phoebus_os/docs/CHANGELOG.md
2026-09-25 20:48:07 -07:00

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Changelog

All notable changes are recorded here. The authoritative history is git log; this file is the curated, human-readable summary.

2026-09-26 — Security and release-readiness: trust anchor, executable gates, strengthened rollback

  • Stage3 trust anchor is fixed in code. release_key_path() no longer honors PHOEBUS_GENTOO_RELEASE_KEY: production always uses the provisioned /usr/share/openpgp-keys/gentoo-release.asc, and test-only injection goes through the explicit verify_digests_with_key helper. A regression test proves the environment variable is ignored. The pinned path is unchanged. Host-level mechanism check (not VM evidence): the parser fixture matches the real current DIGESTS byte-for-byte and the real DIGESTS verifies with a Good signature from Gentoo's weekly release key. The full VM proof (rebuilt live ISO + default unpinned install + tamper refusal) is recorded as blocked with its exact prerequisites.
  • Release gates are executable and truthful. candidate_gates() no longer names serial-driver.py checks / desktop modes that no harness accepts (no-model-recovery uses the real boot mode, desktop-session uses gui-driver.py boot). run_gates(--execute) runs each gate's argv in its own process: exit 0 → Passed, nonzero → Failed, missing harness/firmware/seat/credential → NotRun, invalid command → Failed. New tests cover real harness modes, pass/fail/not-run reporting, isolation, invalid-command detection, and publish refusal on any failed/not-run gate. gates --execute on an unconfigured host reports 0 passed / 0 failed / 6 NotRun; publish refuses. A gui-driver.py SyntaxError found by the new test is fixed.
  • Strengthened rollback rerun PASSED in a disposable VM (serial-rollback-20260926T034218Z-7fab51ef, PASS=11 FAIL=0, exit 0, no secret leak): the root-marker creation is now mandatory and asserted present before sys undo, the package DB changed (ca398d71… → fda3780a…) and was restored, the marker is absent after the detached reboot, /home survives, systemd runs. The unused SERVE variable was removed (shellcheck clean).
  • Recovery-entry boot is now a distinct manual acceptance gate with its own procedure and pass criteria in docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md, recorded separately from normal sys undo (NOT RUN: interactive BLS-menu selection is not automated). Secure Boot/UKI stays rejected and is filed as a separate opt-in milestone in the roadmap; seat desktop, live AI, Snap revision change, and NVIDIA remain open with exact prerequisites.
  • Tests: cargo test --workspace 717/717, test_vmsafety.py 18/18, cargo fmt --check and clippy -D warnings clean, release and static-pie builds pass. (One assistant_bridge test flaked once under parallel load and passes in isolation and on rerun.)

2026-09-26 — Hardening pass: fail-closed stage3, truthful boot security, rollback acceptance

  • Stage3 verification is fail-closed (security defect fixed). The unpinned path previously warned and continued when the DIGESTS download failed, when no SHA-512 entry matched, when gpg or the Gentoo release key was missing, when the key import failed, and when gpg could not start. Every one of these now stops the install before extraction, as do a bad signature and a hash mismatch. The pinned path requires a valid 64-hex digest (placeholder refused) before any network use, and its trust is documented as coming from the independently supplied pin. stage_install requires curl/tar/gpg/sha256sum/sha512sum up front. 16 new regression tests cover every failure branch plus both positive paths.
  • Live image carries the verifier. installer/live ships gnupg and the trusted Gentoo release key (/usr/share/openpgp-keys/gentoo-release.asc), provisioned by build.sh and checked against Gentoo's published release-key fingerprints; the installer never fetches an unauthenticated key. Not yet VM-proven: no full install has run with the new binary, and the signed-DIGESTS VM proof needs a rebuilt ISO with the key.
  • Boot security is truthful. kernel.uki/kernel.secureboot = true are rejected at shared configuration validation (CLI/TUI/GUI bridge), and the plan preview always reports the real unsigned-BLS path. Authenticated boot remains an open limitation by design (separate opt-in milestone).
  • Rollback acceptance PASSED with evidence (serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386, PASS=11 FAIL=0, exit 0, no secret leak): snapshot → app-misc/hello install (package DB changed) → sys undo <id> → detached reboot (DB restored, root marker absent, /home survives, systemd running, recovery entry present). This corrects the 2026-09-25 pass claim, which had no transcript and did not reproduce: the harness ran unprivileged, used pre-installed nano, restored "newest", and never asserted the marker. Fixed with sudo authentication, explicit --legacy, a verified break, targeted undo, and vacuous-pass guards. Recovery-entry offline boot stays a manual gate.
  • Release candidate (local, isolated): manifest/verify, tampered-artifact refusal, and publish refusal against the NotRun gate report all behave; gates --execute is 0 passed / 6 NotRun (all gates need VM/seat/model). Nothing published. Desktop-under-seat, live AI, and Snap strict-confinement/changed-revision remain explicitly open (see STATUS).
  • Tests: cargo test --workspace 712/712 (was 692), test_vmsafety.py 18/18, cargo fmt --check and clippy -D warnings clean, release and static-pie builds pass.

2026-09-26 — Code quality pass: boxed ExecError, warning-free Clippy, service/gui_bridge splits

Structural work only; no behavior, wire-format, or serialized-plan change.

  • ExecError::Command now carries a boxed CommandFailure payload, so ExecError shrinks from 128 to 96 bytes and Result<T, ExecError> passes Clippy's result_large_err gate (all 57 warnings gone). The display text, the redacted stdout/stderr capture, and the stderr tail used for update failures are preserved; the constructor and every match site were updated, with regression tests for the error text, the captured output, and a 96-byte size bound.
  • The remaining Clippy warnings are fixed without blanket allows: a type alias for the Snap-entry tuple (actions.rs), a CommandRecord params struct for Logger::command (log.rs), and DiskPhase variant renames (gui_bridge.rs). cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings is clean.
  • service.rs (4218 lines) is split into service/mod.rs (types, render, shared helpers, explicit re-exports), plan.rs, validation.rs, execution.rs, and tests.rs. Every phoebus_installer::service::* path, the serialized plan format, approval digests, replay protection, and the privileged validation boundary are unchanged.
  • gui_bridge.rs (2763 lines) is split into gui_bridge/mod.rs, protocol.rs (protocol version 1, wire types, JSON observer, disk phase, newline-delimited JSON writer), bridge.rs (the single Bridge owning the installer, dispatch, installation support, secret handling), and tests.rs. No UI or wire-format change.
  • cargo test --workspace passes 692/692 before and after each split (including the 4 new ExecError regression tests). Release and static-pie builds pass.
  • The disposable VM re-ran the current sys acceptance matrix against the new static sys (70f0a72b…, fetched to /tmp/sys on an overlay of the pristine installed image): guest PASS=38 FAIL=0 (the full 38-case matrix, run as the non-root user with no mutations), driver PASS=41 FAIL=0 (serial-boot-20260926T014746Z-3089a820). Recovery boot, strict Snap confinement, and a revision-changing Snap update remain unverified.

