440 lines
42 KiB
Markdown
440 lines
42 KiB
Markdown
# Status
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Truthful implementation/verification matrix. Vocabulary:
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- **Implemented** — code exists.
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- **Unit tested** — covered by automated tests that run on any host.
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- **VM verified** — exercised in the disposable QEMU/OVMF VM.
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- **Hardware verified** — exercised on real hardware.
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- **Not verified** — do not claim it works.
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## Proven baseline (do not regress)
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A complete installation in a disposable UEFI VM, booted with the ISO detached:
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```
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QEMU + OVMF (UEFI)
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30 GiB qcow2, virtio-blk (/dev/vda); live ISO at /dev/sr0
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GPT: 1 GiB FAT32 ESP + LUKS2 remainder
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Btrfs: @ @home @var @snapshots @swap
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Gentoo systemd stage3 (default/linux/amd64/23.0/systemd)
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systemd-boot + BLS entry + dracut initramfs
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LUKS2 passphrase unlock at boot
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systemd PID 1, login, networking
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systemctl is-system-running = running; 0 failed units
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```
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Boot timing (Rust installer): 1.378 s kernel + 5.238 s initrd + 4.114 s
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userspace = 10.730 s.
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The committed VM harness (`installer/tests/vm/serial-driver.py` +
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`install.sh`) drives the **static Rust binary**; the Bash installer is no longer
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on the install path (Bash migration Phase 2, see
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`docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`).
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A second harness (`installer/tests/vm/appliance-driver.py` +
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`appliance-guest.sh`) drives the Debian-Live appliance ISO. On 2026-09-21 it
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produced `INSTALL-RC=0`, `NO_SECRET_LEAK`, and a detached boot
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(`systemd`, running, 0 failed units) whose Btrfs history contains the installer's
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coordinated `@` + `@var` **initial known-good** snapshot and a snapshot-based
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recovery boot entry (see `docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`). `sys undo` is
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VM-verified by the rollback acceptance gate
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(`serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386`, PASS=11 FAIL=0): snapshot →
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`app-misc/hello` install (package DB changed) → `sys undo <id>` → detached
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reboot with the package DB restored, the root break marker gone, `/home`
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preserved, systemd running, and the snapshot-based recovery entry present.
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Booting that recovery entry offline remains a manual gate.
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## Matrix
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| Area | Implemented | Unit tested | VM verified | Hardware verified |
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|------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------------|
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| Config (TOML + legacy), validation | yes | yes | yes | n/a |
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| Hardware/disk discovery, protection | yes | yes | yes | no |
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| Install plan + destructive preview | yes | yes | yes | n/a |
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| Destructive authorization (ERASE) | yes | yes | yes | n/a |
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| GPT partitioning + ESP | yes | yes | yes | no |
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| LUKS2 format/open/close | yes | yes | yes | no |
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| Btrfs subvolumes + swapfile | yes | yes | yes | no |
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| fstab / crypttab generation | yes | yes | yes | no |
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| stage3 fetch + verify (pinned SHA-256 or signed DIGESTS) + extract | yes | yes (both paths; every failure branch incl. missing verifier/key/DIGESTS/entry, nonzero exit, cannot-start) | yes (pinned path; **unpinned path now VM-verified**: default unpinned install from the rebuilt 20260926 ISO completed 12 stages + detached boot; placeholder-pin and archive-hash-mismatch refusals VM-verified on disposable targets with the fail-closed binary) | n/a |
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| stage3 trust anchor (fixed provisioned key) | yes | yes (`release_key_path` ignores `PHOEBUS_GENTOO_RELEASE_KEY`; test-only injection only via explicit `verify_digests_with_key`) | yes (20260926 live ISO carries the fingerprint-checked key — both Gentoo fingerprints verified inside the shipped squashfs; the unpinned VM install verified the real signed DIGESTS + archive hash against it; tampered inputs refused) | n/a |
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| Portage config + sync + getuto | yes | yes | yes | n/a |
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| Signed Gentoo binary install | yes | yes | yes | n/a |
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| Source package compilation | yes | yes | yes | n/a |
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| Kernel install + dracut initramfs | yes | yes | yes | no |
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| systemd-boot + BLS | yes | yes | yes | no |
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| Boot default pins the real kernel (not recovery) | yes | yes | yes | no |
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| Recovery BLS entry (rescue.target) | yes | yes | boots (not default) | no |
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| Users, passwords, sudo | yes | yes | yes | n/a |
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| Locale/timezone/keymap/services | yes | yes | yes | n/a |
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| Rust VM boot parity | yes | yes | yes | no |
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| Rust TUI | yes | yes | smoke test | no |
