phoebus_os/docs/STATUS.md
Phoebus fcdb70bb5e
Some checks are pending
ci / test (push) Waiting to run
fix(assistant): keep disabled Send label readable
2026-10-03 15:16:52 -07:00

799 lines
70 KiB
Markdown
Raw Blame History

This file contains ambiguous Unicode characters

This file contains Unicode characters that might be confused with other characters. If you think that this is intentional, you can safely ignore this warning. Use the Escape button to reveal them.

# Status
Truthful implementation/verification matrix. Vocabulary:
- **Implemented** — code exists.
- **Unit tested** — covered by automated tests that run on any host.
- **VM verified** — exercised in the disposable QEMU/OVMF VM.
- **Hardware verified** — exercised on real hardware.
- **Not verified** — do not claim it works.
## Proven baseline (do not regress)
A complete installation in a disposable UEFI VM, booted with the ISO detached:
```
QEMU + OVMF (UEFI)
30 GiB qcow2, virtio-blk (/dev/vda); live ISO at /dev/sr0
GPT: 1 GiB FAT32 ESP + LUKS2 remainder
Btrfs: @ @home @var @snapshots @swap
Gentoo systemd stage3 (default/linux/amd64/23.0/systemd)
systemd-boot + BLS entry + dracut initramfs
LUKS2 passphrase unlock at boot
systemd PID 1, login, networking
systemctl is-system-running = running; 0 failed units
```
Boot timing (Rust installer): 1.378 s kernel + 5.238 s initrd + 4.114 s
userspace = 10.730 s.
The committed VM harness (`installer/tests/vm/serial-driver.py` +
`install.sh`) drives the **static Rust binary**; the Bash installer is no longer
on the install path (Bash migration Phase 2, see
`docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`).
A second harness (`installer/tests/vm/appliance-driver.py` +
`appliance-guest.sh`) drives the Debian-Live appliance ISO. On 2026-09-21 it
produced `INSTALL-RC=0`, `NO_SECRET_LEAK`, and a detached boot
(`systemd`, running, 0 failed units) whose Btrfs history contains the installer's
coordinated `@` + `@var` **initial known-good** snapshot and a snapshot-based
recovery boot entry (see `docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`). `sys undo` is
VM-verified by the rollback acceptance gate
(`serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386`, PASS=11 FAIL=0): snapshot →
`app-misc/hello` install (package DB changed) → `sys undo <id>` → detached
reboot with the package DB restored, the root break marker gone, `/home`
preserved, systemd running, and the snapshot-based recovery entry present.
The snapshot recovery entry was later selected and booted offline in a
disposable VM; `serial-driver.py recovery` now automates the same check.
## Matrix
Assistant Send button (2026-10-03): the shared button component now renders
disabled controls with a visible label and outline. The running disposable VM
showed Send beside Clear History while the prompt was empty; the control
remained disabled. This is a user-local QML preview, not a rebuilt ISO.
External overlay registration (2026-10-03): `sys overlay review` now performs
bounded GPO and Gentoo registry lookups, clones candidate Git repositories into
temporary review directories, and reports exact revisions, ebuild SHA-256,
keywords and Manifest presence. `sys overlay enable` stages a digest-bound
plan; the broker rechecks the live source and refuses drift before adding the
repository. The policy masks all other overlay packages and scopes any
`~amd64` allowance to the selected atom. Assistant GPO links now display
selectable options. **Implemented, unit tested, and reviewed in the disposable
VM through the non-mutating CLI and graphical selection/plan path. Privileged
repository registration remains unverified.** In the VM, the read-only CLI and
Assistant found gentoo-zh, nest and ruizhi-overlay for
`app-misc/chatgpt-desktop`, all registry-listed as experimental/unofficial;
gentoo-zh offered `26.930.31730` at commit `9232e69f…`. The Assistant displayed
the three choices, staged a ruizhi-overlay plan with distinct details, and
canceled it. No overlay or package was enabled on the host or VM. The first VM
lookup hit a three-second connection timeout; retry succeeded. The guest used
a user-local `sys` binary and a test-only Assistant bridge path override;
the system-installed binary has not been replaced.
GPO package links and read-only Assistant results (2026-10-03): a GPO URL
now triggers an exact Portage resolution check and a bounded external GPO
lookup. If the atom is only an external lead, the Assistant explains that a
repository must be reviewed, registered and synced before installation;
it creates no install plan. Final AI plans with only read-only actions execute
those checks as information instead of showing `Approve & Execute`. Unit
tests cover both boundaries. The running VM's `sys search chatgpt-desktop
--legacy --overlays --portage` showed the external
`app-misc/chatgpt-desktop` lead and no configured Portage match
(`/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/chatgpt-overlay-search.png`); `eselect repository
list -i` reported that the repository module is absent. An overlay and this
package have not been installed in the VM. The updated user-local static `sys`
is SHA-256 `7ee56b9bdce504b4cfd4c6ada58ba8ce3b93ecd906edbc5a26e298c7d0bb1448`.
After restarting the Assistant, the exact link returned an Information card
with the overlay explanation and no approval button
(`/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/gpo-assistant-result.png`). Rust format, strict clippy,
workspace tests, `make check`, and dynamic/static release builds pass. A
fresh ISO remains unverified; `make doctor` reports 8 GiB free against its
20 GiB VM gate.
Assistant plan details (2026-10-03): the GUI review panel displays candidate
identity and reported version, source-health status and evidence, planned
actions, effects, rationale, alternatives, post-execution verification, and
digest instead of repeating the summary. The bridge supplies structured
health and readable action/alternative descriptions. A prepared plan now
describes artifact verification as an installation-time check, not as already
complete. Rust format, strict clippy, workspace tests, `make check`, and
dynamic/static release builds pass. The running VM staged a Firefox Flatpak
plan and scrolled the expanded card to its digest
(`/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/details-scrolled.png`); no package was installed. The
VM user's `~/.local/bin/sys` is SHA-256
`1d356c8e2b8c1bcdbaf6b59bb329ce2df283e32d07c8d2393b88f699b3581df8`.
The root-owned binary and fresh ISO remain older until a new image is built;
`make doctor` reports 8 GiB free against the 20 GiB VM gate.
Package source review coverage correction (2026-10-03): AI install proposals
from every lane now require `inspect_candidate`, including Portage source and
binary candidates that may encapsulate vendor software. The broker uses fresh
candidate inspection for the reviewed plan and revalidates it before execution;
direct typed Flatpak installs also reject an unverified remote. Portage
repository origin, binhost policy, Nix registry revision and independent
upstream advisory status are not proven by this check and are explicitly
described as unknown. Unit tests cover Portage inspection and direct Flatpak
remote rejection. Rust format, strict clippy, workspace tests, `make check`,
and dynamic/static release builds pass. The running VM's read-only inspection
of `app-editors/vim` returned `review_required` and the explicit unknown
repository origin (`/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/all-source-portage.png`). The updated
static binary was installed in the VM user's `~/.local/bin/sys` (SHA-256
`d687107f68d5559b13eafd75c2de4977759a7240e91768aa0c85436b38753a29`)
and the Assistant reconnected. No package was installed. A fresh VM install
under this correction remains unverified; `make doctor` reports 8 GiB free
against its 20 GiB VM gate.
Third-party source health review (2026-10-03): `inspect_candidate` now returns
structured `health` evidence. AI install proposals from Portage vendor, Nix,
Flatpak, Snap, AppImage and custom ebuild lanes require that exact inspection;
the deterministic resolver still confirms candidates. Flatpak plans check the
selected `flathub` remote's HTTPS URL and GPG setting, show the source health
limits, and revalidate the remote, version and verification status before
execution. A disabled GPG setting aborts both planning and execution. General
assistant plans refuse direct package install actions that would bypass the
dedicated workflow. Rust format, strict clippy, workspace tests, `make check`,
and dynamic/static release builds pass. The running VM's read-only inspection
of `org.mozilla.firefox` reported `flathub` at
`https://dl.flathub.org/repo/`, version `157.0`, and `review_required`
(`/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/source-health-inspect2.png`). The static binary was
installed in the VM user's `~/.local/bin/sys` (SHA-256
`3cbbe7aaf25bf4659abc1d5dc3e2772e738ffffc6a324e4a666ef0c5752dd941`)
and the Assistant was restarted connected. No package was installed; an
actual Flatpak install under this review has not yet been VM verified. A new
ISO remains gated by `make doctor` finding 8 GiB free versus 20 GiB required.
Upstream compromise and release age cannot be established from local package
metadata alone.
