475 lines
28 KiB
Markdown
475 lines
28 KiB
Markdown
# Changelog
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All notable changes are recorded here. The authoritative history is `git log`;
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this file is the curated, human-readable summary.
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Format: Keep a Changelog. Dates are UTC.
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## 2026-09-22 — `sys` administration hardening
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Correctness work on the deterministic `sys` broker and the assistant path that
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shares it. Every change is covered by unit tests (368 Rust tests pass); the
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destructive rollback VM acceptance remains unverified (see below).
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### Fixed
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- **Alternate-root execution now targets the requested system.** Package
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execution, service enable/disable and Flatpak operations previously ignored
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`--root` and ran against the host, while `emerge --pretend` previews already
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ran in the target. All of them now go through one `target_spec`/chroot path,
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and operations that cannot be confined to a non-running root (service status,
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start, stop, restart) are **rejected before any command is built**.
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`systemctl --root` is used for offline enable/disable. Regression tests prove
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preview and execution both emit a chroot confined to the same root, and that
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a rejected operation invokes nothing.
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- **Validation at the execution boundary.** `parse_natural` emitted actions
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that were never validated, so a manual `sys install --color=n` could pass an
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option through. `parse_natural` now validates its own output, `resolve_effects`
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and `execute` validate every action before touching a command, and
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option-like operands (leading `-`) are rejected for services, packages and
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search. `emerge`/`flatpak` operands are passed after an explicit `--`
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separator. Manual, JSON and AI entry paths are all covered.
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- **`sys ask` reports failure truthfully.** A failing action now stops the plan,
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records the completed/failed/unattempted actions, and exits nonzero instead of
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returning success.
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- **Complete transaction history.** Ordinary mutating `sys` commands are
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recorded (previously only assistant plans were), the protective snapshot id
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created by the generic high-risk path is preserved and recorded, and a
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recording failure is surfaced instead of being swallowed.
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- **Reliable package approval.** `emerge --pretend` output is now classified as
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*established* (a real plan, including a genuine `0 packages`) or
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*unestablished*; `sys` refuses to proceed when the effects cannot be
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established rather than treating unparseable output as "nothing to do". A
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material change between review and execution still aborts.
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### Added
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- Typed service lifecycle actions `start_service`, `stop_service`,
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`restart_service`, and ordinary commands for the existing bounded verbs:
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`sys flatpak install|remove|list`, `sys nix prepare …`, `sys snapshot [op]`,
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`sys start|stop|restart <unit>`. The AI prompt exposes the new verbs, so the
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manual and AI interfaces share one validated execution path.
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- `phoebus-executor::actions::execute_plan` runs a reviewed multi-action plan,
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stopping at the first failure and marking the rest unattempted, so the
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assistant and any multi-step caller report partial failure consistently.
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- CLI integration tests (`tests/sys_cli.rs`) cover the manual and JSON entry
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paths and exit codes.
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## Unreleased
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### Added
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- **Real OpenCode agent-server adapter.** `phoebus-executor::opencode_client`
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implements the OpenCode session/message protocol over the project's curl
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transport and the `ModelTransport` trait, so the strict proposal parser,
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evidence review, bounded facts and executor are reused unchanged. The GUI
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("OpenCode agent"), the installer CLI (`--ai-backend opencode`,
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`--opencode-server/-provider/-model/-password-file`) and `sys ask` all use it.
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It creates a transient session per request, accepts only the completed
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assistant text parts, disables tools per message, and deletes the session.
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A JSON schema output mode is available in the protocol but is not used: the
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shipped DeepSeek models reject it, and the prompt carries an explicit change
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shape instead. The `opencode 1.18.32` contract was verified directly: session
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creation rejects a `model` field, `/provider` metadata can contain a
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credential and is reduced to ids/model names, and auth is HTTP Basic
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(`opencode` / `OPENCODE_SERVER_PASSWORD`).
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- **`--opencode-test`** obtains and validates a real model response (exit
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nonzero on failure), distinct from the read-only `--opencode-probe`. A live
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acceptance test (`make opencode-acceptance`) fails as BLOCKED when no server
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is configured, so it cannot pass by not running.
