phoebus_os/docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md
2026-09-26 02:05:41 -07:00

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# Disposable UEFI VM boot verification
This records the first successful end-to-end install and boot of Phoebus OS
against a disposable qcow2 disk. No physical disk was ever touched.
## Exact tested path
Host (Ubuntu, no root required):
- QEMU `qemu-system-x86_64` (extracted locally under `/tmp/opencode/qemudeb`),
OVMF (`OVMF_CODE_4M.fd` + `OVMF_VARS_4M.fd`).
- Target disk: `/tmp/opencode/vm/work/target.qcow2`, 30 GiB, virtio-blk
(`/dev/vda` in the guest).
- Live boot: the reference ISO's own `boot/gentoo` + `boot/gentoo.igz`, with
`-append "root=live:CDLABEL=gentoo-amd64-livegui rd.live.dir=/
rd.live.squashimg=image.squashfs cdroot console=ttyS0,115200"`.
- A host `python3 -m http.server` serves the installer tarball, the pinned
stage3 and the test config to the guest over QEMU user networking.
Phase 1 (install):
1. Boot the live ISO headless; get a root shell on the serial console.
2. Download the installer and test config from the host.
3. Write secrets to `0600` files and run the installer binary (the original
run used the Bash prototype; the harness now serves `phoebus-installer`):
`phoebus-installer --config test.conf --install --yes
--luks-passphrase-file FILE --user-password-file FILE`
4. Stages executed in order: `preflight, storage, stage3, fstab,
portage, base packages, kernel, bootloader, users, services, desktop,
finalize`.
Phase 2 (boot the disk alone, ISO detached):
5. Power off, then start a new QEMU with **no ISO and no `-kernel`**, boot
`order=c`, same OVMF NVRAM.
6. Firmware runs `\EFI\systemd\systemd-bootx64.efi`; systemd-boot boots the
"Gentoo Linux" BLS entry from the ESP.
7. `systemd-cryptsetup` prompts for the LUKS2 passphrase, unlocks
`/dev/vda2`, mounts the Btrfs `@` subvolume as `/`.
8. systemd (PID 1) starts, serial getty appears, user login succeeds.
## Verified results
- Firmware booted the disk's own systemd-boot (Boot000C "Linux Boot Manager").
- LUKS2 passphrase prompt and successful unlock.
- Btrfs subvolumes mounted: `/`, `/home`, `/var`, `/.snapshots`, `/swap`
(later fix), ESP at `/efi`.
- `cat /proc/1/comm` -> `systemd`.
- `systemd-analyze`: 1.442s kernel + 5.755s initrd + 2.942s userspace.
- Login as `phoebus` with the configured password; groups:
`wheel audio video render input plugdev power network libinput`.
- Networking up (`enp0s2 10.0.2.15/24`).
- `systemctl --failed`: exactly one unit, `swap-swapfile.swap` (fixed after
this run; see below).
## Bugs found and fixed during this work
1. **Subvolumes created after mounting `@`** - `storage_prepare` mounted
`subvol=@` before `@` existed (mount exit 32). Added `btrfs_create_layout`
(mount top-level, create subvols, unmount, then mount layout) and a
regression test (`tests/test_btrfs_order.sh`).
2. **Generated fstab overwritten by stage3** - fstab/crypttab were generated
during storage, then the stage3 tarball replaced `/etc/fstab`. Moved
generation to a new `fstab_generate` stage after extraction.
3. **`/var/tmp` absent in the target** - systemd's `kernel-install` needs a
temporary directory; `/var/tmp` was missing. The fstab stage now creates
`/var/tmp`, `/tmp`, `/root`, `/home`, and chroot commands set
`TMPDIR=/tmp`.
4. **installkernel needs `uki_generator` even for BLS** - with an explicit
`/etc/kernel/install.conf`, `05-check-config.install` always requires a
`uki_generator`. BLS now writes `uki_generator=none`.
5. **dracut could not build the `crypt` module** - the target lacked
`sys-fs/cryptsetup`. Added `sys-fs/cryptsetup` and `sys-fs/btrfs-progs` to
the base package set.
6. **No `systemd-cryptsetup`** - `sys-apps/systemd` was built without the
`cryptsetup` USE flag, so the encrypted root could not be unlocked. Added
`cryptsetup` (and `policykit`) to the systemd package.use entry.
7. **Kernel command line used unnamed LUKS** - `rd.luks.uuid` yields
`luks-<uuid>`, not the configured name. Switched to
`rd.luks.name=<uuid>=<name>`.
8. **Dracut UKI did not embed the command line** - the dracut `uki_generator`
produced a UKI with no `.cmdline`, so it booted with no `root=`. Deferred
UKI in favour of a reliable BLS entry carrying `options`. UKI remains
future work.
9. **fstab did not mount `@swap`** - the swapfile unit failed because `/swap`
was never the `@swap` subvolume. Added the `subvol=@swap` fstab entry.
10. **`local root="$1" dir="$root/..."` class bug** - reintroduced in
`boot_write_dracut_conf`; split into two `local` statements. This class of
bug is now covered by the regression suite.
11. **Wrong package atoms** - `gui-apps/fuzzel` (not in Gentoo) -> `gui-apps/wofi`,
`app-misc/brightnessctl` (not packaged) removed,
`app-crypt/gnome-keyring` -> `gnome-base/gnome-keyring`,
`gui-apps/polkit-gnome` -> `gnome-extra/polkit-gnome`.
12. **Package policy compiled too much** - unknown packages defaulted to
source. `balanced` now compiles cheap builds and uses signed Gentoo
binaries for everything else, which cut installer time substantially.
## Rust installer parity (same VM path)
The Rust installer (`installer-rs`) reproduced the entire path on a fresh
disposable qcow2 disk using the static binary
`phoebus-installer` (`x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu`, crt-static):
- Same config (legacy flat format), same pinned stage3 URL + SHA-256.
- `INSTALL_RC=0`; stages: storage, stage3, fstab, portage, base packages,
kernel, bootloader, users, services, desktop (none), finalize.
- Policy decisions matched Bash: `sudo`/`networkmanager`/`polkit` binary,
`cryptsetup`/`btrfs-progs` source.
- The installer recorded **81 then 97 measured compile times** from Portage's
`emerge.log` (real data, not estimates).
- `NO_SECRET_LEAK` from the log secret scan.
Booted with the ISO detached:
- UEFI firmware ran systemd-boot; BLS entry booted.
- LUKS2 unlock, Btrfs `@` root, `/home`, `/var`, `/swap`, ESP at `/efi`.
- `cat /proc/1/comm` -> `systemd`.
- `systemctl is-system-running` -> **running** (not degraded).
- `systemctl --failed` -> **0 loaded units listed**.
- `systemd-analyze`: 1.378s kernel + 5.238s initrd + 4.114s userspace =
10.730s.
- Login as `phoebus` succeeded; networking up (`10.0.2.15/24`).
This is the point at which the Rust installer satisfies the parity criteria and
may become the primary installer. The Bash implementation remains the
reference/fallback until the desktop milestone is also verified.
## Desktop and Flatpak (Rust installer, verified)
The Rust installer, running the desktop profile, installed the full Wayland
desktop and Flatpak successfully (`INSTALL_RC=0`; 326 measured compile times
recorded). Key change: a desktop install now selects the supported stable
Gentoo profile `default/linux/amd64/23.0/desktop/systemd` instead of
reconstructing X/Wayland/dbus USE by hand from the minimal systemd profile.
