phoebus_os/docs/HANDOFF.md

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# Handoff
Rolling note between work sessions. **Update this file before you finish**, then
commit it. It should be short and current; use `git log` for detail.
- **Last updated:** this session (2026-09-25), adversarial hardening of the
privileged approval boundary: (1) the broker recomputes the canonical
approval digest for every plan kind, (2) the ledger uses a stable approval
identity instead of the editable integrity seal, (3) crash recovery is
live-safe and terminal transitions are atomic/monotonic, and (4) personal
writes are owned by the initiating user. See ADR 0014. Supersedes the
`0be3010` approval design; that commit's UX/docs changes are preserved.
- **Current focus:**
1. **Canonical digest at the privileged boundary (`service::validate_prepared_plan`):**
- Independently re-derives `compute_plan_digest(actions, candidate,
effects)` and requires it to equal both `plan.digest` and the supplied
`--approval-digest`. Covers Install, LegacyInstall, Removal, General and
Undo. The stored `integrity` seal is only a self-consistency check and is
never treated as authentication.
- Closes the "retain the approved digest, swap an action and effects,
recompute the seal" attack; rejected before any command runs or approval
is consumed.
2. **Stable approval identity (`phoebus_installer::approval`, ADR 0014):**
- Ledger + `.claim` key = `approval_key(plan_id, canonical_digest,
initiator_uid, target_root)`. Presentation fields (summary, rationale,
verification) are excluded, so editing them and resealing cannot mint a
fresh record for a consumed approval; a newly reviewed identical
operation with a new plan id is allowed.
- Claims record the owning process (`pid`, `/proc/<pid>/stat` start ticks,
boot id). Terminal status is published once via an atomic hard link into
`<key>.terminal` and is immutable. `reconcile_interrupted` only marks a
record interrupted when the owner is provably gone, so a live operation
(or a second broker starting concurrently) is never mislabelled, and it
cannot race a real `finish`.
3. **Personal write ownership (`phoebus_executor::personal`):**
- `write_private` creates the config/state path one component at a time
under the resolved home, rejecting symlinks and non-directories.
- Elevated writes (effective root on behalf of a non-root user) chown the
created paths to the initiating user's uid/gid (via a standard-library
`chown` behind an injectable `OwnerFixer`). A non-root process acting for
a different user is refused. Proactive state now routes through the same
path.
4. **Reviewed effects + terminal transactions** (`service::execute_prepared`,
unchanged this session): reviewed per-step effects are carried forward and
freshly resolved effects are evidence compared with
`phoebus_core::effects::approval_holds`; every path after
`transaction::begin` reaches a terminal result.
- **Last verified (this session):**
- `cargo fmt --all -- --check` clean.
- `cargo test --workspace`: 598 passed, 0 failed. New adversarial tests:
swapped-action-with-retained-digest for every plan kind; replay rejected
after a summary edit / other presentation edits / recreating an identical
plan under the original id; a newly reviewed identical operation with a new
id allowed; live claim not reconciled while an abandoned one is;
reconcile-vs-finish race yields one immutable terminal; terminal status not
overwritten; elevated personal write chowns to the initiating user; a
symlinked component is refused; a non-root cross-uid personal write is
refused (unit and CLI).
- `cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets` exits 0 (only the pre-existing
`result_large_err`, one arg-count and one `DiskPhase` lints remain).
- `cargo build --release -p phoebus-installer` clean.
- **Not yet verified this session (BLOCKED):**
- Installed-VM journey and the 12-step acceptance list. The existing
disposable installed disk (`/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/disks/test-disk.qcow2`)
reaches the LUKS prompt but **no passphrase in this environment opens it**:
the harness default (`phoebus-luks-test`, which is also the content of
`/home/dominic/vmlab/serve/luks.pw`) is rejected, and no other credential is
available. Do not guess or brute-force.
- No AI provider credential is present; do not invent one.