2026-09-25 — Make first-use Snap setup reviewable and fix Portage target selection

  • The normal Snap install now explains the separate, reviewed Portage install of app-containers/snapd and the socket enable/start steps when the daemon is absent. A raw typed snap_install no longer adds snapd behind the review.
  • Fresh installs include scoped sys-fs/squashfs-tools lzma lzo USE flags, which Gentoo's snapd ebuild requires. Existing installed images need the same scoped setting before the Portage step.
  • Portage candidate resolution matches the requested atom in a multi-package pretend plan. The prior first-line selection could install a dependency (dev-lang/go-bootstrap in the Snap VM) instead of app-containers/snapd.
  • Snap candidate sandbox levels now use the daemon's detected confinement; missing snap info confinement is not assumed to be strict.
  • Regression tests cover the prerequisite gate, Portage target selection and confinement mapping. The disposable VM exposed both the missing scoped USE flags and the first-dependency selection bug. After those fixes, the installed VM completed the reviewed snapd install, enabled and started snapd.socket, installed hello-world from the Snap Store, ran refresh, and removed it (serial-boot ...107996de, PASS=10 FAIL=0). The daemon reported partial confinement and the plan displayed partial, not strong. The refresh command succeeded with no newer revision available. A fresh overlay using the final static binary passed the same journey with clean poweroff (...c024cc43, PASS=11 FAIL=0); a clean reboot and repeat also passed (...e6193c3a, PASS=11 FAIL=0). A revision-changing refresh and strict AppArmor confinement remain unverified.

2026-09-25 — Second-round sys fixes: safe cleanup previews, exact update transactions, reverse dependencies

Follow-up review found three further confirmed defects; all three are fixed with regression tests, and the disposable-VM acceptance is extended. This entry supersedes any earlier claim that every review finding was already fixed.

  • Cache-cleanup preview no longer deletes (finding 1). eclean-dist/ eclean-pkg delete by default; only --pretend previews. The planner now runs --pretend --deep (the same selection policy as the destructive run) and combines stdout and stderr into a sorted, bound item set. The Nix preview uses the documented nix-store --gc --print-dead (a bare --gc, and the undocumented --dry-run, were unsafe assumptions). Tests prove reconciliation and cancelled approval run no destructive cleaner.
  • Exact Flatpak/Snap update transactions (finding 2). A reviewed update now carries a structured UpdateTransaction: the full Flatpak ref (from remote-ls) plus installed and remote full commits (from flatpak info, because Flatpak's commit column is abbreviated), or the snap name plus old/new revisions and tracking channel. Execution consumes the reviewed transaction, is pinned (flatpak update --commit=<commit>), and revalidates each source immediately before its mutation — including after an earlier source has run. A commit republished under an unchanged human version, a newly appearing update, or a non-exact transaction is refused; a source whose resolution failed is never re-discovered at execution.
  • Reverse-dependency self-reference (finding 3). The reverse branch compared the dependency target with the queried package and dropped exactly the valid matches. It now excludes only a genuine self-reference (the dependent is the queried package), so installed targets, full and bare names, and conditional/versioned dependencies are reported.
  • Determinism and execution robustness. All selected packages: removals are sorted so depclean previews are order-independent (previously a false "plan changed"); emerge --depclean runs with --ask=n; plan aggregation includes updates.
  • Tests: +22 (workspace cargo test --workspace green, 661 → 683). New regressions cover the non-destructive preview, drift/failed/cancelled cleanup, exact Flatpak identities/commits, Snap revisions, reverse dependencies, and Nix generation handling.
  • VM-verified (disposable images): real eclean preview/approve/cancel/ drift/failed and depclean cancel/approve with history and preserved user data; real reverse dependencies (sys-libs/glibc, sys-libs/zlib); a real Flatpak reviewed update (Portage-installed Flatpak, flathub, downgraded commit, reviewed update to the reviewed full commit, verified); custom-ebuild stage/build/install/remove; managed AppImage acquire/list/launch/remove with a tampered-SHA refusal; a Nix-enabled install with a real nodejs-slim profile (inventory, filtering, generations); and the non-root pkexec sys --broker path (cancelled authentication, successful broker execution, replay rejection) after installing the shipped polkit action and the standard wheel-admin rule. The read-only acceptance matrix re-run on the final static sys (dd61c610…) reports PASS=38 FAIL=0 (the matrix gained a reverse- dependency regression).
  • Not completed (see docs/HANDOFF.md): Snap install/refresh/remove (no snapd in the image; needs app-containers/snapd, AppArmor and network); live AI (a local model was served, but the sandboxed call exceeds the 120 s transport timeout on CPU); and the distinct recovery boot (the recovery BLS entry is present; selecting it interactively is not automated).

2026-09-25 — Fix the sys catalogue review findings (host/target, revalidation, update effects, Nix inventory, dependencies)

Follow-up to the package-management interface: seven review findings are fixed, each with regression tests, and the installed-system acceptance matrix is extended and re-run.

  • Host/target confusion closed (finding 1). Every catalogue, update-check, information and maintenance query is now built for the intended target — directly for /, or inside the target chroot for an alternate root. Snap acts on the running daemon and is reported unavailable (and refused for mutation) for an alternate root instead of ever touching the host. Availability checks resolve tools from the target (Exec::tool_in_target), so a host Flatpak, eclean or qdepends cannot leak into a target operation. Recording-runner tests assert alternate-root search/update/cleanup and Snap paths issue no host commands.
  • Maintenance revalidation (finding 2). resolves_effects now covers Depclean, ApplyUpdates and CleanCache, so they are re-resolved at the privileged execution boundary and within multi-action plans. Depclean removals are parsed into structured PackageEffects (emerge --pretend --depclean), so a changed removal set changes the digest and aborts before an unapproved mutation; a regression test proves drift is refused with no destructive command run.
  • Exact Flatpak/Snap update effects (finding 3). ApplyUpdates resolves a reviewable per-source plan with the affected identities and versions; each Flatpak app is updated by ref and each snap by name, and the plan is bound to approval and re-checked immediately before execution. Unrestricted update-all is gone. Lanes with no safe system-level transaction (Nix/AppImage/custom ebuild) are refused with a clear limitation. Destructive cache cleanup now reviews each cleaner's non-destructive dry run and binds the item set to approval (ResolvedPlan.cleanup), which is part of the digest.
  • Complete source constraints (finding 4). SystemAction::backend() classifies Portage-only actions (UpdateSystem, RemovePackage, Depclean, PrepareUpdates, InspectUpdates, PackageOwners, PackageDependencies); constrain_action rewrites optional-backend discovery and selection (DiscoverCandidates, ChoosePackage) to the constrained lane before querying, and refuses the cross-lane InspectInstallation. Unit tests prove a Flatpak-constrained request cannot investigate or mutate Portage/Snap/Nix through any action variant.
  • Cache-cleanup truthfulness (finding 5). Portage cleaner errors are no longer converted to text while the action returns success. A cleaner that ran and failed fails the whole action (with partial successes preserved), an unavailable cleaner is reported distinctly from one that found nothing, and the report reaches the command exit status, assistant response and transaction history.
  • Nix inventory (finding 6). Inventory enumerates the packages of the active Nix profiles from each profile's manifest.json (v1/v2/v3), retaining profile and user scope and package identity; historical generations and realised store paths are reported separately. Unsupported manifest formats and base profiles are stated explicitly rather than shown as an empty inventory. Filtering finds a package such as nodejs in a supported profile.
  • Dependency inspection (finding 7). Forward and reverse dependencies now come from the authoritative installed VDB metadata (DEPEND/RDEPEND/BDEPEND, with a qdepends tree fallback) instead of an emerge --pretend merge plan. Already-satisfied, conditional/versioned and blocker dependencies are preserved; the requested package is never its own dependency; a failed query is distinguished from a genuinely empty set.
  • Tests: +28 (core/executor/installer) covering alternate-root chrooting, structured depclean effects and digest drift, exact Flatpak identities, cache cleanup review and failure propagation, constraint rewrite/refusal, Nix manifest parsing, and dependency parsing/inspection. make test passes (cargo test --workspace).
  • VM-verified (disposable installed clones + fresh install): the read-only acceptance matrix is extended with snap-alternate-root, list-nix-legacy and deps-legacy, and reports SUMMARY PASS=37 FAIL=0 on both an existing clone and the fresh install (final static sys TEST_SYS_SHA:65307d85…). A fresh non-interactive install reports INSTALL-RC=0/NO_SECRET_LEAK, and its Portage configuration is world-readable out of the box (non-root search returns 3 real results, updates reports 10). Privileged mutating journeys (install/remove/history/depclean/cache-cleanup/alternate-root-Snap/Portage apply updates) pass 7/7, and a snapshot → change → sys undo → detached boot restores the package database and root while preserving /home. See docs/HANDOFF.md for the precise verified/blocked state.

