Add a branded live welcome window and a Quickshell/QML installer frontend over a narrow, fail-closed JSON bridge (phoebus-installer --gui-bridge) that reuses the same InstallConfig, plan, validation, authorization and staged executor as the TUI/CLI. Add the Phoebus brand system (emblem, wordmark, wallpaper, tokens), suppress DMS first-run dialogs on the live medium, identify the live medium as protected, make the installer shortcut live-only, and fix the installed boot default so systemd-boot never selects the recovery entry. Verified in a disposable graphical VM (welcome/installer journey, duplicate prevention, keyboard navigation, blocked AI prerequisite) plus a real non-interactive install and detached boot (INSTALL-RC=0, NO_SECRET_LEAK, systemd running, 0 failed units, LUKS2, Btrfs, network).
8.7 KiB
Architecture
Phoebus ships one installer implementation: the Rust workspace in
installer-rs/. It reproduces the proven encrypted UEFI VM boot path and is the
only implementation on the install path. The retired Bash prototype is kept in
git history, tagged v0.1.0-bash-reference; see docs/BASH-MIGRATION.md for
the evidence-gated retirement.
The disposable VM harness lives in installer/tests/vm/ and drives the static
Rust binary.
Layering
Graphical welcome + installer Quickshell/QML (live only; typed JSON protocol)
| phoebus-welcome, phoebus-install
v
TUI / CLI / sys front-ends (phoebus-tui, phoebus-installer)
|
v
Orchestration + plan staged execution, single source of truth
|
v
Executor commands, storage, Portage, boot, services
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v
Core typed config, models, policy, validation
The graphical frontend is one of several front-ends; it never contains
installation logic. phoebus-installer --gui-bridge speaks newline-delimited
JSON on stdin/stdout, reuses the same Installer, plan, validation and
DestructiveAuthorization flow, and reports real stages through
Installer::install_observed. The QML only renders typed state and submits
bounded requests (ADR 0010).
phoebus-core
Pure, non-privileged logic with no external commands except reading /proc,
/sys and small system files:
config—InstallConfig(nested sections, enums for closed sets); TOML and legacy flat-format loading (format is detected structurally).validate— hostname/username/locale/timezone/keymap/password checks.disk/hardware— models and protection classification (pure).plan—InstallPlanwith the canonical step order and human rendering.policy— deterministic source/binary decisions + policy context.emergelog— parses Portageemerge.loginto measured compile times.target—TargetRoot, which rejects absolute paths and..traversal.secret—SecretString(redactedDebug, zeroized on drop) +Redactor.snapshot— deterministic snapshot names + TOML transaction history.boot— BLS entry parse/render and root-subvolume selection for rollback.rollback— rollback state machine, retention and mount/fstab planners.effects— parseemerge --pretendinto resolved effects + plan digest.transaction— the user-queryable log of executed actions and outcomes.action— closedSystemActionschema and a small deterministic parser.brand— the visual identity (palette tokens, sun emblem, wordmark, wallpaper) as deterministic SVG/tokens shared by the QML frontend.update— preparation policy and real Portage argument builders.
phoebus-executor
The only crate that runs privileged commands.
command—CommandSpec,ProcessRunner(real / recording / never) with arguments always separate; there is nosh -c.exec—Execcentralises logging, redaction, dry-run, chroot mounts and target writes.log— file + optional stderr logging; every line is redacted.auth—DestructiveAuthorization, issued only after ERASE + final confirmation.storage,encryption,portage,kernel,boot,users,services,desktop— the install backend, mirroring the proven order.probe— read-only hardware and disk discovery.snapshot,update,admin,actions— post-install foundations.rollback— coordinated root/var/fstab/BLS rollback (ADR 0007).nix— pinned Nix bootstrap, sandboxed build config, lifecycle and cleanup.sandbox— the hardenedsystemd-runboundary for model execution.transaction— persists the transaction log into the target.
phoebus-ai
- Typed
AiProposal/SystemAction(unknown actions fail closed; no shell). assistant— the installed conversational plan schema (AssistantPlan) and its fail-closed parser; the model proposes the same actionssysexecutes.privacy—PrivacyPolicy+ContextBundle; forbidden-path checks. The collector inphoebus-executor::adminonly reads system sources.
phoebus-installer
orchestrate—Installerruns the plan stages and stops on first failure.release—ReleaseManifestcreate/verify, candidate gates, atomic publish and signing command helpers.- Binaries:
phoebus-installer,sys,phoebus-release.
