16 KiB
Handoff
Rolling note between work sessions. Update this file before you finish, then
commit it. It should be short and current; use git log for detail.
-
Security/readiness follow-up (2026-09-26): trust anchor + executable gates + strengthened rollback PASS.
- Stage3 trust anchor (fixed):
release_key_path()ignoresPHOEBUS_GENTOO_RELEASE_KEY; production always uses the provisioned key, test injection only via explicitverify_digests_with_key. Host-level Good-signature check of the real DIGESTS passes (not VM evidence). VM proof blocked: needs a rebuilt live ISO + disposable install (exact prerequisites indocs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md). - Release gates executable: invalid
checks/desktopmodes fixed (realbootmodes),--executeruns each argv and reports Passed/Failed/NotRun from evidence (unconfigured host: 0/0/6, publish refuses). Found and fixed agui-driver.pySyntaxError. 6 new tests. - Strengthened rollback rerun PASSED
(
serial-rollback-20260926T034218Z-7fab51ef, PASS=11 FAIL=0, exit 0, no leak, overlayrollback-accept-8.qcow2): mandatory===ROLLBACK-MARKER present===before undo, DBca398d71…→fda3780a…→restored, marker absent after detached reboot,/homesurvives, systemd running.SERVEshellcheck fix included. - Recovery-entry boot is now a distinct manual gate with its own
procedure (NOT RUN). Roadmap no longer lists passed
sys undoas unfinished; Secure Boot filed as a separate opt-in milestone. - Quality gates:
cargo fmt --check,clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings,cargo test --workspace717/717 (oneassistant_bridgeflake under parallel load, green in isolation and on rerun), release + static-pie builds,test_vmsafety.py18/18,shellcheckclean. Seat desktop, live AI, Snap revision/strict, and NVIDIA stay open with exact prerequisites (STATUS).
- Stage3 trust anchor (fixed):
-
Interface contract (unchanged): ordinary requests use AI; only explicit
--legacyselects deterministic handling; source flags constrain the AI and never bypass it; a missing model stops the workflow and offers the exact--legacycommand without executing it. -
Hardening pass (2026-09-26): stage3 fail-closed + truthful boot security + rollback acceptance PASS.
- Stage3 (security defect, fixed): the unpinned path warned and
continued on DIGESTS-download failure, missing SHA-512 entry, missing
gpg/key, failed key import, and gpg launch errors. All stop the install
before extraction now; bad signature/hash also stop it. The pinned path
requires a valid 64-hex pin (placeholder refused) before any network
use.
stage_installchecks forgpg/sha256sum/sha512sumfirst. 16 new regression tests (every failure branch, nonzero-exit and cannot-start doubles, both positive paths). The live image shipsgnupgplus the Gentoo release key, fingerprint-checked at build time against Gentoo's published fingerprints (13EB…2910weekly,D99E…2058signing). Commits2162670,744059b. - Boot security (fixed):
uki=true/secureboot=trueare rejected atvalidate_config(shared by CLI/TUI/GUI bridge); the plan preview always reports unsigned BLS. Parsing/validation/rendering regressions + golden updated. Commit95e0d05. Authenticated boot stays an open limitation (STATUS). - Rollback acceptance PASSED for real
(
serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386, PASS=11 FAIL=0, exit 0, no secret leak): fresh overlayrollback-accept-7.qcow2onfresh-install-1.qcow2— snapshot →app-misc/helloinstall (DBca39…→fda3…) →sys undo <id>rc=0 → detached reboot (DB restored, root marker absent,/homesurvives, systemd running, recovery entry present). The 2026-09-25 pass claim had no transcript and did not reproduce; fixed harness defects: sudo auth (stale-prompt match bug found and fixed with unique markers), root phases, explicit--legacy, verified break (nanowas pre-installed), targeted undo, marker-absent assertion, preserved phase-1 log. Commits744059b,5f69996. - Release candidate (local, isolated): manifest (2 artifacts), verify,
tamper refusal, and publish refusal against the NotRun report all behave;
gates --executeis 0 passed / 6 NotRun (every gate needs VM/seat/model;run_gatesnever executes gate commands itself). Nothing published. - Quality gates:
cargo fmt --check,cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings,cargo test --workspace712/712, release + static-pie builds,test_vmsafety.py18/18,make doctor19 ok / 1 disk-space warning.
- Stage3 (security defect, fixed): the unpinned path warned and
continued on DIGESTS-download failure, missing SHA-512 entry, missing
gpg/key, failed key import, and gpg launch errors. All stop the install
before extraction now; bad signature/hash also stop it. The pinned path
requires a valid 64-hex pin (placeholder refused) before any network
use.