General Assistant search bounds (2026-10-03): an oversized model investigation
is validated in full and only its first six read-only requests are executed;
the model receives the evidence and a clear note about the skipped checks.
Unit tests cover the cap and a mutating seventh request. In the running VM,
the exact `can you find a package for balena etcher for me` request returned a
package search summary with an AppImage catalog lead, instead of the previous
`max 6` error (`/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/etcher-search-new2.png`). That run also
showed an approval button for a no-action answer; the bridge now returns an
information card for such answers and does not stage an empty plan. The final
user-local static binary was installed in the VM (SHA-256
`6c7226433af167377d2002e2aba9682914e99691c501c61bb2c04681b4e586ee`).
The exact question then returned an Information card with visible read-only
checks and no approval button (`/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/final-question-progress.png`).
The root-owned installed binary remains older until a fresh ISO/install.
Assistant display and unavailable plan (2026-10-03): QML progress updates
modify only the current card's fixed-height activity list; the conversation
model is not replaced for every phase. The Mango Assistant window stays opaque
and does not animate when focus changes. The running VM showed the Assistant
opaque with Kitty focused (`/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/no-fade-terminal-after.png`)
and retained two completed activity phases in a read-only AppImage reply
(`/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/activity-fixed-test.png`). A typed `unavailable` model
step is accepted only after read-only candidate discovery; no proposal or
execution follows it. Bounded investigation exhaustion becomes a read-only
information result with catalog guidance. Unit tests cover the typed result,
bridge response without approval controls, and preserving a user's existing
Mango visual rule. Rust format, strict clippy, workspace tests, and dynamic
and static release builds pass. The exact Etcher VM request returned read-only
AppImage catalog guidance after lane checks, with no approval control or
package change (`/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/etcher-new-progress.png`). The VM
user-local `sys` binary is SHA-256
`f29def8d9d4169f3ffd36c71c3c26781091f6bf0ef2ae518f9881585dd921139`;
the root-owned installed binary remains older until a fresh install.
Assistant activity stream (2026-10-03): `sys --assistant-bridge` emits redacted
progress JSON lines before its final response, keyed by the same ID. The GUI
keeps those lines visible on the corresponding conversation or approval card.
System facts, each model call, read-only investigations, and approved execution
report phases. A malformed install-model JSON reply or typed investigation
gets up to two bounded retries; repeated malformed replies fail closed. Rust unit and
CLI protocol tests cover the retry and event ordering. The startup handshake uses quick proactive
checks; full update discovery runs when the Alerts or Updates view opens.
The running disposable VM displayed model waits and read-only candidate checks
for `i want to install balena etcher` while pending
(`/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/assistant-activity-model-wait.png`). An AppImage catalog
request retained its completed `sys` activity in the card
(`/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/assistant-activity-verified.png`). The first natural
Etcher run failed closed because the model omitted a required `action` field.
With one retry, the model then submitted an invalid application name. The final
two-correction build was installed in the VM and checked the exact natural
request again; the model checked candidates but exhausted eight turns without
a valid proposal. No installation was approved or executed. The failure card
and activity are captured in `/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/two-retry-scrolled.png`.
The GUI now gives a plain explanation for this bounded failure. The
scratchpad now focuses its prompt on opening in the running VM
(`/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/prompt-focus-test.png`).
AppImage catalog discovery (2026-10-03): `sys search <term> --legacy
--appimage` searches managed images and the AppImage community feed on the
running system. Remote matches are `catalog lead` entries with a catalog page
and cannot become install candidates without an independently pinned artifact
URL and SHA-256. The feed parser, offline failure, bounded curl call, and
rendering have unit tests. An explicit AppImage install request now returns
catalog information and the pinning requirement, with no model plan or
installation; the bridge path is unit-tested for the user's exact
`balenaEtcher with appimage` phrase. The model receives any explicit backend
constraint, and oversized investigation batches get a bounded correction.
The release/static binaries were built, and the running VM's user-local `sys`
displayed seven Firefox leads in 0.9 seconds
(`/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/appimage-search-vm.png`), then matched `balenaEtcher`
to `Etcher` (`/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/appimage-etcher-vm.png`). A VM terminal
install request returned catalog guidance without an install plan
(`/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/appimage-install-guidance.png`). The assistant window
was restarted and reconnected to the updated user-local bridge. The
root-owned `/usr/local/bin/sys` remains older until a fresh install; no
AppImage was installed.
Assistant request feedback (2026-10-03): a connected assistant in the
disposable VM accepted "i want to install chatgpt desktop" at 12:34 and
returned a reviewed plan at about 12:41, without installing. During the wait
the old GUI displayed no working card and showed "Ready". Source now routes
natural, multi-word install requests to the reviewed install planner and
renders a pending card with elapsed time until a result or error arrives.
The parser regression and full Rust gates pass. The running VM now uses the
new QML and a user-local static `sys` bridge; an exact-wording request shows
the working card and timer immediately, with no approval buttons (screenshot:
`/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/assistant-exact-pending.png`). The install path later
returned an invalid-model-JSON error without preparing or executing a plan;
the root-owned system binary remains older until a fresh install. The final
user-local QML and static bridge restarted to a connected assistant. Host
format, clippy, Rust tests, release/static builds and `make test` pass.
External overlay discovery (2026-10-02): local Portage search now labels its
scope as configured repositories. `sys search <term> --legacy --overlays`
adds a bounded, opt-in read-only lookup of GPO and labels its results as
unverified external leads. No repository is enabled or package installed by
search. Parser, offline failure, CLI guard, and live GPO lookup checks pass;
the live query found `app-misc/chatgpt-desktop` for `chatgpt`. The updated
static binary was installed as the running VM user's `~/.local/bin/sys` and
`sys search chatgpt desktop --legacy --overlays --portage` displayed the
external lead after an empty configured-Portage result. No overlay or package
was installed.
Natural install lane parsing (2026-10-02): `sys` recognizes trailing
`through/via/using/with <lane>` as a backend constraint. A model failure for a
descriptive package name searches the chosen lane and offers an exact
catalogue-backed command when possible; it never executes that command as a
fallback. Unit and CLI regression tests plus the full host check pass. In the
running disposable VM, the new static binary parsed `chatgpt desktop through
nix`, the connected OpenCode model returned invalid JSON, and the Nix
catalogue search found `chatgpt` with a desktop description. The revised
fallback suggested `sys install chatgpt --legacy --nix` without installing.
A second VM run produced a valid Nix install plan for candidate `chatgpt` but
did not install because the unprivileged command requires root. The updated
static binary is installed at `~/.local/bin/sys` and is first on the
interactive zsh PATH; the root-owned `/usr/local/bin/sys` remains older.
Phoebus Updates entry point (2026-10-02): the installed and live desktops
provide a dedicated launcher and Super+U shortcut that open the Assistant's
Updates view without needing a connected model. Review & Apply launches
`sudo sys apply updates --legacy` in Kitty, retaining the existing typed
approval, snapshots and visible package output. DMS remains the Portage
package supplied by GURU and is included in normal Gentoo updates. The DMS
updater widget is absent from the default bar; custom user bar layouts are
preserved. The installed desktop entry has a provisioning test, and the
launcher script, desktop entry and Rust suite have host checks. A fresh
graphical ISO/install is not VM verified because `make doctor` reports 10 GiB
free versus the 20 GiB VM gate. The running disposable VM has a user-local
copy of the launcher, Assistant QML and Mango binding/window rule; Super+U
opened Phoebus Updates as a 900×650 floating view and listed 20 Portage
updates. The VM's root-owned installed assets were not replaced.
Frame and launcher defaults (2026-10-02): the session now seeds DMS 1.6.2's
`frameEnabled=true`, `launcherLogoMode=os`, and `dockLauncherLogoMode=os` only
when `settings.json` does not yet exist. DMS's sparse settings format makes
missing keys in existing files ambiguous; those files retain their layout and
logo values. Functional session tests cover the first login and preservation
of both explicit and omitted values. `make check`, release/static builds and
ShellCheck pass. The existing disposable VM already shows Frame selected and
the OS launcher icon. A fresh ISO/install with the new seed remains unverified
because the host has 10 GiB free against the 20 GiB VM gate.
Theme color default (2026-10-02): the Mango session seeds DMS 1.6.2's
`currentThemeName` and `currentThemeCategory` as `dynamic` before DMS starts,
when the aurora wallpaper is present and no theme choice exists. This is the
Theme Color → Auto option. Existing theme choices are retained. Functional
session tests cover first use, a missing theme field beside another setting,
and preservation of a chosen theme. `make check`, release/static builds and
ShellCheck pass. The running disposable VM already displays Auto selected with
the aurora wallpaper; this is visual evidence of the option, not of the new
first-login seed. A fresh ISO/install with this default has not been VM-verified
because the host has 10 GiB free against the 20 GiB VM gate.
