Rework the graphical installer into a fixed first-time-user sequence (Welcome, Language and keyboard, Internet and readiness, AI connection, Destination disk, Account and encryption, Review and confirmation, Installation, Completion) with configuration, validation, plans, approval and execution still authoritative in Rust. Fix the audited interaction defects: readiness `Re-check` is a read-only probe that no longer resets the step or clears the disk; model catalogs are fetched after syncing the edited settings and credentials and stale replies are ignored; editing a connection field invalidates the validated state; suggestion lists support arrow/Enter/Escape with a visible highlight and accessibility; the keyboard step labels the live-session limitation truthfully; readiness separates the local link from reachable install services; and busy states always clear, with the bridge failing outstanding requests when the backend exits. Add human-readable language/keyboard names, an explicit AI change review (Accept/Discard), backend-fact review with edit links, real stage progress with elapsed time and activity, and clearer failure and completion guidance. Extend the VM harness with a `gui-install` mode that drives the whole journey through the visible controls, plus regressions for readiness refresh, disk survival, keyboard suggestion selection and AI invalidation. Add Rust tests for readiness, the network probe, error kinds and labels.
555 lines
32 KiB
Markdown
555 lines
32 KiB
Markdown
# Changelog
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All notable changes are recorded here. The authoritative history is `git log`;
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this file is the curated, human-readable summary.
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Format: Keep a Changelog. Dates are UTC.
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## 2026-09-22 — Event-driven analysis of a first-time user's journey
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The graphical installer was audited against a first-time user's journey and
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rebuilt around a fixed, explained sequence: Welcome, Language and keyboard,
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Internet and readiness, AI connection, Destination disk, Account and
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encryption, Review and confirmation, Installation, Completion. Configuration,
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validation, plans, approval and execution stay authoritative in Rust.
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### Fixed
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- **Network "Re-check" no longer resets the wizard.** The readiness refresh is
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a separate, read-only bridge op (`readiness`) that updates the probe result
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only; it cannot change the step or clear the selected disk. The first
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handshake is the only path that initialises the form.
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- **AI catalogs are fetched for the connection on screen.** "Load model
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list" now pushes the edited configuration and credentials before requesting
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the catalog, classifies authentication/unreachable/model failures with a
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stable `error_kind`, and ignores a stale reply that a newer request
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superseded.
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- **The AI connection indicator is invalidated when it should be.** Editing the
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provider, model, endpoint, server or a credential clears the green
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"Validated" state and requires revalidation; irrelevant account or disk edits
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preserve it. A regression assert in the VM harness edits the model and checks
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the state flips.
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- **Suggestion lists are keyboard-operable.** Arrow keys move a visible
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highlight, Enter selects it, Escape dismisses the list, and the highlight is
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exposed through `Accessible` roles. Enter in an open list is consumed so it
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cannot also advance the wizard.
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- **Busy work always completes.** The bridge now fails every outstanding
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request when the backend exits, so no spinner can hang; AI connect/test and
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catalog loads are single-flight; every failure path clears its busy state and
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shows an actionable retry.
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- **Keyboard focus is scrolled into view**, so a keyboard user never tabs to an
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off-screen control, and the `PhoebusToggle` Return handler is fixed (it
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previously called a signal handler as a function).
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### Changed
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- **Human-readable language, keyboard and time-zone names** (e.g. "English
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(United States) — en_US.UTF-8", "German — de") are returned by the backend;
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the stable identifier is still what is validated and written.
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- **The keyboard step tells the truth about the live session.** The live
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session keeps its own layout; the selected layout is applied to the installed
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system, and the typing test is labelled as testing the live keyboard. A live
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Wayland layout switch is not implemented.
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- **Internet readiness distinguishes a local link from reachable installation
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services** and re-checks on demand without disturbing the form.
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- **AI setup explains why a model is required and what is shared** (hardware and
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storage facts; never passwords, passphrases, keys, names or files), shows the
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proposed changes, and requires an explicit Accept or Discard before the step
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can advance.
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- **Disk selection prominently shows model, capacity and device identity**, and
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states exactly which disk will be erased; protected disks explain why they
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cannot be selected. The ERASE confirmation and approval binding are unchanged.
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- **The account step explains login password versus encryption passphrase**, and
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password reveal controls are keyboard-focusable. Technical settings moved
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behind Advanced.