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- **Truthful OpenCode connection states** (`insecure_transport`, `unreachable`,
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`authentication_required`, `authentication_rejected`, `incompatible`,
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`reachable`, `model_catalog`, `selected_model_unavailable`); `ready` is
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reserved for a validated response and is never returned by the probe.
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- **GUI "Test connection"** and OpenCode connection controls, plus a backend
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selection (`ai.backend`) in canonical configuration.
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### Security
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- **The mandatory-AI gate now requires a validated interaction.** Both the GUI
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bridge and the installer CLI refuse to install when only a provider name is
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configured; a successful, validated model interaction bound to the current
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configuration (and credential) is required. Changing the model, endpoint,
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server or a secret invalidates it. A direct provider or `--no-ai` remains the
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fallback.
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- **OpenCode transport policy is enforced.** Plain `http://` is accepted only
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when the resolved destination is loopback and the connection is pinned to the
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checked address; remote access is `https://` with certificate verification or
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an authenticated tunnel to loopback. Redirects, unsafe schemes and oversized
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or trickled bodies are bounded, and credentials travel only on curl's stdin.
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- **Credentials never surface.** The catalog is reduced to ids/model names;
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server responses that echo credentials are not retained, and tests feed
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credential-bearing bodies and assert they do not appear in errors or state.
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### Verified
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- **The graphical installer uses the OpenCode adapter.** In a disposable
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graphical VM the wizard selected "OpenCode agent", entered the server,
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provider and model through the UI, obtained a real model response (Test
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connection) and a validated proposal (Connect and validate, green
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"Validated"). The `opencode` harness run passed 17/17 and the GUI regression
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25/25. A password-protected server was reached through authentication as
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well. The full graphical installation beyond the AI gate is still not run.
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### Fixed
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- **A malformed model proposal now gets one bounded corrective retry** before
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the strict parser rejects the interaction (the shipped DeepSeek models
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occasionally keyed the change or rationale wrongly). The parser remains the
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final authority; a retry that still fails is still rejected.
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- **OpenCode client/probe defects found by testing:** the handwritten HTTP
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reader (no total deadline, UTF-8-unsafe chunk fallback) was removed in favour
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of the curl transport; the catalog is no longer parsed on a non-2xx status; a
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provider-shaped 500 can no longer look like a catalog; the duplicate-session
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harness check requires exactly one session; and GUI navigation is asserted
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from secret-free frontend state lines rather than inferred from a screenshot.
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### Added
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- **OpenCode connection workflow and capability probe.** New ADR 0011 and
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`docs/OPENCODE.md` separate the four components (client, server, model
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service, Phoebus broker) and document host-local and tunnelled remote use.
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`phoebus-executor::opencode_server` probes `/global/health` and
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`/config/providers` and reports a typed state (`disconnected`,
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`authentication_required`, `incompatible`, `reachable_no_model`, `ready`)
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instead of assuming a TCP connect or HTTP 200 means compatibility. Exposed as
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`phoebus-installer --opencode-probe <url>` (read-only, nonzero unless a model
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is available). Never returns provider credentials. Verified against the
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installed `opencode 1.18.32` (ready) and a deliberate unauthenticated LAN bind
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(`authentication_required`).
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### Security
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- **The target disk is revalidated immediately before partitioning.** An
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approval now binds to a verified device, not a name: `storage_prepare` re-probes
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and refuses if the disk disappeared, became protected (mounted/read-only/live),
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or changed size/model since it was selected. Regression tests cover each case.
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- **The GUI bridge refuses replayed and overlapping installs.** An approval is
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single-use and consumed before destructive work; a second `start_install`, a
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retry or a reconnected frontend cannot start a second installation. Request
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lines and secret values are length-bounded; deeply nested JSON is rejected.
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- **Provider transport hardened.** Only `http(s)` endpoints are accepted, URLs
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with characters that could inject curl config directives are refused, the
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transfer is restricted to `http,https`, redirects stay disabled (so an
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`Authorization` header cannot follow a redirect to another origin), and the
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response is size-bounded (`max-filesize`).