- A real privileged `chown` (running as root) could not be exercised in this
unprivileged host; the ownership logic is verified through the injectable
fixer seam and the cross-uid refusal test. A root-run confirmation is a
follow-up.
- **Public repo:** <https://git.phoebus.club/phoebus/phoebus_os>
(remote `origin`, SSH port 2222).
## Next actions (in order)
1. **Unlock or rebuild the installed VM (blocker).** The installed disk reaches
the LUKS prompt but its passphrase is unknown; the committed harness default
is rejected. Either supply the real passphrase or perform a fresh disposable
install (~2 h) to obtain an installed system, then run the full 12-step
acceptance list below.
2. **Installed `sys` acceptance** on the booted disk:
```sh
# serve the static sys first:
cp installer-rs/target/x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/release/sys /home/dominic/vmlab/serve/
env DISK=/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/disks/<clone>.qcow2 \
OVMF_CODE=/usr/share/OVMF/OVMF_CODE_4M.fd \
OVMF_VARS=/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/OVMF_VARS.fd \
BOOT_CHECKS='... curl .../sys ...; SYS_BIN=/tmp/sys bash .../sys-acceptance.sh ...' \
python3 installer/tests/vm/serial-driver.py boot
```
The new broker behaviour (replacement during authentication, replay after
deleting user plan state, cancellation) is already covered by
`phoebus-installer` unit tests; the installed run confirms the sealed
elevation path and the personal-preference acceptance case.
3. **AI-selected install journey (needs an authorised provider)**: boot the
installed disk, serve the built `sys` and a 0600 key file, then:
```sh
sudo sys --ai-provider deepseek --ai-api-key-file /run/phoebus/ai.key \
install <application>
# and the no-model control in the same run:
PHOEBUS_AI_PROVIDER= sudo sys install <application>
```
Confirm the model requests evidence, the resolver confirms the candidate,
the plan is presented before approval, and the transaction is recorded. No
credential is available here; do not invent one.
4. **Rollback VM acceptance** (`serial-driver.py rollback`) on a cloned
disposable image of the installed system.
5. **NVIDIA hardware acceptance (BLOCKED)**: needs an NVIDIA GPU.
6. **Interactive graphical user session** login into Mango / DankMaterialShell
under a physical seat or nested Wayland compositor.
## Known blockers / risks
- **A full VM install still takes hours** (base stage ~116 min). Use the already
installed disposable disk (clone it) for `sys install` journeys rather than a
fresh install.
- **No NVIDIA GPU** (and no authorised passthrough).
- **Snap needs network and AppArmor** for meaningful confinement; the lane
detects confinement honestly.
- **AppImage provides no sandbox**; do not describe it as one.
- **Custom ebuilds remain separately reviewed, untrusted artifacts**; the
install workflow never builds one during investigation.
- **OpenCode transport** concatenates messages, so multi-turn investigation is
best-effort there; the direct providers carry the full conversation.
- Harness artifacts live under `/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/` (outside git).
## Environment notes
- Dev host: Ubuntu 26.04. QEMU/OVMF/xorriso/rustfmt/clippy/ImageMagick/visudo
present. `flatpak` and `snap` clients are present on the host (not proof of
the VM lanes).
- VM harnesses: `installer/tests/vm/{gui-driver,serial-driver,appliance-driver,live-driver}.py`
and `sys-acceptance.sh`. `DISK` must be a disposable qcow2; never `/dev/*`.
- Serve fixtures from `/home/dominic/vmlab/serve` with
`python3 -m http.server 8000 --bind 127.0.0.1` (reachable as `10.0.2.2:8000`).
- The static binaries for the VM: `make static` builds `phoebus-installer` and
`sys` under `installer-rs/target/x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/release/`.
## Definition of a good stopping point
- `make test` passes; `docs/STATUS.md` and `docs/CHANGELOG.md` updated;
`docs/HANDOFF.md` updated; committed (via `scripts/agent-commit.sh`) and
pushed (`scripts/publish.sh`).