Live image ships gnupg plus the Gentoo release key, fingerprint-checked at build time against the published release-key fingerprints, so the fail-closed DIGESTS verification cannot be silently skipped. Rollback harness: authenticate sudo (unique end markers, verified timestamp, abort instead of hanging), run both guest phases as root, use explicit --legacy for snapshot/break/undo, fix the verify SYS path, emit the real systemd state, and preserve the phase-1 transcript.
154 lines
6.6 KiB
Bash
154 lines
6.6 KiB
Bash
# Disposable UEFI VM harness
|
|
|
|
Proves that the installer produces a bootable encrypted system without ever
|
|
touching a physical disk. The target is always a qcow2 file.
|
|
|
|
## Files
|
|
|
|
- `run-vm.sh` interactive QEMU launcher (manual testing).
|
|
- `install.sh` guest-side, non-interactive installation (run in the VM).
|
|
- `serial-driver.py` host-side pexpect driver (`install`, `boot` and
|
|
`rollback` modes).
|
|
- `rollback-guest.sh`, `rollback-verify.sh` guest-side rollback acceptance
|
|
(fetch `sys`, snapshot, break, undo, verify).
|
|
- `snap-guest.sh` guest-side Snap setup/install/refresh/remove acceptance.
|
|
- `test.conf.example` installer configuration used by the driver.
|
|
|
|
## Host prerequisites
|
|
|
|
- `qemu-system-x86_64`, `qemu-img`, OVMF firmware, Python `pexpect`.
|
|
- The reference Gentoo ISO.
|
|
- The static Rust installer (the guest never runs the Bash tree):
|
|
|
|
```sh
|
|
cd installer-rs
|
|
RUSTFLAGS="-C target-feature=+crt-static" \
|
|
cargo build --release -p phoebus-installer --target x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
## Procedure
|
|
|
|
Serve the static installer, the stage3 and the config to the guest:
|
|
|
|
```sh
|
|
cd /path/to/serve
|
|
cp /path/to/phoebus_os/installer-rs/target/x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/release/phoebus-installer .
|
|
cp /path/to/phoebus_os/installer/tests/vm/install.sh .
|
|
cp /path/to/phoebus_os/installer/tests/vm/test.conf.example test.conf # edit TARGET_DISK etc.
|
|
sha256sum stage3.tar.xz # set STAGE3_SHA256
|
|
python3 -m http.server 8000 --bind 127.0.0.1
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
Run the installation (driver boots the ISO kernel/initrd directly and drives
|
|
the serial console):
|
|
|
|
```sh
|
|
QEMU_BIN=/path/to/qemu-system-x86_64 \
|
|
QEMU_LIBDIR=/path/to/qemu/libs \
|
|
QEMU_DATADIR=/path/to/qemu/share \
|
|
OVMF_CODE=/path/to/OVMF_CODE_4M.fd \
|
|
OVMF_VARS=/path/to/OVMF_VARS.fd \
|
|
DISK=/tmp/phoebus/target.qcow2 \
|
|
ISO=/path/to/livegui-amd64.iso \
|
|
KERNEL=/tmp/live/boot/gentoo INITRD=/tmp/live/boot/gentoo.igz \
|
|
INSTALL_URL=http://10.0.2.2:8000/install.sh \
|
|
python3 installer/tests/vm/serial-driver.py install
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
Then boot the disk alone (ISO detached) and verify:
|
|
|
|
```sh
|
|
DISK=/tmp/phoebus/target.qcow2 OVMF_CODE=... OVMF_VARS=... \
|
|
python3 installer/tests/vm/serial-driver.py boot
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
To patch a console into an existing entry for observation, the BLS entry in
|
|
`/efi/loader/entries/*.conf` takes an `options` line; the installer can also
|
|
embed a console via `KERNEL_CONSOLE` (`GENTOO_KERNEL_CONSOLE` equivalent).
|
|
|
|
## Rollback acceptance (`serial-driver.py rollback`)
|
|
|
|
`rollback` drives the real rollback path end to end on an
|
|
**already-installed** disposable disk:
|
|
|
|
1. boot the installed disk, unlock LUKS and log in;
|
|
2. fetch `sys` and `rollback-guest.sh` from the host (the installed system
|
|
carries `/usr/local/bin/sys`; the host copy is a fallback), authenticate
|
|
`sudo` (the password is sent only at sudo's own no-echo prompt, never on a
|
|
command line), record the `/var/db/pkg` fingerprint and a `/home` marker,
|
|
create a recovery point with `sys snapshot`, install a small package (a
|
|
controlled, reversible update) and run `sys undo` — all as root, because
|
|
unprivileged runs would be refused and prove nothing;
|
|
3. power off, boot the disk detached, and run `rollback-verify.sh` (also as
|
|
root), comparing the package fingerprint and the `/home` marker, checking
|
|
kernel modules, systemd state, and reading the snapshot recovery entry and
|
|
`sys rollback status`.