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- **`TargetRoot` refuses symlink escapes.** `write`/`ensure_dir` reject a
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symlinked path component inside the target instead of following it, so a
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planted symlink cannot redirect an installer write to the host.
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- **Unauthenticated OpenCode endpoints are not treated as usable.** The probe
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reports `authentication_required` for a passwordless LAN bind rather than
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`ready`.
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### Fixed
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- **Disk sizes are no longer reported as `0 B`.** `probe_disks` invoked `lsblk`
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without `-b`, so human-readable sizes (`30G`) failed the byte parse and every
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disk displayed `0 B`; the size-based disk-identity check was also blind. The
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`-b` flag is now used and pinned by a test.
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- **The welcome window's primary action is keyboard-reachable.** It now requests
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activation and force-focuses "Install Phoebus OS", so Return launches the
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installer (previously no focus ring was shown and Return did nothing). A
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regression test also rejects the non-existent `FloatingWindow.onActiveChanged`.
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- **The installer cannot be abandoned mid-install without explanation.** Escape
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during the destructive phase is refused and the UI states that the operation
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cannot be cancelled safely; the AI step shows its "connect and validate"
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guidance inline, beside the controls.
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### Changed
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- **The VM harness enforces its own safety rules and reports structured
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results.** `installer/tests/vm/vmsafety.py` validates every writable drive
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(qcow2, inside `PHOEBUS_VM_DISKS`, no `/dev/*`, block/char devices, raw
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images, escaping symlinks or outside backing chains), gives each run its own
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OVMF variable file and QMP socket, uses structured QMP and argument arrays
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(no `os.system`), and returns nonzero on any failed assertion, timeout, EOF or
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missing result. Statuses are `PASS`/`FAIL`/`BLOCKED`/`SKIPPED`/`NOT RUN`.
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`make test` now runs the harness unit tests; `installer/tests/vm/report.py`
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builds a browsable run report.
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### Added
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- **Graphical installation experience.** The live ISO now boots into a branded
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Phoebus welcome window (`phoebus-welcome`) that makes "Install Phoebus OS" the
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dominant action, shows ISO version and readiness (network, firmware, memory,
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cores) and keeps network/display/accessibility/help/keyboard-test/power tools
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available, with troubleshooting tools under Advanced. A full graphical setup
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wizard (`phoebus-install`) guides language and keyboard, network and
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prerequisites, AI model connection, destination disk (with protected disks
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and the installer medium identified), account and encryption, review,
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`ERASE` authorization, progress and completion. Duplicate installer sessions
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are prevented. The TUI/CLI remains the fallback. See ADR 0010 and
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`docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`.
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- **Typed JSON GUI bridge.** `phoebus-installer --gui-bridge` exposes a narrow,
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fail-closed protocol over stdin/stdout that reuses the same `InstallConfig`,
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validation, plan, `DestructiveAuthorization` and staged executor as the TUI.
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Approval is bound to a plan digest, secrets travel only over the stdin pipe,
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and real backend stages are reported with categories (no invented
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percentages). `Installer::install_observed` and an `InstallObserver` trait
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were added; `Installer::install` is unchanged.
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- **Phoebus brand system.** `phoebus-core::brand` provides charcoal/warm
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white/amber tokens plus a sun emblem, wordmark and wallpaper as deterministic
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SVG (emitted via `--emit-asset`, shared with the QML frontend), applied to the
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GRUB menu, live wallpaper, welcome window, installer, application icon and
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completion screen. Readable contrast and the QML/Rust palette are pinned by
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tests.
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### Fixed
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- **Installed systems no longer default into recovery.** `loader.conf` now pins
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the newest real kernel entry, and the snapshot recovery entry carries a
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`sort-key` that keeps it after every kernel, so a low machine-id can never
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make systemd-boot select the recovery entry by filename tie-break. Previously
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an installed system could boot `systemd.unit=rescue.target` after reboot.
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- **DMS first-run dialogs are suppressed on the live medium** by pre-seeding
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DMS's own onboarding and changelog markers, so the installer is the first
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thing the user sees.
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- **The live-medium device is now identified.** `probe_disks` also inspects
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`/run/live/medium` and `/run/live/rootfs`, so the ISO is labelled as the
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installation medium (and remains protected).