This resolved the earlier `cairo[X]`/`libglvnd[X]`/`libxkbcommon[X]`
conflicts, and `sys-fs/{btrfs-progs,cryptsetup} -man` avoided a
Sphinx/Pillow circular dependency.
Booted with the ISO detached and logged in:
- `systemctl is-system-running` -> `running`; `systemctl --failed` -> 0 units.
- `flatpak --version` -> **Flatpak 1.18.1**; `flatpak remotes` -> **flathub
configured**.
- Binaries present and runnable: `dwl 0.7`, `Waybar v0.15.0`, `wofi 1.4.1`,
`mako`, `swaybg`, `pipewire`, `wireplumber`, `grim`, `wl-clipboard`.
Session verification. The VM's serial session has **no logind seat**, so
wlroots' DRM backend correctly refuses (`Failed to start a DRM session`). This
is a headless-harness limitation, not an installer defect. Using
`WLR_BACKENDS=headless WLR_RENDERER=pixman`:
- `dwl` started (pid observed), created the `wayland-0` socket.
- `mako`, `waybar`, and `swaybg` started and connected (`swaybg` found output
`HEADLESS-1`).
- `wl-copy`/`wl-paste` round-tripped `phoebus-clip`.
- `grim /tmp/shot.png` produced a **14401-byte PNG**, proving the compositor
renders and captures.
- `wpctl status` reported the PipeWire graph; `systemctl --user --failed` -> 0.
- `waybar` logged a non-fatal warning about a missing power-menu file and
power-profiles-daemon.
The installer writes `/usr/local/bin/phoebus-session`, which starts waybar,
mako and swaybg and then execs dwl, with a software-render fallback when no
render node is present.
## Official harness on the static binary (Bash migration, Phase 2)
The committed harness (`installer/tests/vm/serial-driver.py` +
`installer/tests/vm/install.sh`) now drives the **static Rust binary** and no
longer runs the Bash installer. Re-verified end to end on a fresh disposable
qcow2 (24 GiB, virtio-blk `/dev/vda`):
```sh
# Build:
cd installer-rs && RUSTFLAGS="-C target-feature=+crt-static" \
cargo build --release -p phoebus-installer --target x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu
# Install in the disposable VM, then boot the disk detached:
python3 installer/tests/vm/serial-driver.py install
python3 installer/tests/vm/serial-driver.py boot
```
Install (`INSTALL-RC=0`):
- The guest fetched `/tmp/phoebus-installer` and printed
`phoebus-installer 0.1.0` (the Rust binary, not Bash).
- Stages completed in proven order: `storage_prepare`, `stage_install`,
`fstab_generate`, `portage_configure`, `packages_base`, `kernel_install`,
`boot_install`, `users_configure`, `services_configure`, `desktop_install`
(none), `finalize`.
- Policy matched Bash: `crypto`/`btrfs-progs` source build, `sudo`/
`networkmanager`/`polkit` binary.
- `NO_SECRET_LEAK`; the run powered off cleanly.
Boot with the ISO detached (`serial-driver.py boot`):
- UEFI firmware ran `\EFI\systemd\systemd-bootx64.efi` (Boot0002 "Linux Boot
Manager"); the BLS "Gentoo Linux" entry booted.
- `systemd-cryptsetup` prompted for the LUKS2 passphrase and unlocked
`phoebus-root (cryptroot)`.
- Login as `phoebus` succeeded.
- `cat /proc/1/comm` -> `systemd`.
- `systemctl is-system-running` -> **running**.
- `systemctl --failed` -> **0 loaded units listed**.
- Networking: `enp0s2 UP 10.0.2.15/24`.
- Mounts: `/` (btrfs `@`), `/home`, `/var`, `/.snapshots`, `/swap`, ESP
`/efi`; `vda2` is `crypto_LUKS`.
This satisfies the Phase 2 exit gate of `docs/BASH-MIGRATION.md`: the only
proven boot path no longer depends on the retired Bash installer.
## Snapshots and safe updates (four-workstream session)
Verified on the installed Btrfs system from the static-binary harness, driving
the new `sys` binary fetched into the guest:
- `sys history` before -> `no transaction history`.
- `sys -y --action '{"action":"create_snapshot","operation":"vm test"}'` ->
`protective snapshot: @-20260920T114917-vm-test`.
- `sys history` after -> `@-20260920T114917-vm-test Committed vm test`.
- `btrfs subvolume list /` shows `@snapshots/@-20260920T114917-vm-test` as a
real subvolume (read-only snapshot).
- `sys -y prepare-updates` fetched distfiles successfully; `--buildpkgonly` was
refused by Portage with `--buildpkgonly requires all dependencies to be
merged`, which the installer now records as `status: Ready` with the reason
(`distfiles fetched; binary prebuild skipped: ...`) instead of a hard failure.
- `sys inspect-updates` reports the state and timestamp.
Unit regression tests cover the failure paths that a VM cannot easily force:
corrupt snapshot history is an error, and a high-risk action aborts when the
protective snapshot fails.
## Desktop session on an installed VM
A full dwl desktop install was built with the static Rust binary
(`DESKTOP_PROFILE=dwl`, `FLATPAK=no`) and booted with the ISO detached:
`INSTALL_RC=0`, all stages, `NO_SECRET_LEAK`, `systemctl is-system-running` ->
`running`, `0 failed units`.
Running the installed `/usr/local/bin/phoebus-session` under the headless
wlroots backend (the serial VM has no logind seat):
- the `wayland-0` socket is created before any helper starts;
- after startup the process tree is `dwl`, `waybar`, `mako`,
`swaybg -c #1e1e2e` and `/usr/libexec/polkit-gnome-authentication-agent-1`
(the polkit agent, which the previous script never started);
- dwl reports the `HEADLESS-1` output;
- after `dwl` exits, **all session processes are reaped**.
Installed and on `PATH`: `dwl`, `waybar`, `mako`, `swaybg`, `kitty`, `wofi`,
`Xwayland`. The polkit agent lives at
`/usr/libexec/polkit-gnome-authentication-agent-1`; the session script's
fallback finds it because it is not on `PATH`.
This is headless verification. A physical VT / real logind seat remains to be
exercised interactively (`docs/DEVELOPMENT.md` -> "Physical VT / real-seat
check").
## Signed binary reuse analysis
The desktop transaction's installer log (`emerge` grouping) shows the policy
already requests signed binaries for the expensive set:
- source group: `sys-fs/cryptsetup sys-fs/btrfs-progs`;
- binary groups: base tools, `gentoo-kernel-bin`/firmware, and the dwl/waybar/
wofi/mako/sway*/gtk-layer-shell/xwayland set.
The desktop install in this session took ~1h49m wall time (12:01–13:50 UTC) on
8 vCPUs. Most of that is Portage falling back to source because the OpenRC/
hardened binhost cannot satisfy the systemd/desktop USE set, even though the
policy requested binaries. Two comparable data points are now recorded: the
base-only install took ~44 min and the desktop install ~1h49m. The code changes
here remove forced flags but cannot raise reuse without a matching binhost, so
no new time saving is claimed.
The remaining source builds are caused by the **official Gentoo binhost being
built for the OpenRC/hardened profile** (`PROFILE: default/linux/amd64/17.0/
hardened`), which cannot satisfy a systemd/desktop USE set. The safe changes
made here are: stop forcing the unused `installkernel uki` flag, remove the
duplicate PipeWire and empty WirePlumber `package.use` lines, and derive the
binhost URI from the selected profile when it is not set. Signature
verification remains enabled. Publishing a matching systemd/desktop binhost is
the remaining step; no time estimate is claimed beyond the recorded ~26 min.