First-login appearance (2026-10-02): the existing disposable VM shows the
bundled `aurora-lagoon.jpg` and a first-letter profile avatar. The session
launcher now seeds DMS's wallpaper path and wallpaper browser directory only
when unset; the installer creates the installation user's avatar before first
login, and the session creates one for later users without a `~/.face`.
Functional session and provisioning tests pass, including preservation of
custom wallpaper, folder and avatar choices. An existing empty DMS state was
also filled without changing another setting. The running VM has the new
session launcher; `make check`, release/static builds and ShellCheck passed.
A fresh ISO/install with these defaults is not verified because the host has
10 GiB free against the 20 GiB VM gate.
Desktop cursor and sizing follow-up (2026-10-02): the default Mango config
now sources DMS's managed cursor fragment, and the session creates it before
Mango starts. Existing profiles gain the include once without overwriting
their other settings. DMS's `resolve-include` returned `exists=true` and
`included=true` for a clean profile in the disposable VM. The Settings rule
uses 65% of the active output width and 80% of its height, retaining maximize
support. In the running VM it opened at approximately 1092×840 on 1680×1050
and 832×614 on 1280×768; the VM was restored to 1680×1050. A fresh image
install with these defaults is not verified because the host has 10 GiB free
against the 20 GiB VM gate. The emitted session migration passed a temporary
home check (add once, idempotent, respects later removal); `make check`,
release/static builds and ShellCheck passed. The running VM's packaged config
and session launcher now carry the change.
Desktop control audit (2026-10-01): in the existing disposable QEMU desktop,
the top-bar launcher, Super+Space and Super+P launcher shortcuts, clipboard,
process/CPU/memory panels, notifications, power profile, control center and
clock opened. DMS Welcome advanced through
its system check, plugins and final page; its new shortcut and Phoebus
Welcome button reopened it. DMS Settings rendered wallpaper, theme, text,
time, sounds, Mango layout, bar setup/widgets/workspaces, notifications,
dock/launcher, keybinds, display/gamma, network, default apps, audio, locale,
clipboard, users, lock/power, plugins and About. The bar Widgets page took
several seconds to populate but did finish. Settings' theme mode, wallpaper
cycle and fit mode, search, and maximize/restore controls were changed and
restored in the disposable VM. Mango's default
`ignore_maximize=1` had made the Settings expand button inert; the Settings
window rule now sets `ignore_maximize:0` and both sizes were verified visually.
The Assistant's floating window, all five tabs, Super+A show/hide, and Escape
hide were exercised. Phoebus Welcome opened Help, DMS Welcome and Assistant,
closed and reopened; Help
loaded from its local HTML file with Super+F1. The live Welcome QML was also
loaded in the installed VM for safe control testing: Network, display chooser
and DMS display settings, text settings, Power/Cancel, advanced terminal,
system/installer logs and disk information opened. Restart, shut down and
the live-only installer launch were inspected in code but not activated on
this installed VM. Individual DMS setting mutations and every plugin were not
exhaustively exercised. A fresh ISO/install with these assets remains
unverified because the host has under 20 GiB free. The live package manifest
now includes Firefox ESR and `xdg-utils` so the new Help button has a browser;
that live-specific path still awaits a fresh ISO boot. The Rust formatting,
Clippy, workspace test, release build and static live installer build gates
passed; the live build script and generated desktop scripts passed ShellCheck (with
the intentional nested-shell quoting diagnostic excluded). Desktop entry
validation passed.
Desktop wallpapers: four generated JPEG choices are bundled into the installer
and seeded into the installation user's `Pictures/Wallpapers` folder and
`/etc/skel` without replacing existing images. The live ISO build copies the
same files into its user's folder. Asset provisioning and preservation are
unit-tested. All four images were copied into the running disposable QEMU
playground and their SHA-256 hashes matched the repository files. A fresh
ISO/install with these assets has not been run.
Virtual-machine integration: QEMU/KVM, VMware and VirtualBox detection,
hypervisor-specific guest packages, Mesa video targets, system services and
Mango display helpers are implemented and unit-tested. The current visible
QEMU VM booted with `virtio-vga-gl`, logged in, and reported `+virgl`; the
`wlr-randr` package was installed and inspected there. On this host the GL
viewer scaled the guest image incorrectly and offset clicks; the 2D VM path
aligned the visible image and pointer. Guest resolution did not follow GTK
window resize in the VirGL run.
VMware and VirtualBox integration is Portage-previewed but **not VM verified**.
See `docs/VIRTUAL-MACHINES.md`.
Desktop usability (2026-10-01): Mango's default DMS Settings rule now opens a
900×700 window; a 2D QEMU playground verified this size and a correctly aligned
click on its close icon. The GTK and SDL VirGL viewers on this host shrank the
rendered image and offset pointer clicks, so the interactive VM launcher now
defaults to unscaled 2D plus a USB tablet. VirGL remains an explicit option.
A fresh install with these defaults is not yet verified.
| Area | Implemented | Unit tested | VM verified | Hardware verified |
|------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------------|
| Config (TOML + legacy), validation | yes | yes | yes | n/a |
| Hardware/disk discovery, protection | yes | yes | yes | no |
| Install plan + destructive preview | yes | yes | yes | n/a |
| Destructive authorization (ERASE) | yes | yes | yes | n/a |
| GPT partitioning + ESP | yes | yes | yes | no |
| LUKS2 format/open/close | yes | yes | yes | no |
| Btrfs subvolumes + swapfile | yes | yes | yes | no |
| fstab / crypttab generation | yes | yes | yes | no |
| stage3 fetch + verify (pinned SHA-256 or signed DIGESTS) + extract | yes | yes (both paths; every failure branch incl. missing verifier/key/DIGESTS/entry, nonzero exit, cannot-start) | yes (pinned path; **unpinned path now VM-verified**: default unpinned install from the rebuilt 20260926 ISO completed 12 stages + detached boot; placeholder-pin and archive-hash-mismatch refusals VM-verified on disposable targets with the fail-closed binary) | n/a |
| stage3 trust anchor (fixed provisioned key) | yes | yes (`release_key_path` ignores `PHOEBUS_GENTOO_RELEASE_KEY`; test-only injection only via explicit `verify_digests_with_key`) | yes (20260926 live ISO carries the fingerprint-checked key — both Gentoo fingerprints verified inside the shipped squashfs; the unpinned VM install verified the real signed DIGESTS + archive hash against it; tampered inputs refused) | n/a |
| Portage config + sync + getuto | yes | yes | yes | n/a |
| Signed Gentoo binary install | yes | yes | yes | n/a |
| Source package compilation | yes | yes | yes | n/a |
| Kernel install + dracut initramfs | yes | yes | yes | no |
| systemd-boot + BLS | yes | yes | yes | no |
| Boot default pins the real kernel (not recovery) | yes | yes | yes | no |
| Recovery BLS entry (rescue.target) | yes | yes | boots (not default) | no |
| Users, passwords, sudo | yes | yes | yes | n/a |
| Polkit administrator identity for wheel | yes | yes (rule contents and permissions) | visible disposable VM overlay: user password accepted by graphical `pkexec /usr/bin/id -u`, returned `0`; installer build with rule not yet ISO-tested | no |
| Locale/timezone/keymap/services | yes | yes | yes | n/a |
| Rust VM boot parity | yes | yes | yes | no |
| Rust TUI | yes | yes | smoke test | no |
| Typed GUI bridge (`--gui-bridge`) | yes | yes (dry-run) | live VM + full journey | n/a |
| Graphical welcome + install wizard (Quickshell) | yes | yes | candidate ISO UEFI graphical gate `gui-gui-20261001T093944Z-0b2eeb6a` PASS=32 (welcome launcher, duplicate guard, locale keyboard filtering, AI requirement) | no |
| Phoebus brand system (SVG + tokens) | yes | yes | live VM | n/a |
| Desktop profile (Mango + DarkMaterial) | yes | yes | live VM + installed | no |
| Desktop session script (socket wait, polkit, cleanup) | yes | yes | functional test (stubs) | no |
| PipeWire/WirePlumber | yes | yes (global user units enabled) | installed graphical seat: audio services active; headless `wpctl` | no |
| Flatpak + flathub | yes | no | installed + remote | no |
| Fast-default Flatpaks (Calibre/GIMP/Flatseal, system-wide, target-only) | yes | yes (install/verify/provisioning; fail-closed on missing app) | yes (installed in target root, verified in `/var/lib/flatpak/app/` and `/var/lib/phoebus/flatpaks-installed`) | no |
| Fast `-bin` defaults (firefox-bin/libreoffice-bin/thunderbird-bin, fail-closed) | yes | yes (atoms, policy, binary-capability refusal) | yes (installed identities verified in Gentoo VDB on detached boot) | no |
| Single generic kernel default (no second generic kernel) | yes | yes (guard + tuned path keeps the fallback) | yes (existing boot path unchanged) | no |