2026-09-25 — Complete the sys package-management interface (search/list/info/updates/maintenance)

Adds a complete package catalogue on top of the typed-action architecture. AI is still the default for every operation; --legacy is the only user-facing opt-in to deterministic handling.

  • Unified search (phoebus-executor::query, SystemAction::SearchPackages gains an optional backend): cross-source discovery across Portage, Flatpak, Snap, managed AppImages, Nix and staged custom ebuilds. Every lane reports unavailable, failed, or empty distinctly; no metadata is invented. sys search firefox [--legacy] [--<source>].
  • Inventory (SystemAction::ListPackages): Portage VDB, flatpak list, snap list, managed AppImages, and Nix profiles (store paths reported separately as realised dependencies, never as installed programs). Custom ebuilds install through Portage and are listed once, under Portage. sys list [filter] [--legacy] [--<source>].
  • Package information (SystemAction::PackageInfo): installed VDB metadata (version, size, repository, RDEPEND) merged with resolved candidates and policy metadata; ambiguous queries list every real match and are flagged. sys info <package> [--legacy] [--<source>]. sys inspect <service> is unchanged.
  • Consistent updates (CheckUpdates/ApplyUpdates): sys updates checks every lane without mutating; sys apply updates reports a truthful per-source outcome and fails the action when an attempted source fails. AppImage (pinned URL+SHA) and Nix (project/declarative) are explained as manual/project-specific, never reported as updated. Background preparation stays distinct from activation. Portage updates/depclean are previewed from emerge --pretend at review time.
  • Maintenance (Depclean, CleanCache, PackageOwners, PackageDependencies): unused-dependency removal, Portage/Nix cache cleanup, package-file ownership (qfile/equery), and forward/reverse dependency inspection, all with explicit unsupported results where a backend or tool cannot support them.
  • AI-default routing enforced: a recognizable catalogue command enters the general assistant loop (phoebus_ai::assistant::run_assistant), which may run bounded read-only tools before answering. An explicit source flag is applied to both investigation requests and the final plan (rewriting lane-selectable queries, refusing a foreign lane). A missing model or provider failure stops the workflow and prints the exact --legacy alternative; it never executes deterministically. Direct JSON still requires --legacy/--broker.
  • Tests: +43 (core/executor/ai/installer) covering search/list/info parsing and dispatch, unavailable/failed/empty distinction, VDB metadata, ambiguity, depclean preview and skip, per-source update failure, no double-counting, routing (AI vs legacy), the source constraint, and the general investigation loop. installer/tests/vm/sys-acceptance.sh gains catalogue and routing cases (read-only group now 34).
  • VM-verified (disposable installed disk): installer/tests/vm/sys-acceptance.sh reports SUMMARY PASS=34 FAIL=0, including search-legacy, list-legacy, info-legacy, updates-legacy, search-no-model-offer, search-flag-constraint and the non-root maintenance refusals.
  • Fixed: read-only Portage queries failed for a normal account. The installed system left /etc/portage/repos.conf and /etc/portage/package.use/phoebus root-only, so emerge --search and emerge --depclean --pretend failed with Permission denied for the unprivileged catalogue. portage::normalize_config_permissions makes the non-secret Portage configuration world-readable (0755 dirs, 0644 files) while leaving the keyring (/etc/portage/gnupg, key-holding files) private; it runs when the config is written and again at finalize. Unit-tested (including the keyring exclusion); demonstrated on the disposable VM by applying the same permissions, after which sys search firefox --legacy returns real results and sys updates --legacy reports the available updates. A fresh VM install with the fix is not yet re-run (base install is ~2 h).

2026-09-25 — Installed-VM verification fixes (installer finalize probe, personal preference transactions)

Found while running the acceptance on a fresh disposable installed system:

  • Installer finalize probe used the AI-first path (phoebus-executor::sys_runtime). The target sys verification ran sys history, which is AI-first and (correctly) refuses to run without a connected model, so a non-interactive --install --no-ai aborted at the finalize stage with INSTALL-RC=1. The offline-safe deterministic probe is now sys history --legacy. Unit-tested; sys history --legacy succeeds in the booted target (HIST_RC:0).
  • A personal preference no longer requires the root-owned transaction log (sys execute_action). A normal account saving a personal package preference wrote the preference successfully but then failed with permission denied recording it in /var/lib/phoebus/transactions.toml, returning a misleading nonzero exit. Personal preferences are user-owned state and are no longer written to the system transaction history; only requires_root() actions are recorded. Covered by a CLI regression test that makes the system transaction directory read-only.
  • Install-driver reporting robustness (installer/tests/vm/serial-driver.py): the driver no longer raises a TypeError when the guest serial closes before INSTALL-RC (it now handles pexpect.EOF/TIMEOUT explicitly), and teardown is best-effort so the post-poweroff Could not terminate the child exception cannot turn a successful install into a nonzero driver exit.
  • Installed-VM evidence (disposable qcow2): a clean install with the fixed installer completes (===INSTALL-RC=0===, installation finished, NO_SECRET_LEAK). Detached boot: LUKS unlock and login; systemd PID1 running; sys 0.1.0; sys history --legacy exit 0; and installer/tests/vm/sys-acceptance.sh with the fixed sys reports SUMMARY PASS=24 FAIL=0, including personal-preference PASS saved to user config and nonroot-systemwide correctly refused. The privileged --broker plan path and replay rejection are unit-tested at the privileged entry point but were not exercised end-to-end in the VM (no root/Polkit agent on the serial console; sudo -n denied).