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| Typed GUI bridge (`--gui-bridge`) | yes | yes (dry-run) | live VM + full journey | n/a |
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| Graphical welcome + install wizard (Quickshell) | yes | yes | live graphical VM + full GUI journey | no |
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| Phoebus brand system (SVG + tokens) | yes | yes | live VM | n/a |
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| Desktop profile (Mango + DarkMaterial) | yes | yes | live VM + installed | no |
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| Desktop session script (socket wait, polkit, cleanup) | yes | yes | functional test (stubs) | no |
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| PipeWire/WirePlumber | yes | no | headless (`wpctl`) | no |
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| Flatpak + flathub | yes | no | installed + remote | no |
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| Fast-default Flatpaks (Calibre/GIMP/Flatseal, system-wide, target-only) | yes | yes (install/verify/provisioning; fail-closed on missing app) | yes (installed in target root, verified in `/var/lib/flatpak/app/` and `/var/lib/phoebus/flatpaks-installed`) | no |
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| Fast `-bin` defaults (firefox-bin/libreoffice-bin/thunderbird-bin, fail-closed) | yes | yes (atoms, policy, binary-capability refusal) | yes (installed identities verified in Gentoo VDB on detached boot) | no |
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| Single generic kernel default (no second generic kernel) | yes | yes (guard + tuned path keeps the fallback) | yes (existing boot path unchanged) | no |
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| User-initiated source builds (`convert_to_source`) | yes | yes (table incl. thunderbird, review, build-before-remove, Brave/unknown refusals) | no (no conversion journey run in a VM) | no |
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| Tuned-kernel build (`build_tuned_kernel`, separate BLS, fallback kept) | yes | yes (refusal without fallback, entry creation, default never blind-switched) | no (no build/boot-test in a VM) | no |
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| Installed first-login welcome (once per user, reopenable, non-blocking) | yes | yes (assets, launcher, autostart, QML guards, DMS seed) | no (first login + graphical checks not run) | no |
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| Install metrics (time, download, peak disk, installed size) | yes | yes (report rendering; orchestration hooks) | yes (Run 13 recorded 588 compile times into target metrics) | no |
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| XWayland / polkit agent / kitty / wofi | yes | no | installed, not launched | no |
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| Package policy + measured history | yes | yes | yes (326 entries) | no |
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| Background update preparation | yes | yes | yes (fetch; buildpkgonly skipped) | no |
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| Btrfs snapshots + history | yes | yes | yes | no |
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| Coordinated snapshot sets (`@` + `@var`) | yes | yes | no | no |
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| Btrfs rollback (`sys undo`) | yes | yes | yes (rollback acceptance `serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386` PASS=11 FAIL=0) | no |
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| Recovery/known-good BLS entry | yes | yes | yes: entry present + snapshot-based (rollback runs) **and the recovery entry itself was booted** (`Phoebus Recovery (known-good snapshot)` selected in the systemd-boot menu with restricted networking and no model: cmdline + findmnt prove root is the read-only `@-20260926T064646-initial-known-good` snapshot with `rescue.target`, serial login works, `sys history/rollback status --legacy` work, `sys ask` fails truthfully with the `--legacy` fallback) | no |
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| Snapshot retention + free-space gate | yes | yes | no | no |
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| AI typed proposals + evidence review | yes | yes | fixture end-to-end | n/a |
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| AI guided install (DeepSeek/OpenAI) | yes | yes | fixture path only (no live call) | n/a |
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| AI privacy boundary (facts only) | yes | yes (every string field scanned, incl. `cpu_features`; forbidden path in `cpu_features` refused) | no | n/a |
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| Provider credential + endpoint boundary | yes | yes (unsafe key characters refused before curl config; userinfo endpoint refused; derived base64 token redacted) | no | n/a |
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| AI typed-action schema (exact, incl. unit-variant extra keys) | yes | yes (plan/step/investigate actions via `validate_action_value`; smuggled extra key refused) | no | n/a |
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| AI connected-model path over a real local stub | yes | yes (4 e2e cases: valid plan executes; request has no home path/credential; shell + smuggled key + malformed fail closed) | no (local stub, not a live model) | n/a |
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| Live real-agent call (`opencode` backend) | yes | yes (`sys ask "list installed packages"` → valid plan + digest, exit 0; hostile shell/private-file instruction refused and downgraded; OpenCode tools disabled; no credential in the log) | yes — host direct (2026-09-28) and **from inside the installed VM through the loopback tunnel** (`serial-boot-20260929T102703Z-ffd1ec25`, `live-agent` + `live-agent-hostile-rejected`) with `opencode-go/deepseek-v4.1-flash` | n/a |
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| Local model through the direct sandbox (VM) | yes | yes (real Qwen2.5-1.5B GGUF via `llama-server`; both sandbox scopes reached the model; schema-noncompliant output failed closed) | VM-run 2026-09-29: reached and failed closed; a 1.5B model is too weak for exact typed plans and its 4096-token context was exceeded by the correction turn — a capable model is required (a capable agent produces valid plans) | n/a |
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| Privilege derived only from the process identity | yes | yes (an environment variable cannot forge uid 0; the removed `PHOEBUS_ALLOW_UNPRIVILEGED_EXEC` regression test) | no | n/a |
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| AI OS sandbox (systemd hardened unit) | yes | yes (argv + sandboxed-send; system properties for root, user-manager subset for non-root) | yes (`serial-boot-20260929T092147Z-6f88907a`: `AI_ROOT_RC=0` system sandbox, `AI_USER_RC=0` `--user` sandbox; previously the user path hung on a polkit `manage-units` prompt) | no |
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| Unprivileged read-only AI plan completes | yes | yes (transaction recording best-effort for non-root; mandatory for privileged mutations) | yes (`serial-boot-20260929T092147Z-6f88907a`: `AI_NOSANDBOX_RC=0` as `phoebus`) | n/a |
