# Status Truthful implementation/verification matrix. Vocabulary: - **Implemented** — code exists. - **Unit tested** — covered by automated tests that run on any host. - **VM verified** — exercised in the disposable QEMU/OVMF VM. - **Hardware verified** — exercised on real hardware. - **Not verified** — do not claim it works. ## Proven baseline (do not regress) A complete installation in a disposable UEFI VM, booted with the ISO detached: ``` QEMU + OVMF (UEFI) 30 GiB qcow2, virtio-blk (/dev/vda); live ISO at /dev/sr0 GPT: 1 GiB FAT32 ESP + LUKS2 remainder Btrfs: @ @home @var @snapshots @swap Gentoo systemd stage3 (default/linux/amd64/23.0/systemd) systemd-boot + BLS entry + dracut initramfs LUKS2 passphrase unlock at boot systemd PID 1, login, networking systemctl is-system-running = running; 0 failed units ``` Boot timing (Rust installer): 1.378 s kernel + 5.238 s initrd + 4.114 s userspace = 10.730 s. The committed VM harness (`installer/tests/vm/serial-driver.py` + `install.sh`) drives the **static Rust binary**; the Bash installer is no longer on the install path (Bash migration Phase 2, see `docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`). A second harness (`installer/tests/vm/appliance-driver.py` + `appliance-guest.sh`) drives the Debian-Live appliance ISO. On 2026-09-21 it produced `INSTALL-RC=0`, `NO_SECRET_LEAK`, and a detached boot (`systemd`, running, 0 failed units) whose Btrfs history contains the installer's coordinated `@` + `@var` **initial known-good** snapshot and a snapshot-based recovery boot entry (see `docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`). `sys undo` is VM-verified by the rollback acceptance gate (`serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386`, PASS=11 FAIL=0): snapshot → `app-misc/hello` install (package DB changed) → `sys undo ` → detached reboot with the package DB restored, the root break marker gone, `/home` preserved, systemd running, and the snapshot-based recovery entry present. Booting that recovery entry offline remains a manual gate. ## Matrix | Area | Implemented | Unit tested | VM verified | Hardware verified | |------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------------| | Config (TOML + legacy), validation | yes | yes | yes | n/a | | Hardware/disk discovery, protection | yes | yes | yes | no | | Install plan + destructive preview | yes | yes | yes | n/a | | Destructive authorization (ERASE) | yes | yes | yes | n/a | | GPT partitioning + ESP | yes | yes | yes | no | | LUKS2 format/open/close | yes | yes | yes | no | | Btrfs subvolumes + swapfile | yes | yes | yes | no | | fstab / crypttab generation | yes | yes | yes | no | | stage3 fetch + verify (pinned SHA-256 or signed DIGESTS) + extract | yes | yes (both paths; every failure branch incl. missing verifier/key/DIGESTS/entry, nonzero exit, cannot-start) | yes (pinned path; unpinned path needs the live-image key) | n/a | | stage3 trust anchor (fixed provisioned key) | yes | yes (`release_key_path` ignores `PHOEBUS_GENTOO_RELEASE_KEY`; test-only injection only via explicit `verify_digests_with_key`) | no (unpinned VM proof needs a rebuilt live ISO + disposable install; host-level Good-signature check of the real DIGESTS noted below, not VM evidence) | n/a | | Portage config + sync + getuto | yes | yes | yes | n/a | | Signed Gentoo binary install | yes | yes | yes | n/a | | Source package compilation | yes | yes | yes | n/a | | Kernel install + dracut initramfs | yes | yes | yes | no | | systemd-boot + BLS | yes | yes | yes | no | | Boot default pins the real kernel (not recovery) | yes | yes | yes | no | | Recovery BLS entry (rescue.target) | yes | yes | boots (not default) | no | | Users, passwords, sudo | yes | yes | yes | n/a | | Locale/timezone/keymap/services | yes | yes | yes | n/a | | Rust VM boot parity | yes | yes | yes | no | | Rust TUI | yes | yes | smoke test | no | | Typed GUI bridge (`--gui-bridge`) | yes | yes (dry-run) | live VM + full journey | n/a | | Graphical welcome + install wizard (Quickshell) | yes | yes | live graphical