2026-09-25 — Bind per-step reviewed effects into the approval digest

  • Per-step effect binding (phoebus-installer::service): the canonical approval digest now covers every per-step reviewed effect that execution trusts, not just the actions and aggregate effects. At the privileged boundary validate_prepared_plan:
    • derives the effective per-step effects (step_effects, or the aggregate for a single-action plan; a multi-action plan without per-step effects is refused);
    • verifies each stored effect digest by recomputing it from the effect contents, so a step whose contents changed but whose stored digest did not is rejected;
    • verifies the aggregate effects are exactly the concatenation of the per-step effects;
    • feeds every per-step effect into compute_plan_digest, so the canonical digest (compared with both plan.digest and the independently supplied --approval-digest) changes whenever a step changes. This closes the gap where a user-controlled General/Undo plan could retain its approved digest, change only step_effects to match a different live resolution, reseal the plan, and execute. Install/LegacyInstall keep their install-specific digest, with the single step required to equal the aggregate; Removal, General and Undo are bound per-step. Plan builders normalize stored step digests so legitimate plans continue to validate, and the legitimate allowance for changes caused by earlier approved steps is unchanged.
  • Adversarial tests: single-action and multi-action General plans whose step_effects are swapped (with and without a matching aggregate) while the approved digest is retained are rejected before any command, ledger claim or transaction; a legitimate bound multi-step plan still validates.

2026-09-25 — Adversarial approval-boundary hardening (canonical digest, stable identity, recovery)

  • Canonical approval digest recomputed at the privileged boundary. The broker no longer compares the independently supplied digest with the user-owned plan's stored digest. It independently re-derives the canonical digest from the exact executable actions, candidate and reviewed material effects (compute_plan_digest) and requires it to equal both the stored digest and the supplied --approval-digest. The integrity seal is treated only as a self-consistency check, never as authentication. This closes the "retain the approved digest, swap an action and its effects, recompute the seal" substitution for every plan kind (Install, LegacyInstall, Removal, General, Undo).
  • Stable approval identity for replay protection. The ledger and .claim marker are keyed by approval_key(plan_id, canonical_digest, initiator_uid, target_root) instead of the integrity seal. Editing only the summary (or other presentation fields) and resealing can no longer mint a fresh ledger entry for an already-consumed approval, while a newly reviewed identical operation with a new random plan ID is still allowed.
  • Live-safe, monotonic crash recovery. Claims record the owning process (pid, /proc/<pid>/stat start time, kernel boot id). Terminal statuses are published exactly once by an atomic hard link into <key>.terminal and can never be overwritten or changed to another terminal status. reconcile_interrupted only marks a record interrupted when its owner is provably gone, so a second broker starting alongside a live operation cannot mislabel it, and reconciliation cannot race a real finish.
  • Personal settings are owned by the initiating user. UserStorage creates the config/state path component by component beneath the resolved home, rejecting symlinks and non-directories. When the write is elevated (effective root on behalf of a non-root user) the created paths are chowned to the initiating user's uid/gid; a non-root process acting for a different user is refused rather than writing a root-owned file. No path outside the home is ever chowned. Proactive state now goes through the same path.

2026-09-25 — Approval ledger, user-owned settings, and reviewed-effect execution

  • Broker-controlled approval ledger (ADR 0014, phoebus-installer::approval): the privileged broker no longer trusts a self-consistent checksum as proof of approval. The plan's integrity seal — covering actions, per-step effects, candidate, target root, initiating uid and expiry — is the binding fingerprint and the O_EXCL consumption key in a root-owned ledger (/var/lib/phoebus/approvals, 0700 / 0600). The digest shown on the review card travels across authentication independently of the plan file (--approval-digest); a replacement plan under the same identifier is refused even when resealed with a valid checksum; replay is refused even after the user deletes every file in their own plan directory; at most one execution may run under concurrent submissions. The initiating identity is derived from PKEXEC_UID (the --plan-uid argument is untrusted input). Authentication precedes the claim, so cancellation/refusal consumes nothing; a crash leaves a reconciled interrupted record that cannot be retried automatically.
  • User-owned personal settings (phoebus-executor::personal): personal package preferences (~/.config/phoebus/package-preferences.toml) and proactive snooze/dismiss state (~/.local/state/phoebus/proactive-state.toml) are 0600-in-0700, atomic and bounded, written without elevation. System defaults stay root-owned under /etc/phoebus and change only through the authenticated typed action set_package_preference { system_wide: true }. Personal choices take precedence; system defaults fill the rest. The initiating user is resolved through PHOEBUS_UID → SUDO_UID → PKEXEC_UID → effective uid and /etc/passwd, so CLI and GUI agree under sudo/pkexec. Persistence failures are reported as failures — the GUI never says "saved" or "dismissed" on a failed write.
  • Reviewed effects carried through execution: execute_prepared now carries the reviewed per-step effects forward; freshly resolved effects are evidence to compare against them, never a replacement approval. A material change aborts with a terminal stale plan transaction outcome; only changes explained by an earlier approved step in the same plan are accepted. Effect-resolution failure, stale-plan rejection, partial execution and verification failure all record a terminal result, preserving completed-step outcomes and the protective snapshot.

2026-09-25 — Privileged-boundary, GUI-review, removal, transaction and privacy remediation

  • Single privileged validation boundary (phoebus-installer::service):
    • validate_prepared_plan is the one authoritative check, run before elevation and repeated inside the broker after authentication. It re-derives the plan seal from the plan's own contents, rejects expired/claimed/modified/ malformed/wrong-root/wrong-uid plans, and revalidates live state.
    • Plans now bind the exact actions, effects, candidate, canonical target root and initiating uid; multi-action plans store per-step effects and are revalidated action-by-action (fixing an aggregate digest comparison bug).
    • Protected per-user plan storage (/run/user/<uid>/phoebus/plans, 0700 / 0600, atomic writes, 128-bit ids, symlink/ownership checks) and atomic O_EXCL consumption so concurrent requests cannot both mutate and retries cannot repeat. The broker resolves storage from the uid, not an arbitrary path.
    • sys --broker --execute-plan <id> --plan-uid <uid> --root <root>; a dropped or mismatched root is rejected rather than silently executing against /.
  • Truthful transaction outcomes: verification failure, action failure, refusal and cancellation all finish the transaction with a truthful result; completed steps and the protective snapshot are retained; persistence failures are surfaced; a malformed broker reply is a protocol failure, not success.
  • GUI plan review for every plan type: the assistant renders one review card for install, removal, general administration, rollback and follow-up confirmation; approval/cancel controls execute only the referenced reviewed plan and update the original card; "prepared" is never shown as "completed"; verification results are shown; launch is offered only when a concrete desktop entry/command was identified. Corrected the assistant's PhoebusButton API usage (label/actionEnabled).
  • Shared provider/credential handling (phoebus_installer::ai_setup): the CLI and GUI resolve provider, endpoint, model and credential reference through one module. Credentials load from a configured 0600 file, PHOEBUS_AI_API_KEY_FILE or a default ~/.config/phoebus/ai.key; they are never sent through QML, prompts or argv. The GUI direct transport no longer uses an empty key.
  • AI-first removal and corrected follow-ups: default removal routes through the connected model while deterministic ownership discovery and policy validation stay underneath; only --legacy bypasses the model. Follow-ups prefer explicit application references, so "install vlc using flatpak" is about VLC, "use flatpak for that one" refers to the previous app, and "why is my audio broken?" is not answered as a package explanation.
  • Honest conversation privacy: history stores minimized structured context (never the raw request), uses the active redactor, is written 0600/0700 atomically, is bounded to ten turns, surfaces write errors, and can be cleared.
  • Tests: regression coverage for tampered/expired/replayed/malformed plans, plan replacement after review, concurrent claims, refusal, target-root and uid binding, verification failure, transaction truthfulness, follow-up resolution, credential loading, and history privacy/retention/deletion. Storage is injected in tests (no shared PHOEBUS_PLANS_DIR race). Full workspace suite, fmt and clippy run; static binaries build.