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| Installed assistant (`sys ask`) | yes | yes | yes (live call 2026-09-28: `sys ask "list installed packages"` via `--ai-backend opencode` to host `opencode serve` through a guest loopback tunnel, model `opencode-go/muse-spark-1.3-contributor`, valid Assistant Plan + approval digest, `AI_LIVE_RC=0`; the `show system status` phrasing elicits schema-noncompliant JSON from this model and is fail-closed rejected) | n/a |
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| Resolved package effects + approval binding (carried through execution) | yes | yes (empty vs unestablished; drift + prior-step allowance) | no | n/a |
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| Privileged approval ledger (replacement/replay/concurrency/interruption) | yes | yes (privileged entry point) | no | n/a |
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| Canonical digest recomputed at the privileged boundary (all plan kinds) | yes | yes (adversarial: swapped action resealed, every kind) | no | n/a |
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| Per-step effect binding into the approval digest (contents + aggregate) | yes | yes (adversarial: step_effects swap rejected; legit multi-step validates) | no | n/a |
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| Stable approval identity (replay after presentation edit/reseal) | yes | yes (summary/other fields/identical id/concurrent/new-id) | no | n/a |
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| Live-safe monotonic recovery (owner liveness, immutable terminal) | yes | yes (live vs abandoned, reconcile/finish race) | no | n/a |
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| Personal preferences + alert state (user-owned, system-default precedence) | yes | yes (save/reload/isolation/precedence/failure) | yes (installed VM: saved to user config, exit 0) | no |
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| Personal write ownership (elevated chown, symlink refusal, cross-uid refusal) | yes | yes (ownership-fixer seam + CLI refusal) | no | no |
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| Personal preference does not need the root-owned system transaction log | yes | yes (CLI regression: read-only transaction dir) | yes (installed VM acceptance) | n/a |
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| Installed `sys` acceptance matrix (read-only/failure) | yes | yes | yes (installed VM, HEAD binary on a golden overlay `serial-boot-20260929T092147Z-6f88907a`: read-only `SUMMARY PASS=49 FAIL=0`; root mutate `serial-boot-20260929T093329Z-4ef893cf`: `SUMMARY PASS=42 FAIL=0` incl. `mutate-install`/`mutate-remove`/`mutate-history`) | no |
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| `sys` adversarial input battery (injection/traversal/boundaries) | yes | yes (54-case `tests/sys_adversarial.rs`; five validation gaps fixed: file-path metacharacters + `..`, application-name traversal, ebuild `..` category (real overlay escape), Flatpak empty element, Nix option prefix) | no | no |
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| Portage config readable for non-root queries (`normalize_config_permissions`) | yes | yes (modes + keyring exclusion) | yes (fresh VM install: 0755/0644 out of the box; non-root `search` returns 3 results, `updates` reports 10) | no |
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| Privileged catalogue mutations (install/remove/depclean/cache/apply updates, alternate-root) | yes | yes (unit) | yes (fresh installed VM via root: 7/7 PASS) | no |
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| Rollback acceptance (snapshot -> change -> `sys undo` -> detached verify) | yes | yes | yes (`serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386` PASS=11 FAIL=0; re-verified with the HEAD binary `serial-rollback-20260929T094640Z-256c2ba1` PASS=11 on a fresh disposable overlay: package DB changed then restored, root marker gone, `/home` survives, systemd running, recovery entry present) | no |
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| Privileged `--broker` plan execution + replay rejection in a VM (pkexec path) | yes | yes (privileged entry point) | yes (non-root `pkexec` with a terminal polkit agent: cancelled auth, broker JSON success, replay rejected; required the shipped policy + wheel-admin rule) | n/a |
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| Cache-cleanup preview is non-destructive (real `eclean`/`nix-store`) | yes | yes (preview uses `--pretend --deep` / `--print-dead`; sorted bound items) | yes (real `eclean`: upstream preview, cancelled approval, approved run, drift refusal, failed cleaner; user data preserved) | n/a |
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| Reverse-dependency inspection includes installed targets | yes | yes (self-reference compares the dependent, not the target) | yes (real `sys-libs/glibc`, `sys-libs/zlib` dependents) | n/a |
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| Transaction log (outcomes, protective snapshots) | yes | yes | read-only in installed VM; write path needs root | no |
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| Flatpak/Nix bounded typed actions | yes | yes | no | no |
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| Shared hardware-aware source selection (all lanes) | yes | yes | no | no |
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| Snap lane (detect/install/list/remove/refresh/connections) | yes (reviewed first-use setup) | yes (incl. exact revisions and confinement) | partial (VM: Portage snapd, active socket, `hello-world` install/list/refresh/remove; partial confinement; refresh had no newer revision; connections not exercised. **Re-checked 2026-09-26 against the live Store**: `hello-world` still 6.4 rev 29 on every channel, refresh reports no updates; guest has no `aa-status`, confinement still `partial`. A revision-changing refresh and strict confinement stay blocked on a Store revision + AppArmor-ready guest) | no |
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| AppImage lane (import/acquire/integrity/desktop/remove) | yes | yes | yes (VM: acquire with pinned SHA, list, launch fixture, remove; tampered SHA refused) | no |
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| Custom ebuild overlay (stage/approve/build/remove) | yes | yes | yes (VM: stage → build/install → VDB+file present → remove) | no |
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| `sys` installed into the target + verified in chroot | yes | yes (unit) | yes (detached boot verified) | no |
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| AI-first install workflow (`sys install`, `sys ask`) | yes | yes | explicit-backend journey; AI-selected not run | no |
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| Bounded AI investigation (typed read-only evidence) | yes | yes | read-only actions on a booted VM | no |
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| Deterministic proposal validation (fabrication/stale/ambiguous/duplicate) | yes | yes | no | no |
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| Explicit backend install flags (no fallback) | yes | yes | yes (Portage install + remove, history) | no |
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| No-model unqualified install refuses and offers commands | yes | yes | yes (matrix case) | no |
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| Install transaction begin/finish + verification | yes | yes | yes (install verified; durable across reboot) | no |