VM + full GUI journey | no | | Phoebus brand system (SVG + tokens) | yes | yes | live VM | n/a | | Desktop profile (Mango + DarkMaterial) | yes | yes | live VM + installed | no | | Desktop session script (socket wait, polkit, cleanup) | yes | yes | functional test (stubs) | no | | PipeWire/WirePlumber | yes | no | headless (`wpctl`) | no | | Flatpak + flathub | yes | no | installed + remote | no | | XWayland / polkit agent / kitty / wofi | yes | no | installed, not launched | no | | Package policy + measured history | yes | yes | yes (326 entries) | no | | Background update preparation | yes | yes | yes (fetch; buildpkgonly skipped) | no | | Btrfs snapshots + history | yes | yes | yes | no | | Coordinated snapshot sets (`@` + `@var`) | yes | yes | no | no | | Btrfs rollback (`sys undo`) | yes | yes | yes (rollback acceptance `serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386` PASS=11 FAIL=0) | no | | Recovery/known-good BLS entry | yes | yes | present + snapshot-based (asserted in the rollback run; selecting it offline with no network/model is a distinct manual acceptance gate with its own procedure and evidence, see `docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`) | no | | Snapshot retention + free-space gate | yes | yes | no | no | | AI typed proposals + evidence review | yes | yes | fixture end-to-end | n/a | | AI guided install (DeepSeek/OpenAI) | yes | yes | fixture path only (no live call) | n/a | | AI privacy boundary (facts only) | yes | yes | no | n/a | | AI OS sandbox (systemd hardened unit) | yes | yes | no | no | | Installed assistant (`sys ask`) | yes | yes | fixture path only (no live call) | n/a | | Resolved package effects + approval binding (carried through execution) | yes | yes (empty vs unestablished; drift + prior-step allowance) | no | n/a | | Privileged approval ledger (replacement/replay/concurrency/interruption) | yes | yes (privileged entry point) | no | n/a | | Canonical digest recomputed at the privileged boundary (all plan kinds) | yes | yes (adversarial: swapped action resealed, every kind) | no | n/a | | Per-step effect binding into the approval digest (contents + aggregate) | yes | yes (adversarial: step_effects swap rejected; legit multi-step validates) | no | n/a | | Stable approval identity (replay after presentation edit/reseal) | yes | yes (summary/other fields/identical id/concurrent/new-id) | no | n/a | | Live-safe monotonic recovery (owner liveness, immutable terminal) | yes | yes (live vs abandoned, reconcile/finish race) | no | n/a | | Personal preferences + alert state (user-owned, system-default precedence) | yes | yes (save/reload/isolation/precedence/failure) | yes (installed VM: saved to user config, exit 0) | no | | Personal write ownership (elevated chown, symlink refusal, cross-uid refusal) | yes | yes (ownership-fixer seam + CLI refusal) | no | no | | Personal preference does not need the root-owned system transaction log | yes | yes (CLI regression: read-only transaction dir) | yes (installed VM acceptance) | n/a | | Installed `sys` acceptance matrix (read-only/failure) | yes | yes | yes (installed VM: `PASS=38 FAIL=0`, catalogue + regression group) | no | | Portage config readable for non-root queries (`normalize_config_permissions`) | yes | yes (modes + keyring exclusion) | yes (fresh VM install: 0755/0644 out of the box; non-root `search` returns 3 results, `updates` reports 10) | no | | Privileged catalogue mutations (install/remove/depclean/cache/apply updates, alternate-root) | yes | yes (unit) | yes (fresh installed VM via root: 7/7 PASS) | no | | Rollback acceptance (snapshot -> change -> `sys undo` -> detached verify) | yes | yes | yes (`serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386` PASS=11 FAIL=0 on a fresh disposable clone: package DB changed then restored, root marker gone, `/home` survives, boot running, no secret leak) | no | | Privileged `--broker` plan execution + replay rejection in a VM (pkexec path) | yes | yes (privileged entry point) | yes (non-root `pkexec` with a terminal polkit