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- **Progress shows real stages, elapsed time and activity**, with a redacted
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Details log; the failure screen explains whether disk changes occurred and
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what is safe to do next; completion explains restart, media removal, unlock
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and first login.
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- **The graphical harness gained a `gui-install` mode** that presses the real
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controls through the whole journey (AI connect, disk, account, ERASE,
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install) on a disposable disk, plus regression checks for readiness refresh,
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disk survival and AI invalidation. `PHOEBUS_GUI_CONFIG`/`/etc/phoebus/install.conf`
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let a live medium preseed wizard defaults without weakening any check.
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### Verified
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- `cargo fmt --all -- --check` and `cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets`
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clean (pre-existing `result_large_err` advisories unchanged); the Rust
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workspace tests are green and `make test` (Rust + 16 harness tests) passes.
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- Disposable graphical VM: `gui` 28/28 PASS (welcome, launcher, duplicate
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prevention, keyboard suggestion selection, network, AI gate blocked and
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reported, no bridge errors) and `opencode` 18/18 PASS (real model response,
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validated proposal, model edit invalidates the connection).
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- `gui-install` passed every journey assertion on a fresh 30 GiB qcow2,
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including `gui-install-erase-confirmed`; the backend then reported real
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progress (disk prepare, stage3 download, fstab, Portage sync, base packages,
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kernel) with elapsed time and categories, and no fabricated percentage. The
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complete install and detached boot result is recorded in
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`docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`.
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## 2026-09-22 — `sys` administration hardening
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Correctness work on the deterministic `sys` broker and the assistant path that
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shares it. Every change is covered by unit tests (368 Rust tests pass); the
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destructive rollback VM acceptance remains unverified (see below).
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### Fixed
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- **Alternate-root execution now targets the requested system.** Package
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execution, service enable/disable and Flatpak operations previously ignored
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`--root` and ran against the host, while `emerge --pretend` previews already
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ran in the target. All of them now go through one `target_spec`/chroot path,
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and operations that cannot be confined to a non-running root (service status,
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start, stop, restart) are **rejected before any command is built**.
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`systemctl --root` is used for offline enable/disable. Regression tests prove
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preview and execution both emit a chroot confined to the same root, and that
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a rejected operation invokes nothing.
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- **Validation at the execution boundary.** `parse_natural` emitted actions
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that were never validated, so a manual `sys install --color=n` could pass an
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option through. `parse_natural` now validates its own output, `resolve_effects`
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and `execute` validate every action before touching a command, and
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option-like operands (leading `-`) are rejected for services, packages and
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search. `emerge`/`flatpak` operands are passed after an explicit `--`
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separator. Manual, JSON and AI entry paths are all covered.
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- **`sys ask` reports failure truthfully.** A failing action now stops the plan,
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records the completed/failed/unattempted actions, and exits nonzero instead of
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returning success.
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- **Complete transaction history.** Ordinary mutating `sys` commands are
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recorded (previously only assistant plans were), the protective snapshot id
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created by the generic high-risk path is preserved and recorded, and a
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recording failure is surfaced instead of being swallowed.
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- **Reliable package approval.** `emerge --pretend` output is now classified as
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*established* (a real plan, including a genuine `0 packages`) or
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*unestablished*; `sys` refuses to proceed when the effects cannot be
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established rather than treating unparseable output as "nothing to do". A
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material change between review and execution still aborts.
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### Added
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- Typed service lifecycle actions `start_service`, `stop_service`,
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`restart_service`, and ordinary commands for the existing bounded verbs:
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`sys flatpak install|remove|list`, `sys nix prepare …`, `sys snapshot [op]`,
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`sys start|stop|restart <unit>`. The AI prompt exposes the new verbs, so the
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manual and AI interfaces share one validated execution path.
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- `phoebus-executor::actions::execute_plan` runs a reviewed multi-action plan,
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stopping at the first failure and marking the rest unattempted, so the
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assistant and any multi-step caller report partial failure consistently.
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- CLI integration tests (`tests/sys_cli.rs`) cover the manual and JSON entry
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paths and exit codes.
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## Unreleased
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### Added
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- **Real OpenCode agent-server adapter.** `phoebus-executor::opencode_client`
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implements the OpenCode session/message protocol over the project's curl
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transport and the `ModelTransport` trait, so the strict proposal parser,
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evidence review, bounded facts and executor are reused unchanged. The GUI
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("OpenCode agent"), the installer CLI (`--ai-backend opencode`,
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`--opencode-server/-provider/-model/-password-file`) and `sys ask` all use it.