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- **The installer shortcut is live-only.** `phoebus-install` and its desktop
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entry are no longer written to an installed system.
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### Changed
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- **Mango + DankMaterialShell is now the default desktop** for both the
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installation ISO and the installed system (explicit owner decision). Omitted
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`desktop.profile` selects `mango`; Flatpak and PipeWire are on by default.
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Explicit `none`, `minimal`, `dwl` and `full` continue to work unchanged
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(ADR 0009).
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- **Installed login uses greetd + tuigreet.** Authentication is always
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required; the default session is Mango and the dwl entry remains selectable
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(`--sessions /usr/share/wayland-sessions`). Live autologin is a separate,
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live-only configuration and is never written to an installed system.
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### Added
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- **Live desktop ISO**: `installer/live/build.sh` now builds a rootless Debian
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testing rootfs containing Mango (built from a pinned source release),
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DankMaterialShell (pinned, SHA-256-verified release tarball), Quickshell,
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scenefx, wlroots 0.20, greetd/tuigreet and the desktop integration, then
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splices it into the base Debian-Live boot equipment. The live user autologins
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into Mango, an "Install Phoebus" launcher opens the unchanged installer UI,
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and a serial/VT recovery console is retained. The build fails clearly if a
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required desktop component is missing. Debian packages never enter the Gentoo
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target. The built ISO was booted in a graphical, seat-providing VM: Mango +
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DankMaterialShell + Quickshell ran and a `screendump` captured the DMS panel
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and welcome window (`docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`).
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- Shared desktop assets are emitted from one source of truth by
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`phoebus-installer --emit-asset` and used by both the installer and the live
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build. Regression tests cover the default/overrides, login configuration,
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live/installed separation, session entries, pinned checksums and the live ISO
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desktop-payload guards.
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### Added
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- **Mango + DankMaterialShell desktop option** (`desktop.profile = "mango"`):
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`gui-wm/mangowm` 0.17.2 (wlroots 0.20) plus `gui-apps/dankmaterialshell`
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1.5.3 / Quickshell 0.3.1 / scenefx 0.5, installed through the GURU community
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overlay with scoped `~amd64` keywords (never global). The installer writes
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GURU's `repos.conf`, bootstraps `dev-vcs/git`, and syncs the overlay. A
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`phoebus-session-mango` entry point, a packaged Mango config seeded once into
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the user's config, DMS keybindings, a `mango-session.target` binding for DMS,
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and `phoebus-mango.desktop`/`phoebus-dwl.desktop` session entries are
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generated. dwl remains the fallback session and is installed alongside. The
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profile is selectable but **not promoted to default** pending graphical-VM
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verification (ADR 0009).
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## 2026-09-21 — Coherent rollback, installed assistant, Nix isolation
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### Added
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- **Coherent rollback and recovery** (`phoebus-core::rollback`,
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`phoebus-executor::rollback`): a recovery point now captures `@` **and** the
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separately mounted `@var` (Portage state) under one name; rollback creates a
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writable root generation, rewrites the restored root's fstab **and** the BLS
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`rootflags=subvol=`, selects a boot entry whose kernel modules match the
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restored `/lib/modules`, and writes "previous" and snapshot-based "recovery"
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entries. A persisted `rollback-state.toml` makes interruption safe and
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resumable; retention prunes old snapshots and protects in-flight targets; a
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1 GiB free-space check gates the operation. See ADR 0007.
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- `sys undo` / `sys undo <id>` / `sys undo status` and the high-risk `undo`
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typed action. The installer now records a snapshot-based "Phoebus Recovery"
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entry at install time, so recovery does not depend on the live root.
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- **Installed conversational assistant** (`phoebus-ai::assistant`,
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`sys ask <request>`): bounded facts -> typed plan -> concrete resolved effects
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-> approval/authentication -> deterministic execution -> transaction record.
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No model is required: `sys ask` falls back to the deterministic parser.
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- **OS-level model sandbox** (`phoebus-executor::sandbox`): the network call
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runs in a hardened, unprivileged transient systemd unit (`DynamicUser`,
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`ProtectHome`, `ProtectSystem=strict`, `NoNewPrivileges`, syscall and
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address-family filters). It fails closed when `systemd-run` is unavailable.