-
Interface contract (unchanged): ordinary requests use AI; only explicit
--legacyselects deterministic handling; source flags constrain the AI and never bypass it; a missing model stops the workflow and offers the exact--legacycommand without executing it. -
Quality pass (2026-09-26): boxed
ExecError::Commanddetails (CommandFailure, 128 → 96 bytes, measured with a path-dependent probe crate; constructor + all match sites updated, error text/redaction/stderr-tail preserved, 4 regression tests), clearedcargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warningswith no blanket allows (type alias,CommandRecordparams struct,DiskPhaserenames), and splitservice.rs(4218 lines →service/mod,plan,validation,execution,tests) andgui_bridge.rs(2763 lines →gui_bridge/mod,protocol,bridge,tests) as structural refactors with explicit re-exports andpub(super)seams — noservice.rsleft alongsideservice/mod.rs.make testgreen (692/692, unchanged across the splits). Release + static-pie builds pass. The disposable VM re-ran the current 38-casesysacceptance matrix against the new staticsys(70f0a72b…): guestPASS=38 FAIL=0, driverPASS=41 FAIL=0(serial-boot-20260926T014746Z-3089a820, overlaysys-acceptance-refactor.qcow2). Commitse69bfb9,1bf31c5,2dd48d1. -
Interface contract (unchanged): ordinary requests use AI; only explicit
--legacyselects deterministic handling; source flags constrain the AI and never bypass it; a missing model stops the workflow and offers the exact--legacycommand without executing it. -
Snap first-use follow-up (2026-09-25): the previous "no snapd" note was a real integration gap. The normal
sys install … --legacy --snapresolver needs snapd to confirm a Store candidate before approval, while a raw typedsnap_installsilently added it during execution. First-use setup is now a separately reviewed Portage install plus socket enable/start, with exact guidance when absent. Fresh installs set scopedsys-fs/squashfs-tools lzma lzo, which Gentoo's snapd ebuild requires. A disposable VM exposed a second bug: Portage candidate resolution picked the first dependency (dev-lang/go-bootstrap) instead of the requestedapp-containers/snapd; it now matches the requested atom. Snap confinement is reported from the daemon rather than assumed strict. The disposable VM completed setup, Store install, refresh and remove (PASS=10 FAIL=0), with partial confinement. A fresh overlay and a clean reboot repeat with the final static binary each passedPASS=11 FAIL=0, including clean poweroff. Refresh found no newer revision. -
Previous session: second-round
sysreview fixes. Follow-up tod3f676a. Three further confirmed defects are fixed with regression tests: unsafe cleanup previews, non-exact Flatpak/Snap update execution, and reverse-dependency self-reference.make testis green (661 → 683 tests). This corrects the earlier blanket claim that every review finding was already fixed. -
Interface contract (unchanged): ordinary requests use AI; only explicit
--legacyselects deterministic handling; source flags constrain the AI and never bypass it; a missing model stops the workflow and offers the exact--legacycommand without executing it.
Snap first-use changes
phoebus-core::systemgenerates scoped SquashFS USE flags for new installs.- Portage candidate resolution selects the requested atom from the pretend plan, even when dependencies precede it. A multi-package regression covers the bug found by the VM.
- The Snap install path gives exact setup commands when snapd is absent; the
typed action no longer adds an unreviewed Portage dependency. Candidate
sandbox levels and missing
snap infofields are treated conservatively. installer/tests/vm/snap-guest.shdrives the installed-system journey. The serial driver can authenticate for boot checks and logs only guest output, keeping sent test passwords out of its transcript.
Previous sys review work
- Cleanup previews are non-destructive (finding 1).
eclean-dist/eclean-pkgdelete by default, soportage_cleanersnow previews with--pretend --deep(same selection policy as execution) and executes with--deep; the Nix preview uses the documentednix-store --gc --print-dead. Items are read from stdout+stderr, sorted and bound. Tests prove a cleaner never runs destructively during planning, revalidation or cancelled approval. - Exact Flatpak/Snap update transactions (finding 2).
ResolvedPlan.updatescarriesUpdateTransactions: full Flatpak ref + full installed/remote commits (viaflatpak info, since thecommitcolumn is abbreviated), or snap name + old/new revisions + channel. Execution consumes the reviewed transaction (add_executable…flatpak update --commit=<c>), revalidates each source immediately before its mutation, verifies the resulting commit/revision, and refuses non-exact transactions. A source whose resolution failed is never re-discovered.PlanStoreaggregation includesupdates. - Reverse dependencies (finding 3). The reverse branch no longer drops valid matches; it excludes only a genuine self-reference (the dependent is the queried package).
- Determinism.
All selected packages:removals are sorted (depclean previews are now order-independent);emerge --depclean --ask=n.