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It creates a transient session per request, accepts only the completed
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assistant text parts, disables tools per message, and deletes the session.
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A JSON schema output mode is available in the protocol but is not used: the
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shipped DeepSeek models reject it, and the prompt carries an explicit change
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shape instead. The `opencode 1.18.32` contract was verified directly: session
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creation rejects a `model` field, `/provider` metadata can contain a
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credential and is reduced to ids/model names, and auth is HTTP Basic
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(`opencode` / `OPENCODE_SERVER_PASSWORD`).
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- **`--opencode-test`** obtains and validates a real model response (exit
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nonzero on failure), distinct from the read-only `--opencode-probe`. A live
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acceptance test (`make opencode-acceptance`) fails as BLOCKED when no server
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is configured, so it cannot pass by not running.
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- **Truthful OpenCode connection states** (`insecure_transport`, `unreachable`,
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`authentication_required`, `authentication_rejected`, `incompatible`,
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`reachable`, `model_catalog`, `selected_model_unavailable`); `ready` is
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reserved for a validated response and is never returned by the probe.
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- **GUI "Test connection"** and OpenCode connection controls, plus a backend
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selection (`ai.backend`) in canonical configuration.
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### Security
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- **The mandatory-AI gate now requires a validated interaction.** Both the GUI
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bridge and the installer CLI refuse to install when only a provider name is
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configured; a successful, validated model interaction bound to the current
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configuration (and credential) is required. Changing the model, endpoint,
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server or a secret invalidates it. A direct provider or `--no-ai` remains the
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fallback.
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- **OpenCode transport policy is enforced.** Plain `http://` is accepted only
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when the resolved destination is loopback and the connection is pinned to the
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checked address; remote access is `https://` with certificate verification or
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an authenticated tunnel to loopback. Redirects, unsafe schemes and oversized
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or trickled bodies are bounded, and credentials travel only on curl's stdin.
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- **Credentials never surface.** The catalog is reduced to ids/model names;
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server responses that echo credentials are not retained, and tests feed
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credential-bearing bodies and assert they do not appear in errors or state.
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### Verified
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- **The graphical installer uses the OpenCode adapter.** In a disposable
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graphical VM the wizard selected "OpenCode agent", entered the server,
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provider and model through the UI, obtained a real model response (Test
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connection) and a validated proposal (Connect and validate, green
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"Validated"). The `opencode` harness run passed 17/17 and the GUI regression
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25/25. A password-protected server was reached through authentication as
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well. The full graphical installation beyond the AI gate is still not run.
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### Fixed
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- **A malformed model proposal now gets one bounded corrective retry** before
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the strict parser rejects the interaction (the shipped DeepSeek models
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occasionally keyed the change or rationale wrongly). The parser remains the
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final authority; a retry that still fails is still rejected.
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- **OpenCode client/probe defects found by testing:** the handwritten HTTP
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reader (no total deadline, UTF-8-unsafe chunk fallback) was removed in favour
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of the curl transport; the catalog is no longer parsed on a non-2xx status; a
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provider-shaped 500 can no longer look like a catalog; the duplicate-session
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harness check requires exactly one session; and GUI navigation is asserted
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from secret-free frontend state lines rather than inferred from a screenshot.
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### Added
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- **OpenCode connection workflow and capability probe.** New ADR 0011 and
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`docs/OPENCODE.md` separate the four components (client, server, model
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service, Phoebus broker) and document host-local and tunnelled remote use.
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`phoebus-executor::opencode_server` probes `/global/health` and
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`/config/providers` and reports a typed state (`disconnected`,
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`authentication_required`, `incompatible`, `reachable_no_model`, `ready`)
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instead of assuming a TCP connect or HTTP 200 means compatibility. Exposed as
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`phoebus-installer --opencode-probe <url>` (read-only, nonzero unless a model
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is available). Never returns provider credentials. Verified against the
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installed `opencode 1.18.32` (ready) and a deliberate unauthenticated LAN bind
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(`authentication_required`).
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### Security
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- **The target disk is revalidated immediately before partitioning.** An
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approval now binds to a verified device, not a name: `storage_prepare` re-probes
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and refuses if the disk disappeared, became protected (mounted/read-only/live),
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or changed size/model since it was selected. Regression tests cover each case.