|
|
|
|
Both transcripts are kept (`serial-phase1.log`, `serial.log`). The guest
|
|
scripts refuse to run unprivileged (`ROLLBACK-NEEDS-ROOT` /
|
|
`AFTER-NEEDS-ROOT`) so a lost `sudo` timestamp fails loudly instead of
|
|
recording vacuous passes.
|
|
|
|
Serve the fixtures as well as the installer:
|
|
|
|
```sh
|
|
cp installer/tests/vm/rollback-guest.sh installer/tests/vm/rollback-verify.sh /path/to/serve/
|
|
cp installer-rs/target/x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/release/sys /path/to/serve/
|
|
DISK=/tmp/phoebus/installed-clone.qcow2 OVMF_CODE=... OVMF_VARS=... \
|
|
python3 installer/tests/vm/serial-driver.py rollback
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
Point `DISK` at a **disposable clone** of the evidence image so the original is
|
|
preserved. Booting the recovery entry itself with the network removed remains a
|
|
manual gate; the harness records the entry but does not select it.
|
|
|
|
## Snap acceptance on an installed disposable image
|
|
|
|
Serve the current static `sys` binary and `snap-guest.sh` from a small local
|
|
directory. Boot an installed **qcow2 overlay** with `serial-driver.py boot`,
|
|
setting `BOOT_AUTHENTICATE=1`, `BOOT_POWEROFF=1`, `CHECKS_TIMEOUT=7200`,
|
|
and the following checks. `BOOT_POWEROFF` cleanly shuts down the guest after
|
|
mutating checks so a later boot observes committed state:
|
|
|
|
```sh
|
|
BOOT_REQUIRE_CASES=snap-sys,snap-portage,snap-socket,snap-confinement,snap-install,snap-refresh,snap-remove
|
|
BOOT_CHECKS='echo ===CHECKS-$(printf START)===; echo SYSTEMD_STATUS:$(systemctl is-system-running); curl -fsSL http://10.0.2.2:8000/snap-guest.sh -o /tmp/snap-guest.sh; sudo bash /tmp/snap-guest.sh; echo ===CHECKS-$(printf END)==='
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
The guest script adds only the scoped `sys-fs/squashfs-tools lzma lzo` USE
|
|
setting to the disposable image, then uses `sys` for the reviewed Portage
|
|
install, socket activation and Snap actions. The boot driver logs only guest
|
|
output, not the test passwords it sends for LUKS, login and `sudo`.
|
|
|
|
## Safety (enforced, not just documented)
|
|
|
|
`vmsafety.py` validates every writable drive before QEMU starts:
|
|
|
|
- `DISK`/`DISKS` must name **qcow2** files inside the disposable directory
|
|
`PHOEBUS_VM_DISKS` (default `$PHOEBUS_VM_STATE/disks`).
|
|
- `/dev/*` paths, block and character devices, non-regular files, raw images,
|
|
symlinks that resolve outside the directory, and disks whose backing chain
|
|
reaches outside it are **refused** with a nonzero exit.
|
|
- Each run gets a private state directory (mode 0700), its own writable OVMF
|
|
variable file and a unique QMP monitor socket.
|
|
- Screenshots use structured QMP and argument arrays; there is no shell
|
|
interpolation (`os.system`) in the harness.
|
|
- Secrets are passed through 0600 files and checked for leakage in the
|
|
installer log by the guest script.
|
|
|
|
## Results
|
|
|
|
Every driver writes `results.json` (and a `screenshot-manifest.json` for the
|
|
GUI driver) under its run directory and exits nonzero on any `FAIL` (and, with
|
|
`PHOEBUS_VM_STRICT=1`, on `BLOCKED`/`NOT RUN`). Statuses are `PASS`, `FAIL`,
|
|
`BLOCKED`, `SKIPPED` and `NOT RUN`; a timeout is always a `FAIL`, never a pass.
|
|
|
|
```sh
|
|
make test-vm # unit-test the safety and result logic (no VM needed)
|
|
PHOEBUS_VM_DISKS=/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/disks \
|
|
OVMF_CODE=/usr/share/OVMF/OVMF_CODE_4M.fd \
|
|
OVMF_VARS=/usr/share/OVMF/OVMF_VARS_4M.fd \
|
|
DISK=/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/disks/target.qcow2 \
|
|
ISO=installer/live/phoebus-installer-amd64.iso \
|
|
python3 installer/tests/vm/gui-driver.py gui
|
|
```
|