## Debian-Live installer appliance (actual ISO)
An appliance ISO was built **without root** by `installer/live/build.sh`
(Debian-Live 13.7 standard base + `/phoebus` overlay). The full-install
evidence below was recorded with build
`c0105bc9a282fddcbefab42baa577ea99843060f00fa45a75bcbc8358186bfd5`.
A desktop install was re-run and verified with build
`c1846f0d18ed9813e5ef3e699b9110f4fb04ab09a4c5ed800970b1d54971d114`:
- mandatory-AI gate refused the install until `--no-ai` was passed
(`GATE_REFUSED_OK`);
- Nix: `/nix/store/2nhrwv91g6ycpyxvhmvc0xs8p92wp4bk-nix-2.24.9` present,
`nix (Nix) 2.24.9`, `nix-daemon.service` **enabled and active**, and
`nix shell nixpkgs#hello` downloaded from `cache.nixos.org` and printed
`Hello, world!`;
- desktop portals: `xdg-desktop-portal 1.20.4`, `-gtk 1.15.3`, `-wlr 0.7.1`;
- desktop binaries present: `dwl`, `waybar`, `kitty`, `wofi`, `Xwayland`;
- hostname `phoebus`, networking `enp0s2 UP 10.0.2.15/24`, systemd PID 1,
`running`, `0 loaded units listed`.
The current build is
`3ba913ba660fb7436e26e587e9777f1f65ed10dcc9b50d17458ebb3d3a739b5c`: Nix is now
on by default, and `finalize` flushes the target (`sync`) before unmounting.
That build was **not** re-run end to end because the host root filesystem
reached ~98% and the base emerge became pathologically slow. Treat `c1846f0d`
as the verified artifact and `3ba913ba` as the current one.
Firmware boot (UEFI/OVMF, no `-kernel`; the ISO's own grub chain):
- auto-boots the live system on the serial console;
- login `user` / `live` (passwordless sudo);
- the overlaid tools run: `cryptsetup 2.7.5`, `sgdisk 1.0.10`,
`partprobe 3.6`, `mkfs.btrfs 6.14`, `mkfs.fat`.
Full install to a fresh 24 GiB qcow2 driven from the appliance:
- `INSTALL_RC=0`, all stages, `NO_SECRET_LEAK`.
Detached boot of the installed disk (ISO removed):
- systemd-boot -> LUKS2 unlock -> `phoebus` login;
- `systemctl is-system-running` -> `running`; `0 loaded units listed`;
- **Gentoo-only**: `Gentoo Base System release 2.18`, Portage 3.0.82.2,
`no-apt`; systemd PID 1;
- `cryptroot` Btrfs mounted at `/`, `/home`, `/var`, `/.snapshots`, `/swap`,
ESP `/efi`.
This is Bash-free and Gentoo-target-only: the appliance contributes tooling,
never configuration.
### Open items found in this run
- **Resolved:** the earlier `gentoo` hostname anomaly did not recur; the target
boots as `phoebus` with `/etc/hostname` set, and DHCP comes up
(`enp0s2 UP 10.0.2.15/24`) once awaited.
- **Implemented, not re-verified:** `/usr/local/bin/phoebus-session` (and the
exported installer log) were absent after boot in the earlier runs. The
installer wrote and existence-checked them, and the root unmounted cleanly,
but comparison with a boot-time-created file showed the **finalize writes were
not on disk**: Btrfs commits lazily and the harness used `poweroff -f`. The
fix is a `sync` in `finalize` before unmounting (build `3ba913ba`). It has not
been re-run end to end (host disk pressure). Until it is, treat the session
script as **unverified** in the shipped ISO.
## 2026-09-21 appliance baseline (rollback/recovery foundations)
A fresh install of the committed code was run in a disposable qcow2 (24 GiB)
with the rebuilt Debian-Live appliance ISO, then booted with the ISO detached.
This validates the coordinated-snapshot and recovery-entry code on a real Btrfs
system; it does **not** validate a rollback (that gate is still pending).
- Build: static `phoebus-installer` from the tree, appliance ISO
`206551ec21e13753fb97f6d65bfc01e3642b0167908807f64d6ca5a80141adab`.
- Config: `DESKTOP_PROFILE=none`, `KERNEL_PROFILE=safe`, LUKS2 + Btrfs,
`NIX_ENABLED=no`; the host served the stage3
(`sha256 6a3d85ee...f77d44d5`), config and 0600 secret files over HTTP.
- Harness: `installer/tests/vm/appliance-driver.py install` then `boot`
(new in this session).
Install:
- `===NO_SECRET_LEAK===`, `===INSTALL-RC=0===`, clean poweroff
(`reboot: Power down`). Target grew to 6.3 GiB.
Detached boot (no ISO, no `-kernel`):
- UEFI ran systemd-boot; its menu listed `Gentoo Linux`,
**`Phoebus Recovery (known-good snapshot)`** and `Reboot Into Firmware
Interface`; the default booted.
- `systemd-cryptsetup` prompted for the LUKS2 passphrase and unlocked
`phoebus-root (cryptroot)`.
- `cat /proc/1/comm` -> `systemd`; `systemctl is-system-running` -> **running**;
`systemctl --failed` -> **0 loaded units listed**.
- Networking: `enp0s2 UP 10.0.2.15/24`.
- The target's transaction history contains the **initial coordinated snapshot**:
```toml
[[records]]
id = "@-20260921T110110-initial-known-good"
operation = "initial known-good"
source_subvol = "/mnt/phoebus"
snapshot_subvol = "@-20260921T110110-initial-known-good"
var_snapshot = "@var-20260921T110110-initial-known-good"
status = "committed"
```
This confirms `@` and the separately mounted `@var` are captured together and
that the installer writes a snapshot-based recovery entry (not one that
depends on the live root). Reading the recovery entry and
`btrfs subvolume list` as the unprivileged user was refused; the menu entry
above is the evidence that it exists.
Not yet verified for this baseline: `sys undo`, a deliberately broken update, a
detached rollback reboot, and recovery with no network/model (the rollback
acceptance gate).
**2026-09-23 update — rollback acceptance automated, still NOT run.** The
missing driver now exists: `serial-driver.py rollback` (with
`rollback-guest.sh` and `rollback-verify.sh`) performs the full sequence,
including a `/var/db/pkg` fingerprint comparison and a `/home` survival check,
and `bash -n` guards run in `test_vmsafety.py`. The **destructive VM gate
itself is unrun**: `make doctor` reports ~12 GiB free versus the >=20 GiB the VM
harness requires, and no already-installed disposable clone is available.
Booting the recovery entry offline is still a manual step. `sys undo` therefore
remains **unverified**, not passing.
**2026-09-26 update — rollback acceptance PASSED.**
`serial-driver.py rollback` on a fresh disposable overlay
(`rollback-accept-7.qcow2`, backing `fresh-install-1.qcow2`, original
preserved; backing chain validated with `qemu-img info --backing-chain`):
driver `serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386` **PASS=11 FAIL=0**,
exit 0, no secret leak in either transcript (both kept:
`serial-phase1.log`, `serial.log` under
`/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-23d1bc0c/`).
- Phase 1: known-good DB fingerprint `ca398d71…`, `sys snapshot --legacy`
→ `@-20260926T030259-rollback-acceptance`, controlled
`app-misc/hello` install `--legacy --portage` → fingerprint changed to
`fda3780a…` (a no-op break would fail the gate here), root marker written,
`sys undo @-20260926T030259-rollback-acceptance --legacy` → rc=0.