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- **The GUI bridge refuses replayed and overlapping installs.** An approval is
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single-use and consumed before destructive work; a second `start_install`, a
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retry or a reconnected frontend cannot start a second installation. Request
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lines and secret values are length-bounded; deeply nested JSON is rejected.
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- **Provider transport hardened.** Only `http(s)` endpoints are accepted, URLs
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with characters that could inject curl config directives are refused, the
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transfer is restricted to `http,https`, redirects stay disabled (so an
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`Authorization` header cannot follow a redirect to another origin), and the
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response is size-bounded (`max-filesize`).
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- **`TargetRoot` refuses symlink escapes.** `write`/`ensure_dir` reject a
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symlinked path component inside the target instead of following it, so a
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planted symlink cannot redirect an installer write to the host.
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- **Unauthenticated OpenCode endpoints are not treated as usable.** The probe
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reports `authentication_required` for a passwordless LAN bind rather than
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`ready`.
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### Fixed
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- **Disk sizes are no longer reported as `0 B`.** `probe_disks` invoked `lsblk`
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without `-b`, so human-readable sizes (`30G`) failed the byte parse and every
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disk displayed `0 B`; the size-based disk-identity check was also blind. The
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`-b` flag is now used and pinned by a test.
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- **The welcome window's primary action is keyboard-reachable.** It now requests
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activation and force-focuses "Install Phoebus OS", so Return launches the
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installer (previously no focus ring was shown and Return did nothing). A
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regression test also rejects the non-existent `FloatingWindow.onActiveChanged`.
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- **The installer cannot be abandoned mid-install without explanation.** Escape
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during the destructive phase is refused and the UI states that the operation
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cannot be cancelled safely; the AI step shows its "connect and validate"
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guidance inline, beside the controls.
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### Changed
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- **The VM harness enforces its own safety rules and reports structured
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results.** `installer/tests/vm/vmsafety.py` validates every writable drive
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(qcow2, inside `PHOEBUS_VM_DISKS`, no `/dev/*`, block/char devices, raw
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images, escaping symlinks or outside backing chains), gives each run its own
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OVMF variable file and QMP socket, uses structured QMP and argument arrays
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(no `os.system`), and returns nonzero on any failed assertion, timeout, EOF or
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missing result. Statuses are `PASS`/`FAIL`/`BLOCKED`/`SKIPPED`/`NOT RUN`.
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`make test` now runs the harness unit tests; `installer/tests/vm/report.py`
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builds a browsable run report.
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### Added
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- **Graphical installation experience.** The live ISO now boots into a branded
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Phoebus welcome window (`phoebus-welcome`) that makes "Install Phoebus OS" the
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dominant action, shows ISO version and readiness (network, firmware, memory,
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cores) and keeps network/display/accessibility/help/keyboard-test/power tools
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available, with troubleshooting tools under Advanced. A full graphical setup
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wizard (`phoebus-install`) guides language and keyboard, network and
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prerequisites, AI model connection, destination disk (with protected disks
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and the installer medium identified), account and encryption, review,
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`ERASE` authorization, progress and completion. Duplicate installer sessions
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are prevented. The TUI/CLI remains the fallback. See ADR 0010 and
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`docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`.
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- **Typed JSON GUI bridge.** `phoebus-installer --gui-bridge` exposes a narrow,
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fail-closed protocol over stdin/stdout that reuses the same `InstallConfig`,
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validation, plan, `DestructiveAuthorization` and staged executor as the TUI.
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Approval is bound to a plan digest, secrets travel only over the stdin pipe,
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and real backend stages are reported with categories (no invented
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percentages). `Installer::install_observed` and an `InstallObserver` trait
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were added; `Installer::install` is unchanged.
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- **Phoebus brand system.** `phoebus-core::brand` provides charcoal/warm
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white/amber tokens plus a sun emblem, wordmark and wallpaper as deterministic
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SVG (emitted via `--emit-asset`, shared with the QML frontend), applied to the
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GRUB menu, live wallpaper, welcome window, installer, application icon and
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completion screen. Readable contrast and the QML/Rust palette are pinned by
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tests.
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### Fixed
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- **Installed systems no longer default into recovery.** `loader.conf` now pins
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the newest real kernel entry, and the snapshot recovery entry carries a
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`sort-key` that keeps it after every kernel, so a low machine-id can never
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make systemd-boot select the recovery entry by filename tie-break. Previously
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an installed system could boot `systemd.unit=rescue.target` after reboot.