agent: cancelled auth, broker JSON success, replay rejected; required the shipped policy + wheel-admin rule) | n/a | | Cache-cleanup preview is non-destructive (real `eclean`/`nix-store`) | yes | yes (preview uses `--pretend --deep` / `--print-dead`; sorted bound items) | yes (real `eclean`: upstream preview, cancelled approval, approved run, drift refusal, failed cleaner; user data preserved) | n/a | | Reverse-dependency inspection includes installed targets | yes | yes (self-reference compares the dependent, not the target) | yes (real `sys-libs/glibc`, `sys-libs/zlib` dependents) | n/a | | Transaction log (outcomes, protective snapshots) | yes | yes | read-only in installed VM; write path needs root | no | | Flatpak/Nix bounded typed actions | yes | yes | no | no | | Shared hardware-aware source selection (all lanes) | yes | yes | no | no | | Snap lane (detect/install/list/remove/refresh/connections) | yes (reviewed first-use setup) | yes (incl. exact revisions and confinement) | partial (VM: Portage snapd, active socket, `hello-world` install/list/refresh/remove; partial confinement; refresh had no newer revision; connections not exercised) | no | | AppImage lane (import/acquire/integrity/desktop/remove) | yes | yes | yes (VM: acquire with pinned SHA, list, launch fixture, remove; tampered SHA refused) | no | | Custom ebuild overlay (stage/approve/build/remove) | yes | yes | yes (VM: stage → build/install → VDB+file present → remove) | no | | `sys` installed into the target + verified in chroot | yes | yes (unit) | yes (detached boot verified) | no | | AI-first install workflow (`sys install`, `sys ask`) | yes | yes | explicit-backend journey; AI-selected not run | no | | Bounded AI investigation (typed read-only evidence) | yes | yes | read-only actions on a booted VM | no | | Deterministic proposal validation (fabrication/stale/ambiguous/duplicate) | yes | yes | no | no | | Explicit backend install flags (no fallback) | yes | yes | yes (Portage install + remove, history) | no | | No-model unqualified install refuses and offers commands | yes | yes | yes (matrix case) | no | | Install transaction begin/finish + verification | yes | yes | yes (install verified; durable across reboot) | no | | Installed config loaded (`/etc/phoebus/install.toml`) | yes | no | install writes it; `sys` reads it on the installed system | no | | `sys` consistent target-root execution | yes | yes | no | no | | `sys` validation at the execution boundary | yes | yes | no | n/a | | `sys ask` truthful failure (nonzero, stop, record) | yes | yes | no | n/a | | Unified package search (`sys search`, all lanes, `--legacy`) | yes | yes (cross-lane; unavailable/failed/empty distinguished; source filter) | no | no | | Installed-package inventory (`sys list`, all lanes, `--legacy`) | yes | yes (VDB/Flatpak/Snap/AppImage; **Nix active-profile packages** vs generations/store; custom ebuild never double-counted) | yes (VM read-only group) | no | | Package information (`sys info`, `--legacy`) | yes | yes (installed/available, version/deps/size/provenance; ambiguity flagged) | yes (VM read-only group) | no | | Cross-source update check/apply (`sys updates`, `apply updates`) | yes | yes (exact per-source transactions with full Flatpak commits/snap revisions, pinned and revalidated; manual/project-specific refused) | Flatpak verified in VM (reviewed ref+commit, pinned update, verified); direct Snap refresh with no newer revision VM-verified, exact Snap apply-updates transaction unit-tested only; Portage verified | no | | Nix active-profile inventory (`sys list --nix`) | yes | yes (manifest v1/v2/v3; scope; generations vs store) | yes (NIX_ENABLED=yes install: real `nodejs-slim` profile listed and filtered; a re-run correctly reported a dangling profile) | no | | Catalogue maintenance (`depclean`, `clean cache`, `owners`, `deps`/`rdeps`) | yes | yes (structured depclean effects; cache-cleanup dry-run review + failure propagation; VDB dependency metadata) | yes (VM: depclean + cache-cleanup journeys; deps read-only) | no | | AI-default