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- **Resolved package effects and approval binding** (`phoebus-core::effects`):
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`emerge --pretend` is parsed into additions/upgrades/downgrades/removals with
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source-vs-binary provenance and download size; a plan digest binds approval,
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and a material change between review and execution aborts. New bounded typed
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actions `flatpak_install`/`flatpak_remove`/`flatpak_list` and `nix_prepare`.
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- **Transaction log** (`phoebus-core::transaction`): assistant and `sys`
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actions record their actions, result and recovery point; `sys history` shows
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snapshots and transactions.
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- **Desktop completeness**: `phoebus-menu` (wofi drun launcher + power menu),
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`phoebus-lock` (swaylock), `phoebus-idle` (swayidle: lock, suspend,
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before-sleep lock) and a system-wide Waybar config with network, audio,
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battery, clock and power controls.
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- **Release gates** (`phoebus-installer::release`): a registry of the real
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candidate checks (install, detached boot, desktop, updates/rollback,
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no-model), a gate report that never records an unexecuted check as passed,
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atomic publication that preserves the last known-good `latest.iso.prev`, and
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signing/verification command helpers.
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- New VM harness for the Debian-Live appliance:
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`installer/tests/vm/appliance-driver.py`, `appliance-guest.sh` and
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`appliance-test.conf.example`.
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### Changed
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- **Nix build isolation is enforced**: `sandbox = true`,
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`sandbox-fallback = false`, with store bounds (`min-free`/`max-free`) and
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`auto-optimise-store`. Lifecycle operations (remove/purge, gc) and a
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bounded `nix_prepare` action were added; the Portage-owned ebuild approach is
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documented in ADR 0008. See ADR 0006.
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- Desktops install `swayidle`/`swaylock` session helpers and a Waybar
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configuration; `phoebus-session` starts the idle daemon.
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### Added
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- **Nix bootstrap (on by default, VM-verified).** `phoebus-executor::nix`
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fetches the pinned, SHA-256-verified official Nix release and bootstraps it
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into the target with discrete commands (store copy, `nix-store --load-db`,
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`nixbld` users, state dirs, profile and daemon units). A desktop VM confirmed
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`nix-daemon.service` active and `nix shell nixpkgs#hello` printing
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`Hello, world!`. A binary ebuild was ruled out: the upstream installer has no
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`DESTDIR` and runs `nix-store --load-db` against the real root.
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- `finalize` now flushes the target (`sync`) before unmounting, so late writes
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such as `/usr/local/bin/phoebus-session` and the exported installer log are on
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disk even after a forced poweroff.
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### Changed
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- **Installing Phoebus now requires an AI.** The installer refuses an install
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with no provider unless the explicit break-glass `--no-ai` (alias `--legacy`,
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or `PHOEBUS_NO_AI=1`) is used. A new `local` provider (Ollama/llama.cpp/
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LM Studio) and `--ai-endpoint` support a model the user downloaded; no model
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is shipped.
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- Desktop installs now include `sys-apps/xdg-desktop-portal`,
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`xdg-desktop-portal-gtk` and `xdg-desktop-portal-wlr`, so Flatpak and
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Wayland apps get file choosers and screencast support.
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### Added
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- `sys` offline package commands: `sys install <name>`, `sys remove <name>`,
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`sys search <query>` (plus the `remove_package`/`search_packages` typed
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actions). They are deterministic Portage operations with no model involved —
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`emerge` resolves a bare name or a full atom — so the system stays fully
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administrable offline and without the assistant.
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- **Debian-Live installer appliance** (`installer/live/build.sh`, no root): a
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bootable Phoebus installer ISO built by overlaying the static installer, the
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OpenCode manifest and the Debian tools the live image lacks onto a Debian-Live
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stable base, with a serial-visible auto-booting grub config. The target stays
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Gentoo. See `docs/PLAN-DEBIAN-LIVE.md` and ADR 0005.
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- Git workflow: committed hooks (`.githooks/`), `scripts/check-secrets.sh`,
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`scripts/agent-commit.sh`, `scripts/publish.sh`, `scripts/setup-hooks.sh`.
