153 lines
8.9 KiB
Markdown
153 lines
8.9 KiB
Markdown
# Handoff
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Rolling note between work sessions. **Update this file before you finish**, then
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commit it. It should be short and current; use `git log` for detail.
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- **Last updated:** this session (2026-09-25), adversarial hardening of the
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privileged approval boundary: (1) the broker recomputes the canonical
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approval digest for every plan kind, (2) the ledger uses a stable approval
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identity instead of the editable integrity seal, (3) crash recovery is
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live-safe and terminal transitions are atomic/monotonic, and (4) personal
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writes are owned by the initiating user. See ADR 0014. Supersedes the
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`0be3010` approval design; that commit's UX/docs changes are preserved.
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- **Current focus:**
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1. **Canonical digest at the privileged boundary (`service::validate_prepared_plan`):**
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- Independently re-derives `compute_plan_digest(actions, candidate,
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effects, step_effects)` and requires it to equal both `plan.digest` and
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the supplied `--approval-digest`. Covers Install, LegacyInstall, Removal,
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General and Undo. The stored `integrity` seal is only a self-consistency
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check and is never treated as authentication.
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- **Per-step effect binding:** execution trusts `step_effects`, so the
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canonical digest now hashes every step (contents recomputed, not read
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from the stored digest); each stored step digest must match its contents,
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and the aggregate must be the concatenation of the steps. A multi-action
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plan without per-step effects is refused. Install/LegacyInstall keep the
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install-specific digest with the single step required to equal the
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aggregate. This closes the "retain the approved digest, change only
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`step_effects`, recompute the seal" gap; rejected before any command runs
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or approval is consumed. The earlier-step allowance in `approval_holds`
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is unchanged.
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2. **Stable approval identity (`phoebus_installer::approval`, ADR 0014):**
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- Ledger + `.claim` key = `approval_key(plan_id, canonical_digest,
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initiator_uid, target_root)`. Presentation fields (summary, rationale,
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verification) are excluded, so editing them and resealing cannot mint a
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fresh record for a consumed approval; a newly reviewed identical
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operation with a new plan id is allowed.
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- Claims record the owning process (`pid`, `/proc/<pid>/stat` start ticks,
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boot id). Terminal status is published once via an atomic hard link into
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`<key>.terminal` and is immutable. `reconcile_interrupted` only marks a
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record interrupted when the owner is provably gone, so a live operation
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(or a second broker starting concurrently) is never mislabelled, and it
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cannot race a real `finish`.
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3. **Personal write ownership (`phoebus_executor::personal`):**
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- `write_private` creates the config/state path one component at a time
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under the resolved home, rejecting symlinks and non-directories.
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- Elevated writes (effective root on behalf of a non-root user) chown the
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created paths to the initiating user's uid/gid (via a standard-library
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`chown` behind an injectable `OwnerFixer`). A non-root process acting for
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a different user is refused. Proactive state now routes through the same
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path.
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4. **Reviewed effects + terminal transactions** (`service::execute_prepared`,
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unchanged this session): reviewed per-step effects are carried forward and
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freshly resolved effects are evidence compared with
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`phoebus_core::effects::approval_holds`; every path after
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`transaction::begin` reaches a terminal result.
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- **Last verified (this session):**
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- `cargo fmt --all -- --check` clean.
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- `cargo test --workspace`: 601 passed, 0 failed. New per-step binding
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adversarial tests: single-action and multi-action General plans with
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`step_effects` swapped (with and without a matching aggregate) while the
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approved digest is retained are rejected before any command, ledger claim or
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transaction; a legitimate bound multi-step plan still validates. The prior
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session's adversarial tests (swapped action resealed for every plan kind;
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replay after a summary/presentation edit or recreating an identical plan;
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live-vs-abandoned reconciliation; reconcile-vs-finish; personal ownership;
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cross-uid refusal) all still pass.
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- `cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets` exits 0 (only the pre-existing
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`result_large_err`, one arg-count and one `DiskPhase` lints remain).
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- `cargo build --release -p phoebus-installer` clean.
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- **Not yet verified this session (BLOCKED):**
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- Installed-VM journey and the 12-step acceptance list. The existing
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disposable installed disk (`/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/disks/test-disk.qcow2`)
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reaches the LUKS prompt but **no passphrase in this environment opens it**:
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the harness default (`phoebus-luks-test`, which is also the content of
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`/home/dominic/vmlab/serve/luks.pw`) is rejected, and no other credential is
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available. Do not guess or brute-force.