Safety model
- Every command goes through
Exec, which logs a redacted command line, exit status and duration, and honours dry-run centrally. - Destructive functions take
&DestructiveAuthorization; the token is created only after the destructive preview and confirmations. - All target writes go through
TargetRoot; host-versus-target mistakes are caught by construction and covered by tests. - Secrets travel over stdin only and are registered with the redactor before any logging. They never enter the config.
- The AI cannot execute; it can only propose typed changes that the backend
validates and the user approves. The assistant's model call additionally runs
inside an unprivileged, hardened
systemd-rununit (sandbox), so the boundary is enforced by the OS and not only by the schema. - Approval is bound to the reviewed resolved plan: package effects are resolved again before execution and a material change aborts.
Rollback and recovery
A recovery point is a snapshot set: @ and the separate @var (Portage state)
together; /home is excluded. Rollback creates a writable root generation,
rewrites subvol= in both the restored root's fstab and the BLS entry options
(the explicit argument overrides the Btrfs default), selects a kernel entry
whose modules match the restored root, and writes previous/recovery entries.
See ADR 0007.
Desktop profiles
Two sessions are generated, and each starts exactly one compositor and one set of shell services:
- dwl (
desktop.profile = "dwl"): the proven session — dwl, waybar, wofi, mako, swaybg, swayidle, swaylock, the polkit agent. Entry point/usr/local/bin/phoebus-session, session filephoebus-dwl.desktop. - Mango + DankMaterialShell (
desktop.profile = "mango"):gui-wm/mangowmplus the DMS shell (panel, launcher, notifications, lock, idle, audio/network/ Bluetooth/display controls) from the GURU overlay. Entry point/usr/local/bin/phoebus-session-mango, session filephoebus-mango.desktop. The dwl session is installed alongside as a fallback. The Mango session never starts the dwl helpers. See ADR 0009.
desktop.profile selects both the Gentoo desktop/systemd profile and the
package set; the plan shows the selected session before installation, and the
installer writes both session entry points for the Mango profile so the user can
return to dwl.
Installation order (do not regress)
storage_prepare -> stage_install -> fstab_generate -> portage_configure
-> packages_base -> kernel_install -> boot_install -> users_configure
-> services_configure -> desktop_install -> finalize
Storage order: partition GPT, create ESP, LUKS format/open, mkfs.btrfs, mount
top-level, create subvolumes, unmount, mount the subvolume layout. fstab and
crypttab are generated after stage3 extraction (stage3 ships its own
/etc/fstab).
Configuration and plan
InstallConfig is canonical data; the plan and all rendering derive from it.
The same plan drives the review screen, the destructive preview, dry-run and
the actual execution, so the UI cannot diverge from the backend.
Post-install foundations
- Snapshots: read-only Btrfs snapshots under
/.snapshots, recorded in a TOML history. A snapshot set captures@and the separate@var;/homeis intentionally not snapshotted so user documents survive a rollback. - Rollback:
sys undorestores a committed snapshot as the next boot root with coordinated fstab, BLS and kernel selection (ADR 0007); a persisted state file makes an interrupted rollback resumable. - Background updates:
emerge --fetchonlythen--buildpkgonlystage distfiles and reusable local binary packages without installing; activation stays explicit. - Kernel/boot:
sys-kernel/gentoo-kernel-bin(safe) orgentoo-kernel(optimized), dracut initramfs, systemd-boot BLS entries, plus a snapshot-based recovery entry that does not depend on the live root.
Extension points
ProcessRunner— swap the real runner for a recording/never runner in tests, or for a different execution backend.InstallStep— add stages inplan.rsand handle them inorchestrate.rs.SystemAction— add closed verbs; the policy engine classifies and previews them, and the broker executes them after approval.