- Phase 2 (detached): DB fingerprint back to `ca398d71…`, `/home` marker
identical, root marker **absent**, `systemctl is-system-running` →
`running`, kernel modules present, `phoebus-recovery.conf` present with
`systemd.unit=rescue.target` and a `@snapshots/` root, rollback status
recorded.
- Harness defects fixed to earn this (all previously allowed vacuous
passes): sudo authentication with unique end markers and a verified
timestamp, both phases as root, explicit `--legacy`, break package
verified absent then verified changed (`nano` was already in the base
image), undo targeting the recorded snapshot id, driver assertions for a
changed break and an absent root marker.
- Still manual: booting the recovery entry itself offline (select it in the
systemd-boot menu with no network).
**2026-09-23 update — NVIDIA gates still NOT run.** The live driver decision,
the hardened payload verifier and the installed lifecycle are implemented and
covered by Rust/fixture tests, but no NVIDIA-accelerated boot has been observed:
no NVIDIA GPU is present and QEMU's virtual GPU cannot establish acceleration.
The full desktop ISO was not assembled (disk), so the ordinary virtual-GPU
`gui`/`install`/`boot` journeys were not re-run against the repaired harness
either.
## Mango + DankMaterialShell verification (IN PROGRESS)
### Live ISO — graphical VM (verified 2026-09-21)
Artifact: `installer/live/build.sh` output
`phoebus-mango-amd64.iso`,
sha256 `c235b873bc04a90c91ff4be361a605907997c509c4021e611645336c23f924d9`
(1.6 GiB). The image was built rootlessly from the signed Debian testing
archive plus pinned Mango 0.17.2 and DankMaterialShell 1.6.2 releases
(`installer/live/releases.sha256`).
Booted in a disposable QEMU/OVMF VM with a **graphical device**
(`-device virtio-gpu-pci`, no `-vga`, serial console still attached) — a real
DRM node and logind seat, not a headless compositor:
- `uname -r` -> `7.1.13+deb14-amd64`; `systemctl is-system-running` -> running;
`/dev/dri/card0` and `/dev/dri/renderD128` present.
- Live autologin ran as an unprivileged `phoebus` user in session `c1` on
`seat0`/tty7; `mango` (compositor), `/usr/bin/dms run --session` and
`qs` (Quickshell) were running under the user manager
(`mango-session.target` and `dms.service` both **active**).
- No dwl helpers (`waybar`/`mako`/`swayidle`/`swaylock`) were started.
- A framebuffer `screendump` showed the DankMaterialShell desktop: the DMS
panel (clock, weather, tray, network/battery/volume/power) and the DMS
first-run "Welcome to DankMaterialShell" window, composited by Mango. This is
the acceptance evidence for "the ISO boots into a usable Mango +
DankMaterialShell live desktop".
- The "Install Phoebus" application entry and `/usr/local/bin/phoebus-install`
are installed by the build; the launcher runs the installer UI and passes no
`--yes`/`--install`/`--no-ai` (unit-tested), so opening it cannot start a
destructive operation automatically. The serial console and a spare VT
remain available as a recovery path.
Fixes found by this test (all committed): the live kernel/initrd must replace
the base ISO's **versioned** `/live/vmlinuz-*` paths; setuid bits must be
restored when packing as an unprivileged user (for `sudo`); `virtio_gpu` must
be autoloaded; greetd's `greeter` account must exist even with an
`initial_session`; greetd must run on VT7 to avoid the `getty@tty1` conflict;
live-config autologin (`noautologin`) must be disabled in favour of greetd; and
the Mango session must not export `WAYLAND_DISPLAY` before the compositor
starts (wlroots would pick its nested backend instead of DRM) and needs the Qt
Wayland shell-integration packages for Quickshell.
### Installed system — not yet run
A default install (`desktop.profile = "mango"`; the default) and a detached
encrypted boot to the greetd login are **not yet verified in a VM**: the Mango
transaction syncs the GURU overlay and compiles Quickshell/DMS/scenefx/Qt,
which was not feasible here. The configuration and login behaviour are covered
by unit tests (`live_iso.rs`, `system::installed_login_*`, `desktop.rs`), and
the plan renders the session. Verify with the harness once a full Mango build
is affordable:
```sh
python3 installer/tests/vm/appliance-driver.py install # DESKTOP_PROFILE=mango
python3 installer/tests/vm/appliance-driver.py boot
```
Remaining graphical checks (installed system and live): panel interactions and
launcher, notifications, polkit prompt, lock/unlock, idle/suspend and resume,
display changes, clipboard/screenshots/terminal/file manager, a Flatpak app
launch + file chooser + screen sharing, logout/reboot, fail-closed shell restart,
and resource metrics.
Known prerequisites/limits: the installed `mango` transaction needs the GURU
overlay (git) and compiles Quickshell/DMS/scenefx; the live build needs the
signed Debian testing archive. A graphical VM must provide a real seat (for
example `-device virtio-gpu-pci` with the serial console still attached);
`-display none` alone is not sufficient evidence of a graphical session.
1. Live ISO boots to Mango + DMS (screenshot/`screendump` evidence, not just
process names); panel, launcher and terminal work; "Install Phoebus" opens
the installer UI without starting a destructive operation.
2. Live text-console recovery (serial and a spare VT) remains accessible.
3. Fresh install with the default profile reaches `systemctl is-system-running
= running` with 0 failed units; `emerge --pretend` shows only the reviewed
`~amd64` atoms.
4. Detached encrypted boot; LUKS unlock; **authenticated** login on a real seat;
Mango is the sole graphical session.
5. `phoebus-mango.desktop` starts the session; exactly one compositor (mango),
one shell (dms), one lock/idle (DMS) and one polkit agent run; no
waybar/mako/swaybg/swayidle/swaylock processes.
6. Panel, launcher (Mod+Space), notifications, tray and the DMS settings panel;
audio/network/Bluetooth controls; lock/unlock; idle/suspend and resume.
7. Display configuration/scaling and a second monitor if the VM supports one.
8. Clipboard history, screenshots, terminal, file manager, and `phoebus-assistant`.
9. An actual Flatpak app: launch, file chooser, and portal screen sharing.
10. Logout reaps session processes; reboot cleanly.
11. Shell-failure handling (kill `dms`, compositor survives, locking still
locks), and default-selection behaviour: omitting the profile selects Mango,
explicit `none` is respected, and obsolete profiles are rejected.
12. Idle memory/CPU and startup metrics recorded.
Until results are recorded here, the default stands by owner decision but no
stability is claimed.
## Graphical installer ISO and typed bridge (2026-09-21)
A dedicated driver, `installer/tests/vm/gui-driver.py`, boots the built live
ISO with a **graphical device** and a serial console, drives the graphical
frontend through the compositor, and captures QEMU framebuffer screenshots.
Artifact: `installer/live/phoebus-installer-amd64.iso`, 1.6 GiB,
`sha256 2a52178c4b4a71bbc5c011b89533988ceb9aa95493160cb93c4335f03d9a1eee`
(Mango 0.17.2 + DankMaterialShell 1.6.2).
What was observed (`gui` mode):
1. The live session autologins into Mango + DMS; the branded
`phoebus-welcome` window opens automatically. The DMS first-run greeter and
changelog dialogs do **not** appear (markers pre-seeded).
2. The welcome shows the wordmark, emblem, wallpaper, ISO version (`0.1.0`) and
readiness (network connected, UEFI, memory, cores), with "Install Phoebus
OS" dominant and the secondary tools plus Advanced present.
