phoebus_os/docs/STATUS.md
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# Status
Truthful implementation/verification matrix. Vocabulary:
- **Implemented** — code exists.
- **Unit tested** — covered by automated tests that run on any host.
- **VM verified** — exercised in the disposable QEMU/OVMF VM.
- **Hardware verified** — exercised on real hardware.
- **Not verified** — do not claim it works.
## Proven baseline (do not regress)
A complete installation in a disposable UEFI VM, booted with the ISO detached:
```
QEMU + OVMF (UEFI)
30 GiB qcow2, virtio-blk (/dev/vda); live ISO at /dev/sr0
GPT: 1 GiB FAT32 ESP + LUKS2 remainder
Btrfs: @ @home @var @snapshots @swap
Gentoo systemd stage3 (default/linux/amd64/23.0/systemd)
systemd-boot + BLS entry + dracut initramfs
LUKS2 passphrase unlock at boot
systemd PID 1, login, networking
systemctl is-system-running = running; 0 failed units
```
Boot timing (Rust installer): 1.378 s kernel + 5.238 s initrd + 4.114 s
userspace = 10.730 s.
The committed VM harness (`installer/tests/vm/serial-driver.py` +
`install.sh`) drives the **static Rust binary**; the Bash installer is no longer
on the install path (Bash migration Phase 2, see
`docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`).
A second harness (`installer/tests/vm/appliance-driver.py` +
`appliance-guest.sh`) drives the Debian-Live appliance ISO. On 2026-09-21 it
produced `INSTALL-RC=0`, `NO_SECRET_LEAK`, and a detached boot
(`systemd`, running, 0 failed units) whose Btrfs history contains the installer's
coordinated `@` + `@var` **initial known-good** snapshot and a snapshot-based
recovery boot entry (see `docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`). `sys undo` is
VM-verified by the rollback acceptance gate
(`serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386`, PASS=11 FAIL=0): snapshot →
`app-misc/hello` install (package DB changed) → `sys undo <id>` → detached
reboot with the package DB restored, the root break marker gone, `/home`
preserved, systemd running, and the snapshot-based recovery entry present.
Booting that recovery entry offline remains a manual gate.
## Matrix
| Area | Implemented | Unit tested | VM verified | Hardware verified |
|------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------------|
| Config (TOML + legacy), validation | yes | yes | yes | n/a |
| Hardware/disk discovery, protection | yes | yes | yes | no |
| Install plan + destructive preview | yes | yes | yes | n/a |
| Destructive authorization (ERASE) | yes | yes | yes | n/a |
| GPT partitioning + ESP | yes | yes | yes | no |
| LUKS2 format/open/close | yes | yes | yes | no |
| Btrfs subvolumes + swapfile | yes | yes | yes | no |
| fstab / crypttab generation | yes | yes | yes | no |
| stage3 fetch + verify (pinned SHA-256 or signed DIGESTS) + extract | yes | yes (both paths; every failure branch incl. missing verifier/key/DIGESTS/entry, nonzero exit, cannot-start) | yes (pinned path; **unpinned path now VM-verified**: default unpinned install from the rebuilt 20260926 ISO completed 12 stages + detached boot; placeholder-pin and archive-hash-mismatch refusals VM-verified on disposable targets with the fail-closed binary) | n/a |
| stage3 trust anchor (fixed provisioned key) | yes | yes (`release_key_path` ignores `PHOEBUS_GENTOO_RELEASE_KEY`; test-only injection only via explicit `verify_digests_with_key`) | yes (20260926 live ISO carries the fingerprint-checked key — both Gentoo fingerprints verified inside the shipped squashfs; the unpinned VM install verified the real signed DIGESTS + archive hash against it; tampered inputs refused) | n/a |
| Portage config + sync + getuto | yes | yes | yes | n/a |
| Signed Gentoo binary install | yes | yes | yes | n/a |
| Source package compilation | yes | yes | yes | n/a |
| Kernel install + dracut initramfs | yes | yes | yes | no |
| systemd-boot + BLS | yes | yes | yes | no |
| Boot default pins the real kernel (not recovery) | yes | yes | yes | no |
| Recovery BLS entry (rescue.target) | yes | yes | boots (not default) | no |
| Users, passwords, sudo | yes | yes | yes | n/a |
| Locale/timezone/keymap/services | yes | yes | yes | n/a |
| Rust VM boot parity | yes | yes | yes | no |
| Rust TUI | yes | yes | smoke test | no |
| Typed GUI bridge (`--gui-bridge`) | yes | yes (dry-run) | live VM + full journey | n/a |
| Graphical welcome + install wizard (Quickshell) | yes | yes | live graphical VM + full GUI journey | no |
| Phoebus brand system (SVG + tokens) | yes | yes | live VM | n/a |
| Desktop profile (Mango + DarkMaterial) | yes | yes | live VM + installed | no |
| Desktop session script (socket wait, polkit, cleanup) | yes | yes | functional test (stubs) | no |
| PipeWire/WirePlumber | yes | no | headless (`wpctl`) | no |
| Flatpak + flathub | yes | no | installed + remote | no |