Verified in disposable VMs
- Cache cleanup + depclean (real tools):
ecleanupstream preview is non-destructive;sys clean cachepreview/cancelled/approved/drift/failed all behave correctly; depclean cancel/approve with transaction history and preserved/home. - Reverse dependencies:
sys-libs/glibcandsys-libs/zlibreport real dependents (conditional/versioned included). - Flatpak: installed via Portage (
sys-apps/flatpak, enablingmedia-libs/freetype[harfbuzz]), flathub added, an app installed and downgraded, thensys apply updates --flatpakresolved full ref+commits, deployed the pinned commit, and verified it. - Custom ebuild: stage → build/install (VDB entry + installed file) → remove.
- Managed AppImage: acquire with pinned SHA-256, list, run the managed ELF, remove; a placeholder SHA is refused.
- Nix: a
NIX_ENABLED=yesinstall bootstraps Nix;nix profile install nixpkgs#nodejs-sliminto/nix/var/nix/profiles/profileis enumerated bysys list --nixand found bysys list nodejs --nix, with store paths and generations reported separately. - Non-root
pkexec sys --broker: with the shipped polkit action and the standard wheel-admin rule installed on the disposable image, a wheel user authenticated through a terminal agent; cancellations changed nothing, the approved removal returned the broker JSON outcome, and the replay was rejected. The shipped privilege policy is unchanged. - Read-only acceptance:
installer/tests/vm/sys-acceptance.shPASS=38 FAIL=0re-run against the final staticsys(dd61c610…), including the newrdeps-legacyreverse-dependency regression. - Snap first use: the disposable VM installed
app-containers/snapdthrough the reviewed Portage plan (six effects), enabled and startedsnapd.socket, installed Snap Storehello-world6.4 revision 29, ran refresh, then removed it. The daemon reportedpartialconfinement and the install review agreed. The harness reportedPASS=10 FAIL=0(serial-boot-20260926T001830Z-107996de). Final-binary runs on a fresh overlay passedPASS=11 FAIL=0on first boot (serial-boot-20260926T005327Z-c024cc43) and after a clean reboot (serial-boot-20260926T010605Z-e6193c3a); both shut down cleanly.
Not completed / blocked
- Stage3 VM proof with the new binary: unit-tested (19 stage3 tests) and
the pinned path is unchanged for real pins, but no full install has run
with the fail-closed binary yet; the next disposable install is the proof.
The unpinned (signed-DIGESTS) VM proof additionally needs a rebuilt live
ISO carrying the provisioned key (
installer/live/build.shnow provisions it; no ISO was rebuilt in this session). - Installed Mango + DMS session under a seat: still needs a
seat-providing graphical VM (or physical VT): login, kitty, DMS
spotlight, lock/idle, polkit agent, logout, reboot
(
docs/DEVELOPMENT.mdphysical-VT procedure). - Snap update to a different revision / strict confinement: refresh with no newer revision and partial confinement were VM-verified. A revision-changing refresh and AppArmor-backed strict confinement were not (need an AppArmor-ready guest kernel with loaded policy, and a Store snap that actually has a newer revision than installed).
- Live AI: a local OpenAI-compatible model (
llama-server+ a GGUF model) was served on the host; the AI workflow reached the model, but the sandboxed call exceeded the 120 s transport timeout on CPU (curlexit 28). Needs a faster model/GPU or a remote provider credential. Fixture-backed routing and failure tests pass (ask-offline, missing-model offer, source constraint). - Recovery boot (distinct from rollback): the recovery BLS entry is present and asserted in the rollback acceptance, but booting it interactively was not automated. Method: select "Phoebus Recovery (known-good snapshot)" in the systemd-boot menu with no network.
- Nix re-run flakiness: a later
sys list --nixre-run reported the profile link dangling (the profile store path was gone) and correctly listed no packages; the first run with a real profile is the positive evidence.
Known blockers / risks
- VM serial login is occasionally flaky; retry the boot when
detached-boot-loginfails. make doctorpasses (KVM accessible via an ACL). Disk is shared by build and VM; watch free space.- The pre-existing
test-disk.qcow2cannot be unlocked (unknown passphrase); do not guess or brute-force it.
Next actions (in order)
- Stage3 install proof: next disposable install with the fail-closed binary (pinned path), then a rebuilt live ISO (with the provisioned Gentoo key) proving the signed-DIGESTS path in the VM.
- Recovery boot by selecting the recovery BLS entry with the network down.
- Live AI with a faster local model/GPU or an authorized provider credential (natural-language discovery, source constraints, reviewed install).
- Installed desktop under a seat (Mango + DMS login through reboot).
- Nix profile GC stability if the dangling re-run is reproducible.
- Snap strict confinement and changed-revision update in a disposable VM when an AppArmor-ready kernel and a revision-changing Store test are available.
Definition of a good stopping point
make testpasses;docs/STATUS.md,docs/CHANGELOG.mdand this file updated; committed (scripts/agent-commit.sh) and pushed (scripts/publish.sh).