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- **DMS first-run dialogs are suppressed on the live medium** by pre-seeding
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DMS's own onboarding and changelog markers, so the installer is the first
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thing the user sees.
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- **The live-medium device is now identified.** `probe_disks` also inspects
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`/run/live/medium` and `/run/live/rootfs`, so the ISO is labelled as the
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installation medium (and remains protected).
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- **The installer shortcut is live-only.** `phoebus-install` and its desktop
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entry are no longer written to an installed system.
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### Changed
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- **Mango + DankMaterialShell is now the default desktop** for both the
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installation ISO and the installed system (explicit owner decision). Omitted
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`desktop.profile` selects `mango`; Flatpak and PipeWire are on by default.
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Explicit `none`, `minimal`, `dwl` and `full` continue to work unchanged
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(ADR 0009).
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- **Installed login uses greetd + tuigreet.** Authentication is always
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required; the default session is Mango and the dwl entry remains selectable
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(`--sessions /usr/share/wayland-sessions`). Live autologin is a separate,
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live-only configuration and is never written to an installed system.
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### Added
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- **Live desktop ISO**: `installer/live/build.sh` now builds a rootless Debian
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testing rootfs containing Mango (built from a pinned source release),
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DankMaterialShell (pinned, SHA-256-verified release tarball), Quickshell,
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scenefx, wlroots 0.20, greetd/tuigreet and the desktop integration, then
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splices it into the base Debian-Live boot equipment. The live user autologins
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into Mango, an "Install Phoebus" launcher opens the unchanged installer UI,
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and a serial/VT recovery console is retained. The build fails clearly if a
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required desktop component is missing. Debian packages never enter the Gentoo
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target. The built ISO was booted in a graphical, seat-providing VM: Mango +
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DankMaterialShell + Quickshell ran and a `screendump` captured the DMS panel
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and welcome window (`docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`).
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- Shared desktop assets are emitted from one source of truth by
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`phoebus-installer --emit-asset` and used by both the installer and the live
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build. Regression tests cover the default/overrides, login configuration,
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live/installed separation, session entries, pinned checksums and the live ISO
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desktop-payload guards.
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### Added
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- **Mango + DankMaterialShell desktop option** (`desktop.profile = "mango"`):
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`gui-wm/mangowm` 0.17.2 (wlroots 0.20) plus `gui-apps/dankmaterialshell`
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1.5.3 / Quickshell 0.3.1 / scenefx 0.5, installed through the GURU community
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overlay with scoped `~amd64` keywords (never global). The installer writes
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GURU's `repos.conf`, bootstraps `dev-vcs/git`, and syncs the overlay. A
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`phoebus-session-mango` entry point, a packaged Mango config seeded once into
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the user's config, DMS keybindings, a `mango-session.target` binding for DMS,
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and `phoebus-mango.desktop`/`phoebus-dwl.desktop` session entries are
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generated. dwl remains the fallback session and is installed alongside. The
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profile is selectable but **not promoted to default** pending graphical-VM
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verification (ADR 0009).
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## 2026-09-21 — Coherent rollback, installed assistant, Nix isolation
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### Added
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- **Coherent rollback and recovery** (`phoebus-core::rollback`,
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`phoebus-executor::rollback`): a recovery point now captures `@` **and** the
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separately mounted `@var` (Portage state) under one name; rollback creates a
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writable root generation, rewrites the restored root's fstab **and** the BLS
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`rootflags=subvol=`, selects a boot entry whose kernel modules match the
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restored `/lib/modules`, and writes "previous" and snapshot-based "recovery"
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entries. A persisted `rollback-state.toml` makes interruption safe and
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resumable; retention prunes old snapshots and protects in-flight targets; a
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1 GiB free-space check gates the operation. See ADR 0007.