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- Documentation set: `docs/OBJECTIVES.md`, `ROADMAP.md`, `STATUS.md`,
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`ARCHITECTURE.md`, `DEVELOPMENT.md`, `CONTRIBUTING.md`, `GIT-WORKFLOW.md`,
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`CHANGELOG.md`, and the top-level `AGENTS.md`.
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- `.gitignore` covering the ISO, build output, transcripts and secrets.
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## 2026-09-20 — AI guidance, desktop reliability, snapshots
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### Added
|
||
- AI-assisted install guidance: an OpenAI-compatible provider layer for
|
||
**DeepSeek** and **OpenAI** plus a test transport
|
||
(`phoebus-ai::provider`), credential loading and a curl transport that keeps
|
||
the API key out of argv, config and logs (`phoebus-executor::ai`), and CLI
|
||
flags `--ai`, `--ai-provider`, `--ai-model`, `--ai-api-key-file`,
|
||
`--ai-proposal-file`, `--ai-facts`. The TUI offers
|
||
DeepSeek/ChatGPT/without-AI.
|
||
- Typed proposal extensions: scoped `package.use`, explicit build jobs and
|
||
binary-package preference. Every proposal now requires a non-empty reason and
|
||
duplicate/conflicting changes are rejected before anything is applied.
|
||
- `sys` history and update preparation are VM-verified on a Btrfs install.
|
||
|
||
### Changed
|
||
- `phoebus-session` now starts `dwl` first, waits for the Wayland socket before
|
||
launching waybar/mako/swaybg, establishes `XDG_RUNTIME_DIR` and a session bus,
|
||
starts the polkit authentication agent, and reaps helpers on logout.
|
||
- Portage policy: the unused `installkernel uki` flag is no longer forced, the
|
||
duplicate/empty PipeWire/WirePlumber lines are gone, and the signed binhost is
|
||
derived from the selected profile when unset.
|
||
- Update preparation records a successful distfile fetch as ready even when
|
||
`--buildpkgonly` is skipped because dependencies must be merged first, and the
|
||
state note now includes the redacted Portage reason.
|
||
|
||
### Fixed
|
||
- A high-risk `sys` action now creates its protective snapshot inside
|
||
`actions::execute` and **fails closed** if the `.snapshots` subvolume exists
|
||
but the snapshot cannot be created; corrupt snapshot history is surfaced
|
||
instead of being hidden as empty.
|
||
|
||
## 2026-09-20 — Retire the Bash installer (migration Phases 0–4)
|
||
|
||
### Added
|
||
- `phoebus-executor::opencode`: pinned-manifest parsing, architecture
|
||
detection, fetch through `Exec`, SHA-256 verification, fail-closed
|
||
placeholder checks, extraction and config writer (7 unit tests).
|
||
- `--bootstrap-opencode` on the CLI; `PHOEBUS_OPENCODE_MANIFEST` overrides the
|
||
embedded manifest for fixture verification.
|
||
- `cli_coverage` and golden plan tests (`plan_golden.rs`, `tests/golden/`).
|
||
- `docs/BASH-MIGRATION.md`: the evidence-gated retirement plan and ledger.
|
||
|
||
### Changed
|
||
- The disposable VM harness installs with the static Rust binary; full
|
||
encrypted install + detached boot re-verified (systemd PID 1, `running`,
|
||
0 failed units, LUKS, login).
|
||
- CI, the pre-commit hook, the Makefile and the commit/publish scripts gate on
|
||
Rust only (`cargo fmt`, `clippy`, `test`).
|
||
- `installer/doc/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md` and `installer/doc/FINDINGS.md`
|
||
moved to `docs/`.
|
||
|
||
### Removed
|
||
- The Bash installer tree (entry point, libraries, TUI, configuration, shell
|
||
test suite and README), retired in favour of `installer-rs/`. The Bash
|
||
reference remains tagged `v0.1.0-bash-reference`. The disposable VM harness
|
||
under `installer/tests/vm/` is retained.