| User-initiated source builds (`convert_to_source`) | yes | yes (table incl. thunderbird, review, build-before-remove, Brave/unknown refusals) | no (no conversion journey run in a VM) | no |
| Tuned-kernel build (`build_tuned_kernel`, separate BLS, fallback kept) | yes | yes (refusal without fallback, entry creation, default never blind-switched) | no (same long build; VM attempt recorded under the balanced row) | no |
| Balanced source kernel (`build_balanced_kernel`, broad hardware, bin fallback) | yes | yes (plan/fragment/review, refusal without fallback, separate `phoebus-balanced.conf`, default untouched; two VM-found bugs fixed: exact VDB match, `loader/entries` path) | **started, not completed** (disposable VM 2026-09-29: full distribution-config kernel build exceeded 3 h with 10 jobs, `RC=124`, no system change; needs a multi-hour window) | no |
| Installed first-login welcome (once per user, reopenable, non-blocking) | yes | yes (assets, explicit Mango session launch, QML actions, DMS seed) | fresh candidate installed desktop 30/30; screenshot inspected, Escape creates seen marker | no |
| Install metrics (time, download, peak disk, installed size) | yes | yes (report rendering; orchestration hooks) | yes (Run 13 recorded 588 compile times into target metrics) | no |
| XWayland / polkit agent / kitty / wofi | yes | no | polkit agent and kitty launched in visible VM; XWayland and wofi not separately verified | no |
| Package policy + measured history | yes | yes | yes (326 entries) | no |
| Background update preparation | yes | yes | yes (fetch; buildpkgonly skipped) | no |
| Btrfs snapshots + history | yes | yes | yes | no |
| Coordinated snapshot sets (`@` + `@var` for high-risk package actions) | yes | yes | yes (2026-10-01 final `sys`: Flatpak, Snap and AppImage package mutations each reported a protective snapshot; detached AppImage rollback `serial-rollback-20261001T171752Z-b9f8d068` restored the root and app state, PASS=11) | no |
| Inter-process mutation lock (`SystemLock` + dead-PID recovery) | yes | yes | no | no |
| Atomic durable transaction log (`transactions.toml`) | yes | yes | read-only in installed VM; write path needs root | no |
| System health overview (`sys status` / `SystemStatus`) | yes | yes | no | no |
| Automatic Boot Assessment BLS counting (upstream `systemd-bless-boot`) | yes | yes | fresh candidate counted detached boot 5/5 and automatic fallback 9/9 | no |
| Btrfs rollback (`sys undo`) | yes | yes | yes (rollback acceptance `serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386` PASS=11 FAIL=0) | no |
| Recovery/known-good BLS entry | yes | yes | yes: entry present + snapshot-based (rollback runs) **and the recovery entry itself was booted** (`Phoebus Recovery (known-good snapshot)` selected in the systemd-boot menu with restricted networking and no model: cmdline + findmnt prove root is the read-only `@-20260926T064646-initial-known-good` snapshot with `rescue.target`, serial login works, `sys history/rollback status --legacy` work, `sys ask` fails truthfully with the `--legacy` fallback) | no |
| Snapshot retention + free-space gate | yes | yes | no | no |
| AI typed proposals + evidence review | yes | yes | fixture end-to-end | n/a |
| AI guided install (DeepSeek/OpenAI) | yes | yes | real OpenCode `opencode-go/deepseek-v4.1-flash` guided proposal in live candidate VM 18/18, four changes applied | n/a |
| AI privacy boundary (facts only) | yes | yes (every string field scanned, incl. `cpu_features`; forbidden path in `cpu_features` refused) | no | n/a |
| Provider credential + endpoint boundary | yes | yes (unsafe key characters refused before curl config; userinfo endpoint refused; derived base64 token redacted) | no | n/a |
| AI typed-action schema (exact, incl. unit-variant extra keys) | yes | yes (plan/step/investigate actions via `validate_action_value`; smuggled extra key refused) | no | n/a |
| AI connected-model path over a real local stub | yes | yes (4 e2e cases: valid plan executes; request has no home path/credential; shell + smuggled key + malformed fail closed) | no (local stub, not a live model) | n/a |
| Live real-agent call (`opencode` backend) | yes | yes (`sys ask "list installed packages"` → valid plan + digest, exit 0; hostile shell/private-file instruction refused and downgraded; OpenCode tools disabled; no credential in the log) | yes — host direct (2026-09-28) and **from inside the installed VM through the loopback tunnel** (`serial-boot-20260929T102703Z-ffd1ec25`, `live-agent` + `live-agent-hostile-rejected`) with `opencode-go/deepseek-v4.1-flash` | n/a |
| Local model through the direct sandbox (VM) | yes | yes (real Qwen2.5-1.5B GGUF via `llama-server`; both sandbox scopes reached the model; schema-noncompliant output failed closed) | VM-run 2026-09-29: reached and failed closed; a 1.5B model is too weak for exact typed plans and its 4096-token context was exceeded by the correction turn — a capable model is required (a capable agent produces valid plans) | n/a |
| OpenCode transport parity (sandbox + network endpoint) | yes | yes (`CurlHttpClient::sandboxed` inlines the body under `PrivateTmp`; `--opencode-insecure-http` opt-in for remote plain http; endpoint-policy test) | yes (`serial-boot-20260929T114319Z-c43c2a92`: real host agent, OpenCode sandboxed by default, driver PASS=8) | n/a |
| Read-only host-root probes never block on a prompt | yes | yes (`CommandSpec::detached` runs host-root Flatpak in a new session via `setsid --wait`, no controlling terminal; field-preserving unit test) | yes (VM: real-agent `sys ask "search for firefox"` completed with zero auth prompts, `serial-boot-20260929T111941Z-2be30b89`) | n/a |
| Privilege derived only from the process identity | yes | yes (an environment variable cannot forge uid 0; the removed `PHOEBUS_ALLOW_UNPRIVILEGED_EXEC` regression test) | no | n/a |
| AI OS sandbox (systemd hardened unit) | yes | yes (argv + sandboxed-send; system properties for root, user-manager subset for non-root) | yes (`serial-boot-20260929T092147Z-6f88907a`: `AI_ROOT_RC=0` system sandbox, `AI_USER_RC=0` `--user` sandbox; previously the user path hung on a polkit `manage-units` prompt) | no |
| Unprivileged read-only AI plan completes | yes | yes (transaction recording best-effort for non-root; mandatory for privileged mutations) | yes (`serial-boot-20260929T092147Z-6f88907a`: `AI_NOSANDBOX_RC=0` as `phoebus`) | n/a |
| Installed assistant (`sys ask`) | yes | yes | yes (live call 2026-09-28: `sys ask "list installed packages"` via `--ai-backend opencode` to host `opencode serve` through a guest loopback tunnel, model `opencode-go/muse-spark-1.3-contributor`, valid Assistant Plan + approval digest, `AI_LIVE_RC=0`; the `show system status` phrasing elicits schema-noncompliant JSON from this model and is fail-closed rejected) | n/a |
| Resolved package effects + approval binding (carried through execution) | yes | yes (empty vs unestablished; drift + prior-step allowance) | no | n/a |
| Privileged approval ledger (replacement/replay/concurrency/interruption) | yes | yes (privileged entry point) | no | n/a |
| Canonical digest recomputed at the privileged boundary (all plan kinds) | yes | yes (adversarial: swapped action resealed, every kind) | no | n/a |
| Per-step effect binding into the approval digest (contents + aggregate) | yes | yes (adversarial: step_effects swap rejected; legit multi-step validates) | no | n/a |
| Stable approval identity (replay after presentation edit/reseal) | yes | yes (summary/other fields/identical id/concurrent/new-id) | no | n/a |
| Live-safe monotonic recovery (owner liveness, immutable terminal) | yes | yes (live vs abandoned, reconcile/finish race) | no | n/a |
| Personal preferences + alert state (user-owned, system-default precedence) | yes | yes (save/reload/isolation/precedence/failure) | yes (installed VM: saved to user config, exit 0) | no |
| Personal write ownership (elevated chown, symlink refusal, cross-uid refusal) | yes | yes (ownership-fixer seam + CLI refusal) | no | no |
| Personal preference does not need the root-owned system transaction log | yes | yes (CLI regression: read-only transaction dir) | yes (installed VM acceptance) | n/a |
| Installed `sys` acceptance matrix (read-only/failure) | yes | yes | yes (2026-10-01 final static `sys` on an installed VM `serial-boot-20261001T171419Z-1f7973dd`: `SUMMARY PASS=75 FAIL=0`, including search/list/info/updates for all six selectors, failure/refusal cases, and honest manual-lane reports; older root mutate gate PASS=42) | no |
| `sys` terminal progress and prose answers | yes | yes (progress/redaction/heartbeat/wrapping, human CLI vs broker; CR-delimited command output) | visible playground: live phases and real OpenCode answers; 2026-10-01 installed overlay `serial-boot-20261001T171118Z-024ef75c` PASS=22: Portage merge and Flatpak transaction output reached the human terminal; `serial-boot-20261001T165211Z-a1c34407` PASS=9: custom ebuild source build output visible; `serial-boot-20261001T165609Z-019f7bb4` showed the live snapd Portage build and Snap actions | no |
| `sys` adversarial input battery (injection/traversal/boundaries) | yes | yes (54-case `tests/sys_adversarial.rs`; five validation gaps fixed: file-path metacharacters + `..`, application-name traversal, ebuild `..` category (real overlay escape), Flatpak empty element, Nix option prefix) | no | no |