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- `sys undo` / `sys undo <id>` / `sys undo status` and the high-risk `undo`
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typed action. The installer now records a snapshot-based "Phoebus Recovery"
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entry at install time, so recovery does not depend on the live root.
|
||
- **Installed conversational assistant** (`phoebus-ai::assistant`,
|
||
`sys ask <request>`): bounded facts -> typed plan -> concrete resolved effects
|
||
-> approval/authentication -> deterministic execution -> transaction record.
|
||
No model is required: `sys ask` falls back to the deterministic parser.
|
||
- **OS-level model sandbox** (`phoebus-executor::sandbox`): the network call
|
||
runs in a hardened, unprivileged transient systemd unit (`DynamicUser`,
|
||
`ProtectHome`, `ProtectSystem=strict`, `NoNewPrivileges`, syscall and
|
||
address-family filters). It fails closed when `systemd-run` is unavailable.
|
||
- **Resolved package effects and approval binding** (`phoebus-core::effects`):
|
||
`emerge --pretend` is parsed into additions/upgrades/downgrades/removals with
|
||
source-vs-binary provenance and download size; a plan digest binds approval,
|
||
and a material change between review and execution aborts. New bounded typed
|
||
actions `flatpak_install`/`flatpak_remove`/`flatpak_list` and `nix_prepare`.
|
||
- **Transaction log** (`phoebus-core::transaction`): assistant and `sys`
|
||
actions record their actions, result and recovery point; `sys history` shows
|
||
snapshots and transactions.
|
||
- **Desktop completeness**: `phoebus-menu` (wofi drun launcher + power menu),
|
||
`phoebus-lock` (swaylock), `phoebus-idle` (swayidle: lock, suspend,
|
||
before-sleep lock) and a system-wide Waybar config with network, audio,
|
||
battery, clock and power controls.
|
||
- **Release gates** (`phoebus-installer::release`): a registry of the real
|
||
candidate checks (install, detached boot, desktop, updates/rollback,
|
||
no-model), a gate report that never records an unexecuted check as passed,
|
||
atomic publication that preserves the last known-good `latest.iso.prev`, and
|
||
signing/verification command helpers.
|
||
- New VM harness for the Debian-Live appliance:
|
||
`installer/tests/vm/appliance-driver.py`, `appliance-guest.sh` and
|
||
`appliance-test.conf.example`.
|
||
|
||
### Changed
|
||
- **Nix build isolation is enforced**: `sandbox = true`,
|
||
`sandbox-fallback = false`, with store bounds (`min-free`/`max-free`) and
|
||
`auto-optimise-store`. Lifecycle operations (remove/purge, gc) and a
|
||
bounded `nix_prepare` action were added; the Portage-owned ebuild approach is
|
||
documented in ADR 0008. See ADR 0006.
|
||
- Desktops install `swayidle`/`swaylock` session helpers and a Waybar
|
||
configuration; `phoebus-session` starts the idle daemon.
|
||
|
||
### Added
|
||
- **Nix bootstrap (on by default, VM-verified).** `phoebus-executor::nix`
|
||
fetches the pinned, SHA-256-verified official Nix release and bootstraps it
|
||
into the target with discrete commands (store copy, `nix-store --load-db`,
|
||
`nixbld` users, state dirs, profile and daemon units). A desktop VM confirmed
|
||
`nix-daemon.service` active and `nix shell nixpkgs#hello` printing
|
||
`Hello, world!`. A binary ebuild was ruled out: the upstream installer has no
|
||
`DESTDIR` and runs `nix-store --load-db` against the real root.
|
||
- `finalize` now flushes the target (`sync`) before unmounting, so late writes
|
||
such as `/usr/local/bin/phoebus-session` and the exported installer log are on
|
||
disk even after a forced poweroff.
|
||
|
||
### Changed
|
||
- **Installing Phoebus now requires an AI.** The installer refuses an install
|
||
with no provider unless the explicit break-glass `--no-ai` (alias `--legacy`,
|
||
or `PHOEBUS_NO_AI=1`) is used. A new `local` provider (Ollama/llama.cpp/
|
||
LM Studio) and `--ai-endpoint` support a model the user downloaded; no model
|
||
is shipped.
|
||
- Desktop installs now include `sys-apps/xdg-desktop-portal`,
|
||
`xdg-desktop-portal-gtk` and `xdg-desktop-portal-wlr`, so Flatpak and
|
||
Wayland apps get file choosers and screencast support.
|
||
|
||
### Added
|
||
- `sys` offline package commands: `sys install <name>`, `sys remove <name>`,
|
||
`sys search <query>` (plus the `remove_package`/`search_packages` typed
|
||
actions). They are deterministic Portage operations with no model involved —
|
||
`emerge` resolves a bare name or a full atom — so the system stays fully
|
||
administrable offline and without the assistant.