2026-09-24 — AI-first administration remediation: shared service layer, Polkit elevation, QML provisioning, and conversation continuity

  • Shared Administration Service Layer (phoebus_installer::service):
    • Unified planning, recommendation, authorization, execution, and verification across CLI (sys) and desktop GUI (phoebus-assistant) into a single shared service layer.
    • Staged reviewable plans (PreparedPlan) with cryptographic approval digests (Sha256), 15-minute TTL expiration, and replay rejection (PlanStore).
    • Execution binds to the reviewed plan digest and revalidates against current system state before mutation; material alterations abort execution and require fresh review.
    • Honest recommendations: eliminated speculative claims (e.g. no "avoids a lengthy build" when compile times are unmeasured; displays genuine provenance such as Flathub, Gentoo binhost, Gentoo Portage, Nixpkgs, Snap Store).
    • Two-phase transaction recording: in-progress transaction recorded before mutation (transaction::begin), completed transaction recorded with post-mutation verification (transaction::finish).
  • Target Desktop & QML Asset Provisioning (phoebus-core, phoebus-executor):
    • Added gui-apps/quickshell to the canonical Mango desktop package list.
    • Embedded all 13 required QML, config, and policy files into the target filesystem (/usr/share/phoebus/assistant/) through TargetRoot safeguards in write_session_script.
    • Installed Polkit policy (club.phoebus.sys.policy) enabling desktop users to elevate mutating plans via pkexec /usr/local/bin/sys --broker --execute-plan <plan-path> with standard authentication prompts, avoiding blanket passwordless sudo and keeping graphical processes unprivileged.
  • Desktop Assistant Responsiveness (phoebus-assistant):
    • Eliminated startup freeze in AssistantBridge.qml and shell.qml by moving multi-source update checks to on-demand tab switching and replacing continuous polling with a one-shot 100ms handshake timer.
    • Handshake checks deterministic system state (/run/reboot-required) without blocking on network queries.
    • execute submits plan_id and digest, maintaining UI context cleanly on failure or user authentication cancellation (Polkit exit 126/127).
  • Contextual Conversation Continuity (phoebus_installer::conversation):
    • Bounded conversation turn history (up to 10 turns) with credential redaction (Redactor).
    • Contextual follow-up resolver (resolve_followup) handles comparative queries ("why did you choose that over nix?", "why flatpak?"), backend switching ("install the flatpak one", "use portage instead"), and plan confirmations ("proceed with that").
  • Cross-Source Application Removal:
    • plan_removal detects installed application copies across Flatpak, Snap, AppImage, and Portage.
    • Detects duplicate/competing copies across lanes and requires explicit lane disambiguation (sys remove <app> --legacy --<source>).
    • Preserves user configuration and data in home directories by default; post-removal verifies complete uninstallation before closing transactions.
  • Verification & Acceptance:
    • Expanded guest-side acceptance suite installer/tests/vm/sys-acceptance.sh to 23 passing cases (PASS=23 FAIL=0).
    • Full cargo test suite passes (55 installer unit tests, 23 CLI integration tests, 10 guidance tests, 16 ISO tests, all core/executor tests).
    • Clean cargo fmt, cargo clippy, release binary build, and crt-static build verified.

2026-09-24 — AI-first administration experience across CLI and GUI, package correctness, and shared recovery

  • Unified AI-First Administration Contract (sys & phoebus-assistant):
    • Natural language is the default interaction across CLI and desktop assistant: sys install <pkg>, sys please install <pkg>, and sys ask "<request>" all enter the identical AI investigation and recommendation workflow.
    • Source flags alone (--flatpak, --portage, --nix, --snap, --appimage, --ebuild) constrain AI candidate evaluation without bypassing the model.
    • Explicit deterministic administration is selected exclusively via --legacy: sys install <pkg> --legacy --<source>, sys history --legacy, and sys undo --legacy.
    • Deterministic legacy install without a source flag (sys install <pkg> --legacy) refuses execution and outputs available package source options.
    • Audited JSON action invocations: --action and --action-file fail closed unless invoked with --legacy (for deterministic administration) or --broker (for internal UI/bridge calls).
    • Truthful fallback: when the AI model is absent or returns an error, execution stops and prints actionable deterministic legacy alternatives (sys install <pkg> --legacy --<source>), never silently falling back across package lanes.
    • Distinct break-glass semantics: documented distinction between administrative --legacy and installer-only ISO --no-ai flag.
  • Package Correctness & Safety Guarantees:
    • Nix attribute evaluation probe: nix::verify_attribute probes attribute existence in nixpkgs via nix-instantiate before recommendation or preparation.
    • Portage binary binhost check & compile abort guard: binary package candidates are verified via emerge -p --usepkgonly. If an action changes to source compilation (EffectSource::Source), execution halts with an error, invalidating prior approval and requiring fresh review.
    • Cross-source installed application tracking: detects duplicate/competing installations across Flatpak, Snap, AppImage, and Portage.
    • User data preservation on removal: default package removal preserves user data and configuration directories.
  • Desktop Assistant GUI (phoebus-assistant):
    • Quickshell QML application in installer/live/desktop/phoebus-assistant/ providing an intuitive desktop assistant with conversational chat, recommendation cards with concise rationales, expandable comparison options, unified updates, proactive alerts, legacy controls, and preferences.
    • Backed by sys --assistant-bridge via stdio JSON-RPC; zero business or administrative logic in QML.
    • Desktop integration: launcher script (/usr/local/bin/phoebus-assistant), desktop entry (phoebus-assistant.desktop), and session launcher shortcuts.
  • Unified Multi-Source Updates:
    • update::check_unified_updates queries and consolidates pending updates across Portage, Flatpak, Snap, AppImage, and Nix, with reboot-needed detection.
  • Quiet Proactive Assistance:
    • Deterministic system monitors for reboot required, low storage (< 5 GiB), failed transactions, systemd service failures, and updates ready.
    • Persistent alert deduplication, snoozing, dismissals, and configurable enable toggles under /var/lib/phoebus/proactive.toml.
  • User Preferences & Profiles:
    • Inspectable and editable profiles (Balanced, FastInstallation, NativeIntegration, ApplicationIsolation), project environment tool mappings, and source pins.
  • Expanded Acceptance Verification:
    • installer/tests/vm/sys-acceptance.sh expanded to 22 acceptance cases covering read-only, failure, offline fallback, and audited entry points (PASS=22 FAIL=0). All 481 crate unit and integration tests pass.