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| Installed config loaded (`/etc/phoebus/install.toml`) | yes | no | install writes it; `sys` reads it on the installed system | no |
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| `sys` consistent target-root execution | yes | yes | no | no |
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| `sys` validation at the execution boundary | yes | yes | no | n/a |
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| `sys ask` truthful failure (nonzero, stop, record) | yes | yes | no | n/a |
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| Unified package search (`sys search`, all lanes, `--legacy`) | yes | yes (cross-lane; unavailable/failed/empty distinguished; source filter) | no | no |
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| Installed-package inventory (`sys list`, all lanes, `--legacy`) | yes | yes (VDB/Flatpak/Snap/AppImage; **Nix active-profile packages** vs generations/store; custom ebuild never double-counted) | yes (VM read-only group) | no |
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| Package information (`sys info`, `--legacy`) | yes | yes (installed/available, version/deps/size/provenance; ambiguity flagged) | yes (VM read-only group) | no |
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| Cross-source update check/apply (`sys updates`, `apply updates`) | yes | yes (exact per-source transactions with full Flatpak commits/snap revisions, pinned and revalidated; manual/project-specific refused) | Flatpak verified in VM (reviewed ref+commit, pinned update, verified); direct Snap refresh with no newer revision VM-verified, exact Snap apply-updates transaction unit-tested only; Portage verified | no |
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| Nix active-profile inventory (`sys list --nix`) | yes | yes (manifest v1/v2/v3; scope; generations vs store) | yes (NIX_ENABLED=yes install: real `nodejs-slim` profile listed and filtered; a re-run correctly reported a dangling profile. **2026-09-26 on the fresh unpinned install**: bootstrap present (`/nix/store` populated, `default` link valid, `nix 2.24.9` runs); `sys list --nix` truthfully reports the base system profile has no package manifest. GC-dangling repro: `nix-collect-garbage` is not on root's PATH; user-level install/GC repro attempted — see VM evidence. **2026-09-28 run 15**: modern XDG per-user profiles enumerated — `nix profile install nixpkgs#hello` as `phoebus` into `~/.local/state/nix/profiles/profile`, `sys list --nix` reports `hello 2.12.3 [per-user:phoebus]` with 824 store paths noted separately; installer now normalizes `/nix` + `/etc/nix*` permissions so unprivileged clients work) | no |
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| Catalogue maintenance (`depclean`, `clean cache`, `owners`, `deps`/`rdeps`) | yes | yes (structured depclean effects; cache-cleanup dry-run review + failure propagation; VDB dependency metadata) | yes (VM: depclean + cache-cleanup journeys; deps read-only) | no |
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| AI-default catalogue routing (source flags constrain, never bypass) | yes | yes (investigation loop, full backend classification + optional-backend rewrite, fallback offers exact `--legacy` command) | yes (read-only routing cases) | no |
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| Alternate-root catalogue/update/maintenance rooting | yes | yes (chroot for Portage/Flatpak/Nix; Snap refused; recording-runner no-host-command tests) | yes (VM: alternate-root Snap refused) | no |
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| Service start/stop/restart + flatpak/nix/snapshot commands | yes | yes | no | no |
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| Desktop session helpers (DMS bar/launcher/lock/idle) | yes | yes | functional test (stubs) | no |
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| Mango + DankMaterialShell profile | yes | yes | live VM yes; installed desktop_install yes (347 pkgs); **seatd service active and running on detached boot** (`/run/seatd.sock` 0660 root:seat, `phoebus` in seat group); greeter, seat, DRM, PAM authentication and `sys --legacy` are verified | no |
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| Mango is the canonical desktop | yes | yes | live VM yes; installed default session configured | no |
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| greetd login (Mango + DarkMaterial) | yes | yes | yes (tuigreet verified on detached boot; **graphical authentication verified under a seat VM**: seat0 + DRM card0 + greeter session, correct password authenticates per the journal) | no |
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| Live desktop ISO (Mango + DMS) | yes | guards tested | graphical VM + GUI journey + detached boot + interactive welcome (20260926 ISO, screenshot) | no |
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| Live welcome autostart + duplicate prevention | yes | guards tested | live graphical VM | no |
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| Welcome primary action keyboard-focus | yes | guards tested | live graphical VM | no |
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| VM harness disk safety + structured results | yes | yes (16 tests) | n/a | n/a |
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| Target disk revalidation before partition | yes | yes | no | n/a |
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| Bridge replay/concurrency + input bounds | yes | yes | no | n/a |
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| Provider transport endpoint/size hardening | yes | yes | no | n/a |
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| `TargetRoot` symlink-escape guard | yes | yes | n/a | n/a |
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| OpenCode server capability probe | yes | yes | real host probe + auth + policy | n/a |
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| OpenCode proposal adapter (real inference) | yes | yes | real model (`deepseek-v4-flash`) | n/a |
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| OpenCode in GUI / CLI / `sys ask` | yes | yes | yes (GUI AI step; `sys ask` live 2026-09-28 via opencode backend + muse-spark, valid plan + digest) | n/a |
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| OpenCode full graphical install | yes | yes | yes (12 stages, 174 packages, detached boot) | n/a |
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| GUI readiness refresh / AI revalidation / keyboard nav | yes | yes (Rust) | VM harness regressions | n/a |
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| Mandatory AI requires a validated interaction | yes | yes | bridge + CLI | n/a |
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| GURU packaging (scoped keywords) | yes | yes | no (build/install unverified) | no |
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| Release gates + atomic publish | yes | yes (executable: every gate names a real harness mode; `--execute` runs each command in its own process and reports Passed/Failed/NotRun from evidence; invalid commands, isolation, failed-gate and publish refusal covered) | no (no end-to-end candidate: VM/graphical/model gates need a runner; unconfigured host reports 0 passed / 0 failed / 6 NotRun with exact missing prerequisites) | n/a |
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| `sys` verbs | yes | yes | yes | no |