|
||
- **Debian-Live installer appliance** (`installer/live/build.sh`, no root): a
|
||
bootable Phoebus installer ISO built by overlaying the static installer, the
|
||
OpenCode manifest and the Debian tools the live image lacks onto a Debian-Live
|
||
stable base, with a serial-visible auto-booting grub config. The target stays
|
||
Gentoo. See `docs/PLAN-DEBIAN-LIVE.md` and ADR 0005.
|
||
- Git workflow: committed hooks (`.githooks/`), `scripts/check-secrets.sh`,
|
||
`scripts/agent-commit.sh`, `scripts/publish.sh`, `scripts/setup-hooks.sh`.
|
||
- Documentation set: `docs/OBJECTIVES.md`, `ROADMAP.md`, `STATUS.md`,
|
||
`ARCHITECTURE.md`, `DEVELOPMENT.md`, `CONTRIBUTING.md`, `GIT-WORKFLOW.md`,
|
||
`CHANGELOG.md`, and the top-level `AGENTS.md`.
|
||
- `.gitignore` covering the ISO, build output, transcripts and secrets.
|
||
|
||
## 2026-09-20 — AI guidance, desktop reliability, snapshots
|
||
|
||
### Added
|
||
- AI-assisted install guidance: an OpenAI-compatible provider layer for
|
||
**DeepSeek** and **OpenAI** plus a test transport
|
||
(`phoebus-ai::provider`), credential loading and a curl transport that keeps
|
||
the API key out of argv, config and logs (`phoebus-executor::ai`), and CLI
|
||
flags `--ai`, `--ai-provider`, `--ai-model`, `--ai-api-key-file`,
|
||
`--ai-proposal-file`, `--ai-facts`. The TUI offers
|
||
DeepSeek/ChatGPT/without-AI.
|
||
- Typed proposal extensions: scoped `package.use`, explicit build jobs and
|
||
binary-package preference. Every proposal now requires a non-empty reason and
|
||
duplicate/conflicting changes are rejected before anything is applied.
|
||
- `sys` history and update preparation are VM-verified on a Btrfs install.
|
||
|
||
### Changed
|
||
- `phoebus-session` now starts `dwl` first, waits for the Wayland socket before
|
||
launching waybar/mako/swaybg, establishes `XDG_RUNTIME_DIR` and a session bus,
|
||
starts the polkit authentication agent, and reaps helpers on logout.
|
||
- Portage policy: the unused `installkernel uki` flag is no longer forced, the
|
||
duplicate/empty PipeWire/WirePlumber lines are gone, and the signed binhost is
|
||
derived from the selected profile when unset.
|
||
- Update preparation records a successful distfile fetch as ready even when
|
||
`--buildpkgonly` is skipped because dependencies must be merged first, and the
|
||
state note now includes the redacted Portage reason.
|
||
|
||
### Fixed
|
||
- A high-risk `sys` action now creates its protective snapshot inside
|
||
`actions::execute` and **fails closed** if the `.snapshots` subvolume exists
|
||
but the snapshot cannot be created; corrupt snapshot history is surfaced
|
||
instead of being hidden as empty.
|
||
|
||
## 2026-09-20 — Retire the Bash installer (migration Phases 0–4)
|
||
|
||
### Added
|
||
- `phoebus-executor::opencode`: pinned-manifest parsing, architecture
|
||
detection, fetch through `Exec`, SHA-256 verification, fail-closed
|
||
placeholder checks, extraction and config writer (7 unit tests).
|
||
- `--bootstrap-opencode` on the CLI; `PHOEBUS_OPENCODE_MANIFEST` overrides the
|
||
embedded manifest for fixture verification.
|
||
- `cli_coverage` and golden plan tests (`plan_golden.rs`, `tests/golden/`).
|
||
- `docs/BASH-MIGRATION.md`: the evidence-gated retirement plan and ledger.
|
||
|
||
### Changed
|
||
- The disposable VM harness installs with the static Rust binary; full
|
||
encrypted install + detached boot re-verified (systemd PID 1, `running`,
|
||
0 failed units, LUKS, login).
|
||
- CI, the pre-commit hook, the Makefile and the commit/publish scripts gate on
|
||
Rust only (`cargo fmt`, `clippy`, `test`).
|
||
- `installer/doc/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md` and `installer/doc/FINDINGS.md`
|
||
moved to `docs/`.
