phoebus_os/docs/SYS.md
Phoebus f9e39925b4 feat(install): AI-first sys install workflow
Implement the shared installation workflow (ADR 0013). sys install, sys ask
install and the explicit backend flags all use one path: identify -> evidence
-> AI investigation -> deterministic validation/effects -> review -> approval
-> execute -> verify -> history.

- phoebus-ai::install: bounded, multi-turn investigation. The model may request
  typed read-only evidence (discover_candidates, inspect_candidate,
  check_backend, inspect_installation), ask one bounded question about intent,
  and must return a structured InstallProposal. Turn/request/size limits and
  repeated-request detection bound it; a rejected proposal is revised.
- phoebus-core: add the four read-only investigation actions and strict
  validators; add a transaction id; backend/kind wire names now match as_str.
- phoebus-executor::install: resolve_explicit (no model, no fallback),
  resolve_deterministic and resolve_with_ai; validate_proposal re-resolves the
  candidate against real metadata, rejects fabrication/ambiguity/staleness/
  duplicates, maps it to the existing broker action, and binds approval to a
  digest; revalidate + verify_installed. chooser gains per-lane friendly-name
  resolution and structured evidence.
- transaction::begin/finish record an in-progress transaction before mutation.
- sys: --portage/--flatpak/--nix/--snap/--appimage/--ebuild (mutually
  exclusive) bypass the model; an unqualified install consults the model and,
  with none, prints the deterministic selection and installs nothing.
- The installer persists /etc/phoebus/install.toml; sys loads it and adds free
  space, Wayland, usable lanes, saved preferences and recovery capability to
  the bounded facts.
- Docs: ADR 0013, docs/SYS.md install sections and cases 23-31, CHANGELOG,
  STATUS, HANDOFF, ROADMAP. New live-VM workflow check script.

Host gates pass: fmt, clippy (no new warnings), workspace tests, make test.
VM: verified the workflow CLI and read-only investigation on the reference
LiveGUI ISO; a full target install journey is running (see HANDOFF).
2026-09-23 20:30:13 -07:00

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# `sys` — the deterministic Phoebus system interface
`sys` is the typed, validated execution boundary shared by the assistant and
the offline (no-model) administrator. Whatever the assistant can do, a human can
do by typing the same action; the assistant only makes it easier. The AI path
emits the same closed action schema, and the LLM never holds privilege: every
mutation is reviewed and authenticated by a human through the privileged broker.
```
sys <phrase> # deterministic parser (no model)
sys --action '<json>' # one typed action
sys --action-file plan.json # a typed action from a file
sys ask "<request>" # assistant proposes the same typed actions
```
Run `sys --help` for the flags. Mutating actions require root (`sudo sys ...`).
Without a model, `sys ask` prints the deterministic equivalent and exits.
## AI-first installation (`sys install`)
```
sys install firefox # AI investigates and recommends
sys install firefox --flatpak # deterministic, no model
sys install firefox --portage
sys install nodejs --nix
sys install thunderbird --snap
sys install MyTool --appimage
sys install app-misc/my-thing --ebuild # build a staged custom ebuild
sys ask install firefox # the same workflow via the assistant
```
One shared workflow (ADR 0013) is used by all of these:
```
identify -> evidence -> AI investigation -> proposed selection
-> deterministic validation + effects -> review -> approve -> execute
-> verify -> history
```
- **Unqualified** installation consults the connected model. The model may
request bounded, read-only evidence (`discover_candidates`,
`inspect_candidate`, `check_backend`, `inspect_installation`) and may ask one
bounded question about your intent. It returns a structured proposal naming a
real candidate id; the deterministic resolver independently confirms that
candidate against backend metadata, computes the effects, and binds approval
to a digest. A fabricated, stale, ambiguous or duplicating proposal is
rejected and returned to the model for a bounded revision.
- **Explicit backend flags** (`--portage`, `--flatpak`, `--nix`, `--snap`,
`--appimage`, `--ebuild`) bypass the model, are mutually exclusive, and never
fall back to another lane. If the lane cannot satisfy the request, the reason
and alternatives are shown and nothing is installed.
- **No model** for an unqualified install: the deterministic candidate
selection and the explicit commands are printed, and nothing is installed. A
provider failure is never permission to install through a lane.
- Every install is recorded in the transaction log **before** it runs (an
interrupted run leaves an in-progress record) and verified afterwards
(package database, `flatpak list`, `snap list`, or the managed AppImage
record). A verification failure is a failed transaction.