|
||
|
||
## 2026-09-20 — Rust installer parity, desktop, and foundations
|
||
|
||
### Added
|
||
- Rust workspace (`installer-rs/`): `phoebus-core`, `phoebus-executor`,
|
||
`phoebus-ai`, `phoebus-tui`, `phoebus-installer` (~9.4k LOC, 45 files).
|
||
- Typed `InstallConfig` supporting TOML and the legacy flat format.
|
||
- `TargetRoot` (host/target path safety), `SecretString`/`Redactor`,
|
||
`DestructiveAuthorization`, central `Exec` command layer with dry-run.
|
||
- Storage backend: GPT, ESP, LUKS2, Btrfs layout, fstab/crypttab, swapfile.
|
||
- Stage3 fetch with pinned SHA-256 (or signed DIGESTS), Portage configuration,
|
||
signed binary use, source builds, kernel, dracut, systemd-boot BLS.
|
||
- Desktop/Flatpak: selects `default/linux/amd64/23.0/desktop/systemd`, writes
|
||
`/usr/local/bin/phoebus-session`; flathub remote configured.
|
||
- Package policy instrumentation: measured compile times parsed from
|
||
`emerge.log` (326 entries recorded in the desktop run), persisted to
|
||
`/var/lib/phoebus/compile-times.tsv`.
|
||
- Snapshots: read-only Btrfs snapshots + TOML transaction history.
|
||
- Background update preparation (`--fetchonly` + `--buildpkgonly`).
|
||
- Typed `SystemAction` schema, privileged broker, and the `sys` command.
|
||
- AI privacy boundary (`PrivacyPolicy`, `ContextBundle`, forbidden paths).
|
||
- Release tooling: `phoebus-release` manifest/verify/sha256/assemble.
|
||
- ratatui TUI with plan review and ERASE confirmation.
|
||
- Recovery BLS entry booting `rescue.target`.
|
||
|
||
### Fixed
|
||
- Subvolumes mounted before creation.
|
||
- fstab/crypttab overwritten by stage3 extraction (moved to `fstab_generate`).
|
||
- Missing `/var/tmp` breaking `kernel-install`.
|
||
- `installkernel` requiring `uki_generator` even for BLS.
|
||
- dracut `crypt` module and `systemd-cryptsetup` missing.
|
||
- LUKS cmdline using `rd.luks.uuid` instead of `rd.luks.name`.
|
||
- dracut UKI missing the kernel command line (BLS adopted).
|
||
- `@swap` not mounted, breaking swap activation.
|
||
- Portage GPG verify user unable to read the getuto keyring.
|
||
- Transient rsync mirror quarantine (sync retries).
|
||
- Pillow/HarfBuzz documentation circular dependency.
|
||
- Legacy config silently parsed as TOML with defaults.
|
||
|
||
### Verified
|
||
- Full encrypted UEFI install and boot with the ISO detached: `systemd` PID 1,
|
||
`is-system-running = running`, 0 failed units, 10.73 s boot.
|
||
- Desktop stack headless: dwl, waybar, mako, swaybg, `grim` screenshot,
|
||
`wl-copy`/`wl-paste`, `wpctl`, `flatpak 1.18.1` + flathub.
|
||
- No secret leakage in the installer log.
|
||
|
||
## 2026-09-19 — Bash installer prototype and first VM boot
|
||
|
||
### Added
|
||
- Bash + `dialog` installer (`installer/`) with deterministic backend, TUI,
|
||
plan/review, dry-run, logging, and destructive confirmation.
|
||
- Read-only hardware/disk discovery with live-medium protection.
|
||
- GPT/LUKS2/Btrfs backend, systemd stage3, Portage, kernel, systemd-boot,
|
||
users/services/desktop modules.
|
||
- Unit/regression suite and a disposable VM harness.
|
||
|
||
### Verified
|
||
- First complete encrypted UEFI VM install and boot with the Bash installer.
|
||
|
||
### Fixed
|
||
- The subvolume-ordering, fstab-timing, `/var/tmp`, `rd.luks.name`,
|
||
`uki_generator`, cryptsetup, `@swap`, and `local root="$1" dir=...` bugs
|
||
(these are the class of bug the Rust port is designed to prevent).
|