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- No AI provider credential is present; do not invent one.
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- A real privileged `chown` (running as root) could not be exercised in this
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unprivileged host; the ownership logic is verified through the injectable
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fixer seam and the cross-uid refusal test. A root-run confirmation is a
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follow-up.
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- **Public repo:** <https://git.phoebus.club/phoebus/phoebus_os>
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(remote `origin`, SSH port 2222).
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## Next actions (in order)
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1. **Unlock or rebuild the installed VM (blocker).** The installed disk reaches
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the LUKS prompt but its passphrase is unknown; the committed harness default
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is rejected. Either supply the real passphrase or perform a fresh disposable
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install (~2 h) to obtain an installed system, then run the full 12-step
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acceptance list below.
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2. **Installed `sys` acceptance** on the booted disk:
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```sh
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# serve the static sys first:
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cp installer-rs/target/x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/release/sys /home/dominic/vmlab/serve/
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env DISK=/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/disks/<clone>.qcow2 \
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OVMF_CODE=/usr/share/OVMF/OVMF_CODE_4M.fd \
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OVMF_VARS=/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/OVMF_VARS.fd \
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BOOT_CHECKS='... curl .../sys ...; SYS_BIN=/tmp/sys bash .../sys-acceptance.sh ...' \
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python3 installer/tests/vm/serial-driver.py boot
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```
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The new broker behaviour (replacement during authentication, replay after
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deleting user plan state, cancellation) is already covered by
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`phoebus-installer` unit tests; the installed run confirms the sealed
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elevation path and the personal-preference acceptance case.
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3. **AI-selected install journey (needs an authorised provider)**: boot the
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installed disk, serve the built `sys` and a 0600 key file, then:
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```sh
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sudo sys --ai-provider deepseek --ai-api-key-file /run/phoebus/ai.key \
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install <application>
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# and the no-model control in the same run:
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PHOEBUS_AI_PROVIDER= sudo sys install <application>
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```
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Confirm the model requests evidence, the resolver confirms the candidate,
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the plan is presented before approval, and the transaction is recorded. No
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credential is available here; do not invent one.
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4. **Rollback VM acceptance** (`serial-driver.py rollback`) on a cloned
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disposable image of the installed system.
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5. **NVIDIA hardware acceptance (BLOCKED)**: needs an NVIDIA GPU.
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6. **Interactive graphical user session** login into Mango / DankMaterialShell
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under a physical seat or nested Wayland compositor.
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## Known blockers / risks
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- **A full VM install still takes hours** (base stage ~116 min). Use the already
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installed disposable disk (clone it) for `sys install` journeys rather than a
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fresh install.
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- **No NVIDIA GPU** (and no authorised passthrough).
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- **Snap needs network and AppArmor** for meaningful confinement; the lane
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detects confinement honestly.
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- **AppImage provides no sandbox**; do not describe it as one.
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- **Custom ebuilds remain separately reviewed, untrusted artifacts**; the
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install workflow never builds one during investigation.
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- **OpenCode transport** concatenates messages, so multi-turn investigation is
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best-effort there; the direct providers carry the full conversation.
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- Harness artifacts live under `/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/` (outside git).
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## Environment notes
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- Dev host: Ubuntu 26.04. QEMU/OVMF/xorriso/rustfmt/clippy/ImageMagick/visudo
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present. `flatpak` and `snap` clients are present on the host (not proof of
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the VM lanes).
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- VM harnesses: `installer/tests/vm/{gui-driver,serial-driver,appliance-driver,live-driver}.py`
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and `sys-acceptance.sh`. `DISK` must be a disposable qcow2; never `/dev/*`.
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- Serve fixtures from `/home/dominic/vmlab/serve` with
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`python3 -m http.server 8000 --bind 127.0.0.1` (reachable as `10.0.2.2:8000`).
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- The static binaries for the VM: `make static` builds `phoebus-installer` and
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`sys` under `installer-rs/target/x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/release/`.
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## Definition of a good stopping point
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- `make test` passes; `docs/STATUS.md` and `docs/CHANGELOG.md` updated;
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`docs/HANDOFF.md` updated; committed (via `scripts/agent-commit.sh`) and
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pushed (`scripts/publish.sh`).
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