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| OpenCode pinned bootstrap | yes | yes | no | n/a |
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| Release manifest/verify | yes | yes (host CLI: manifest, verify, tampered-artifact refusal) | no | n/a |
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| NVIDIA PCI device classification + branch/flavor policy | yes | yes | no | no |
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| NVIDIA installed Gentoo integration (Portage/modprobe/dracut/initramfs) | yes | yes | no | no |
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| NVIDIA live ISO payload (bundled modules/firmware/userspace) | yes | yes (verifier + guards) | no | no |
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| NVIDIA kernel/module/initramfs update coordination (`@module-rebuild`) | yes | yes | no | no |
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| NVIDIA live GPU decision + real nouveau fallback | yes | yes (fixtures + CLI) | no | no |
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| Live GUI broker scoped sudoers (no `NOPASSWD: ALL`) | yes | yes (`visudo`) | no | n/a |
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| Rollback acceptance harness mode | yes | yes (bash -n/unit + vacuous-pass guards) | yes (destructive gate `serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386` PASS=11 FAIL=0; root-marker creation is mandatory and asserted present before undo, absent after the detached reboot) | no |
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| Desktop assistant GUI (`phoebus-assistant`) | yes | yes | yes (live VM layout) | no |
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| Desktop assistant JSON-RPC bridge (`sys --assistant-bridge`) | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | n/a |
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| AI-first administration contract (`sys install`, `please`, `ask`) | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | no |
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| Deterministic `--legacy` administration (fail-closed source choice) | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | n/a |
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| Audited action execution (`--legacy`/`--broker` enforcement) | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | n/a |
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| Nix attribute verification probe | yes | yes | no | n/a |
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| Portage binary binhost verification + compile abort guard | yes | yes | no | n/a |
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| Cross-source application ownership & user data preservation | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | no |
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| Unified multi-source update management | yes | yes | no | no |
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| Quiet proactive assistance monitor & deduplicated alerting | yes | yes | no | no |
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| User preference profiles & project environment mappings | yes | yes | no | n/a |
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| Shared administration service layer (`service::*`) & PreparedPlan staging | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | n/a |
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| Authoritative privileged validation boundary (integrity/root/uid/state/claim) | yes | yes | no (needs an authenticated VM boot) | n/a |
|
||
| Protected per-user plan storage, atomic claim, tamper/traversal rejection | yes | yes | no (needs an authenticated VM boot) | n/a |
|
||
| Plan digests, target-root/uid binding, TTL, replay & concurrent-claim protection | yes | yes | no | n/a |
|
||
| Truthful transaction outcomes (failure/verify-fail/refusal/interruption) | yes | yes | no | n/a |
|
||
| AI-first removal (deterministic discovery underneath; `--legacy` bypasses) | yes | yes | no | n/a |
|
||
| GUI plan review card for every plan type; prepared ≠ completed | yes | no (QML) | no (needs graphical VM) | no |
|
||
| Shared provider/credential handling (`ai_setup::*`) for CLI and GUI | yes | yes | no (no live credential) | n/a |
|
||
| Contextual conversation continuity (`conversation::*`) | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | n/a |
|
||
| Conversation-history privacy (minimized, redacted, 0600, bounded, clearable) | yes | yes | no | n/a |
|
||
| Target desktop QML assets & Polkit policy provisioning | yes | yes | yes (live VM layout) | no |
|
||
| Desktop assistant unprivileged execution & Polkit elevation | yes | yes | yes (live VM layout) | no |
|
||
| UKI / Secure Boot | no (deferred; `uki`/`secureboot = true` rejected at validation) | no (rejection + truthful plan rendering covered) | no | no |
|
||
| Mango workstation applications (Emacs … OpenSSH, exact atoms) | yes | yes (every atom asserted; no silent omit/substitute; Kitty kept, st absent, Nemo default) | no (needs 60–80 GiB disposable install + detached boot) | no |
|
||
| Brave stable via scoped another-brave-overlay (pinned, beta/nightly masked) | yes (stable only; pin validated pre-network, fail-closed) | yes (pin validation, scoping, mask) | no (needs network + PHOEBUS_BRAVE_PIN at ISO build + upstream checksum verification in the VM) | no |
|
||
| Zsh default for new users (root Bash, /bin/sh unchanged, packaged plugins) | yes | yes (useradd -s, root chsh, skel seeding, preservation) | no | no |
|
||
| Cursor theme (Vanilla-DMZ 24 across Mango/XWayland/GTK/Qt/DMS/greeter) | yes | yes (config files asserted) | no (ordinary/text/link/resize/busy after reboot unverified) | no |
|
||
| Default Portage ccache (installed first, 2G cap, security preserved) | yes | yes (make.conf + package asserted) | no (actual hit on a repeated source build unverified) | no |
|
||
| Local CUPS (enabled, remote sharing/admin disabled) | yes | yes (cupsd.conf asserted) | no (local print job unverified) | no |
|
||
| OpenSSH installed, sshd disabled/inactive, no firewall port | yes | yes (service set + disable asserted) | no (client -V, server present, disabled+inactive after reboot unverified) | no |
|
||
| AI connection handoff (reuse default, per-user 0600 key, truthful status) | yes | yes (0600/0700, symlink refusal, opt-out/missing/local, no secret in errors) | no (fixture handoff only; live authorized-provider result NotRun) | no |
|
||
| Startup system check (blur/PPD/matugen/cava, truthful summary) | yes | yes (4-check evaluation + summary wording) | no (recheck after reboot NotRun; needs PPD D-Bus + DMS integration) | no |
|
||
| Assistant dark default + light mode + responsive + token drift guard | yes | yes (palette/aliases, drift test, layout guards) | no (graphical VM at 1024×768/1280×720/scaled NotRun) | no |
|
||
|
||
## Fast-defaults session (2026-09-26): what was proven and what was not
|
||
|
||
- Implemented + unit-tested in this session (757 Rust tests, was 736):
|
||
`-bin` fast defaults, target-only system-wide Flatpaks with fail-closed
|
||
verification, single generic kernel guard, preference neutrality,
|
||
`convert_to_source` / `build_tuned_kernel` typed actions with full
|
||
reviews, installed welcome + DMS seed, portal/MIME defaults, install
|
||
metrics hooks, plan-review delivery section, and 4 new `sys` acceptance
|
||
cases (script now covers 37 documented cases).
