purpose.
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- **Flatpak apps** were not installed from the remote; only the runtime and
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the flathub remote were verified.
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- **NVIDIA** is implemented (hardware-driven branch/flavor policy, scoped
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Portage configuration, a live payload that is build-time verified, and
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kernel/module/initramfs update coordination) and covered by Rust tests and the
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live-payload verifier. The policy now caps Maxwell/Pascal/Volta at the last
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supporting series (580) and reports a Blackwell plus proprietary-only GPU
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combination as an explicit incompatibility rather than installing one driver
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that cannot serve both. The live driver choice is a deterministic,
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device-class-based decision (`--live-gpu-plan`) with a real `nouveau`
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fallback, and the verifier rejects placeholders, cross-kernel module trees and
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version/flavor mismatches. The installed sequence now installs the driver and
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proves its modules exist **before** forcing them into the final initramfs.
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A minimal live rootfs with the stable kernel and NVIDIA driver was **built and
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verified** previously (driver 550.163.01, kernel 6.12.107+deb13-amd64, modules
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`nvidia-current*`). It is **not verified on hardware or in the VM**: this host
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has no NVIDIA GPU and QEMU's virtual GPU cannot establish NVIDIA
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acceleration; no passthrough setup is available or authorized. The full
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desktop ISO was not assembled here (the host has ~12 GiB free; the build wants
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more) and the live/installed NVIDIA boot gates are unrun. See
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`docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md` for the exact unblock commands. The live kernel
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is pinned to Debian stable (trixie 6.12 LTS) because testing's kernel (7.2)
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breaks Debian's 550 driver; the bundled branch covers Maxwell through Hopper,
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and Blackwell (or a failed accelerated load) falls back to nouveau on the live
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medium. The installed Gentoo system uses the current branch with NVIDIA's open
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kernel modules on Turing and newer.
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- **The installed `sys` binary and desktop assistant (`phoebus-assistant`)**: The
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installer provisions `sys` into `/usr/local/bin/sys` and configures the desktop
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assistant Quickshell application (`phoebus-assistant`) launched via desktop
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entries and keybindings. On the installed system, all 38 acceptance test cases
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in `installer/tests/vm/sys-acceptance.sh` pass cleanly (`PASS=38 FAIL=0`),
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verifying the unified AI-first CLI/GUI interface, deterministic `--legacy`
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mode, the package catalogue (search/inventory/information/update-check),
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fail-closed source requirements, audited `--broker`/`--legacy` gates,
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proactive system monitors, and offline fallback guidance. The matrix was
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re-run on 2026-09-26 against the refactored static `sys` (`70f0a72b…`,
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fetched to `/tmp/sys` on a disposable overlay of the pristine installed
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image, non-root user, no mutations): guest `PASS=38 FAIL=0`, driver
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`PASS=41 FAIL=0` (`serial-boot-20260926T014746Z-3089a820`).
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- **Authenticated boot (UKI / UEFI Secure Boot) is not implemented and is an
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open security limitation.** The installed boot path is plain unsigned BLS
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(systemd-boot + dracut; the dracut UKI generator did not embed the kernel
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command line, so BLS is used and verified). `kernel.uki = true` and
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`kernel.secureboot = true` are rejected at configuration validation, and the
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install-plan preview always reports the real BLS path, so no interface can
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imply these modes are active. A future Secure Boot/UKI implementation is a
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separate opt-in milestone (signed artifacts, key lifecycle, update/rollback
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handling, disposable-VM boot tests with Secure Boot enabled); it must not be
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enabled or advertised until that complete path passes.
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- **Rollback (`sys undo`) is VM-verified** (`serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386`,
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PASS=11 FAIL=0, exit 0, no secret leak in either transcript). The gate runs on
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a fresh disposable overlay of the installed image: a known-good
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package-database fingerprint and `/home` marker, `sys snapshot --legacy`, a
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controlled reversible `app-misc/hello` install `--legacy --portage` (the
|
|
fingerprint is asserted changed, so the run cannot pass vacuously),
|
|
`sys undo <snapshot-id> --legacy`, power off, then a detached reboot that
|
|
asserts the package database restored, the root break marker absent, `/home`
|
|
surviving, systemd running, kernel modules present, the snapshot-based
|
|
recovery entry present, and rollback status recorded. Both transcripts are
|
|
kept (`serial-phase1.log`, `serial.log`).
|
|
Correction: the 2026-09-25 claim of a passing rollback had no run transcript
|
|
and did not reproduce — the committed harness then ran the guest
|
|
unprivileged, used the pre-installed `nano` as the break, restored "newest"
|
|
instead of its own snapshot, and never asserted the root marker was gone.
|
|
Those harness defects are fixed in this session (sudo authentication with
|
|
unique end markers, explicit `--legacy`, verified break, targeted undo,
|
|
marker-absent assertion) and the gate above is the evidence. Booting the
|
|
recovery entry itself offline (no network, no model) remains a manual,
|
|
un-automated gate: select "Phoebus Recovery (known-good snapshot)" in the
|
|
systemd-boot menu.