| Portage config readable for non-root queries (`normalize_config_permissions`) | yes | yes (modes + keyring exclusion) | yes (fresh VM install: 0755/0644 out of the box; non-root `search` returns 3 results, `updates` reports 10) | no |
| Privileged catalogue mutations (install/remove/depclean/cache/apply updates, alternate-root) | yes | yes (unit) | yes (fresh installed VM via root: 7/7 PASS) | no |
| Rollback acceptance (snapshot -> change -> `sys undo` -> detached verify) | yes | yes | yes (Portage 2026-09-29 PASS=11; AppImage with final `sys` on 2026-10-01 `serial-rollback-20261001T171752Z-b9f8d068` PASS=11: automatic snapshot, file changed then restored absent, root marker gone, `/home` survives, systemd running, recovery entry present) | no |
| Privileged `--broker` plan execution + replay rejection in a VM (pkexec path) | yes | yes (privileged entry point) | yes (non-root `pkexec` with a terminal polkit agent: cancelled auth, broker JSON success, replay rejected; required the shipped policy + wheel-admin rule) | n/a |
| Cache-cleanup preview is non-destructive (real `eclean`/`nix-store`) | yes | yes (preview uses `--pretend --deep` / `--print-dead`; sorted bound items) | yes (real `eclean`: upstream preview, cancelled approval, approved run, drift refusal, failed cleaner; user data preserved) | n/a |
| Reverse-dependency inspection includes installed targets | yes | yes (self-reference compares the dependent, not the target) | yes (real `sys-libs/glibc`, `sys-libs/zlib` dependents) | n/a |
| Transaction log (outcomes, protective snapshots) | yes | yes | read-only in installed VM; write path needs root | no |
| Flatpak/Nix bounded typed actions | yes | yes | yes (`serial-boot-20261001T171118Z-024ef75c` PASS=22: Flatpak remove/reinstall with visible transaction output and protective snapshot; `nixpkgs#hello` realisation, with exact source flags) | no |
| Shared hardware-aware source selection (all lanes) | yes | yes | no | no |
| Snap lane (detect/install/list/remove/refresh/connections) | yes (snapd and socket enabled by default on new Mango desktops; reviewed first-use setup for older/minimal installs) | yes (incl. exact revisions and confinement; default package/service assertions) | partial (2026-10-01 installed overlay `serial-boot-20261001T165609Z-019f7bb4` PASS=11: Portage built snapd with visible output, socket active, daemon confinement reported, `hello-world` installed/refreshed/removed through `sys`; `serial-boot-20261001T170948Z-37654456` PASS=12 re-ran with final `sys` and confirmed protective snapshot. Refresh had no newer Store revision. Earlier VM evidence includes partial confinement; connections and a revision-changing refresh remain unverified. The new desktop default still needs a fresh-install VM run) | no |
| AppImage lane (import/acquire/integrity/desktop/remove) | yes | yes | yes (older VM: pinned acquire, tampered-hash refusal; 2026-10-01 final `sys` on installed overlay `serial-boot-20261001T171118Z-024ef75c`: import, protective snapshot, normal-user list/launch from `/opt/phoebus/appimages`, pinned update and natural-command removal all passed) | no |
| Custom ebuild overlay (stage/approve/build/remove) | yes | yes (unmerge failure and unchanged VDB preserve staged recipe) | yes (2026-10-01 installed overlay `serial-boot-20261001T165211Z-a1c34407` PASS=9: staged exact digest, built/installed VDB+file, source output visible, unmerged and removed recipe) | no |
| `sys` installed into the target + verified in chroot | yes | yes (unit) | yes (detached boot verified) | no |
| AI-first install workflow (`sys install`, `sys ask`) | yes | yes | explicit-backend journey; AI-selected not run | no |
| Bounded AI investigation (typed read-only evidence) | yes | yes | read-only actions on a booted VM | no |
| Deterministic proposal validation (fabrication/stale/ambiguous/duplicate) | yes | yes | no | no |
| Explicit backend install flags (no fallback) | yes | yes | yes (Portage install + remove, history) | no |
| No-model unqualified install refuses and offers commands | yes | yes | yes (matrix case) | no |
| Install transaction begin/finish + verification | yes | yes | yes (install verified; durable across reboot) | no |
| Installed config loaded (`/etc/phoebus/install.toml`) | yes | no | install writes it; `sys` reads it on the installed system | no |
| `sys` consistent target-root execution | yes | yes | no | no |
| `sys` validation at the execution boundary | yes | yes | no | n/a |
| `sys ask` truthful failure (nonzero, stop, record) | yes | yes | no | n/a |
| Unified package search (`sys search`, all lanes, `--legacy`) | yes | yes (cross-lane; unavailable/failed/empty distinguished; source filter; AppImage catalog leads) | yes (`serial-boot-20261001T171419Z-1f7973dd`: all six selectors; 2026-10-03 running VM: AppImage feed returned seven Firefox leads) | no |
| Installed-package inventory (`sys list`, all lanes, `--legacy`) | yes | yes (VDB/Flatpak/Snap/AppImage; **Nix active-profile packages** vs generations/store; custom ebuild never double-counted) | yes (VM read-only group) | no |
| Package information (`sys info`, `--legacy`) | yes | yes (installed/available, version/deps/size/provenance; ambiguity flagged) | yes (VM read-only group) | no |
| Cross-source update check/apply (`sys updates`, `apply updates`) | yes | yes (exact per-source transactions with full Flatpak commits/snap revisions, pinned and revalidated; manual/project-specific refused; unchecked and failed lanes never claim freshness) | 2026-10-01 six-lane `sys updates` matrix PASS=75 and manual AppImage/Nix/custom-ebuild honesty checks; earlier Flatpak reviewed pinned update and Portage update VM-verified; direct Snap refresh completed with no newer revision, exact Snap apply-updates transaction unit-tested only | no |
| Nix active-profile inventory (`sys list --nix`) | yes | yes (manifest v1/v2/v3; scope; generations vs store) | yes (NIX_ENABLED=yes install: real `nodejs-slim` profile listed and filtered; a re-run correctly reported a dangling profile. **2026-09-26 on the fresh unpinned install**: bootstrap present (`/nix/store` populated, `default` link valid, `nix 2.24.9` runs); `sys list --nix` truthfully reports the base system profile has no package manifest. GC-dangling repro: `nix-collect-garbage` is not on root's PATH; user-level install/GC repro attempted — see VM evidence. **2026-09-28 run 15**: modern XDG per-user profiles enumerated — `nix profile install nixpkgs#hello` as `phoebus` into `~/.local/state/nix/profiles/profile`, `sys list --nix` reports `hello 2.12.3 [per-user:phoebus]` with 824 store paths noted separately; installer now normalizes `/nix` + `/etc/nix*` permissions so unprivileged clients work) | no |
| Nix executable integration (`sys install --nix`, user profile PATH) | yes | yes (profile command, PATH script, manifest and executable verification) | yes (2026-10-01 disposable encrypted overlay: real `cmatrix` installed into shared profile, directly executable, on shell PATH and listed; visible playground updated and 9/9 serial boot checks passed; graphical session PATH inheritance is unit-tested but not yet VM-inspected) | no |
| Catalogue maintenance (`depclean`, `clean cache`, `owners`, `deps`/`rdeps`) | yes | yes (structured depclean effects; cache-cleanup dry-run review + failure propagation; VDB dependency metadata) | yes (VM: depclean + cache-cleanup journeys; deps read-only) | no |
| AI-default catalogue routing (source flags constrain, never bypass) | yes | yes (investigation loop, full backend classification + optional-backend rewrite, fallback offers exact `--legacy` command) | yes (read-only routing cases) | no |
| Alternate-root catalogue/update/maintenance rooting | yes | yes (chroot for Portage/Flatpak/Nix; Snap refused; recording-runner no-host-command tests) | yes (VM: alternate-root Snap refused) | no |
| Service start/stop/restart + flatpak/nix/snapshot commands | yes | yes | no | no |
| Desktop session helpers (DMS bar/launcher/lock/idle) | yes | yes | functional test (stubs) | no |
| Mango + DankMaterialShell profile | yes | yes | live VM yes; installed desktop_install yes (347 pkgs); **seatd service active and running on detached boot** (`/run/seatd.sock` 0660 root:seat, `phoebus` in seat group); greeter, seat, DRM, PAM authentication and `sys --legacy` are verified | no |
| Mango is the canonical desktop | yes | yes | fresh candidate installed graphical seat 30/30: Mango + DMS, first-login Phoebus welcome, terminal, spotlight, lock/unlock/logout | no |
| greetd login (Mango + DarkMaterial) | yes | yes | authenticated seat0 + DRM card0 graphical login and logout, `gui-desktop-20261001T084157Z-ccefa3e1` | no |
| Slate tuigreet login palette and greeting | yes | yes (generated greetd TOML, 16-color VT palette, installed drop-in, package, inset status bar and soft-gray keycaps) | existing encrypted VM: authenticated in-guest update and greetd restart showed inset `ESC`, gray keycaps/action text, slate background and Phoebus greeting (`/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/greeter-slate-inset-gray-20261003.png`); reference/VM pixels match `#2e3440` background and `#d8dee9` UI gray; fresh-install reboot pending | no |