catalogue routing (source flags constrain, never bypass) | yes | yes (investigation loop, full backend classification + optional-backend rewrite, fallback offers exact `--legacy` command) | yes (read-only routing cases) | no | | Alternate-root catalogue/update/maintenance rooting | yes | yes (chroot for Portage/Flatpak/Nix; Snap refused; recording-runner no-host-command tests) | yes (VM: alternate-root Snap refused) | no | | Service start/stop/restart + flatpak/nix/snapshot commands | yes | yes | no | no | | Desktop session helpers (DMS bar/launcher/lock/idle) | yes | yes | functional test (stubs) | no | | Mango + DankMaterialShell profile | yes | yes | live VM yes; installed desktop_install yes (174 pkgs) | no | | Mango is the canonical desktop | yes | yes | live VM yes; installed default session configured | no | | greetd login (Mango + DarkMaterial) | yes | yes | yes (tuigreet verified on detached boot) | no | | Live desktop ISO (Mango + DMS) | yes | guards tested | graphical VM + GUI journey + detached boot | no | | Live welcome autostart + duplicate prevention | yes | guards tested | live graphical VM | no | | Welcome primary action keyboard-focus | yes | guards tested | live graphical VM | no | | VM harness disk safety + structured results | yes | yes (16 tests) | n/a | n/a | | Target disk revalidation before partition | yes | yes | no | n/a | | Bridge replay/concurrency + input bounds | yes | yes | no | n/a | | Provider transport endpoint/size hardening | yes | yes | no | n/a | | `TargetRoot` symlink-escape guard | yes | yes | n/a | n/a | | OpenCode server capability probe | yes | yes | real host probe + auth + policy | n/a | | OpenCode proposal adapter (real inference) | yes | yes | real model (`deepseek-v4-flash`) | n/a | | OpenCode in GUI / CLI / `sys ask` | yes | yes | GUI AI step + `sys ask` live | n/a | | OpenCode full graphical install | yes | yes | yes (12 stages, 174 packages, detached boot) | n/a | | GUI readiness refresh / AI revalidation / keyboard nav | yes | yes (Rust) | VM harness regressions | n/a | | Mandatory AI requires a validated interaction | yes | yes | bridge + CLI | n/a | | GURU packaging (scoped keywords) | yes | yes | no (build/install unverified) | no | | Release gates + atomic publish | yes | yes (executable: every gate names a real harness mode; `--execute` runs each command in its own process and reports Passed/Failed/NotRun from evidence; invalid commands, isolation, failed-gate and publish refusal covered) | no (no end-to-end candidate: VM/graphical/model gates need a runner; unconfigured host reports 0 passed / 0 failed / 6 NotRun with exact missing prerequisites) | n/a | | `sys` verbs | yes | yes | yes | no | | OpenCode pinned bootstrap | yes | yes | no | n/a | | Release manifest/verify | yes | yes (host CLI: manifest, verify, tampered-artifact refusal) | no | n/a | | NVIDIA PCI device classification + branch/flavor policy | yes | yes | no | no | | NVIDIA installed Gentoo integration (Portage/modprobe/dracut/initramfs) | yes | yes | no | no | | NVIDIA live ISO payload (bundled modules/firmware/userspace) | yes | yes (verifier + guards) | no | no | | NVIDIA kernel/module/initramfs update coordination (`@module-rebuild`) | yes | yes | no | no | | NVIDIA live GPU decision + real nouveau fallback | yes | yes (fixtures + CLI) | no | no | | Live GUI broker scoped sudoers (no `NOPASSWD: ALL`) | yes | yes (`visudo`) | no | n/a | | Rollback acceptance harness mode | yes | yes (bash -n/unit + vacuous-pass guards) | yes (destructive gate `serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386` PASS=11 FAIL=0; root-marker creation is mandatory and asserted present before undo, absent after the detached reboot) | no | | Desktop assistant GUI (`phoebus-assistant`) | yes | yes | yes (live VM layout) | no | | Desktop assistant JSON-RPC bridge (`sys --assistant-bridge`) | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | n/a | | AI-first administration contract (`sys install`, `please`, `ask`) | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | no | | Deterministic `--legacy` administration (fail-closed source choice) | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | n/a | | Audited action execution (`--legacy`/`--broker` enforcement) | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | n/a | | Nix attribute verification probe | yes | yes | no | n/a | | Portage binary binhost verification + compile abort guard | yes | yes | no | n/a | | Cross-source application ownership & user data preservation | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | no | | Unified multi-source update management | yes | yes | no | no | | Quiet proactive assistance monitor & deduplicated alerting | yes | yes | no | no | | User preference profiles & project environment mappings | yes | yes | no | n/a | | Shared administration service layer (`service::*`) & PreparedPlan staging | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | n/a | | Authoritative privileged validation boundary (integrity/root/uid/state/claim) | yes | yes | no (needs an authenticated VM boot) | n/a | | Protected per-user plan storage, atomic claim, tamper/traversal rejection | yes | yes | no (needs an authenticated VM boot) | n/a | | Plan digests, target-root/uid binding, TTL, replay & concurrent-claim protection | yes | yes | no | n/a | | Truthful transaction outcomes (failure/verify-fail/refusal/interruption) | yes | yes | no | n/a | | AI-first removal (deterministic discovery underneath; `--legacy` bypasses) | yes | yes | no | n/a | | GUI plan review card for every plan type; prepared ≠ completed | yes | no (QML) | no (needs graphical VM) | no | | Shared provider/credential handling (`ai_setup::*`) for CLI and GUI | yes | yes | no (no live credential) | n/a | | Contextual conversation continuity (`conversation::*`) | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | n/a | | Conversation-history privacy (minimized, redacted, 0600, bounded, clearable) | yes | yes | no | n/a | | Target desktop QML assets & Polkit policy provisioning | yes | yes | yes (live VM layout) | no | | Desktop assistant unprivileged execution & Polkit elevation | yes | yes | yes (live VM layout) | no | | UKI / Secure Boot | no (deferred; `uki`/`secureboot = true` rejected at validation) | no (rejection + truthful plan rendering covered) | no | no | ## Known limitations - **Desktop graphical session** was verified with the *headless* wlroots backend because the serial-only VM has no logind seat. The DRM path and a real VT login are not yet exercised. `phoebus-session` is written by the installer for that purpose. - **Flatpak apps** were not installed from the remote; only the runtime and the flathub remote were verified. - **NVIDIA** is implemented (hardware-driven branch/flavor policy, scoped Portage configuration, a live payload that is build-time verified, and kernel/module/initramfs update coordination) and covered by Rust tests and the live-payload verifier. The policy now caps Maxwell/Pascal/Volta at the last supporting series (580) and reports a Blackwell plus proprietary-only GPU combination as an explicit incompatibility rather than installing one driver that cannot serve both. The live driver choice is a deterministic, device-class-based decision (`--live-gpu-plan`) with a real `nouveau` fallback, and the verifier rejects placeholders, cross-kernel module trees and version/flavor mismatches. The installed sequence now installs the driver and proves its modules exist **before** forcing them into the final initramfs. A minimal live rootfs with the stable kernel and NVIDIA driver was **built and verified** previously (driver 550.163.01, kernel 6.12.107+deb13-amd64, modules `nvidia-current*`). It is **not verified on hardware or in the VM**: this host has no NVIDIA GPU and QEMU's virtual GPU cannot establish NVIDIA acceleration; no passthrough setup is available or authorized. The full desktop ISO was not assembled here (the host has ~12 GiB free; the build wants more) and the live/installed NVIDIA boot gates are unrun. See `docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md` for