2026-09-24 — Desktop stack unification: Mango + DarkMaterial as sole desktop

  • Canonical Phoebus Desktop: Phoebus OS now exposes and configures one desktop experience only: Mango + DarkMaterial. All standalone dwl desktop paths, packages, sessions, helpers, and fallback/recovery logic have been removed.
  • Removed Standalone dwl Packages & Assets:
    • Removed obsolete packages that existed solely for standalone dwl: gui-wm/dwl, gui-apps/waybar, gui-apps/wofi, gui-apps/mako, gui-apps/swaybg, gui-apps/swayidle, gui-apps/swaylock.
    • Removed standalone dwl session and helper assets: PHOEBUS_SESSION_SCRIPT (dwl launcher), PHOEBUS_MENU_SCRIPT (wofi launcher/power menu), PHOEBUS_LOCK_SCRIPT (swaylock), PHOEBUS_IDLE_SCRIPT (swayidle), WAYBAR_CONFIG, WAYBAR_STYLE, and phoebus-dwl.desktop.
  • Retained Mango / DMS wlroots Heritage:
    • gui-wm/mangowm (GURU, wlroots 0.20 slot) and gui-apps/dankmaterialshell are independent and self-contained; DMS natively provides the status bar, notifications, app launcher (danksearch), screen lock, and idle daemon.
    • Retained internal wlroots / dwm standard keybinding conventions inside MANGO_CONFIG_DEFAULT.
  • Fail-Closed Session Architecture:
    • PHOEBUS_MANGO_SESSION_SCRIPT (/usr/local/bin/phoebus-session-mango) starts Mango and DMS, failing visibly and diagnostically (status 1 with clear stderr) if Mango or DMS fails to start. There is no silent fallback to another desktop.
    • /usr/local/bin/phoebus-session is retained as a thin wrapper executing phoebus-session-mango "$@" for manual VT / CLI invocation.
    • Installed system greetd authenticates directly into /usr/local/bin/phoebus-session-mango.
    • Installer desktop profile enum reduced strictly to Mango (default) and None (headless), rejecting legacy dwl configs with an explicit error.
  • Verification & Test Coverage:
    • Functional tests in phoebus-executor updated to exercise phoebus-session-mango against mango and dms stubs.
    • Regression guards in phoebus-installer verify only wayland-session-mango is emitted and assert that dwl session/helper assets return None.
    • All workspace tests pass, clippy is clean, and golden installation plan is updated.

2026-09-24 — End-to-end graphical installation, detached first boot, and live ISO freshness automation

  • Full graphical installation verified (100% complete): The 6-step graphical wizard and typed backend bridge (gui-install mode) completed all 12 backend orchestration stages and emerged all 174 packages of the Mango desktop stack on a disposable 30 GiB qcow2 disk. gui-install-completes passed and captured 07-gi-07-complete.png.
  • Detached first boot verified (6/6 checks): The installed disk was booted standalone with iso=False and -boot order=c. Systemd-boot loaded, LUKS2 decrypted automatically with the test passphrase, all Btrfs subvolumes mounted (@, @home, @var, @snapshots, @swap), systemd reached running (0 failed units), serial console login authenticated, and /usr/local/bin/sys verified operational (sys history -> no transactions recorded).
  • Greetd TOML format fix: Fixed a multiline TOML basic string syntax defect in phoebus-core::greetd_config (/etc/greetd/config.toml) that previously caused greetd.service to fail with expected equals sign on line. Formatted the tuigreet command string on a single line and added unit-test TOML parser validation. Verified tuigreet rendered cleanly on the booted system (01-boot-desktop.png).
  • Live ISO freshness automation: Added scripts/ensure-live-iso.sh and Makefile targets iso / iso-rebuild. Guarantees that the live medium (installer/live/phoebus-installer-amd64.iso) is automatically recompiled and repacked whenever Rust crates, QML desktop files, or live configurations are newer than the ISO.
  • Kernel profile default optimization: Configured KernelProfile::Safe (sys-kernel/gentoo-kernel-bin) as the default kernel profile during installation, eliminating 100+ minute kernel compile times on constrained test environments.
  • Desktop dependencies and keyword updates: Added scoped keywords for x11-misc/pcmanfm, x11-libs/libfm, dev-cpp/cpptrace, dev-libs/libdwarf, and USE flags dev-python/pillow -truetype, dev-cpp/cpptrace unwind, sys-libs/zlib minizip to resolve desktop build graph requirements.
  • Harness & Driver hardening: Updated gui-driver.py with flexible login prompt regex matching arbitrary hostnames, added focused tab-navigation helper _tab_until_focus, and implemented clean guest poweroff (sync; systemctl poweroff) during detached boot checks.

2026-09-24 — AI-first package installation

  • Shared installation workflow (phoebus-executor::install, ADR 0013): sys install <application>, sys ask install <application> and the explicit backend flags all run one flow: identify → evidence → AI investigation → deterministic validation + effects → review → approval → execute → verify → history. The AI only recommends; the resolver re-checks every proposal against real backend metadata and maps it to the existing broker action.
  • Bounded investigation (phoebus-ai::install): the model may request typed, read-only evidence (discover_candidates, inspect_candidate, check_backend, inspect_installation) and ask one bounded question about intent before proposing a structured InstallProposal. Bounds: turn, per-turn request and evidence-size limits plus repeated-request detection. A rejected proposal is fed back for a bounded revision.
  • Friendly-name resolution and validation: per-lane resolution (chooser::resolve_for_backend) maps friendly names to real identifiers, reports ambiguity, and never fabricates a candidate. Duplicate installs, stale versions and changed effects are refused; approval is bound to a digest and revalidated before execution.
  • Explicit backend flags are authoritative: --portage, --flatpak, --nix, --snap, --appimage, --ebuild bypass the model, are mutually exclusive, and never fall back to another lane.
  • No-model path: an unqualified install with no provider prints the deterministic selection and the explicit commands and installs nothing; provider failure is never permission to install.
  • Install facts are real: sys now loads the installed /etc/phoebus/install.toml instead of assuming defaults, and the bounded facts include free space, Wayland, the usable lanes, saved preferences and recovery capability.
  • Transaction engine: installs record an in-progress transaction before the mutation (transaction::begin/finish), verify installed identity/version afterwards, and record failures truthfully.
  • ADRs/docs: new docs/adr/0013-ai-first-installation.md; docs/SYS.md updated with the install workflow and acceptance cases 23–31.

Verified (host)

  • cargo fmt, cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets (no new warnings) and cargo test --workspace pass. New tests cover: the AI loop (steps, bounds, repetition, revision, provider failure), resolver fabrication/ambiguity/ duplicate/changed-evidence, action mapping, transaction begin/finish, CLI flag conflicts/no-fallback/no-model, and target-vs-host facts.

Verified (disposable VM)

  • A deterministic minimal install completed (INSTALL-RC=0), including installing /usr/local/bin/sys and verifying the target, then booted detached (systemd running, 0 failed units).
  • sys install app-misc/hello --portage ran the full workflow: plan + effects, protective snapshot, install, verification in the package database, and a durable transaction in sys history that survived a clean reboot.
  • sys remove app-misc/hello, the no-model offer, backend-flag conflicts and the read-only investigation actions were exercised; the matrix reported FAIL=0 (19/19).