| Live desktop ISO (Mango + DMS) | yes | guards tested | candidate ISO SHA `b14f37e1…c7b986b5281`: UEFI GUI 32/32, real OpenCode 18/18; embedded static binaries match | no |
| Live welcome autostart + duplicate prevention | yes | guards tested | live graphical VM | no |
| Welcome primary action keyboard-focus | yes | guards tested | live graphical VM | no |
| VM harness disk safety + structured results | yes | yes (22 tests, including backing-chain and redaction cases) | n/a | n/a |
| Target disk revalidation before partition | yes | yes | no | n/a |
| Bridge replay/concurrency + input bounds | yes | yes | no | n/a |
| Provider transport endpoint/size hardening | yes | yes | no | n/a |
| `TargetRoot` symlink-escape guard | yes | yes | n/a | n/a |
| OpenCode server capability probe | yes | yes | real host probe + auth + policy | n/a |
| OpenCode proposal adapter (real inference) | yes | yes | real model (`deepseek-v4-flash`) | n/a |
| OpenCode in GUI / CLI / `sys ask` | yes | yes | yes (GUI AI step; `sys ask` live 2026-09-28 via opencode backend + muse-spark, valid plan + digest) | n/a |
| OpenCode full graphical install | yes | yes | yes (12 stages, 174 packages, detached boot) | n/a |
| GUI readiness refresh / AI revalidation / keyboard nav | yes | yes (Rust) | VM harness regressions | n/a |
| Mandatory AI requires a validated interaction | yes | yes | bridge + CLI | n/a |
| GURU packaging (scoped keywords) | yes | yes | no (build/install unverified) | no |
| Release gates + atomic publish | yes | yes (executable gates, exact ISO hash and clean source revision required for publish; separate disk required for repeat install; live assistant and CI gates required) | candidate ISO UEFI UI 32/32, real assistant 18/18, two independent installs 5/5 each, detached boot 5/5, installed desktop 30/30, offline recovery 6/6, fallback 9/9, rollback 11/11, interrupted update 10/10; CI NotRun, ISO unpublished | n/a |
| `sys` verbs | yes | yes | yes | no |
| OpenCode pinned bootstrap | yes | yes | no | n/a |
| Release manifest/verify | yes | yes (host CLI: manifest, verify, tampered-artifact refusal) | no | n/a |
| NVIDIA PCI device classification + branch/flavor policy | yes | yes | no | no |
| NVIDIA installed Gentoo integration (Portage/modprobe/dracut/initramfs) | yes | yes | no | no |
| NVIDIA live ISO payload (bundled modules/firmware/userspace) | yes | yes (verifier + guards) | no | no |
| NVIDIA kernel/module/initramfs update coordination (`@module-rebuild`) | yes | yes | no | no |
| NVIDIA live GPU decision + real nouveau fallback | yes | yes (fixtures + CLI) | no | no |
| Live GUI broker scoped sudoers (no `NOPASSWD: ALL`) | yes | yes (`visudo`) | no | n/a |
| Rollback acceptance harness mode | yes | yes (bash -n/unit + vacuous-pass guards) | yes (destructive gate `serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386` PASS=11 FAIL=0; root-marker creation is mandatory and asserted present before undo, absent after the detached reboot) | no |
| Desktop assistant GUI (`phoebus-assistant`) | yes | yes (asset/sizing and parser checks) | partial (2026-10-03 installed VM: connected bridge, request submission, immediate working card and timer, old general-plan response, new install-path invalid-model-JSON error; no execution) | no |
| Desktop assistant JSON-RPC bridge (`sys --assistant-bridge`) | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | n/a |
| AI-first administration contract (`sys install`, `please`, `ask`) | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | no |
| Deterministic `--legacy` administration (fail-closed source choice) | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | n/a |
| Audited action execution (`--legacy`/`--broker` enforcement) | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | n/a |
| Nix attribute verification probe | yes | yes | no | n/a |
| Portage binary binhost verification + compile abort guard | yes | yes | no | n/a |
| Cross-source application ownership & user data preservation | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | no |
| Unified multi-source update management | yes | yes | no | no |
| Quiet proactive assistance monitor & deduplicated alerting | yes | yes | no | no |
| User preference profiles & project environment mappings | yes | yes | no | n/a |
| Shared administration service layer (`service::*`) & PreparedPlan staging | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | n/a |
| Authoritative privileged validation boundary (integrity/root/uid/state/claim) | yes | yes | no (needs an authenticated VM boot) | n/a |
| Protected per-user plan storage, atomic claim, tamper/traversal rejection | yes | yes | no (needs an authenticated VM boot) | n/a |
| Plan digests, target-root/uid binding, TTL, replay & concurrent-claim protection | yes | yes | no | n/a |
| Truthful transaction outcomes (failure/verify-fail/refusal/interruption) | yes | yes | no | n/a |
| AI-first removal (deterministic discovery underneath; `--legacy` bypasses) | yes | yes | no | n/a |
| GUI plan review card for every plan type; prepared ≠ completed | yes | no (QML) | no (needs graphical VM) | no |
| Shared provider/credential handling (`ai_setup::*`) for CLI and GUI | yes | yes | no (no live credential) | n/a |
| Contextual conversation continuity (`conversation::*`) | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | n/a |
| Conversation-history privacy (minimized, redacted, 0600, bounded, clearable) | yes | yes | no | n/a |
| Target desktop QML assets & Polkit policy provisioning | yes | yes | yes (live VM layout) | no |
| Desktop assistant unprivileged execution & Polkit elevation | yes | yes | yes (live VM layout) | no |
| UKI / Secure Boot | no (deferred; `uki`/`secureboot = true` rejected at validation) | no (rejection + truthful plan rendering covered) | no | no |
| Mango workstation applications (Emacs … OpenSSH, exact atoms) | yes | yes (every atom asserted; no silent omit/substitute; Kitty kept, st absent, Nemo default) | no (needs 60–80 GiB disposable install + detached boot) | no |
| Brave stable via scoped another-brave-overlay (pinned, beta/nightly masked) | yes (stable only; pin validated pre-network, fail-closed) | yes (pin validation, scoping, mask) | no (needs network + PHOEBUS_BRAVE_PIN at ISO build + upstream checksum verification in the VM) | no |
| Zsh default for new users (root Bash, /bin/sh unchanged, packaged plugins) | yes | yes (useradd -s, root chsh, skel seeding, preservation) | no | no |
| Cursor theme (Vanilla-DMZ 24 across Mango/XWayland/GTK/Qt/DMS/greeter) | yes | yes (config files asserted) | no (ordinary/text/link/resize/busy after reboot unverified) | no |
| Default Portage ccache (installed first, 2G cap, security preserved) | yes | yes (make.conf + package asserted) | no (actual hit on a repeated source build unverified) | no |
| Local CUPS (enabled, remote sharing/admin disabled) | yes | yes (cupsd.conf asserted) | no (local print job unverified) | no |
| OpenSSH installed, sshd disabled/inactive, no firewall port | yes | yes (service set + disable asserted) | no (client -V, server present, disabled+inactive after reboot unverified) | no |
| AI connection handoff (reuse default, per-user 0600 key, truthful status) | yes | yes (0600/0700, symlink refusal, opt-out/missing/local, no secret in errors) | no (fixture handoff only; live authorized-provider result NotRun) | no |
| Startup system check (blur/PPD/matugen/cava, truthful summary) | yes | yes (4-check evaluation + summary wording) | no (recheck after reboot NotRun; needs PPD D-Bus + DMS integration) | no |
| Assistant dark default + light mode + responsive + token drift guard | yes | yes (palette/aliases, drift test, layout guards) | no (graphical VM at 1024×768/1280×720/scaled NotRun) | no |
| Userspace AI agent framework (`agent_jail`, `desktop_config`, `phoebus-mcp`, `sys propose`) | yes | yes (Bubblewrap credential masking, schema validation + checkpoint undo, MCP JSON-RPC conformance, unprivileged plan staging) | smoke test (`phoebus-agent-run`, MCP stdio, theme undo) | no |
| Automatic Boot Assessment (upstream `systemd-bless-boot`, boot counting, unmetered recovery) | yes | yes (correct `+tries-tries_done` parsing, upstream failed-unit health check, recovery sort/default, entry protection) | fresh candidate counted detached boot 5/5 and fallback 9/9 | no |
| Update preflight safety gates (>=10 GiB storage gate + atomic coordinated `@` and `@var` snapshots) | yes | yes (`check_update_preflight` storage refusal, `create_pre_update_snapshot_set`) | no | no |
| Tiered update channels (`Core`, `Proven` [default], `Edge`) | yes | yes (`UpdateChannel` enum, serialization, channel defaults) | no | no |
## Fast-defaults session (2026-09-26): what was proven and what was not
- Implemented + unit-tested in this session (757 Rust tests, was 736):
`-bin` fast defaults, target-only system-wide Flatpaks with fail-closed
verification, single generic kernel guard, preference neutrality,
`convert_to_source` / `build_tuned_kernel` typed actions with full
reviews, installed welcome + DMS seed, portal/MIME defaults, install
metrics hooks, plan-review delivery section, and 4 new `sys` acceptance
cases (script now covers 37 documented cases).