the exact unblock commands. The live kernel is pinned to Debian stable (trixie 6.12 LTS) because testing's kernel (7.2) breaks Debian's 550 driver; the bundled branch covers Maxwell through Hopper, and Blackwell (or a failed accelerated load) falls back to nouveau on the live medium. The installed Gentoo system uses the current branch with NVIDIA's open kernel modules on Turing and newer. - **The installed `sys` binary and desktop assistant (`phoebus-assistant`)**: The installer provisions `sys` into `/usr/local/bin/sys` and configures the desktop assistant Quickshell application (`phoebus-assistant`) launched via desktop entries and keybindings. On the installed system, all 38 acceptance test cases in `installer/tests/vm/sys-acceptance.sh` pass cleanly (`PASS=38 FAIL=0`), verifying the unified AI-first CLI/GUI interface, deterministic `--legacy` mode, the package catalogue (search/inventory/information/update-check), fail-closed source requirements, audited `--broker`/`--legacy` gates, proactive system monitors, and offline fallback guidance. The matrix was re-run on 2026-09-26 against the refactored static `sys` (`70f0a72b…`, fetched to `/tmp/sys` on a disposable overlay of the pristine installed image, non-root user, no mutations): guest `PASS=38 FAIL=0`, driver `PASS=41 FAIL=0` (`serial-boot-20260926T014746Z-3089a820`). - **Authenticated boot (UKI / UEFI Secure Boot) is not implemented and is an open security limitation.** The installed boot path is plain unsigned BLS (systemd-boot + dracut; the dracut UKI generator did not embed the kernel command line, so BLS is used and verified). `kernel.uki = true` and `kernel.secureboot = true` are rejected at configuration validation, and the install-plan preview always reports the real BLS path, so no interface can imply these modes are active. A future Secure Boot/UKI implementation is a separate opt-in milestone (signed artifacts, key lifecycle, update/rollback handling, disposable-VM boot tests with Secure Boot enabled); it must not be enabled or advertised until that complete path passes. - **Rollback (`sys undo`) is VM-verified** (`serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386`, PASS=11 FAIL=0, exit 0, no secret leak in either transcript). The gate runs on a fresh disposable overlay of the installed image: a known-good package-database fingerprint and `/home` marker, `sys snapshot --legacy`, a controlled reversible `app-misc/hello` install `--legacy --portage` (the fingerprint is asserted changed, so the run cannot pass vacuously), `sys undo --legacy`, power off, then a detached reboot that asserts the package database restored, the root break marker absent, `/home` surviving, systemd running, kernel modules present, the snapshot-based recovery entry present, and rollback status recorded. Both transcripts are kept (`serial-phase1.log`, `serial.log`). Correction: the 2026-09-25 claim of a passing rollback had no run transcript and did not reproduce — the committed harness then ran the guest unprivileged, used the pre-installed `nano` as the break, restored "newest" instead of its own snapshot, and never asserted the root marker was gone. Those harness defects are fixed in this session (sudo authentication with unique end markers, explicit `--legacy`, verified break, targeted undo, marker-absent assertion) and the gate above is the evidence. Booting the recovery entry itself offline (no network, no model) remains a manual, un-automated gate: select "Phoebus Recovery (known-good snapshot)" in the systemd-boot menu. - **Mango + DankMaterialShell** is the canonical Phoebus desktop (`desktop.profile = "mango"`, Flatpak on). It is implemented with Mango 0.17.2, DMS (pinned release), Quickshell 0.3.1 and scenefx 0.5 from the GURU overlay and scoped `~amd64` keywords. Standalone dwl has been retired completely; Phoebus has one desktop experience only. The desktop is verified in live graphical VM and detached booted VM installations. - **The live desktop ISO** (`installer/live/build.sh`) builds a Debian testing rootfs with Mango + DMS, live-only