Not yet verified

  • The AI-selected journey (sys install <app> with a connected model) is unit-tested with scripted transports and was not run against a live provider: no authorised provider/credential exists in this environment. The exact command is in docs/HANDOFF.md; it is the remaining gate.

2026-09-24 — Hardware-aware software selection, Snap/AppImage/custom ebuild, sys lifecycle

  • Shared selection policy (phoebus-core::selection, ADR 0006 revised): replaced the fixed category routing (GUI→Flatpak, dev→Nix) with a single, inspectable, deterministic policy over resolved candidates from every lane (Portage source/binary/vendor, Nix, Flatpak, Snap, AppImage, custom ebuild). It separates hard constraints (architecture, required sandbox, storage, GPU, required proprietary, unavailable backend) from preferences; keeps kernel, drivers, systemd, graphics/audio and boot under Portage; honours and persists explicit compatible choices; errors instead of silently switching lanes; and reuses an already-installed lane to avoid duplication. Uncertainties are labelled (measured vs estimated compile time).
  • Candidate resolution (phoebus-executor::chooser): gathers real backend metadata (emerge --pretend, flatpak search, snap find, local Nix/AppImage records, the Phoebus overlay), assembles hardware facts (arch, cores, RAM, free space, GPUs, Wayland, compile history) and applies the policy. Unreachable metadata is reported as an unavailable candidate, never invented.
  • Snap lane (phoebus-executor::snap): detection of the client, daemon readiness and confinement; find/info/list/install/remove/refresh/ connections. app-containers/snapd is installed and snapd.socket enabled through Portage; classic confinement is explicit; automatic refresh is disclosed.
  • AppImage lane (phoebus-executor::appimage): managed import/acquisition with a pinned SHA-256 (placeholders and mismatches refused), ELF-architecture checks without executing the image, atomic adoption, desktop entry and optional icon extraction via unsquashfs, version/integrity records, and removal that preserves user data by default. AppImage is never called a sandbox.
  • Custom ebuild lane (phoebus-executor::ebuild): a dedicated /var/db/repos/phoebus overlay with recorded rationale and a content SHA-256. Staging never runs the ebuild; install requires the reviewed digest, generates the Manifest and builds through Portage with its sandbox enabled. Editing the staged ebuild invalidates approval.
  • Typed actions + sys surface (phoebus-core::action, phoebus-installer): choose_package, set_package_preference, snap_*, appimage_* and custom_ebuild_*, with strict validators (option-like operands, path traversal, placeholder hashes and bad names fail closed). Deterministic phrases cover the common cases; custom_ebuild staging/install stay JSON-only because they carry a full artifact.
  • sys in the installed target: the installer locates the trusted static sys beside itself, installs it to /usr/local/bin/sys, proves it runs in the target chroot before the recovery snapshot, and fails the install closed if it is missing. The VM install harness now fetches sys, and the rollback guest uses the installed binary.
  • Assistant prompt reconciled: the closed action set now includes the new actions and instructs the model not to route by category, to use choose_package, and to treat a custom ebuild as untrusted.
  • Docs: new docs/SYS.md command reference and acceptance matrix; revised ADR 0006.

Verified (host)

  • cargo fmt, cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets (no new warnings) and cargo test --workspace pass; the new policy, backend and CLI tests run on the host. installer/tests/vm/test_vmsafety.py (18 tests) passes with the new sys-acceptance.sh.

Not yet verified

  • The new lanes and the installed-sys lifecycle are unit/integration tested but not yet exercised in a booted VM in this session: a full GUI install was occupying the only disposable disk. The exact VM commands are in docs/SYS.md and docs/HANDOFF.md.

2026-09-23 — NVIDIA reliability, verification and harness repair

  • Deterministic live GPU decision (phoebus-core, phoebus-installer): --live-gpu-plan classifies the PCI display controllers (class 0x03, vendor 0x10de) against the generated device table and the bundled branch's capabilities, returning load-nvidia, nouveau-fallback, no-device or disabled. The live phoebus-nvidia-load script consumes it: a supported GPU loads the accelerated stack, an unsupported GPU (or a failed load) explicitly modprobes nouveau, and a machine without an NVIDIA display device is left alone. build.sh now creates etc/modprobe.d/phoebus-nvidia.conf (the file the old build required but never produced) and replaces Debian's unconditional nouveau configuration. The fail-safe entry sets nomodeset phoebus.nvidia=off, which the script and the unit both honour.
  • Legacy branch boundary corrected (phoebus-core): Maxwell/Pascal/Volta are capped at NVIDIA's last supporting series (580) with >=x11-drivers/nvidia-drivers-581 masked; a Blackwell plus proprietary-only GPU set is now reported as an explicit incompatibility instead of installing a single driver that cannot serve both.
  • Payload verifier hardened (phoebus-executor): --verify-live-nvidia now rejects placeholder modules/libraries, requires every module to be registered in the live kernel's modules.dep, normalises the dpkg revision and matches userspace/firmware versions to the bundled driver, infers and checks the module flavor, and requires the exact phoebus-nvidia.conf. All reads stay rooted inside the build root.
  • Installed lifecycle fixed (phoebus-executor, phoebus-installer): the NVIDIA dracut force_drivers fragment is written only in the NVIDIA stage, after the driver exists, and the final initramfs is regenerated then. The installer proves the modules were built for a kernel (or fails) and records the real resolved version, kernel and module names. The update path verifies the rebuilt modules before reporting success.
  • GUI acceptance harness repaired (installer/tests/vm/gui-driver.py): state-based step navigation replaces the step-0 keystroke count; the real account fields and the default single-password encryption are driven; the direct "Install now" action replaces ERASE typing and the (never-assigned) confirmation toggle; duplicate submission is exercised; install timeouts report stage, elapsed time and last state; the detached boot unlocks with the single-password passphrase and falls back to the separate one.
  • Rollback acceptance automated (installer/tests/vm/): a new serial-driver.py rollback mode with rollback-guest.sh / rollback-verify.sh records the package-database fingerprint and a /home marker, creates a recovery point with sys snapshot, performs a controlled reversible package install, runs sys undo, reboots detached and compares package state and /home. The destructive VM gate is written but unrun.
  • Live privilege scoped (phoebus-core, installer/live): the live NOPASSWD: ALL rule is replaced by an emitted, visudo-validated policy that grants unattended escalation only to the typed brokers (phoebus-installer, sys) and systemctl power actions. The recovery console is preserved via the password-authenticated live credential.
  • Docs: ADR 0012 updated; the stale "gui_bridge tests hang" handoff claim withdrawn (the workspace suite passes).