| Fast-default Flatpaks (Calibre/GIMP/Flatseal, system-wide, target-only) | yes | yes (install/verify/provisioning; fail-closed on missing app) | no (launch, icons, MIME, updates after reboot not run) | no |
| Fast `-bin` defaults (firefox-bin/libreoffice-bin, fail-closed) | yes | yes (atoms, policy, binary-capability refusal) | no (installed identity not verified in a VM) | no |
| Single generic kernel default (no second generic kernel) | yes | yes (guard + tuned path keeps the fallback) | yes (existing boot path unchanged) | no |
| User-initiated source builds (`convert_to_source`) | yes | yes (table, review, build-before-remove, Brave/unknown refusals) | no (no conversion journey run in a VM) | no |
| Tuned-kernel build (`build_tuned_kernel`, separate BLS, fallback kept) | yes | yes (refusal without fallback, entry creation, default never blind-switched) | no (no build/boot-test in a VM) | no |
| Installed first-login welcome (once per user, reopenable, non-blocking) | yes | yes (assets, launcher, autostart, QML guards, DMS seed) | no (first login + graphical checks not run) | no |
| Install metrics (time, download, peak disk, installed size) | yes | yes (report rendering; orchestration hooks) | no (no measured install yet) | no |
| XWayland / polkit agent / kitty / wofi | yes | no | installed, not launched | no |
| Package policy + measured history | yes | yes | yes (326 entries) | no |
| Background update preparation | yes | yes | yes (fetch; buildpkgonly skipped) | no |
| Btrfs snapshots + history | yes | yes | yes | no |
| Coordinated snapshot sets (`@` + `@var`) | yes | yes | no | no |
| Btrfs rollback (`sys undo`) | yes | yes | yes (rollback acceptance `serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386` PASS=11 FAIL=0) | no |
| Recovery/known-good BLS entry | yes | yes | yes: entry present + snapshot-based (rollback runs) **and the recovery entry itself was booted** (`Phoebus Recovery (known-good snapshot)` selected in the systemd-boot menu with restricted networking and no model: cmdline + findmnt prove root is the read-only `@-20260926T064646-initial-known-good` snapshot with `rescue.target`, serial login works, `sys history/rollback status --legacy` work, `sys ask` fails truthfully with the `--legacy` fallback) | no |
| Snapshot retention + free-space gate | yes | yes | no | no |
| AI typed proposals + evidence review | yes | yes | fixture end-to-end | n/a |
| AI guided install (DeepSeek/OpenAI) | yes | yes | fixture path only (no live call) | n/a |
| AI privacy boundary (facts only) | yes | yes | no | n/a |
| AI OS sandbox (systemd hardened unit) | yes | yes | no | no |
| Installed assistant (`sys ask`) | yes | yes | fixture path only (no live call) | n/a |
| Resolved package effects + approval binding (carried through execution) | yes | yes (empty vs unestablished; drift + prior-step allowance) | no | n/a |
| Privileged approval ledger (replacement/replay/concurrency/interruption) | yes | yes (privileged entry point) | no | n/a |
| Canonical digest recomputed at the privileged boundary (all plan kinds) | yes | yes (adversarial: swapped action resealed, every kind) | no | n/a |
| Per-step effect binding into the approval digest (contents + aggregate) | yes | yes (adversarial: step_effects swap rejected; legit multi-step validates) | no | n/a |
| Stable approval identity (replay after presentation edit/reseal) | yes | yes (summary/other fields/identical id/concurrent/new-id) | no | n/a |
| Live-safe monotonic recovery (owner liveness, immutable terminal) | yes | yes (live vs abandoned, reconcile/finish race) | no | n/a |
| Personal preferences + alert state (user-owned, system-default precedence) | yes | yes (save/reload/isolation/precedence/failure) | yes (installed VM: saved to user config, exit 0) | no |
| Personal write ownership (elevated chown, symlink refusal, cross-uid refusal) | yes | yes (ownership-fixer seam + CLI refusal) | no | no |
| Personal preference does not need the root-owned system transaction log | yes | yes (CLI regression: read-only transaction dir) | yes (installed VM acceptance) | n/a |
| Installed `sys` acceptance matrix (read-only/failure) | yes | yes | yes (installed VM: `PASS=38 FAIL=0`, catalogue + regression group) | no |
| Portage config readable for non-root queries (`normalize_config_permissions`) | yes | yes (modes + keyring exclusion) | yes (fresh VM install: 0755/0644 out of the box; non-root `search` returns 3 results, `updates` reports 10) | no |
| Privileged catalogue mutations (install/remove/depclean/cache/apply updates, alternate-root) | yes | yes (unit) | yes (fresh installed VM via root: 7/7 PASS) | no |