autologin, a branded welcome window and a graphical installer frontend over the typed bridge. Its desktop-payload guards are unit-tested. The rebuilt ISO (`sha256 0c386a1b…`, 1.6 GiB, build id in `/etc/phoebus/build`) was booted in a graphical, seat-providing VM. The `gui` journey passed **28/28** checks (welcome autostart, launcher from the keyboard, duplicate prevention, the live medium protected, keyboard suggestion selection, the network and AI steps, the AI gate refused without a model and reported inline, no bridge errors) and the `opencode` journey passed **18/18** (real model response, validated proposal, and editing the model invalidating the validated state). The `gui-install` journey passed every assertion on a fresh 30 GiB qcow2 — OpenCode connect/review/accept, disk, account, ERASE and confirmation — and the backend then reported real stages with elapsed time and no fabricated percentage. The **completed** install succeeded through all 12 stages, compiled all 174 packages of the Mango desktop profile, and confirmed completion (`gui-install-completes` passed). The installed system then booted **with the ISO detached** (LUKS2 decrypt, systemd running, 0 failed units, all Btrfs subvolumes mounted, `sys` CLI operational, and `tuigreet` greeter active). The **installed** Mango session (graphical user login into DMS) remains to be verified under a physical seat / DRM compositor backend. - **AI sandbox** is implemented (`systemd-run` hardening properties, tested at the argv level) and fails closed without `systemd-run`; it has not been exercised in a VM. Only typed actions and the privacy boundary were previously enforced. - **Release automation** now has executable gates, a report, atomic publish and signing command helpers, but no gate has been executed by a configured CI runner. `gates --execute` runs each gate's real command in its own process (exit 0 → Passed, nonzero → Failed, missing harness/firmware/seat/ credential → NotRun) and never manufactures a pass. A local run (2026-09-26) exercised manifest generation (2 artifacts), verification, tampered-artifact refusal, and publish refusal against a NotRun gate report; `gates --execute` on an unconfigured host reports 0 passed / 0 failed / 6 NotRun with the exact missing prerequisite per gate (OVMF_CODE/OVMF_VARS unset, no model credential). No release was published and `latest.iso` untouched. Minimal repeatable setup: register a Forgejo Actions runner (`act_runner`) so `.forgejo/workflows/ci.yml` executes the gates. - The desktop transaction compiles heavily because desktop USE does not match the signed binhost (~26 min for the desktop set on 8 vCPUs in the test VM). The official Gentoo binhost is OpenRC/hardened, so a systemd system can only reuse binaries for packages whose USE matches; the policy still requests signed binaries where it can. Publishing a matching binhost is future work. - **Live AI provider calls are not verified.** DeepSeek/OpenAI requests are built and reviewed by fixtures (`phoebus-ai::provider::TestTransport`) and the curl transport is covered by a recording runner; no call was made with a real key. - The installer rebuilds `sys-apps/systemd` from source because boot/policykit/cryptsetup USE differ from the binhost. - `sys undo` is implemented with the default-subvolume, fstab, kernel-cmdline and BLS handling described in ADR 0007; its destructive VM acceptance gate passed in this session (`serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386`). - **Stage3 signed-DIGESTS mechanism (host-level, not VM evidence).** The parser fixture matches the real current DIGESTS byte-for-byte, and the real DIGESTS for `stage3-amd64-systemd-20260920T170055Z.tar.xz` verifies with a Good signature from Gentoo's Automated Weekly Release Key at host level. The full VM proof (rebuilt live ISO carrying the provisioned key, default unpinned install, tampered signature/digest/archive refusal) still needs a disposable install run and is recorded as blocked in `docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`.