|
||
- Quality gates green: `cargo fmt --check`, `clippy --workspace --all-targets
|
||
-- -D warnings`, release build, `test_vmsafety.py` 18/18, shellcheck clean.
|
||
- **Not built, not installed, not booted in this session.** A fresh ISO
|
||
was built from the fast-defaults commit and content-verified
|
||
(`installer/live/phoebus-installer-amd64-fastdefaults.iso`, 1.6 GiB,
|
||
`ad9cddb2…`, build `20260926T145700Z` from `e747baf`; embedded binaries
|
||
hash-match the fresh static build, Gentoo key shows both published
|
||
fingerprints, Mango/DMS + installer UI present; git-ignored, never
|
||
committed). No disposable qcow2 install/boot ran — a wall-clock blocker,
|
||
not a host blocker (`make doctor`: 20 ok, 0 warnings; ~103 GiB free).
|
||
The requested verifications (installed `-bin` identities, system-wide
|
||
Flatpaks + manifest, first-login welcome, graphical Calibre/GIMP launches,
|
||
file/device workflows, normal + offline recovery boots, one
|
||
source-conversion journey, one tuned-kernel build + test boot, measured
|
||
time/disk figures) are **NotRun**. Exact unblock: build the ISO
|
||
(`installer/live/build.sh`), install to a disposable 80 GiB qcow2 with
|
||
network (`serial-driver.py install`), boot detached (`serial-driver.py
|
||
boot`), run `sys-acceptance.sh` (now 37 documented cases) plus the
|
||
graphical/file/device/source/tuned gates in
|
||
`docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`; never touch `/dev/*`, never commit the
|
||
ISO/images/transcripts/secrets.
|
||
|
||
## Workstation session (2026-09-26): what was proven and what was not
|
||
|
||
- Implemented + unit-tested in this session (736/736 Rust tests): workstation
|
||
atoms, Brave scoping/pin validation, Zsh/cursor/ccache/CUPS/sshd-disabled,
|
||
AI per-user key handoff, startup-check model + truthful summary, assistant
|
||
dark/light + responsive + token drift guard, 60/20 GiB disk gates.
|
||
- Quality gates green: `cargo fmt --check`, `clippy --workspace --all-targets
|
||
-- -D warnings`, release build, `test_vmsafety.py` 18/18, shellcheck
|
||
(pre-existing SC2012 info only).
|
||
- **Not built, not installed, not booted in this session.** No fresh ISO was
|
||
built (`make doctor`: 8 GiB free, needs ≥20; workstation target needs
|
||
60–80 GiB), so there is no new ISO hash to report. No disposable qcow2
|
||
install/boot ran; the requested verifications (installed apps, Kitty
|
||
default, Zsh login, cursor consistency, local CUPS job, disabled sshd after
|
||
reboot, startup recheck, both assistant themes, model handoff with a
|
||
fixture + any live authorized-provider result) are **NotRun**. Exact
|
||
unblock: free ≥80 GiB, set `PHOEBUS_BRAVE_PIN` to the reviewed
|
||
another-brave-overlay commit at ISO build time, build the ISO, install to a
|
||
disposable 80 GiB qcow2, boot detached, and run the gates in
|
||
`docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md` (seat VM for the compositor/cursor/DMS
|
||
checks; a real 0600 provider credential for the live AI call; never touch
|
||
`/dev/*`, never commit the ISO/images/transcripts/secrets).
|
||
- **Brave review status.** Reviewed 2026-09-26 from the Gentoo wiki +
|
||
another-brave-overlay repo metadata: stable `www-client/brave-browser`
|
||
exists (binary, based on the official google-chrome ebuilds); beta/nightly
|
||
exist as separate atoms and are masked here. No overlay commit was pinned
|
||
(default pin empty, path refuses pre-network). Blocker: pick + record the
|
||
40-hex commit and verify the upstream release + checksums in the VM.
|
||
- **Screenshots.** The four September 26 screenshots referenced in the request
|
||
are not in the repo (`docs/screenshots/` holds older captures only); the
|
||
blur/PPD/matugen/cava warnings were implemented from their described text.
|
||
If the images exist elsewhere, attach their paths for pixel-level regression.
|
||
|
||
## Known limitations
|
||
|
||
- **Desktop graphical session** was verified with the *headless* wlroots
|
||
backend because the serial-only VM has no logind seat. The DRM path and a
|
||
real VT login are not yet exercised. `phoebus-session` is written by the
|
||
installer for that purpose.
|
||
- **Flatpak apps** were not installed from the remote; only the runtime and
|
||
the flathub remote were verified.
|
||
- **NVIDIA** is implemented (hardware-driven branch/flavor policy, scoped
|
||
Portage configuration, a live payload that is build-time verified, and
|
||
kernel/module/initramfs update coordination) and covered by Rust tests and the
|
||
live-payload verifier. The policy now caps Maxwell/Pascal/Volta at the last
|
||
supporting series (580) and reports a Blackwell plus proprietary-only GPU
|
||
combination as an explicit incompatibility rather than installing one driver
|
||
that cannot serve both. The live driver choice is a deterministic,
|
||
device-class-based decision (`--live-gpu-plan`) with a real `nouveau`
|
||
fallback, and the verifier rejects placeholders, cross-kernel module trees and
|
||
version/flavor mismatches. The installed sequence now installs the driver and
|
||
proves its modules exist **before** forcing them into the final initramfs.