| Rollback acceptance (snapshot -> change -> `sys undo` -> detached verify) | yes | yes | yes (`serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386` PASS=11 FAIL=0 on a fresh disposable clone: package DB changed then restored, root marker gone, `/home` survives, boot running, no secret leak) | no |
| Privileged `--broker` plan execution + replay rejection in a VM (pkexec path) | yes | yes (privileged entry point) | yes (non-root `pkexec` with a terminal polkit agent: cancelled auth, broker JSON success, replay rejected; required the shipped policy + wheel-admin rule) | n/a |
| Cache-cleanup preview is non-destructive (real `eclean`/`nix-store`) | yes | yes (preview uses `--pretend --deep` / `--print-dead`; sorted bound items) | yes (real `eclean`: upstream preview, cancelled approval, approved run, drift refusal, failed cleaner; user data preserved) | n/a |
| Reverse-dependency inspection includes installed targets | yes | yes (self-reference compares the dependent, not the target) | yes (real `sys-libs/glibc`, `sys-libs/zlib` dependents) | n/a |
| Transaction log (outcomes, protective snapshots) | yes | yes | read-only in installed VM; write path needs root | no |
| Flatpak/Nix bounded typed actions | yes | yes | no | no |
| Shared hardware-aware source selection (all lanes) | yes | yes | no | no |
| Snap lane (detect/install/list/remove/refresh/connections) | yes (reviewed first-use setup) | yes (incl. exact revisions and confinement) | partial (VM: Portage snapd, active socket, `hello-world` install/list/refresh/remove; partial confinement; refresh had no newer revision; connections not exercised. **Re-checked 2026-09-26 against the live Store**: `hello-world` still 6.4 rev 29 on every channel, refresh reports no updates; guest has no `aa-status`, confinement still `partial`. A revision-changing refresh and strict confinement stay blocked on a Store revision + AppArmor-ready guest) | no |
| AppImage lane (import/acquire/integrity/desktop/remove) | yes | yes | yes (VM: acquire with pinned SHA, list, launch fixture, remove; tampered SHA refused) | no |
| Custom ebuild overlay (stage/approve/build/remove) | yes | yes | yes (VM: stage → build/install → VDB+file present → remove) | no |
| `sys` installed into the target + verified in chroot | yes | yes (unit) | yes (detached boot verified) | no |
| AI-first install workflow (`sys install`, `sys ask`) | yes | yes | explicit-backend journey; AI-selected not run | no |
| Bounded AI investigation (typed read-only evidence) | yes | yes | read-only actions on a booted VM | no |
| Deterministic proposal validation (fabrication/stale/ambiguous/duplicate) | yes | yes | no | no |
| Explicit backend install flags (no fallback) | yes | yes | yes (Portage install + remove, history) | no |
| No-model unqualified install refuses and offers commands | yes | yes | yes (matrix case) | no |
| Install transaction begin/finish + verification | yes | yes | yes (install verified; durable across reboot) | no |
| Installed config loaded (`/etc/phoebus/install.toml`) | yes | no | install writes it; `sys` reads it on the installed system | no |
| `sys` consistent target-root execution | yes | yes | no | no |
| `sys` validation at the execution boundary | yes | yes | no | n/a |
| `sys ask` truthful failure (nonzero, stop, record) | yes | yes | no | n/a |
| Unified package search (`sys search`, all lanes, `--legacy`) | yes | yes (cross-lane; unavailable/failed/empty distinguished; source filter) | no | no |
| Installed-package inventory (`sys list`, all lanes, `--legacy`) | yes | yes (VDB/Flatpak/Snap/AppImage; **Nix active-profile packages** vs generations/store; custom ebuild never double-counted) | yes (VM read-only group) | no |
| Package information (`sys info`, `--legacy`) | yes | yes (installed/available, version/deps/size/provenance; ambiguity flagged) | yes (VM read-only group) | no |
| Cross-source update check/apply (`sys updates`, `apply updates`) | yes | yes (exact per-source transactions with full Flatpak commits/snap revisions, pinned and revalidated; manual/project-specific refused) | Flatpak verified in VM (reviewed ref+commit, pinned update, verified); direct Snap refresh with no newer revision VM-verified, exact Snap apply-updates transaction unit-tested only; Portage verified | no |
| Nix active-profile inventory (`sys list --nix`) | yes | yes (manifest v1/v2/v3; scope; generations vs store) | yes (NIX_ENABLED=yes install: real `nodejs-slim` profile listed and filtered; a re-run correctly reported a dangling profile. **2026-09-26 on the fresh unpinned install**: bootstrap present (`/nix/store` populated, `default` link valid, `nix 2.24.9` runs); `sys list --nix` truthfully reports the base system profile has no package manifest. GC-dangling repro: `nix-collect-garbage` is not on root's PATH; user-level install/GC repro attempted — see VM evidence) | no |