- Quality gates green: `cargo fmt --check`, `clippy --workspace --all-targets
-- -D warnings`, release build, `test_vmsafety.py` 18/18, shellcheck clean.
- **Not built, not installed, not booted in this session.** A fresh ISO
was built from the fast-defaults commit and content-verified
(`installer/live/phoebus-installer-amd64-fastdefaults.iso`, 1.6 GiB,
`ad9cddb2…`, build `20260926T145700Z` from `e747baf`; embedded binaries
hash-match the fresh static build, Gentoo key shows both published
fingerprints, Mango/DMS + installer UI present; git-ignored, never
committed). No disposable qcow2 install/boot ran — a wall-clock blocker,
not a host blocker (`make doctor`: 20 ok, 0 warnings; ~103 GiB free).
The requested verifications (installed `-bin` identities, system-wide
Flatpaks + manifest, first-login welcome, graphical Calibre/GIMP launches,
file/device workflows, normal + offline recovery boots, one
source-conversion journey, one tuned-kernel build + test boot, measured
time/disk figures) are **NotRun**. Exact unblock: build the ISO
(`installer/live/build.sh`), install to a disposable 80 GiB qcow2 with
network (`serial-driver.py install`), boot detached (`serial-driver.py
boot`), run `sys-acceptance.sh` (now 37 documented cases) plus the
graphical/file/device/source/tuned gates in
`docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`; never touch `/dev/*`, never commit the
ISO/images/transcripts/secrets.
## Workstation session (2026-09-26): what was proven and what was not
- Implemented + unit-tested in this session (736/736 Rust tests): workstation
atoms, Brave scoping/pin validation, Zsh/cursor/ccache/CUPS/sshd-disabled,
AI per-user key handoff, startup-check model + truthful summary, assistant
dark/light + responsive + token drift guard, 60/20 GiB disk gates.
- Quality gates green: `cargo fmt --check`, `clippy --workspace --all-targets
-- -D warnings`, release build, `test_vmsafety.py` 18/18, shellcheck
(pre-existing SC2012 info only).
- **Not built, not installed, not booted in this session.** No fresh ISO was
built (`make doctor`: 8 GiB free, needs ≥20; workstation target needs
60–80 GiB), so there is no new ISO hash to report. No disposable qcow2
install/boot ran; the requested verifications (installed apps, Kitty
default, Zsh login, cursor consistency, local CUPS job, disabled sshd after
reboot, startup recheck, both assistant themes, model handoff with a
fixture + any live authorized-provider result) are **NotRun**. Exact
unblock: free ≥80 GiB, set `PHOEBUS_BRAVE_PIN` to the reviewed
another-brave-overlay commit at ISO build time, build the ISO, install to a
disposable 80 GiB qcow2, boot detached, and run the gates in
`docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md` (seat VM for the compositor/cursor/DMS
checks; a real 0600 provider credential for the live AI call; never touch
`/dev/*`, never commit the ISO/images/transcripts/secrets).
- **Brave review status.** Reviewed 2026-09-26 from the Gentoo wiki +
another-brave-overlay repo metadata: stable `www-client/brave-browser`
exists (binary, based on the official google-chrome ebuilds); beta/nightly
exist as separate atoms and are masked here. No overlay commit was pinned
(default pin empty, path refuses pre-network). Blocker: pick + record the
40-hex commit and verify the upstream release + checksums in the VM.
- **Screenshots.** The four September 26 screenshots referenced in the request
are not in the repo (`docs/screenshots/` holds older captures only); the
blur/PPD/matugen/cava warnings were implemented from their described text.
If the images exist elsewhere, attach their paths for pixel-level regression.
## Known limitations
- **Desktop graphical session** was verified with the *headless* wlroots
backend because the serial-only VM has no logind seat. The DRM path and a
real VT login are not yet exercised. `phoebus-session` is written by the
installer for that purpose.
- **Flatpak apps** were installed from Flathub in disposable VMs, including a
remove/reinstall cycle with live output on 2026-10-01; no hardware check.
- **AppImages imported by earlier builds** remain under private
`/var/lib/phoebus/appimages` and need a one-time administrator re-import to
the accessible `/opt/phoebus/appimages` path. The old file is kept for
explicit cleanup.
- **Nix** is a development realisation and inventory lane. `sys prepare` does
not persist a profile install, so per-profile removal and updates remain
project/user-managed rather than a `sys` transaction.
- **NVIDIA** is implemented (hardware-driven branch/flavor policy, scoped
Portage configuration, a live payload that is build-time verified, and
kernel/module/initramfs update coordination) and covered by Rust tests and the
live-payload verifier. The policy now caps Maxwell/Pascal/Volta at the last
supporting series (580) and reports a Blackwell plus proprietary-only GPU
combination as an explicit incompatibility rather than installing one driver
that cannot serve both. The live driver choice is a deterministic,
device-class-based decision (`--live-gpu-plan`) with a real `nouveau`
fallback, and the verifier rejects placeholders, cross-kernel module trees and
version/flavor mismatches. The installed sequence now installs the driver and
proves its modules exist **before** forcing them into the final initramfs.
A minimal live rootfs with the stable kernel and NVIDIA driver was **built and
verified** previously (driver 550.163.01, kernel 6.12.107+deb13-amd64, modules
`nvidia-current*`). It is **not verified on hardware or in the VM**: this host
has no NVIDIA GPU and QEMU's virtual GPU cannot establish NVIDIA
acceleration; no passthrough setup is available or authorized. The full
desktop ISO was not assembled here (the host has ~12 GiB free; the build wants
more) and the live/installed NVIDIA boot gates are unrun. See
`docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md` for the exact unblock commands. The live kernel
is pinned to Debian stable (trixie 6.12 LTS) because testing's kernel (7.2)
breaks Debian's 550 driver; the bundled branch covers Maxwell through Hopper,
and Blackwell (or a failed accelerated load) falls back to nouveau on the live
medium. The installed Gentoo system uses the current branch with NVIDIA's open
kernel modules on Turing and newer.
