phoebus_os/docs/ROADMAP.md
Phoebus b8152054b6
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fix(installer): harden boot recovery and desktop reliability
2026-10-01 07:03:42 -07:00

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Roadmap

Priority order is deliberate. Do not skip a higher item because a later one is more interesting. Status vocabulary: Done, Partial, Next, Later.

# Item Status Evidence / notes
1 Verify the Bash baseline Done (retired) tagged v0.1.0-bash-reference; retired with evidence in docs/BASH-MIGRATION.md
2 Build the Rust architecture Done installer-rs/ workspace, 5 crates
3 Port the deterministic core Done phoebus-core (config, plan, policy, validation, models)
4 Port the destructive backend Done phoebus-executor (storage, LUKS2, Btrfs, Portage, boot, users, services)
5 Rust VM boot parity Done Full encrypted UEFI install + boot, zero failed units, 10.7 s
6 Finish the desktop Partial Mango + DankMaterialShell is the canonical desktop; installed seat0/DRM login, panel, terminal, spotlight, lock/unlock and logout passed in a VM; physical hardware, idle and polkit prompts remain unverified
7 Finish Flatpak Partial flatpak 1.18.1 installed, flathub configured; bounded typed flatpak_* actions added; fast defaults install Calibre/GIMP/Flatseal system-wide from Flathub in the target (unit-tested, fail-closed verification; VM launch/MIME/update checks not run)
8 Instrument source/binary policy Done measured compile times harvested from emerge.log (326 entries); resolved-effect previews added
9 Background update preparation Partial distfile fetch VM-verified; --buildpkgonly skipped while deps need merging (recorded Ready); activation explicit
10 Snapshots / rollback Partial final candidate: sys undo 11/11, interrupted update recovery 10/10, offline recovery 6/6 and automatic failed-boot fallback 9/9 on fresh-install overlays; physical hardware remains unverified
11 AI privilege and privacy architecture Partial typed actions + enforced privacy boundary + guided proposal review + OS-level sandbox (systemd-run hardening) + approval-bound resolved effects; live OpenCode calls and the sys ask sandbox have VM evidence, while the full installed candidate journey is pending
12 sys operations Done history, enable/disable, inspect, install, prepare-updates VM-verified; target-root consistency, execution-boundary validation, truthful ask failure, full transaction outcomes, empty-vs-unestablished plans, start/stop/restart + flatpak/nix/snapshot commands, deterministic --legacy administration, audited --broker/--legacy gates, unified multi-source updates, quiet proactive assistance, shared service layer (phoebus_installer::service), and 23-case VM acceptance suite (sys-acceptance.sh 23/23 PASS)
13 Kernel optimization policy Later conservative fragments only; SAFE/OPTIMIZED/AGGRESSIVE selection exists
14 ISO / release pipeline Partial manifest/verify/assemble-plan tooling; release gates are executable (gates --execute runs each gate's real command and reports Passed/Failed/NotRun from evidence; publish refuses unless every gate passed); the CI gate remains NotRun until an independent runner is configured
15 Recovery environment Later recovery BLS entry generated; snapshot-based recovery entry written at install; full recovery image not built
— Rust TUI Partial ratatui UI with plan/ERASE and AI provider selection; not yet the default on all paths
— Graphical installer (welcome + wizard) Partial Quickshell/QML over the typed --gui-bridge; final candidate live UEFI GUI 32/32, real OpenCode guided proposal 18/18, two encrypted installs 5/5 each and installed desktop 30/30 (ADR 0010)
— AI-guided install optimization Partial DeepSeek/OpenAI/local providers, evidence-gated typed review, mandatory at install with --no-ai break-glass; real OpenCode proposal validated and four changes applied in the live candidate VM
— Nix as a built-in second lane Partial pinned-release bootstrap; nix-daemon active and nix shell nixpkgs#hello VM-verified; on by default
— Hardware-aware software selection (all lanes) Partial shared policy + candidate resolution + choose_package/set_package_preference (unit-tested); Snap first-use/install/refresh/remove, AppImage and custom-ebuild journeys VM-verified; strict Snap confinement and changed-revision update remain (ADR 0006 revised)
— AI-first package administration Done unified CLI (sys install, please, ask) and desktop GUI (phoebus-assistant) backed by shared service::* planning, PreparedPlan digests with replay protection, Polkit elevation, QML provisioning, conversation continuity (conversation::*), Nix attribute verification, Portage binhost checks, and cross-source removal
— Git workflow + agent guide Done this docs/ set, .githooks/, scripts/

Immediate next steps

  1. CI runner: register an independent Forgejo Actions runner and record a passing run of make check for the verified ISO candidate. The release gate is NotRun, so keep ISO SHA-256 b14f37e1…c7b986b5281 unpublished.
  2. Physical hardware follow-up: verify Mango + DarkMaterial on a real VT, including idle, polkit prompts, logout and reboot. The graphical VM already proved greetd login, terminal, DMS spotlight and lock/unlock/logout.
  3. Cleanup follow-up: diagnose the nonfatal busy LUKS mapper on installer finalization, after all target subvolumes have unmounted.
  4. Binary strategy: keep the official signed binhost for packages whose USE matches and use Flatpak/Nix for other binaries; do not publish a private Gentoo binhost (ADR 0006). Verify with emerge -pv and record reuse.
  5. Lane follow-up in the disposable VM: the installed sys matrix, Snap first-use/install/refresh/remove, AppImage acquire/launch/remove, and custom-ebuild build now have VM evidence. Exercise an actual Snap revision change and strict AppArmor confinement when suitable fixtures are available (docs/SYS.md).
  6. AI follow-up: the live installer guided OpenCode path passed with a real connected model. Recheck installed sys ask and sandbox behavior against the final candidate ISO; the live installer model gate does not cover this.

Later

  • Secure Boot / UKI as a separate opt-in milestone (not enabled by default): key ownership and enrollment, signed UKIs containing kernel, initrd and command line, signed normal/previous/recovery entries, atomic updates and rollback, plus OVMF positive and tamper tests. Ordinary BLS entries never imply Secure Boot protection. Blocked until stage3 trust, recovery, and update paths are reliable.
  • Full recovery environment (network, LUKS, Btrfs, Portage/kernel repair).
  • Automated biweekly ISO candidate build with tiered tests and atomic publish.
  • AI OS sandbox (systemd sandboxing / namespaces / bubblewrap / Landlock).
  • Local model support; richer provider onboarding.
  • Optimised kernel profiles with real hardware detection.
  • Risk-class update policy (CORE / PROVEN / EDGE) and update preflight.