| Catalogue maintenance (`depclean`, `clean cache`, `owners`, `deps`/`rdeps`) | yes | yes (structured depclean effects; cache-cleanup dry-run review + failure propagation; VDB dependency metadata) | yes (VM: depclean + cache-cleanup journeys; deps read-only) | no |
| AI-default catalogue routing (source flags constrain, never bypass) | yes | yes (investigation loop, full backend classification + optional-backend rewrite, fallback offers exact `--legacy` command) | yes (read-only routing cases) | no |
| Alternate-root catalogue/update/maintenance rooting | yes | yes (chroot for Portage/Flatpak/Nix; Snap refused; recording-runner no-host-command tests) | yes (VM: alternate-root Snap refused) | no |
| Service start/stop/restart + flatpak/nix/snapshot commands | yes | yes | no | no |
| Desktop session helpers (DMS bar/launcher/lock/idle) | yes | yes | functional test (stubs) | no |
| Mango + DankMaterialShell profile | yes | yes | live VM yes; installed desktop_install yes (174 pkgs); **installed graphical session under a seat: compositor start FAILS** — Mango exits in <1s with libseat `No backend was able to open a seat` (no seatd in the image; the logind path does not succeed under the tuigreet session). Greeter, seat, DRM, PAM authentication and `sys --legacy` are verified; kitty/DMS spotlight/lock/idle/polkit-agent/logout/reboot remain unverified | no |
| Mango is the canonical desktop | yes | yes | live VM yes; installed default session configured | no |
| greetd login (Mango + DarkMaterial) | yes | yes | yes (tuigreet verified on detached boot; **graphical authentication verified under a seat VM**: seat0 + DRM card0 + greeter session, correct password authenticates per the journal) | no |
| Live desktop ISO (Mango + DMS) | yes | guards tested | graphical VM + GUI journey + detached boot + interactive welcome (20260926 ISO, screenshot) | no |
| Live welcome autostart + duplicate prevention | yes | guards tested | live graphical VM | no |
| Welcome primary action keyboard-focus | yes | guards tested | live graphical VM | no |
| VM harness disk safety + structured results | yes | yes (16 tests) | n/a | n/a |
| Target disk revalidation before partition | yes | yes | no | n/a |
| Bridge replay/concurrency + input bounds | yes | yes | no | n/a |
| Provider transport endpoint/size hardening | yes | yes | no | n/a |
| `TargetRoot` symlink-escape guard | yes | yes | n/a | n/a |
| OpenCode server capability probe | yes | yes | real host probe + auth + policy | n/a |
| OpenCode proposal adapter (real inference) | yes | yes | real model (`deepseek-v4-flash`) | n/a |
| OpenCode in GUI / CLI / `sys ask` | yes | yes | GUI AI step + `sys ask` live | n/a |
| OpenCode full graphical install | yes | yes | yes (12 stages, 174 packages, detached boot) | n/a |
| GUI readiness refresh / AI revalidation / keyboard nav | yes | yes (Rust) | VM harness regressions | n/a |
| Mandatory AI requires a validated interaction | yes | yes | bridge + CLI | n/a |
| GURU packaging (scoped keywords) | yes | yes | no (build/install unverified) | no |
| Release gates + atomic publish | yes | yes (executable: every gate names a real harness mode; `--execute` runs each command in its own process and reports Passed/Failed/NotRun from evidence; invalid commands, isolation, failed-gate and publish refusal covered) | no (no end-to-end candidate: VM/graphical/model gates need a runner; unconfigured host reports 0 passed / 0 failed / 6 NotRun with exact missing prerequisites) | n/a |
| `sys` verbs | yes | yes | yes | no |
| OpenCode pinned bootstrap | yes | yes | no | n/a |
| Release manifest/verify | yes | yes (host CLI: manifest, verify, tampered-artifact refusal) | no | n/a |
| NVIDIA PCI device classification + branch/flavor policy | yes | yes | no | no |
| NVIDIA installed Gentoo integration (Portage/modprobe/dracut/initramfs) | yes | yes | no | no |
| NVIDIA live ISO payload (bundled modules/firmware/userspace) | yes | yes (verifier + guards) | no | no |
| NVIDIA kernel/module/initramfs update coordination (`@module-rebuild`) | yes | yes | no | no |
| NVIDIA live GPU decision + real nouveau fallback | yes | yes (fixtures + CLI) | no | no |
| Live GUI broker scoped sudoers (no `NOPASSWD: ALL`) | yes | yes (`visudo`) | no | n/a |
| Rollback acceptance harness mode | yes | yes (bash -n/unit + vacuous-pass guards) | yes (destructive gate `serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386` PASS=11 FAIL=0; root-marker creation is mandatory and asserted present before undo, absent after the detached reboot) | no |
| Desktop assistant GUI (`phoebus-assistant`) | yes | yes | yes (live VM layout) | no |
| Desktop assistant JSON-RPC bridge (`sys --assistant-bridge`) | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | n/a |
| AI-first administration contract (`sys install`, `please`, `ask`) | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | no |