|
||
A minimal live rootfs with the stable kernel and NVIDIA driver was **built and
|
||
verified** previously (driver 550.163.01, kernel 6.12.107+deb13-amd64, modules
|
||
`nvidia-current*`). It is **not verified on hardware or in the VM**: this host
|
||
has no NVIDIA GPU and QEMU's virtual GPU cannot establish NVIDIA
|
||
acceleration; no passthrough setup is available or authorized. The full
|
||
desktop ISO was not assembled here (the host has ~12 GiB free; the build wants
|
||
more) and the live/installed NVIDIA boot gates are unrun. See
|
||
`docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md` for the exact unblock commands. The live kernel
|
||
is pinned to Debian stable (trixie 6.12 LTS) because testing's kernel (7.2)
|
||
breaks Debian's 550 driver; the bundled branch covers Maxwell through Hopper,
|
||
and Blackwell (or a failed accelerated load) falls back to nouveau on the live
|
||
medium. The installed Gentoo system uses the current branch with NVIDIA's open
|
||
kernel modules on Turing and newer.
|
||
- **The installed `sys` binary and desktop assistant (`phoebus-assistant`)**: The
|
||
installer provisions `sys` into `/usr/local/bin/sys` and configures the desktop
|
||
assistant Quickshell application (`phoebus-assistant`) launched via desktop
|
||
entries and keybindings. On the installed system, all 38 acceptance test cases
|
||
in `installer/tests/vm/sys-acceptance.sh` pass cleanly (`PASS=38 FAIL=0`),
|
||
verifying the unified AI-first CLI/GUI interface, deterministic `--legacy`
|
||
mode, the package catalogue (search/inventory/information/update-check),
|
||
fail-closed source requirements, audited `--broker`/`--legacy` gates,
|
||
proactive system monitors, and offline fallback guidance. The matrix was
|
||
re-run on 2026-09-26 against the refactored static `sys` (`70f0a72b…`,
|
||
fetched to `/tmp/sys` on a disposable overlay of the pristine installed
|
||
image, non-root user, no mutations): guest `PASS=38 FAIL=0`, driver
|
||
`PASS=41 FAIL=0` (`serial-boot-20260926T014746Z-3089a820`).
|
||
- **Authenticated boot (UKI / UEFI Secure Boot) is not implemented and is an
|
||
open security limitation.** The installed boot path is plain unsigned BLS
|
||
(systemd-boot + dracut; the dracut UKI generator did not embed the kernel
|
||
command line, so BLS is used and verified). `kernel.uki = true` and
|
||
`kernel.secureboot = true` are rejected at configuration validation, and the
|
||
install-plan preview always reports the real BLS path, so no interface can
|
||
imply these modes are active. A future Secure Boot/UKI implementation is a
|
||
separate opt-in milestone (signed artifacts, key lifecycle, update/rollback
|
||
handling, disposable-VM boot tests with Secure Boot enabled); it must not be
|
||
enabled or advertised until that complete path passes.
|
||
- **Rollback (`sys undo`) is VM-verified** (`serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386`,
|
||
PASS=11 FAIL=0, exit 0, no secret leak in either transcript). The gate runs on
|
||
a fresh disposable overlay of the installed image: a known-good
|
||
package-database fingerprint and `/home` marker, `sys snapshot --legacy`, a
|
||
controlled reversible `app-misc/hello` install `--legacy --portage` (the
|
||
fingerprint is asserted changed, so the run cannot pass vacuously),
|
||
`sys undo <snapshot-id> --legacy`, power off, then a detached reboot that
|
||
asserts the package database restored, the root break marker absent, `/home`
|
||
surviving, systemd running, kernel modules present, the snapshot-based
|
||
recovery entry present, and rollback status recorded. Both transcripts are
|
||
kept (`serial-phase1.log`, `serial.log`).
|
||
Correction: the 2026-09-25 claim of a passing rollback had no run transcript
|
||
and did not reproduce — the committed harness then ran the guest
|
||
unprivileged, used the pre-installed `nano` as the break, restored "newest"
|
||
instead of its own snapshot, and never asserted the root marker was gone.
|
||
Those harness defects are fixed in this session (sudo authentication with
|
||
unique end markers, explicit `--legacy`, verified break, targeted undo,
|
||
marker-absent assertion) and the gate above is the evidence. Booting the
|
||
recovery entry itself offline (no network, no model) remains a manual,
|
||
un-automated gate: select "Phoebus Recovery (known-good snapshot)" in the
|
||
systemd-boot menu.
|
||
- **Mango + DankMaterialShell** is the canonical Phoebus desktop
|
||
(`desktop.profile = "mango"`, Flatpak on). It is implemented with Mango
|
||
0.17.2, DMS (pinned release), Quickshell 0.3.1 and scenefx 0.5 from the GURU
|
||
overlay and scoped `~amd64` keywords. Standalone dwl has been retired completely;
|
||
Phoebus has one desktop experience only. The desktop is verified in live graphical
|
||
VM and detached booted VM installations.