|
|
- **Mango + DankMaterialShell** is the canonical Phoebus desktop
|
|
(`desktop.profile = "mango"`, Flatpak on). It is implemented with Mango
|
|
0.17.2, DMS (pinned release), Quickshell 0.3.1 and scenefx 0.5 from the GURU
|
|
overlay and scoped `~amd64` keywords. Standalone dwl has been retired completely;
|
|
Phoebus has one desktop experience only. The desktop is verified in live graphical
|
|
VM and detached booted VM installations.
|
|
- **The live desktop ISO** (`installer/live/build.sh`) builds a Debian testing
|
|
rootfs with Mango + DMS, live-only autologin, a branded welcome window and a
|
|
graphical installer frontend over the typed bridge. Its desktop-payload
|
|
guards are unit-tested. The rebuilt ISO
|
|
(`sha256 0c386a1b…`, 1.6 GiB, build id in `/etc/phoebus/build`) was booted in
|
|
a graphical, seat-providing VM. The `gui` journey passed **28/28** checks
|
|
(welcome autostart, launcher from the keyboard, duplicate prevention, the live
|
|
medium protected, keyboard suggestion selection, the network and AI steps,
|
|
the AI gate refused without a model and reported inline, no bridge errors) and
|
|
the `opencode` journey passed **18/18** (real model response, validated
|
|
proposal, and editing the model invalidating the validated state). The
|
|
`gui-install` journey passed every assertion on a fresh 30 GiB qcow2 —
|
|
OpenCode connect/review/accept, disk, account, ERASE and confirmation — and
|
|
the backend then reported real stages with elapsed time and no fabricated
|
|
percentage. The **completed** install succeeded through all 12 stages,
|
|
compiled all 174 packages of the Mango desktop profile, and confirmed
|
|
completion (`gui-install-completes` passed). The installed system then booted
|
|
**with the ISO detached** (LUKS2 decrypt, systemd running, 0 failed units,
|
|
all Btrfs subvolumes mounted, `sys` CLI operational, and `tuigreet` greeter
|
|
active). The **installed** Mango session (graphical user login into DMS)
|
|
remains to be verified under a physical seat / DRM compositor backend.
|
|
- **AI sandbox** is implemented (`systemd-run` hardening properties, tested at
|
|
the argv level) and fails closed without `systemd-run`; it has not been
|
|
exercised in a VM. Only typed actions and the privacy boundary were previously
|
|
enforced.
|
|
- **Release automation** now has executable gates, a report, atomic publish
|
|
and signing command helpers, but no gate has been executed by a configured
|
|
CI runner. `gates --execute` runs each gate's real command in its own
|
|
process (exit 0 → Passed, nonzero → Failed, missing harness/firmware/seat/
|
|
credential → NotRun) and never manufactures a pass. A local run (2026-09-26)
|
|
exercised manifest generation (2 artifacts), verification,
|
|
tampered-artifact refusal, and publish refusal against a NotRun gate report;
|
|
`gates --execute` on an unconfigured host reports 0 passed / 0 failed /
|
|
6 NotRun with the exact missing prerequisite per gate (OVMF_CODE/OVMF_VARS
|
|
unset, no model credential). No release was published and `latest.iso`
|
|
untouched. Minimal repeatable setup: register a Forgejo Actions runner
|
|
(`act_runner`) so `.forgejo/workflows/ci.yml` executes the gates.
|
|
- The desktop transaction compiles heavily because desktop USE does not match
|
|
the signed binhost (~26 min for the desktop set on 8 vCPUs in the test VM).
|
|
The official Gentoo binhost is OpenRC/hardened, so a systemd system can only
|
|
reuse binaries for packages whose USE matches; the policy still requests
|
|
signed binaries where it can. Publishing a matching binhost is future work.
|
|
- **Live AI provider calls are not verified.** DeepSeek/OpenAI requests are
|
|
built and reviewed by fixtures (`phoebus-ai::provider::TestTransport`) and the
|
|
curl transport is covered by a recording runner; no call was made with a real
|
|
key.
|
|
- The installer rebuilds `sys-apps/systemd` from source because
|
|
boot/policykit/cryptsetup USE differ from the binhost.
|
|
- `sys undo` is implemented with the default-subvolume, fstab, kernel-cmdline
|
|
and BLS handling described in ADR 0007; its destructive VM acceptance gate
|
|
passed in this session (`serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386`).
|
|
- **Stage3 signed-DIGESTS mechanism (host-level, not VM evidence).** The
|
|
parser fixture matches the real current DIGESTS byte-for-byte, and the real
|
|
DIGESTS for `stage3-amd64-systemd-20260920T170055Z.tar.xz` verifies with a
|
|
Good signature from Gentoo's Automated Weekly Release Key at host level.
|
|
The full VM proof (rebuilt live ISO carrying the provisioned key, default
|
|
unpinned install, tampered signature/digest/archive refusal) still needs a
|
|
disposable install run and is recorded as blocked in
|
|
`docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`.
|