| Deterministic `--legacy` administration (fail-closed source choice) | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | n/a |
| Audited action execution (`--legacy`/`--broker` enforcement) | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | n/a |
| Nix attribute verification probe | yes | yes | no | n/a |
| Portage binary binhost verification + compile abort guard | yes | yes | no | n/a |
| Cross-source application ownership & user data preservation | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | no |
| Unified multi-source update management | yes | yes | no | no |
| Quiet proactive assistance monitor & deduplicated alerting | yes | yes | no | no |
| User preference profiles & project environment mappings | yes | yes | no | n/a |
| Shared administration service layer (`service::*`) & PreparedPlan staging | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | n/a |
| Authoritative privileged validation boundary (integrity/root/uid/state/claim) | yes | yes | no (needs an authenticated VM boot) | n/a |
| Protected per-user plan storage, atomic claim, tamper/traversal rejection | yes | yes | no (needs an authenticated VM boot) | n/a |
| Plan digests, target-root/uid binding, TTL, replay & concurrent-claim protection | yes | yes | no | n/a |
| Truthful transaction outcomes (failure/verify-fail/refusal/interruption) | yes | yes | no | n/a |
| AI-first removal (deterministic discovery underneath; `--legacy` bypasses) | yes | yes | no | n/a |
| GUI plan review card for every plan type; prepared ≠ completed | yes | no (QML) | no (needs graphical VM) | no |
| Shared provider/credential handling (`ai_setup::*`) for CLI and GUI | yes | yes | no (no live credential) | n/a |
| Contextual conversation continuity (`conversation::*`) | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | n/a |
| Conversation-history privacy (minimized, redacted, 0600, bounded, clearable) | yes | yes | no | n/a |
| Target desktop QML assets & Polkit policy provisioning | yes | yes | yes (live VM layout) | no |
| Desktop assistant unprivileged execution & Polkit elevation | yes | yes | yes (live VM layout) | no |
| UKI / Secure Boot | no (deferred; `uki`/`secureboot = true` rejected at validation) | no (rejection + truthful plan rendering covered) | no | no |
| Mango workstation applications (Emacs … OpenSSH, exact atoms) | yes | yes (every atom asserted; no silent omit/substitute; Kitty kept, st absent, Nemo default) | no (needs 60–80 GiB disposable install + detached boot) | no |
| Brave stable via scoped another-brave-overlay (pinned, beta/nightly masked) | yes (stable only; pin validated pre-network, fail-closed) | yes (pin validation, scoping, mask) | no (needs network + PHOEBUS_BRAVE_PIN at ISO build + upstream checksum verification in the VM) | no |
| Zsh default for new users (root Bash, /bin/sh unchanged, packaged plugins) | yes | yes (useradd -s, root chsh, skel seeding, preservation) | no | no |
| Cursor theme (Vanilla-DMZ 24 across Mango/XWayland/GTK/Qt/DMS/greeter) | yes | yes (config files asserted) | no (ordinary/text/link/resize/busy after reboot unverified) | no |
| Default Portage ccache (installed first, 2G cap, security preserved) | yes | yes (make.conf + package asserted) | no (actual hit on a repeated source build unverified) | no |
| Local CUPS (enabled, remote sharing/admin disabled) | yes | yes (cupsd.conf asserted) | no (local print job unverified) | no |
| OpenSSH installed, sshd disabled/inactive, no firewall port | yes | yes (service set + disable asserted) | no (client -V, server present, disabled+inactive after reboot unverified) | no |
| AI connection handoff (reuse default, per-user 0600 key, truthful status) | yes | yes (0600/0700, symlink refusal, opt-out/missing/local, no secret in errors) | no (fixture handoff only; live authorized-provider result NotRun) | no |
| Startup system check (blur/PPD/matugen/cava, truthful summary) | yes | yes (4-check evaluation + summary wording) | no (recheck after reboot NotRun; needs PPD D-Bus + DMS integration) | no |
| Assistant dark default + light mode + responsive + token drift guard | yes | yes (palette/aliases, drift test, layout guards) | no (graphical VM at 1024×768/1280×720/scaled NotRun) | no |
## Fast-defaults session (2026-09-26): what was proven and what was not
- Implemented + unit-tested in this session (757 Rust tests, was 736):
`-bin` fast defaults, target-only system-wide Flatpaks with fail-closed
verification, single generic kernel guard, preference neutrality,
`convert_to_source` / `build_tuned_kernel` typed actions with full
reviews, installed welcome + DMS seed, portal/MIME defaults, install
metrics hooks, plan-review delivery section, and 4 new `sys` acceptance
cases (script now covers 37 documented cases).