- **The installed `sys` binary and desktop assistant (`phoebus-assistant`)**: The
installer provisions `sys` into `/usr/local/bin/sys` and configures the desktop
assistant Quickshell application (`phoebus-assistant`) launched via desktop
entries and keybindings. On the installed system, all 38 acceptance test cases
in `installer/tests/vm/sys-acceptance.sh` pass cleanly (`PASS=38 FAIL=0`),
verifying the unified AI-first CLI/GUI interface, deterministic `--legacy`
mode, the package catalogue (search/inventory/information/update-check),
fail-closed source requirements, audited `--broker`/`--legacy` gates,
proactive system monitors, and offline fallback guidance. The matrix was
re-run on 2026-09-26 against the refactored static `sys` (`70f0a72b…`,
fetched to `/tmp/sys` on a disposable overlay of the pristine installed
image, non-root user, no mutations): guest `PASS=38 FAIL=0`, driver
`PASS=41 FAIL=0` (`serial-boot-20260926T014746Z-3089a820`).
- **Authenticated boot (UKI / UEFI Secure Boot) is not implemented and is an
open security limitation.** The installed boot path is plain unsigned BLS
(systemd-boot + dracut; the dracut UKI generator did not embed the kernel
command line, so BLS is used and verified). `kernel.uki = true` and
`kernel.secureboot = true` are rejected at configuration validation, and the
install-plan preview always reports the real BLS path, so no interface can
imply these modes are active. A future Secure Boot/UKI implementation is a
separate opt-in milestone (signed artifacts, key lifecycle, update/rollback
handling, disposable-VM boot tests with Secure Boot enabled); it must not be
enabled or advertised until that complete path passes.
- **Rollback (`sys undo`) is VM-verified** (`serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386`,
PASS=11 FAIL=0, exit 0, no secret leak in either transcript). The gate runs on
a fresh disposable overlay of the installed image: a known-good
package-database fingerprint and `/home` marker, `sys snapshot --legacy`, a
controlled reversible `app-misc/hello` install `--legacy --portage` (the
fingerprint is asserted changed, so the run cannot pass vacuously),
`sys undo <snapshot-id> --legacy`, power off, then a detached reboot that
asserts the package database restored, the root break marker absent, `/home`
surviving, systemd running, kernel modules present, the snapshot-based
recovery entry present, and rollback status recorded. Both transcripts are
kept (`serial-phase1.log`, `serial.log`).
Correction: the 2026-09-25 claim of a passing rollback had no run transcript
and did not reproduce — the committed harness then ran the guest
unprivileged, used the pre-installed `nano` as the break, restored "newest"
instead of its own snapshot, and never asserted the root marker was gone.
Those harness defects are fixed in this session (sudo authentication with
unique end markers, explicit `--legacy`, verified break, targeted undo,
marker-absent assertion) and the gate above is the evidence. The recovery
entry was later booted offline and is now selected by the automated
`serial-driver.py recovery` mode.
- **Mango + DankMaterialShell** is the canonical Phoebus desktop
(`desktop.profile = "mango"`, Flatpak on). It is implemented with Mango
0.17.2, DMS (pinned release), Quickshell 0.3.1 and scenefx 0.5 from the GURU
overlay and scoped `~amd64` keywords. Standalone dwl has been retired completely;
Phoebus has one desktop experience only. The desktop is verified in live graphical
VM and detached booted VM installations.
- **The live desktop ISO** (`installer/live/build.sh`) builds a Debian testing
rootfs with Mango + DMS, live-only autologin, a branded welcome window and a
graphical installer frontend over the typed bridge. Its desktop-payload
guards are unit-tested. The rebuilt ISO
(`sha256 0c386a1b…`, 1.6 GiB, build id in `/etc/phoebus/build`) was booted in
a graphical, seat-providing VM. The `gui` journey passed **28/28** checks
(welcome autostart, launcher from the keyboard, duplicate prevention, the live
medium protected, keyboard suggestion selection, the network and AI steps,
the AI gate refused without a model and reported inline, no bridge errors) and
the `opencode` journey passed **18/18** (real model response, validated
proposal, and editing the model invalidating the validated state). The
`gui-install` journey passed every assertion on a fresh 30 GiB qcow2 —
OpenCode connect/review/accept, disk, account, ERASE and confirmation — and
the backend then reported real stages with elapsed time and no fabricated
percentage. The **completed** install succeeded through all 12 stages,
compiled all 174 packages of the Mango desktop profile, and confirmed
completion (`gui-install-completes` passed). The installed system then booted
**with the ISO detached** (LUKS2 decrypt, systemd running, 0 failed units,
all Btrfs subvolumes mounted, `sys` CLI operational, and `tuigreet` greeter
active). (That paragraph describes the Sep-24 evidence run; the 2026-09-26
unpinned rerun from the rebuilt ISO is recorded in
`docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`.) The **installed** Mango session's
seat management blocker was resolved on 2026-09-28 (Run 13): `sys-auth/seatd`
installed with `server systemd builtin` USE, `seatd.service` active and
verified running on detached boot (`/run/seatd.sock` mode 0660 root:seat),
`phoebus` and greeter users in group `seat`, and session startup script
includes bounded seat socket wait. Graphical desktop seat verification
under headless wlroots is proven; graphical verification under a physical seat
remains an open hardware gate.
- **AI sandbox** is implemented (`systemd-run` hardening properties) and is now
exercised in a disposable VM: the **system** sandbox (full property set) for a
root caller and the **user** sandbox (`systemd-run --user`, with
`DynamicUser`/`PrivateDevices`/`ProtectKernelModules` omitted because the user
manager rejects them) for an unprivileged caller. Before the fix, an
unprivileged `sys ask` hung on a polkit `manage-units` password prompt; it now
completes (`serial-boot-20260929T092147Z-6f88907a`, `AI_ROOT_RC=0`,
`AI_USER_RC=0`). Open hypothesis: a read-only `flatpak search` can trigger
Flatpak's interactive `appstream-update` polkit prompt when the session is not
recognized as active (headless serial); polkit's default `allow_active=yes`
covers a real active seat. Not yet exercised: a strict-confinement AppArmor
guest and a physical seat.
- **Release automation** now has executable gates, a report, atomic publish
and signing command helpers, but no gate has been executed by a configured
CI runner. `gates --execute` runs each gate's real command in its own
process (exit 0 → Passed, nonzero → Failed, missing harness/firmware/seat/
credential → NotRun) and never manufactures a pass. A local run (2026-09-26)
exercised manifest generation (2 artifacts), verification,
tampered-artifact refusal, and publish refusal against a NotRun gate report;
`gates --execute` on an unconfigured host reports 0 passed / 0 failed /
6 NotRun with the exact missing prerequisite per gate (OVMF_CODE/OVMF_VARS
unset, no model credential). No release was published and `latest.iso`
untouched. Minimal repeatable setup: register a Forgejo Actions runner
(`act_runner`) so `.forgejo/workflows/ci.yml` executes the gates.
- The desktop transaction compiles heavily because desktop USE does not match
the signed binhost (~26 min for the desktop set on 8 vCPUs in the test VM).
The official Gentoo binhost is OpenRC/hardened, so a systemd system can only
reuse binaries for packages whose USE matches; the policy still requests
signed binaries where it can. Publishing a matching binhost is future work.
- **Live AI provider calls are not verified.** DeepSeek/OpenAI requests are
built and reviewed by fixtures (`phoebus-ai::provider::TestTransport`) and the
curl transport is covered by a recording runner; no call was made with a real
key.
- The installer rebuilds `sys-apps/systemd` from source because
boot/policykit/cryptsetup USE differ from the binhost.
- `sys undo` is implemented with the default-subvolume, fstab, kernel-cmdline
and BLS handling described in ADR 0007; its destructive VM acceptance gate
passed in this session (`serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386`).
- **Stage3 signed-DIGESTS mechanism is now VM-verified, not just host-level.**
The parser fixture matches the real current DIGESTS byte-for-byte; on
2026-09-26 the default unpinned install from the rebuilt live ISO (which
ships the fingerprint-checked provisioned key) completed all 12 stages
plus a detached boot (`INSTALL-RC=0`, `NO_SECRET_LEAK`), which proves the
real signed DIGESTS and the downloaded archive hash verified against the
fixed trust anchor — `fetch()` must return `Ok` before `extract()` runs,
and the run demonstrably extracted. Tampered inputs are refused in the VM:
a placeholder pin is refused before any network use (zero stage3 fetches)
and a mismatched archive hash is refused after download with no extraction.
A tampered-*signature* VM case is not feasible without a network MITM (the
key is fixed and Gentoo serves authentic DIGESTS); the bad-signature
branch is unit-tested.