|
||
- **The live desktop ISO** (`installer/live/build.sh`) builds a Debian testing
|
||
rootfs with Mango + DMS, live-only autologin, a branded welcome window and a
|
||
graphical installer frontend over the typed bridge. Its desktop-payload
|
||
guards are unit-tested. The rebuilt ISO
|
||
(`sha256 0c386a1b…`, 1.6 GiB, build id in `/etc/phoebus/build`) was booted in
|
||
a graphical, seat-providing VM. The `gui` journey passed **28/28** checks
|
||
(welcome autostart, launcher from the keyboard, duplicate prevention, the live
|
||
medium protected, keyboard suggestion selection, the network and AI steps,
|
||
the AI gate refused without a model and reported inline, no bridge errors) and
|
||
the `opencode` journey passed **18/18** (real model response, validated
|
||
proposal, and editing the model invalidating the validated state). The
|
||
`gui-install` journey passed every assertion on a fresh 30 GiB qcow2 —
|
||
OpenCode connect/review/accept, disk, account, ERASE and confirmation — and
|
||
the backend then reported real stages with elapsed time and no fabricated
|
||
percentage. The **completed** install succeeded through all 12 stages,
|
||
compiled all 174 packages of the Mango desktop profile, and confirmed
|
||
completion (`gui-install-completes` passed). The installed system then booted
|
||
**with the ISO detached** (LUKS2 decrypt, systemd running, 0 failed units,
|
||
all Btrfs subvolumes mounted, `sys` CLI operational, and `tuigreet` greeter
|
||
active). (That paragraph describes the Sep-24 evidence run; the 2026-09-26
|
||
unpinned rerun from the rebuilt ISO is recorded in
|
||
`docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`.) The **installed** Mango session's
|
||
seat management blocker was resolved on 2026-09-28 (Run 13): `sys-auth/seatd`
|
||
installed with `server systemd builtin` USE, `seatd.service` active and
|
||
verified running on detached boot (`/run/seatd.sock` mode 0660 root:seat),
|
||
`phoebus` and greeter users in group `seat`, and session startup script
|
||
includes bounded seat socket wait. Graphical desktop seat verification
|
||
under headless wlroots is proven; graphical verification under a physical seat
|
||
remains an open hardware gate.
|
||
- **AI sandbox** is implemented (`systemd-run` hardening properties) and is now
|
||
exercised in a disposable VM: the **system** sandbox (full property set) for a
|
||
root caller and the **user** sandbox (`systemd-run --user`, with
|
||
`DynamicUser`/`PrivateDevices`/`ProtectKernelModules` omitted because the user
|
||
manager rejects them) for an unprivileged caller. Before the fix, an
|
||
unprivileged `sys ask` hung on a polkit `manage-units` password prompt; it now
|
||
completes (`serial-boot-20260929T092147Z-6f88907a`, `AI_ROOT_RC=0`,
|
||
`AI_USER_RC=0`). Open hypothesis: a read-only `flatpak search` can trigger
|
||
Flatpak's interactive `appstream-update` polkit prompt when the session is not
|
||
recognized as active (headless serial); polkit's default `allow_active=yes`
|
||
covers a real active seat. Not yet exercised: a strict-confinement AppArmor
|
||
guest and a physical seat.
|
||
- **Release automation** now has executable gates, a report, atomic publish
|
||
and signing command helpers, but no gate has been executed by a configured
|
||
CI runner. `gates --execute` runs each gate's real command in its own
|
||
process (exit 0 → Passed, nonzero → Failed, missing harness/firmware/seat/
|
||
credential → NotRun) and never manufactures a pass. A local run (2026-09-26)
|
||
exercised manifest generation (2 artifacts), verification,
|
||
tampered-artifact refusal, and publish refusal against a NotRun gate report;
|
||
`gates --execute` on an unconfigured host reports 0 passed / 0 failed /
|
||
6 NotRun with the exact missing prerequisite per gate (OVMF_CODE/OVMF_VARS
|
||
unset, no model credential). No release was published and `latest.iso`
|
||
untouched. Minimal repeatable setup: register a Forgejo Actions runner
|
||
(`act_runner`) so `.forgejo/workflows/ci.yml` executes the gates.
|
||
- The desktop transaction compiles heavily because desktop USE does not match
|
||
the signed binhost (~26 min for the desktop set on 8 vCPUs in the test VM).
|
||
The official Gentoo binhost is OpenRC/hardened, so a systemd system can only
|
||
reuse binaries for packages whose USE matches; the policy still requests
|
||
signed binaries where it can. Publishing a matching binhost is future work.
|
||
- **Live AI provider calls are not verified.** DeepSeek/OpenAI requests are
|
||
built and reviewed by fixtures (`phoebus-ai::provider::TestTransport`) and the
|
||
curl transport is covered by a recording runner; no call was made with a real
|
||
key.
|
||
- The installer rebuilds `sys-apps/systemd` from source because
|
||
boot/policykit/cryptsetup USE differ from the binhost.
|
||
- `sys undo` is implemented with the default-subvolume, fstab, kernel-cmdline
|
||
and BLS handling described in ADR 0007; its destructive VM acceptance gate
|
||
passed in this session (`serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386`).
|
||
- **Stage3 signed-DIGESTS mechanism is now VM-verified, not just host-level.**
|
||
The parser fixture matches the real current DIGESTS byte-for-byte; on
|
||
2026-09-26 the default unpinned install from the rebuilt live ISO (which
|
||
ships the fingerprint-checked provisioned key) completed all 12 stages
|
||
plus a detached boot (`INSTALL-RC=0`, `NO_SECRET_LEAK`), which proves the
|
||
real signed DIGESTS and the downloaded archive hash verified against the
|
||
fixed trust anchor — `fetch()` must return `Ok` before `extract()` runs,
|
||
and the run demonstrably extracted. Tampered inputs are refused in the VM:
|
||
a placeholder pin is refused before any network use (zero stage3 fetches)
|
||
and a mismatched archive hash is refused after download with no extraction.
|
||
A tampered-*signature* VM case is not feasible without a network MITM (the
|
||
key is fixed and Gentoo serves authentic DIGESTS); the bad-signature
|
||
branch is unit-tested.
|