3. Launching `phoebus-install` opens the wizard; running it again leaves the
session count at 1 (`DUP n1=1 n2=1`), so duplicate installer sessions are
prevented.
4. Keyboard navigation (Ctrl+Right / Enter / Tab) reaches step 2 (network and
prerequisites, with real UEFI/memory/CPU/network values) and step 3 (AI
model). Provider selection, the secret API-key field and the model field
render; advancing without a connected model is refused with
"Connect and validate an AI model before continuing."
5. A backend probe on the real guest lists `/dev/vda` as unprotected and
selectable, and `/dev/sr0` as the `live_medium` installation medium,
protected (the model tests cover the classification logic).
6. Screenshots: `docs/screenshots/01-welcome.png` … `05-ai-blocked.png`. The
destination-disk, review and confirmation screens
(`06`–`08`) were rendered from the same QML against a dry-run backend
because a real provider call was not available in this environment.
What was **not** possible: a live AI provider call (no key/model in this
environment). The AI step is verified as a blocked prerequisite and in unit
tests with a fixture transport; it is **not** a passed live call.
Real install + detached boot on the same ISO (`install` then `boot` modes):
- Guest install used the same deterministic backend as the GUI
(`phoebus-installer --install --yes --no-ai`): `INSTALL-RC=0`,
`installation complete`, `NO_SECRET_LEAK`.
- Detached boot (no ISO, `-boot order=c`): systemd PID 1, `running`, **0
failed units**, `systemd-boot` menu shows **Gentoo Linux first**, LUKS2
unlocked, `/dev/vda1 -> /efi`, `cryptroot` Btrfs with
`/ /home /var /.snapshots /swap`, network up.
Bug found and fixed during this work: the snapshot recovery BLS entry shared
the kernel's `sort-key`, and the specification's final filename tie-break
(decreasing) made it first when the random machine-id sorted low; with
`default *` the installed system booted `systemd.unit=rescue.target`. Fixed by
pinning `loader.conf` to the newest real kernel entry and giving the recovery
entry `sort-key zzzz-phoebus-recovery`; unit tests pin both.
## 2026-09-22 — automated graphical journey (gui-driver) and hardened harness
The graphical live ISO was rebuilt and driven automatically by
`installer/tests/vm/gui-driver.py gui` in a graphical, seat-providing
QEMU/OVMF VM with a disposable qcow2 disk directory and a per-run OVMF variable
file.
- Source revision: `7e9fa9c` plus uncommitted work; build id recorded in
`/etc/phoebus/build` (`7e9fa9c+dirty…`).
- Static installer: `sha256 2f9cd4b3…` (4,716,544 bytes, static-pie).
- ISO: `installer/live/phoebus-installer-amd64.iso`,
`sha256 428dbd75…`, 1.6 GiB, built with
`PHOEBUS_REUSE_ROOTFS=1` (Mango 0.17.2 + DankMaterialShell 1.6.2).
- Result: **23/23 checks PASS**, exit status 0
(`/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/gui-gui-20260922T025537Z-69f754cf/`).
Asserted: welcome autostart; live/branding payload markers from command
output (not the echoed command); the live medium protected; "Install Phoebus
OS" launched the installer from a Return keypress; duplicate sessions
prevented (`n1=n2=1`); the frontend reported no bridge errors; keyboard
navigation reached the network and AI steps; advancing without a connected
model was refused and started no installation.
- Screenshots at every page (welcome focus, language, network, AI model, AI
blocked, final state) plus a `screenshot-manifest.json`; `report.py` builds a
browsable `report.html`. All artifacts stay under `/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/`
(outside git).
Harness safety verified in the same work: the drivers reject `/dev/*`, block
and character devices, raw images, symlinks escaping the disposable directory,
and outside backing chains, with a nonzero exit (`make test-vm`, 16 unit
tests). Screenshots use structured QMP and argument arrays; there is no shell
interpolation.
A host-local OpenCode transport test also ran: `phoebus-installer
--opencode-probe` returned `ready` against `opencode 1.18.32` through a
forwarded second loopback endpoint, and `authentication_required` (exit 1)
against a deliberately unauthenticated LAN bind.
## 2026-09-22 — graphical journey polish and the `gui-install` mode
The graphical installer was reworked into a fixed first-time-user journey and
re-verified on the final ISO.
- Source revision: `34c12d3` plus the session work; ISO
`installer/live/phoebus-installer-amd64.iso`, `sha256 0c386a1b…`, 1.6 GiB,
built with `PHOEBUS_REUSE_ROOTFS=1` (Mango 0.17.2 + DankMaterialShell 1.6.2).
- `gui` **28/28 PASS** (`/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/gui-gui-20260922T191954Z-876d5e91/`):
welcome autostart, launcher from the keyboard, duplicate prevention, the live
medium protected, keyboard suggestion selection (Down then Enter stores the
identifier), the network and AI steps, the AI gate refused without a model
with an inline error, and no bridge errors.
- `opencode` **18/18 PASS**
(`/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/gui-opencode-20260922T192457Z-01714c92/`): OpenCode
selected and driven through the UI, a real model response (Test connection),
a validated proposal (4 changes applied), and a regression asserting that
editing the model flips the validated state off.
- `gui-install` **24 PASS / 1 FAIL**
(`/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/gui-gui-install-20260922T151232Z-0ef19969/`): every
journey assertion passed — OpenCode connect/review/accept,
`back-nav-preserves-ai`, `readiness-refresh-preserves-wizard`,
`disk-survives-backtrack`, disk selection, account and encryption, ERASE and
`gui-install-erase-confirmed` — and the backend then reported the real stage
sequence (`storage_prepare`, `stage_install`, `fstab_generate`,
`portage_configure`, `packages_base`, `kernel_install`) with elapsed time and
no fabricated percentage. The single FAIL is `gui-install-completes`: after
four hours the install was still in `kernel_install`, because the
base-package stage took ~116 min and the AI-selected optimized kernel
compiled for more than 100 min on this host, so the harness timeout fired.
**The completed install + detached boot gate is BLOCKED on host build time**;
the deterministic noninteractive install + detached boot (above) remains the
proven boot path. No code defect is implicated.
- The new `PHOEBUS_GUI_CONFIG` / `/etc/phoebus/install.conf` hook lets a medium
preseed the wizard defaults. It changes defaults only: validation, the plan,
the AI gate and the ERASE authorization are unchanged.
## 2026-09-24 — End-to-end graphical install and detached first-boot verification
The graphical installer journey was completed 100% through all 12 backend
orchestration stages and the Mango desktop package set, followed by a clean
detached boot verification with the live ISO removed.
- **Fresh Live ISO:** `installer/live/phoebus-installer-amd64.iso` rebuilt with
`scripts/ensure-live-iso.sh` (SHA-256 `4b83df6b531bc38ffc38e3aee21a3519f2d414a8af883f36ef82f52c4e0458d6`, 1.6 GiB).
- **Kernel profile optimization for installation:** Default kernel profile
configured to `KernelProfile::Safe` (`sys-kernel/gentoo-kernel-bin`), eliminating
the 100+ minute kernel compile from source that previously exceeded harness timeouts.
- **Graphical Installation (`gui-install`, run `gui-gui-install-20260924T144711Z-feab515b`):**
- All 6 wizard steps driven via virtual input: OpenCode local connection,
hardware-aware recommendations, disk selection (`/dev/vda`), account (`phoebus`),
LUKS2 passphrase, ERASE confirmation.