- Quality gates green: `cargo fmt --check`, `clippy --workspace --all-targets
-- -D warnings`, release build, `test_vmsafety.py` 18/18, shellcheck clean.
- **Not built, not installed, not booted in this session.** No fresh ISO was
built and no disposable qcow2 install/boot ran — a session-time blocker,
not a host blocker (`make doctor`: 20 ok, 0 warnings; 104 GiB free).
The requested verifications (installed `-bin` identities, system-wide
Flatpaks + manifest, first-login welcome, graphical Calibre/GIMP launches,
file/device workflows, normal + offline recovery boots, one
source-conversion journey, one tuned-kernel build + test boot, measured
time/disk figures) are **NotRun**. Exact unblock: build the ISO
(`installer/live/build.sh`), install to a disposable 80 GiB qcow2 with
network (`serial-driver.py install`), boot detached (`serial-driver.py
boot`), run `sys-acceptance.sh` (now 37 documented cases) plus the
graphical/file/device/source/tuned gates in
`docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`; never touch `/dev/*`, never commit the
ISO/images/transcripts/secrets.
## Workstation session (2026-09-26): what was proven and what was not
- Implemented + unit-tested in this session (736/736 Rust tests): workstation
atoms, Brave scoping/pin validation, Zsh/cursor/ccache/CUPS/sshd-disabled,
AI per-user key handoff, startup-check model + truthful summary, assistant
dark/light + responsive + token drift guard, 60/20 GiB disk gates.
- Quality gates green: `cargo fmt --check`, `clippy --workspace --all-targets
-- -D warnings`, release build, `test_vmsafety.py` 18/18, shellcheck
(pre-existing SC2012 info only).
- **Not built, not installed, not booted in this session.** No fresh ISO was
built (`make doctor`: 8 GiB free, needs ≥20; workstation target needs
60–80 GiB), so there is no new ISO hash to report. No disposable qcow2
install/boot ran; the requested verifications (installed apps, Kitty
default, Zsh login, cursor consistency, local CUPS job, disabled sshd after
reboot, startup recheck, both assistant themes, model handoff with a
fixture + any live authorized-provider result) are **NotRun**. Exact
unblock: free ≥80 GiB, set `PHOEBUS_BRAVE_PIN` to the reviewed
another-brave-overlay commit at ISO build time, build the ISO, install to a
disposable 80 GiB qcow2, boot detached, and run the gates in
`docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md` (seat VM for the compositor/cursor/DMS
checks; a real 0600 provider credential for the live AI call; never touch
`/dev/*`, never commit the ISO/images/transcripts/secrets).
- **Brave review status.** Reviewed 2026-09-26 from the Gentoo wiki +
another-brave-overlay repo metadata: stable `www-client/brave-browser`
exists (binary, based on the official google-chrome ebuilds); beta/nightly
exist as separate atoms and are masked here. No overlay commit was pinned
(default pin empty, path refuses pre-network). Blocker: pick + record the
40-hex commit and verify the upstream release + checksums in the VM.
- **Screenshots.** The four September 26 screenshots referenced in the request
are not in the repo (`docs/screenshots/` holds older captures only); the
blur/PPD/matugen/cava warnings were implemented from their described text.
If the images exist elsewhere, attach their paths for pixel-level regression.
## Known limitations
- **Desktop graphical session** was verified with the *headless* wlroots
backend because the serial-only VM has no logind seat. The DRM path and a
real VT login are not yet exercised. `phoebus-session` is written by the
installer for that purpose.
- **Flatpak apps** were not installed from the remote; only the runtime and
the flathub remote were verified.
- **NVIDIA** is implemented (hardware-driven branch/flavor policy, scoped
Portage configuration, a live payload that is build-time verified, and
kernel/module/initramfs update coordination) and covered by Rust tests and the
live-payload verifier. The policy now caps Maxwell/Pascal/Volta at the last
supporting series (580) and reports a Blackwell plus proprietary-only GPU
combination as an explicit incompatibility rather than installing one driver
that cannot serve both. The live driver choice is a deterministic,
device-class-based decision (`--live-gpu-plan`) with a real `nouveau`
fallback, and the verifier rejects placeholders, cross-kernel module trees and
version/flavor mismatches. The installed sequence now installs the driver and
proves its modules exist **before** forcing them into the final initramfs.