|
||
|
||
### Removed
|
||
- The Bash installer tree (entry point, libraries, TUI, configuration, shell
|
||
test suite and README), retired in favour of `installer-rs/`. The Bash
|
||
reference remains tagged `v0.1.0-bash-reference`. The disposable VM harness
|
||
under `installer/tests/vm/` is retained.
|
||
|
||
## 2026-09-20 — Rust installer parity, desktop, and foundations
|
||
|
||
### Added
|
||
- Rust workspace (`installer-rs/`): `phoebus-core`, `phoebus-executor`,
|
||
`phoebus-ai`, `phoebus-tui`, `phoebus-installer` (~9.4k LOC, 45 files).
|
||
- Typed `InstallConfig` supporting TOML and the legacy flat format.
|
||
- `TargetRoot` (host/target path safety), `SecretString`/`Redactor`,
|
||
`DestructiveAuthorization`, central `Exec` command layer with dry-run.
|
||
- Storage backend: GPT, ESP, LUKS2, Btrfs layout, fstab/crypttab, swapfile.
|
||
- Stage3 fetch with pinned SHA-256 (or signed DIGESTS), Portage configuration,
|
||
signed binary use, source builds, kernel, dracut, systemd-boot BLS.
|
||
- Desktop/Flatpak: selects `default/linux/amd64/23.0/desktop/systemd`, writes
|
||
`/usr/local/bin/phoebus-session`; flathub remote configured.
|
||
- Package policy instrumentation: measured compile times parsed from
|
||
`emerge.log` (326 entries recorded in the desktop run), persisted to
|
||
`/var/lib/phoebus/compile-times.tsv`.
|
||
- Snapshots: read-only Btrfs snapshots + TOML transaction history.
|
||
- Background update preparation (`--fetchonly` + `--buildpkgonly`).
|
||
- Typed `SystemAction` schema, privileged broker, and the `sys` command.
|
||
- AI privacy boundary (`PrivacyPolicy`, `ContextBundle`, forbidden paths).
|
||
- Release tooling: `phoebus-release` manifest/verify/sha256/assemble.
|
||
- ratatui TUI with plan review and ERASE confirmation.
|
||
- Recovery BLS entry booting `rescue.target`.
|
||
|
||
### Fixed
|
||
- Subvolumes mounted before creation.
|
||
- fstab/crypttab overwritten by stage3 extraction (moved to `fstab_generate`).
|
||
- Missing `/var/tmp` breaking `kernel-install`.
|
||
- `installkernel` requiring `uki_generator` even for BLS.
|
||
- dracut `crypt` module and `systemd-cryptsetup` missing.
|
||
- LUKS cmdline using `rd.luks.uuid` instead of `rd.luks.name`.
|
||
- dracut UKI missing the kernel command line (BLS adopted).
|
||
- `@swap` not mounted, breaking swap activation.
|
||
- Portage GPG verify user unable to read the getuto keyring.
|
||
- Transient rsync mirror quarantine (sync retries).
|
||
- Pillow/HarfBuzz documentation circular dependency.
|
||
- Legacy config silently parsed as TOML with defaults.
|
||
|
||
### Verified
|
||
- Full encrypted UEFI install and boot with the ISO detached: `systemd` PID 1,
|
||
`is-system-running = running`, 0 failed units, 10.73 s boot.
|
||
- Desktop stack headless: dwl, waybar, mako, swaybg, `grim` screenshot,
|
||
`wl-copy`/`wl-paste`, `wpctl`, `flatpak 1.18.1` + flathub.
|
||
- No secret leakage in the installer log.
|
||
|
||
## 2026-09-19 — Bash installer prototype and first VM boot
|
||
|
||
### Added
|
||
- Bash + `dialog` installer (`installer/`) with deterministic backend, TUI,
|
||
plan/review, dry-run, logging, and destructive confirmation.
|
||
- Read-only hardware/disk discovery with live-medium protection.
|
||
- GPT/LUKS2/Btrfs backend, systemd stage3, Portage, kernel, systemd-boot,
|
||
users/services/desktop modules.
|
||
- Unit/regression suite and a disposable VM harness.
|
||
|
||
### Verified
|
||
- First complete encrypted UEFI VM install and boot with the Bash installer.
|
||
|
||
### Fixed
|
||
- The subvolume-ordering, fstab-timing, `/var/tmp`, `rd.luks.name`,
|
||
`uki_generator`, cryptsetup, `@swap`, and `local root="$1" dir=...` bugs
|
||
(these are the class of bug the Rust port is designed to prevent).
|