- Executed all 12 backend stages in sequence:
1. `storage_prepare` (GPT, ESP, LUKS2, Btrfs subvolumes `@`, `@home`, `@var`, `@snapshots`, `@swap`)
2. `stage_install` (pinned Gentoo systemd stage3)
3. `fstab_generate` (fstab and crypttab)
4. `portage_configure` (binary package binhost, scoped keywords and USE)
5. `packages_base` (essential system packages)
6. `kernel_install` (`sys-kernel/gentoo-kernel-bin` + dracut initramfs)
7. `nvidia_drivers` (hardware check / skipped for virtio-gpu)
8. `boot_install` (systemd-boot + BLS entry)
9. `users_configure` (user `phoebus`, wheel/sudo group, shadow hash)
10. `services_configure` (systemd essential services, locale-gen)
11. `desktop_install` (all 174 packages emerged: Mango, DankMaterialShell, Quickshell, greetd, tuigreet, Wayland libraries, Flatpak)
12. `finalize` (installation metadata `/etc/phoebus/install.toml`, clean unmount)
- `gui-install-completes` passed (`07-gi-07-complete.png` captured):
"Phoebus OS is installed. Your system is ready. It can boot, run and recover without a network or a model."
- **Detached First Boot (`gui-boot`, run `gui-boot-20260924T183545Z-4b5de282`):**
- Booted with `iso=False`, `-boot order=c` pointing strictly at `/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/disks/test-disk.qcow2`.
- Firmware booted systemd-boot -> kernel loaded -> LUKS2 prompted and unlocked with test passphrase.
- All Btrfs subvolumes mounted correctly (`@` on `/`, `@home` on `/home`, `@var` on `/var`, `@snapshots` on `/.snapshots`, `@swap` on `/swap`).
- Serial console login authenticated successfully.
- `sys` deterministic CLI verified installed and operational: `/usr/local/bin/sys history` reported `no transactions recorded`.
- Systemd reached `running` (0 failed units).
- Greeter fix: Diagnosed and fixed a TOML multiline syntax issue in `/etc/greetd/config.toml` (command string formatted on a single line). `greetd.service` started `tuigreet` cleanly, verified by QMP screendump (`01-boot-desktop.png` displaying "Authenticate into phoebus-vm").
- Clean guest poweroff executed and verified (`sync; systemctl poweroff`).
- Results: 6/6 PASS (`qemu-spawned`, `detached-boot-login`, `boot-systemd-running`, `boot-sys-installed`, `screenshot-01-boot-desktop`, `screenshot-02-final-state`).
## 2026-09-25 — Snap first-use acceptance on an installed disposable VM
- Target: `snap-acceptance.qcow2`, a disposable overlay of the installed
`fresh-install-1.qcow2` image in the VM disk directory. QEMU/OVMF booted the
installed system; no physical disk was attached or modified.
- The first attempt found a real Gentoo dependency requirement:
`sys-fs/squashfs-tools[lzma,lzo]`. The guest test applied only those scoped
USE flags. Fresh Phoebus installs now generate the same package-specific
setting.
- The next attempt exposed a Portage resolver bug: the candidate was the
first dependency (`dev-lang/go-bootstrap`) instead of the requested
`app-containers/snapd`. The resolver now selects the requested atom, and the
approved plan showed six new source packages including `snapd-2.63`.
- Final run `serial-boot-20260926T001830Z-107996de` reported `PASS=10 FAIL=0`:
installed snapd through the reviewed `sys` Portage path, enabled and started
`snapd.socket`, installed Snap Store `hello-world` 6.4 revision 29 through
`sys`, ran `sys snap refresh hello-world --legacy`, then removed it and
verified absence. The daemon reported `partial` confinement and the install
plan reported `partial` as well.
- The refresh command succeeded with no newer revision. A revision-changing
refresh and AppArmor-backed strict confinement remain unverified.
- Final static `sys` SHA-256 `df608076aaf54290bfe0d4cdad9bcbca50064bf53ced62c44cf0e765d2a2f73f`
was retested on the fresh `snap-acceptance-final.qcow2` overlay. The first
run (`serial-boot-20260926T005327Z-c024cc43`) passed 11/11 checks including
a clean guest poweroff. A clean reboot and repeat
(`serial-boot-20260926T010605Z-e6193c3a`) also passed 11/11, with another
`hello-world` install, refresh, removal and clean poweroff.
## 2026-09-26 — `sys` acceptance re-run against the refactored static binary
- Target: `sys-acceptance-refactor.qcow2`, a disposable overlay (absolute
backing path, satisfying the harness disk-safety gate) of the pristine
installed `fresh-install-1.qcow2` image. QEMU/OVMF booted the installed
system detached; no physical disk was attached or modified.
- Purpose: prove the quality-pass refactor (boxed `ExecError`, Clippy fixes,
`service/` and `gui_bridge/` module splits) changed no behavior. The guest
fetched the new static-pie `sys` (`SHA-256
70f0a72b9ca4534250c2ee27417efffc0681da88ba4d2633da932813b0c0e044`,
built from the post-split tree) to `/tmp/sys` and ran the current
`installer/tests/vm/sys-acceptance.sh` with `SYS_BIN=/tmp/sys` as the
non-root `phoebus` user with no mutations — so the matrix exercised the new
binary, not the image's provisioned one.
- Result `serial-boot-20260926T014746Z-3089a820`: guest
`===SYS-ACC-END=== SUMMARY PASS=38 FAIL=0` (the full 38-case matrix:
version/history/undo, failure cases, offline/model-free behavior, source
selection, AI-first read-only workflow, catalogue including the
`rdeps-legacy` regression, and non-root privilege refusals), driver
`PASS=41 FAIL=0` (38 cases + login + `systemd is-system-running` +
disposable-disk), exit 0.
- Not covered by this run: the mutate group (`SYS_ACCEPTANCE_MUTATE=1`),
recovery boot, strict Snap confinement, and a revision-changing Snap update.
## 2026-09-26 — Security and release-readiness follow-up (COMPLETED)
- **Stage3 trust anchor is fixed, not VM-proven.** `release_key_path()` no
longer reads `PHOEBUS_GENTOO_RELEASE_KEY`: production always uses the
provisioned `/usr/share/openpgp-keys/gentoo-release.asc`, and test-only
injection goes through the explicit `verify_digests_with_key` helper (19
stage3 tests pass). Host-level mechanism check (not VM evidence): the
committed parser fixture matches the real current DIGESTS byte-for-byte,
and the real DIGESTS for
`stage3-amd64-systemd-20260920T170055Z.tar.xz` verifies with a Good
signature from Gentoo's Automated Weekly Release Key.
**Blocked VM proof:** rebuild the live image (ships gnupg + the
fingerprint-checked key) and run the default unpinned stage3 install on a
disposable qcow2, verifying the real signed DIGESTS and downloaded hash
plus tampered signature/digest/archive refusal. Prerequisite: a live-ISO
rebuild (multi-GB; host has ~26 GiB free, shared with VM disks) and a full
install cycle; no ISO was rebuilt in this session.
- **Rollback gate strengthened, rerun in progress.** `rollback-guest.sh`
creation of `/etc/phoebus/rollback-broken.txt` is now mandatory
(`mkdir -p`, write, `===ROLLBACK-MARKER present===`, exit 1 if absent;
the old `|| true` could have hidden a failed break). The absent-afterward
assertion stays where it belongs: after the detached reboot
(`rollback-verify.sh` + driver `rollback-root-restored`), because `sys
undo` activates the restored generation on the next boot. The unused
`SERVE` variable was removed (`shellcheck` clean).