Read-only investigation is also directly available:
| Phrase / JSON | Typed action | Kind |
| --- | --- | --- |
| *(JSON only)* | `discover_candidates` | read |
| *(JSON only)* | `inspect_candidate` | read |
| *(JSON only)* | `check_backend` | read |
| *(JSON only)* | `inspect_installation` | read |
Example:
```sh
sys --action '{"action":"discover_candidates","query":"firefox","gui":true}'
sys --action '{"action":"check_backend","backend":"snap"}'
```
## Commands and typed actions
### Services (Portage/systemd ownership)
| Phrase | Typed action | Kind |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `inspect sshd` | `inspect_service` | read |
| `enable sshd` | `enable_service` | mutate |
| `disable sshd` | `disable_service` | mutate |
| `start sshd` | `start_service` | mutate |
| `stop sshd` | `stop_service` | mutate |
| `restart sshd` | `restart_service` | mutate |
### Packages (Portage)
| Phrase | Typed action | Kind |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `install vim` / `add vim` | `install_package` | mutate |
| `remove vim` / `uninstall vim` | `remove_package` | mutate |
| `search firefox` / `find firefox` | `search_packages` | read |
| `update` | `update_system` | mutate |
| `prepare updates` | `prepare_updates` | mutate |
| `what are you compiling` | `inspect_updates` | read |
| *(JSON only)* | `inspect_package` | read |
### Source selection (all lanes)
| Phrase | Typed action | Kind |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `choose firefox` | `choose_package` | read |
| `choose firefox via flatpak` | `choose_package` | read |
| `choose spotify as a gui sandboxed app` | `choose_package` | read |
| `prefer firefox via flatpak` | `set_package_preference` | mutate |
| `prefer firefox auto` | `set_package_preference` | mutate |
`choose` resolves real backend metadata, applies the shared policy
(ADR 0006), and prints the selected lane, version, provenance, integrity,
sandbox level, sizes, update behaviour and the rejected alternatives. It never
installs anything and never fabricates a candidate.
### Flatpak
| Phrase | Typed action | Kind |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `flatpak install org.chromium.Chromium` | `flatpak_install` | mutate |
| `flatpak remove org.chromium.Chromium` | `flatpak_remove` | mutate |
| `flatpak list` | `flatpak_list` | read |
### Nix (developer lane)
| Phrase | Typed action | Kind |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `nix prepare nodejs python312` | `nix_prepare` | mutate |
### Snap (opt-in; `app-containers/snapd` through Portage)
| Phrase | Typed action | Kind |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `snap find notes` | `snap_find` | read |
| `snap info thunderbird` | `snap_info` | read |
| `snap install thunderbird [channel]` | `snap_install` | mutate |
| `snap remove thunderbird` | `snap_remove` | mutate |
| `snap list` | `snap_list` | read |
| `snap refresh [name]` | `snap_refresh` | mutate |
| `snap connections thunderbird` | `snap_connections` | read |
Snap requires a ready `snapd` daemon. If it is absent, `snap_install` installs
`app-containers/snapd` through Portage and enables `snapd.socket` first.
Confinement is detected (`strict`/`partial`/`none`); `--classic` is only used
when the typed action sets `"classic": true` and is shown in the review. The
plan notes that snapd also refreshes automatically.
### AppImage (opt-in; managed, not sandboxed)
| Phrase | Typed action | Kind |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `appimage import /path/App.AppImage` | `appimage_import` | mutate |
| *(JSON only)* | `appimage_acquire` | mutate |
| *(JSON only)* | `appimage_update` | mutate |
| `appimage remove name` | `appimage_remove` | mutate |
| `appimage info name` | `appimage_info` | read |
| `appimage list` | `appimage_list` | read |
Acquisition requires a pinned SHA-256; a placeholder or mismatch is refused and
the download is discarded. Architecture is read from the ELF header without
executing the image. Desktop entries are installed, and user data is preserved
on removal unless `"purge_data": true`. AppImage provides **no application
sandbox** and is described as such.
### Custom ebuilds (Phoebus overlay)
| Phrase | Typed action | Kind |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `ebuilds` / `custom ebuilds` | `custom_ebuild_list` | read |
| *(JSON only)* | `custom_ebuild_prepare` | mutate |
| *(JSON only)* | `custom_ebuild_install` | mutate |
| *(JSON only)* | `custom_ebuild_remove` | mutate |
A custom ebuild is untrusted executable code. `custom_ebuild_prepare` writes it
to `/var/db/repos/phoebus` with a rationale and the SHA-256 of its exact
content; it does not build it. `custom_ebuild_install` requires that same
digest, regenerates the `Manifest` and builds through Portage with its sandbox
enabled. Editing the staged ebuild invalidates the approval.