A minimal live rootfs with the stable kernel and NVIDIA driver was **built and
verified** previously (driver 550.163.01, kernel 6.12.107+deb13-amd64, modules
`nvidia-current*`). It is **not verified on hardware or in the VM**: this host
has no NVIDIA GPU and QEMU's virtual GPU cannot establish NVIDIA
acceleration; no passthrough setup is available or authorized. The full
desktop ISO was not assembled here (the host has ~12 GiB free; the build wants
more) and the live/installed NVIDIA boot gates are unrun. See
`docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md` for the exact unblock commands. The live kernel
is pinned to Debian stable (trixie 6.12 LTS) because testing's kernel (7.2)
breaks Debian's 550 driver; the bundled branch covers Maxwell through Hopper,
and Blackwell (or a failed accelerated load) falls back to nouveau on the live
medium. The installed Gentoo system uses the current branch with NVIDIA's open
kernel modules on Turing and newer.
- **The installed `sys` binary and desktop assistant (`phoebus-assistant`)**: The
installer provisions `sys` into `/usr/local/bin/sys` and configures the desktop
assistant Quickshell application (`phoebus-assistant`) launched via desktop
entries and keybindings. On the installed system, all 38 acceptance test cases
in `installer/tests/vm/sys-acceptance.sh` pass cleanly (`PASS=38 FAIL=0`),
verifying the unified AI-first CLI/GUI interface, deterministic `--legacy`
mode, the package catalogue (search/inventory/information/update-check),
fail-closed source requirements, audited `--broker`/`--legacy` gates,
proactive system monitors, and offline fallback guidance. The matrix was
re-run on 2026-09-26 against the refactored static `sys` (`70f0a72b…`,
fetched to `/tmp/sys` on a disposable overlay of the pristine installed
image, non-root user, no mutations): guest `PASS=38 FAIL=0`, driver
`PASS=41 FAIL=0` (`serial-boot-20260926T014746Z-3089a820`).
- **Authenticated boot (UKI / UEFI Secure Boot) is not implemented and is an
open security limitation.** The installed boot path is plain unsigned BLS
(systemd-boot + dracut; the dracut UKI generator did not embed the kernel
command line, so BLS is used and verified). `kernel.uki = true` and
`kernel.secureboot = true` are rejected at configuration validation, and the
install-plan preview always reports the real BLS path, so no interface can
imply these modes are active. A future Secure Boot/UKI implementation is a
separate opt-in milestone (signed artifacts, key lifecycle, update/rollback
handling, disposable-VM boot tests with Secure Boot enabled); it must not be
enabled or advertised until that complete path passes.
- **Rollback (`sys undo`) is VM-verified** (`serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386`,
PASS=11 FAIL=0, exit 0, no secret leak in either transcript). The gate runs on
a fresh disposable overlay of the installed image: a known-good
package-database fingerprint and `/home` marker, `sys snapshot --legacy`, a
controlled reversible `app-misc/hello` install `--legacy --portage` (the
fingerprint is asserted changed, so the run cannot pass vacuously),
`sys undo <snapshot-id> --legacy`, power off, then a detached reboot that
asserts the package database restored, the root break marker absent, `/home`
surviving, systemd running, kernel modules present, the snapshot-based
recovery entry present, and rollback status recorded. Both transcripts are
kept (`serial-phase1.log`, `serial.log`).
Correction: the 2026-09-25 claim of a passing rollback had no run transcript
and did not reproduce — the committed harness then ran the guest
unprivileged, used the pre-installed `nano` as the break, restored "newest"
instead of its own snapshot, and never asserted the root marker was gone.
Those harness defects are fixed in this session (sudo authentication with
unique end markers, explicit `--legacy`, verified break, targeted undo,
marker-absent assertion) and the gate above is the evidence. Booting the
recovery entry itself offline (no network, no model) remains a manual,
un-automated gate: select "Phoebus Recovery (known-good snapshot)" in the
systemd-boot menu.
- **Mango + DankMaterialShell** is the canonical Phoebus desktop
(`desktop.profile = "mango"`, Flatpak on). It is implemented with Mango
0.17.2, DMS (pinned release), Quickshell 0.3.1 and scenefx 0.5 from the GURU
overlay and scoped `~amd64` keywords. Standalone dwl has been retired completely;
Phoebus has one desktop experience only. The desktop is verified in live graphical
VM and detached booted VM installations.