- **Strengthened rerun PASSED** (`serial-rollback-20260926T034218Z-7fab51ef`,
PASS=11 FAIL=0, exit 0, overlay `rollback-accept-8.qcow2` on
`fresh-install-1.qcow2`, logs under
`/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/serial-rollback-20260926T034218Z-89357549/`): known-good
DB `ca398d71…` → mandatory `===ROLLBACK-MARKER present===` → controlled
`app-misc/hello` install (DB `fda3780a…`, changed as required) → `sys undo`
rc=0 → detached reboot (DB restored to `ca398d71…`, root marker **absent**,
`/home` survives, systemd `running`, modules present, recovery entry
present, status recorded). No secret leak in either transcript
(`SECRET_LEAK_FOUND` count 0 in both).
- **Recovery-entry acceptance is a distinct manual gate** (separate from
normal `sys undo`). Procedure: on a disposable installed disk, select
"Phoebus Recovery (known-good snapshot)" in the systemd-boot menu with the
network unavailable and no model configured; verify the booted snapshot
identity (`btrfs subvolume show /`, recovery entry options), reach a
login, and run basic deterministic `sys` operation (`sys history`,
`sys rollback status --legacy`, one read-only query). Pass criteria: the
selected snapshot boots, systemd runs, `sys --legacy` works, and `sys ask`
without a model fails truthfully with the exact `--legacy` fallback
offered. Status: NOT RUN — the harness records the entry but does not
select it (interactive BLS-menu selection is not automated).
- **Release gates are executable and truthful.** `candidate_gates()` no
longer names `serial-driver.py checks` / `desktop` modes no harness
accepts: `no-model-recovery` uses the real `boot` mode (with `BOOT_CHECKS`
running `sys --legacy`), `desktop-session` uses the real graphical
harness (`gui-driver.py boot`). `run_gates(--execute)` runs each gate's
argv in its own process and reports Passed/Failed/NotRun from evidence
(missing harness/firmware/seat/credential → NotRun; nonzero exit →
Failed; invalid command → Failed). A `gui-driver.py do_boot` SyntaxError
(unclosed `assert_true(`) found by the new gate-mode test is fixed.
Evidence: `phoebus-release gates --execute` on an unconfigured host → 0
passed / 0 failed / 6 NotRun with exact missing prerequisites, and
`publish` refuses against that report (exit 1).
- **Seat desktop, live AI, Snap revision change, NVIDIA:** unchanged and
explicitly open. Installed Mango+DMS under a seat needs a
seat-providing VM or physical VT; a live AI call needs a responsive local
model or an authorized provider credential (fixture routing/failure tests
pass; the gate is NotRun with the exact missing credential); a
revision-changing Snap refresh needs a Store snap with a newer revision
plus an AppArmor-ready guest kernel for strict confinement (existing
partial-confinement/no-op-refresh evidence stays labeled as such); NVIDIA
needs a GPU or authorized passthrough (see below).
## 2026-09-26 — Live ISO rebuild from HEAD + unpinned install proof (COMPLETED)
- **Rebuilt ISO.** `installer/live/phoebus-installer-amd64-20260926.iso`
(1.6 GiB, SHA-256
`250dbe9ad780408a40b7b7f0757791fadcc1e4309b932e98f6059c7baf93e2e5`,
build id `20260926T041500Z`) built from HEAD `11c0ee0` with
`PHOEBUS_REUSE_ROOTFS=1` (cached `livefs.tar` reused for the Debian
rootfs; payload, binaries, key and branding re-installed fresh — reuse
does not carry stale binaries, UI or keys). The Sep-24
(`827bf843…`) ISO predates the stage3 fail-closed + trust-anchor +
boot-security commits and is kept alongside.
- **Content inspection (not timestamps).** The finished squashfs was
listed and selectively extracted: embedded
`/usr/local/bin/phoebus-installer` (`25741706…`) and `/usr/local/bin/sys`
(`3b331643…`) hash-match the fingerprint-fresh static build;
`/usr/share/openpgp-keys/gentoo-release.asc` (57,698 bytes) shows both
published fingerprints (`13EB…2910` weekly, `D99E…2058` signing) under
`gpg --show-keys`; `/usr/bin/gpg`, `/usr/bin/mango`, `/usr/bin/dms`,
the welcome/installer `shell.qml` configs, the install desktop entry and
`/etc/phoebus/{version,build,live}` (`0.1.0`,
`PHOEBUS_BUILD_ID=20260926T041500Z`) are all present.
- **Unpinned signed-DIGESTS install PASSED.**
`gui-driver.py install` run `gui-install-20260926T040728Z-f3ae68f4`
booted the new ISO on disposable
`disks/unpinned-accept-1.qcow2` (30 GiB) and installed with the
ISO-embedded fail-closed binary and a served `test.conf` with **no**
`STAGE3_URL`/`STAGE3_SHA256` (empty URL resolves latest-stage3 from
Gentoo autobuilds; signed DIGESTS verified against the fixed provisioned
key): `INSTALL-RC=0`, `NO_SECRET_LEAK`, `installation complete` after
~165 min (full mango desktop, 174 packages). Detached boot (ISO
detached): LUKS unlock, login, `systemctl is-system-running = running`,
`0 loaded units listed`, networking, all Btrfs subvolumes mounted, `sys
history --legacy` showing `@-20260926T064646-initial-known-good`. The
harness `--no-ai` flag is **test-only** evidence and is not the normal
user path (the wizard requires a connected model; the interactive VM is
left for the owner to drive by hand).
- **Harness fix (real defect, fixed):** `gui-driver.py do_boot` asserted
bare `sys history` output, but bare `sys history` is AI-first and
truthfully refuses without a model — the check now uses
`sys history --legacy`. The product was correct (`/usr/local/bin/sys`
present and working); the gate was stale. Re-run detached boots pass
`boot-sys-installed`. (The driver's `detached-boot-login` flag is
timing-sensitive to PAM OSC noise on the serial line even when the login
succeeds and checks run; login itself works — 1/4 flag-pass with 4/4
substantive checks green.)
- **Tamper refusals PASSED** (new ISO, fail-closed binary, disposable 4
GiB targets, `INSTALL-RC=1` + `NO_SECRET_LEAK` both): placeholder pin
refused before any network use (zero stage3 fetches on the serve log);
mismatched archive hash refused after download with no extraction.
Method note: `appliance-guest-gui.sh` ignores the driver's `SERVE_URL`
env and always uses the default port 8000 — tamper variants were served
by swapping the port-8000 `test.conf` (the main run had long since
fetched its copy). A tampered-*signature* VM case is infeasible without
a network MITM; the bad-signature branch is unit-tested.
- **Recovery-entry boot PASSED** (distinct manual gate, now verified).
Visible QEMU on the installed disk with restricted networking
(`-netdev user,restrict=y`) and no model: keypresses provably freeze the
3 s systemd-boot timeout (screenshot), `Phoebus Recovery (known-good
snapshot)` selected with Down+Enter (screenshot), kernel cmdline
`rootflags=subvol=@snapshots/@-20260926T064646-initial-known-good` with
`ro` + `systemd.unit=rescue.target`, findmnt confirms the read-only
snapshot root, serial login as `phoebus` works, `sys history` /
`rollback status --legacy` work, `sys ask` fails truthfully offering the
exact `--legacy` command, systemd `degraded` (rescue target, as
designed). Method notes: video-console (tty1) keystrokes never reach the
dracut LUKS prompt (`/dev/console` is serial here) — the passphrase must
be written to the serial pty with ONLCR/ICRNL neutralized, otherwise a
`\r` is appended and a correct passphrase is rejected; a `down`+`ret`
pair landing at LUKS burns attempts as `**` (escape remnant) and three
failures drop to the dracut emergency shell (root, no cryptsetup binary
present). Transcript of the proof session kept under
`/var/tmp/phoebus-recovery/rec-entry-proof.log`.