### Snapshots and rollback
| Phrase | Typed action | Kind |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `snapshot before update` | `create_snapshot` | mutate |
| `undo` / `rollback` | `undo` | mutate |
| `undo status` | `rollback_status` | read |
| `history` | `history` | read |
## Acceptance matrix
The matrix below is the repeatable acceptance suite. `installer/tests/vm/
sys-acceptance.sh` runs the deterministic and JSON groups inside a booted,
installed, detached VM and prints a machine-readable summary; it is safe to run
with no network and no model.
| # | Case | Command | Expected |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | Identity | `sys --version` | prints the version, exit 0 |
| 2 | Read-only history | `sys history` | state, exit 0, no mutation |
| 3 | Invalid natural operand | `sys -- install --color=n` | rejected, nonzero |
| 4 | Unknown phrase | `sys frobnicate` | rejected, nonzero, examples shown |
| 5 | JSON unknown action | `--action '{"action":"run_shell"}'` | fail closed, nonzero |
| 6 | JSON unknown field | `--action '{"action":"history","x":1}'` | fail closed, nonzero |
| 7 | Option-like operand (JSON) | `install_package atom="-C"` | rejected before any command |
| 8 | Invalid Snap name | `snap_install name="Bad Name"` | rejected, nonzero |
| 9 | Invalid AppImage hash | `appimage_acquire sha256="00"` | rejected, nonzero |
| 10 | Ebuild path traversal | `custom_ebuild_prepare atom="../../x"` | rejected, nonzero |
| 11 | Choose with no lane | `sys choose unused-name` | selection or clear failure, never invented |
| 12 | Inventory (empty root) | `--root T appimage list` / `ebuilds` | "no managed …", exit 0 |
| 13 | Mutating as non-root | `set_package_preference` | refused: needs root |
| 14 | Snap daemon absent | `snap list` on a system without snapd | useful error, nonzero |
| 15 | Install a tiny package | `sys install app-misc/hello` (Portage) | installed; `emerge -p` confirms; recorded in `sys history` |
| 16 | Remove it | `sys remove app-misc/hello` | removed; recorded |
| 17 | Service lifecycle | `sys enable/start/stop sshd` | unit state matches `systemctl` |
| 18 | Update preparation | `sys prepare updates` then `what are you compiling` | state reported truthfully |
| 19 | Snapshot + undo | `sys snapshot`, mutate, `sys undo`, reboot | root/var/package state restored |
| 20 | Approval rejected | answer `n` at the prompt | no mutation, nonzero |
| 21 | Plan changed between review and exec | concurrent metadata change | aborts, nonzero |
| 22 | Offline `sys ask` | `sys ask "<request>"` with no provider | deterministic fallback, nonzero |
| 23 | Unqualified install consults the model | `sys install firefox` with a provider | model investigated; resolver confirmed |
| 24 | Explicit backend, no model | `sys install firefox --flatpak` with no provider | deterministic, no model consulted |
| 25 | Conflicting backend flags | `sys install x --flatpak --nix` | rejected by the CLI |
| 26 | Explicit lane cannot satisfy | `sys install x --portage` without Portage | explained, no fallback, nonzero |
| 27 | Unqualified with no model | `sys install firefox` and no provider | deterministic offer printed, nothing installed |
| 28 | Ambiguous friendly name | a name matching several candidates | clarification required, nonzero |
| 29 | Fabricated candidate | model proposes a non-existent id | rejected, revised, no install |
| 30 | Changed candidate version | metadata changes after review | approval invalidated, nonzero |
| 31 | Failed install history | a failing backend command | transaction recorded as failed |
Cases 1–14 and 21–31 are covered by host tests
(`crates/phoebus-core/src/selection.rs`, `.../action.rs`,
`crates/phoebus-ai/src/install.rs`,
`crates/phoebus-executor/src/{install,snap,appimage,ebuild,chooser,transaction}.rs`,
and `crates/phoebus-installer/tests/sys_cli.rs`). Cases 15–20 and the in-VM
subset are exercised by the VM acceptance script; their current verification
status is recorded in `docs/STATUS.md`.
## Security properties
- **No shell.** Every command is an argument vector through
`phoebus-executor::Exec`; there is no `sh -c` on any path.
- **Validated at the boundary.** Every action (manual, JSON, or AI) is
re-validated before a command is built; option-like operands are rejected.
- **Target-root isolation.** Alternate-root operations are chrooted; runtime
operations (services, Snap) refuse an alternate root.
- **Approval binding.** A resolved plan has a digest; a material change between
review and execution aborts. A custom ebuild binds approval to its content
digest.
- **Secrets** travel only through mode-0600 files/stdin and are redacted from
logs and history.