- **The live desktop ISO** (`installer/live/build.sh`) builds a Debian testing
rootfs with Mango + DMS, live-only autologin, a branded welcome window and a
graphical installer frontend over the typed bridge. Its desktop-payload
guards are unit-tested. The rebuilt ISO
(`sha256 0c386a1b…`, 1.6 GiB, build id in `/etc/phoebus/build`) was booted in
a graphical, seat-providing VM. The `gui` journey passed **28/28** checks
(welcome autostart, launcher from the keyboard, duplicate prevention, the live
medium protected, keyboard suggestion selection, the network and AI steps,
the AI gate refused without a model and reported inline, no bridge errors) and
the `opencode` journey passed **18/18** (real model response, validated
proposal, and editing the model invalidating the validated state). The
`gui-install` journey passed every assertion on a fresh 30 GiB qcow2 —
OpenCode connect/review/accept, disk, account, ERASE and confirmation — and
the backend then reported real stages with elapsed time and no fabricated
percentage. The **completed** install succeeded through all 12 stages,
compiled all 174 packages of the Mango desktop profile, and confirmed
completion (`gui-install-completes` passed). The installed system then booted
**with the ISO detached** (LUKS2 decrypt, systemd running, 0 failed units,
all Btrfs subvolumes mounted, `sys` CLI operational, and `tuigreet` greeter
active). (That paragraph describes the Sep-24 evidence run; the 2026-09-26
unpinned rerun from the rebuilt ISO is recorded in
`docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`.) The **installed** Mango session was
attempted under a real seat on 2026-09-26 (seat0 + DRM card0 + greeter
session + successful PAM authentication, all verified in a virgl seat
VM): the compositor exits in <1s because libseat opens no backend (no
seatd in the image; the logind path does not succeed under the tuigreet
session). Greeter login works; kitty, DMS spotlight, lock/idle, the
polkit agent, logout, reboot and the compositor itself stay unverified —
the libseat failure is the blocker, with the exact error recorded in
`docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`.
- **AI sandbox** is implemented (`systemd-run` hardening properties, tested at
the argv level) and fails closed without `systemd-run`; it has not been
exercised in a VM. Only typed actions and the privacy boundary were previously
enforced.
- **Release automation** now has executable gates, a report, atomic publish
and signing command helpers, but no gate has been executed by a configured
CI runner. `gates --execute` runs each gate's real command in its own
process (exit 0 → Passed, nonzero → Failed, missing harness/firmware/seat/
credential → NotRun) and never manufactures a pass. A local run (2026-09-26)
exercised manifest generation (2 artifacts), verification,
tampered-artifact refusal, and publish refusal against a NotRun gate report;
`gates --execute` on an unconfigured host reports 0 passed / 0 failed /
6 NotRun with the exact missing prerequisite per gate (OVMF_CODE/OVMF_VARS
unset, no model credential). No release was published and `latest.iso`
untouched. Minimal repeatable setup: register a Forgejo Actions runner
(`act_runner`) so `.forgejo/workflows/ci.yml` executes the gates.
- The desktop transaction compiles heavily because desktop USE does not match
the signed binhost (~26 min for the desktop set on 8 vCPUs in the test VM).
The official Gentoo binhost is OpenRC/hardened, so a systemd system can only
reuse binaries for packages whose USE matches; the policy still requests
signed binaries where it can. Publishing a matching binhost is future work.
- **Live AI provider calls are not verified.** DeepSeek/OpenAI requests are
built and reviewed by fixtures (`phoebus-ai::provider::TestTransport`) and the
curl transport is covered by a recording runner; no call was made with a real
key.
- The installer rebuilds `sys-apps/systemd` from source because
boot/policykit/cryptsetup USE differ from the binhost.
- `sys undo` is implemented with the default-subvolume, fstab, kernel-cmdline
and BLS handling described in ADR 0007; its destructive VM acceptance gate
passed in this session (`serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386`).
- **Stage3 signed-DIGESTS mechanism is now VM-verified, not just host-level.**
The parser fixture matches the real current DIGESTS byte-for-byte; on
2026-09-26 the default unpinned install from the rebuilt live ISO (which
ships the fingerprint-checked provisioned key) completed all 12 stages
plus a detached boot (`INSTALL-RC=0`, `NO_SECRET_LEAK`), which proves the
real signed DIGESTS and the downloaded archive hash verified against the
fixed trust anchor — `fetch()` must return `Ok` before `extract()` runs,
and the run demonstrably extracted. Tampered inputs are refused in the VM:
a placeholder pin is refused before any network use (zero stage3 fetches)
and a mismatched archive hash is refused after download with no extraction.
A tampered-*signature* VM case is not feasible without a network MITM (the
key is fixed and Gentoo serves authentic DIGESTS); the bad-signature
branch is unit-tested.