- **Seat desktop PARTIAL (blocker found).** Seat VM (`virtio-gpu-gl-pci`,
virgl present, overlay of the installed disk): logind seat0 with DRM
card0 (`[MASTER]`), keyboard, mouse; `/dev/dri/card0` (no render node);
tuigreet active with `--cmd /usr/local/bin/phoebus-session-mango`;
tuigreet PAM authentication of the correct password verified in the
journal (earlier "Authentication failed" readings were QMP-typing
focus races; `-` keys arrive correctly, proven by visible echo).
The Mango compositor exits in <1s after every successful authentication:
`libseat: No backend was able to open a seat`, `Failed to start a DRM
session` (captured by running the session script from a shell). No seatd
in the image and the logind path does not succeed under the tuigreet
session — this is the precise blocker for kitty/DMS/lock/idle/polkit/
logout/reboot. Session transcript and journal excerpts kept under
`/var/tmp/phoebus-seat/`.
- **Interactive VM (open).** The new ISO boots a KVM/GTK VM with a fresh
unique disk (`phoebus-interactive-20260926.qcow2`) and private OVMF vars
in `/var/tmp/phoebus-interactive/`; screenshots show the Mango top bar
and the branded welcome (`Install Phoebus OS`, Live medium 0.1.0,
network/UEFI/RAM/CPU chips). Left running for the owner; installer
untouched, no passwords or model credentials entered.
- Evidence disk `disks/unpinned-accept-1.qcow2` KEPT; scratch overlays
(`unpinned-tamper-*`, `nix-gc-*`, `seat-accept-1`) removed after their
run logs were kept. Host free space ~16 GiB at the end (watched, nothing
deleted without identification).
- **Rebuilt ISO.** `installer/live/phoebus-installer-amd64-20260926.iso`
(1.6 GiB, SHA-256
`250dbe9ad780408a40b7b7f0757791fadcc1e4309b932e98f6059c7baf93e2e5`,
build id `20260926T041500Z`) built from HEAD `11c0ee0` with
`PHOEBUS_REUSE_ROOTFS=1` (cached `livefs.tar` reused for the Debian
rootfs; payload, binaries, key and branding re-installed fresh — reuse
does not carry stale binaries, UI or keys). The Sep-24
(`827bf843…`) ISO predates the stage3 fail-closed + trust-anchor +
boot-security commits and is kept alongside.
- **Content inspection (not timestamps).** The finished squashfs was
listed and selectively extracted: embedded
`/usr/local/bin/phoebus-installer` (`25741706…`) and `/usr/local/bin/sys`
(`3b331643…`) hash-match the fingerprint-fresh static build;
`/usr/share/openpgp-keys/gentoo-release.asc` (57,698 bytes) shows both
published fingerprints (`13EB…2910` weekly, `D99E…2058` signing) under
`gpg --show-keys`; `/usr/bin/gpg`, `/usr/bin/mango`, `/usr/bin/dms`,
the welcome/installer `shell.qml` configs, the install desktop entry and
`/etc/phoebus/{version,build,live}` (`0.1.0`,
`PHOEBUS_BUILD_ID=20260926T041500Z`) are all present.
- **Unpinned signed-DIGESTS install (running).**
`gui-driver.py install` run `gui-install-20260926T040728Z-f3ae68f4`
boots the new ISO on disposable
`disks/unpinned-accept-1.qcow2` (30 GiB) and installs with the
ISO-embedded fail-closed binary and a served `test.conf` with **no**
`STAGE3_URL`/`STAGE3_SHA256` (empty URL resolves latest-stage3 from
Gentoo autobuilds; signed DIGESTS verified against the fixed provisioned
key). Guest progress: live login passed, partitioning/LUKS2/Btrfs
complete, install stages running. The harness `--no-ai` flag is
**test-only** evidence and is not the normal user path (the wizard
requires a connected model; the interactive VM below is left for the
owner to drive by hand).
- **Interactive VM (open).** The new ISO boots a KVM/GTK VM with a fresh
unique disk (`phoebus-interactive-20260926.qcow2`) and private OVMF vars
in `/var/tmp/phoebus-interactive/`; screenshot shows the Mango top bar
and the branded welcome ("Install Phoebus OS", Live medium 0.1.0).
- Still open after this run: installed compositor session (libseat
blocker above), live AI provider call (no credential/model available),
revision-changing Snap refresh + strict confinement (no Store revision /
AppArmor guest), per-user Nix profile enumeration (new coverage gap),
NVIDIA hardware. Secure Boot/UKI stays a separate opt-in milestone.
## Known remaining work
- The graphical session was verified with the **headless** wlroots backend
(no logind seat in the serial harness). A physical VT / seat path is
architected (`phoebus-session`) but was not exercised on real hardware.
- NVIDIA proprietary support is implemented (hardware-driven branch/flavor
policy, scoped Portage configuration, a build-time-verified live payload, and
kernel/module/initramfs update coordination) with Rust tests. A minimal live
rootfs was **built and its NVIDIA payload verified** this session (driver
`550.163.01`, kernel `6.12.107+deb13-amd64`, modules `nvidia-current*`). It is
**NOT VERIFIED on hardware**: no NVIDIA GPU is present on this host, QEMU's
virtual GPU cannot establish NVIDIA acceleration, and no passthrough setup is
available or authorized. The full desktop ISO was not assembled here (the
host has ~10 GiB free; the build wants more).
The live kernel is pinned to Debian **stable** because Debian testing's
current kernel (7.2) removed the `strncpy` declaration the 550 driver uses, so
`nvidia-kernel-dkms` fails to build against it. The bundled branch covers
Maxwell through Ada/Hopper; Blackwell falls back to nouveau on the live
medium. The installed Gentoo system uses the current branch with open kernel
modules on Turing and newer.
**Unblock (hardware):** boot the built ISO on a machine with an NVIDIA GPU
(or an authorized passthrough VM) and check: `systemctl status
phoebus-nvidia.service`, `nvidia-smi`, `cat
/sys/module/nvidia_drm/parameters/modeset` == `Y`, an accelerated
Mango/DMS session, XWayland/Flatpak rendering, monitor handling and
suspend/resume. Then boot the installed Gentoo system and confirm the same,
plus that a kernel update rebuilds the modules via `@module-rebuild` and
regenerates the initramfs. **Unblock (build):** free sufficient disk space and
run `installer/live/build.sh` (it fails, by design, if the NVIDIA payload is
missing or mismatched), then the `gui` harness mode to confirm ordinary
virtual-GPU boot is unchanged.
- UKI is deferred (BLS is used).
- The installer rebuilds `sys-apps/systemd` from source because
boot/policykit/cryptsetup USE differ from the binhost. Shipping a matching
systemd binpkg is a future optimization.
- Desktop USE still does not match the signed binhost, so the desktop
transaction compiles a large amount from source (~26 minutes for the desktop
package set on 8 vCPUs in the test VM).
- **The complete graphical install and detached boot gate is now VERIFIED.**
The `gui-install` harness drives the real controls through the complete wizard,
performs the real 12-stage install on a disposable qcow2, and boots detached with
systemd running, LUKS2 unlocked, `sys` available, and `tuigreet` active.
- **A separate physical computer for the OpenCode transport test is NOT
available**; that check is BLOCKED. The forwarded-hop and
unauthenticated-LAN-refusal tests are host-local.