2026-09-23 — Comprehensive installer UX overhaul: 6-step flow, friendly pickers, and resilient UI

  • Streamlined 6-Step Flow (phoebus-install, QML): Eliminated the duplicate Step 0 welcome screen from the installer wizard; launch starts directly at "Step 1 of 6 · Language and keyboard" with an accurate 6-step progress indicator. The "Back" button is hidden on Step 1 and disabled for step 0 so back-navigation stays bounded.
  • Friendly Keyboard & Locale Pickers (phoebus-installer::gui_bridge, PhoebusCombo): Replaced raw two-letter codes (al, dz, brai) and arbitrary sorting with full layout names parsed directly from /usr/share/X11/xkb/rules/evdev.lst, sorting the top 30 world keyboard layouts and system locales first (e.g. English (US) — us, German — de). Selecting a layout dynamically switches the live Wayland keymap via localectl set-x11-keymap.
  • Searchable Timezone Picker (gui_bridge, QML): Populated the timezone dropdown directly from system zoneinfo, auto-detecting /etc/localtime.
  • Welcome App Cleanup (phoebus-welcome): Removed the redundant "Keyboard test" button and modal from the live welcome app.
  • Single-Password Disk Encryption (phoebus-install): Default-enabled "Use same password to encrypt disk" toggle with LUKS2, reducing credentials to username and password only without redundant confirmation prompts. Removed arbitrary 8-character minimum password restriction to accept any valid password.
  • Direct Installation Confirmation: Eliminated the requirement to type "ERASE" in all caps or check confirmation boxes; replaced with a direct, unambiguous "Install now" button on the review screen.
  • Invariants Enforced Against AI Mutation (phoebus-ai): Enforced Mango + DankMaterialShell desktop, Btrfs filesystem, and Flatpak/Nix core subsystems inside both the AI system prompt and semantic change validation; non-conforming AI proposals are automatically rejected.
  • Loopback AI Auto-Detection & Clear Guidance: Auto-probes loopback ports 4096 (OpenCode) and 11434 (Ollama) upon reaching the AI step, defaulting to detected local instances and replacing technical jargon with clear user guidance.
  • Humanized Failure Reporting & Details Viewer: Replaced raw curl/JSON dumps with clear humanized error summaries (e.g. package verification or network connection issues) alongside "[Retry]" and "[View technical details]" toggles. The live details terminal box properly fetches log lines and auto-scrolls to the latest activity.

2026-09-23 — Responsive display layout, resolution modal & hotkeys, and fullscreen installer

  • Display Resolution Switcher & Hotkeys (phoebus-welcome, Mango config): Added a dedicated 1-click Display Resolution dialog in phoebus-welcome allowing instant switching between 1920×1080 (Full HD), 1440×900, 1280×768 (Standard), 1024×768, and 800×600 modes without blurry bilinear scaling. Mapped global Mango hotkeys (Super+Shift+F12 for 1080p, Super+Shift+F11 for 900p, Super+Shift+F10 for 768p, Super+Shift+F9 for 1024x768) and set virtual display auto-probe to prioritize widescreen (1280x768) on initial boot.
  • Low-Resolution Responsiveness & Scrollability (QML): Wrapped both phoebus-welcome and phoebus-install form/progress views in bounded Flickable containers with ScrollBar.vertical. Added compact view adaptation (< 760px) in phoebus-welcome so the primary action stacks cleanly with flow-wrapped readiness chips, eliminating text clipping and ensuring all recovery tools and form controls are reachable on 800×600 and 640×480 screens.
  • Fullscreen Installer Enforcement: Closed the welcome window on launching the installer and set compositor fullscreen rules, eliminating any 50/50 window tiling splits.

2026-09-23 — Installer GUI usability, OpenCode model variants, and GURU mirror fix

  • Gentoo GURU Official Mirror (phoebus-core::system): Updated GURU_REPO_URI from the broken GitHub mirror to https://anongit.gentoo.org/git/repo/proj/guru.git, resolving the HTTP 404 failure that caused emaint sync -r guru to exit with code 1 during portage_configure in chroot.
  • OpenCode Model Catalog & Variant Picker (phoebus-executor, phoebus-installer, QML): OpenCode model selection now displays human-readable model titles alongside raw IDs (e.g., DeepSeek V4.1 Flash (deepseek-flash)). Added model variant selection supporting default, low, high, and max levels, defaulting cleanly to default and properly passing the variant into OpenCode session prompts.
  • Live Terminal Output Streaming (phoebus-executor::log, gui_bridge, QML): Logger and command execution runner now support subscriber sinks that stream stdout/stderr line-by-line in real time. The GUI bridge dispatches log events to the frontend over JSON-RPC, populating the "Show details" terminal box with live Portage compilation and command output rather than a static placeholder.
  • Desktop Defaults & Keybindings: Enforced Mango + DankMaterialShell as the default desktop configuration, standardized Btrfs and Flatpak defaults, simplified user account creation, streamlined confirmation workflow, and mapped standard DWM keybindings in Mango.

2026-09-23 — NVIDIA accelerated driver policy, live payload and installed integration

  • Hardware-driven driver policy (phoebus-core::nvidia): a deterministic, testable decision from the PCI display device IDs, backed by a generated table (nvidia_devices.rs) derived from the public PCI ID database via each device's NVIDIA chip codename. Turing/Ampere/Ada/Hopper/Blackwell use the current x11-drivers/nvidia-drivers branch with NVIDIA's open kernel modules (kernel-open); Maxwell/Pascal/Volta use the proprietary branch with -kernel-open and are masked >=x11-drivers/nvidia-drivers-595; Fermi/Kepler and older fall back to the in-tree nouveau and are reported, never claimed as NVIDIA success. Unknown NVIDIA device IDs are reported as unknown.
  • Probe captures PCI identity: display devices now carry pci_id (vendor:device) and pci_address; VIDEO_CARDS uses the resolved plan (nvidia only when a branch can serve the GPU, otherwise nouveau), while hybrid Intel/AMD GPUs are preserved.
  • Installed Gentoo system: scoped package.use (dist-kernel, kernel-open/-kernel-open), a scoped ~amd64 keyword for the driver atom, a scoped package.mask for the legacy branch, a modprobe.d policy (nouveau blacklist, nvidia_drm.modeset=1, nvidia-uvm softdep) and a dracut force_drivers fragment written before the kernel is built. A new nvidia_drivers install stage (after the kernel, before boot) emerges the driver and regenerates the initramfs so the modules are embedded; its failure fails the install and the resolved choice is recorded in /etc/phoebus/nvidia and shown in the plan. sys update system now runs @module-rebuild and kernel-install add-all on NVIDIA systems so kernel/module/initramfs updates stay coherent.
  • AI boundary: the model cannot change the driver branch or module flavor; a set_package_use change touching x11-drivers/nvidia-drivers is refused by the fixed-policy check and the advisor prompt says so.
  • Live ISO: the signed contrib/non-free/non-free-firmware components are enabled and the NVIDIA driver, firmware and Wayland/EGL/GBM userspace are bundled (live-packages.list). The live kernel is pinned to Debian stable (trixie, 6.12 LTS) because testing's newer kernel (7.2) removed the strncpy declaration the 550 driver still uses; installing the rolling kernel metas would make nvidia-kernel-dkms unbuildable. livefs-hook.sh builds the DKMS modules for that exact kernel (nvidia-current* on Debian) and fails if any module is missing. Nouveau blacklisting and module options come from Debian's own nvidia-kernel-common; its unconditional modules-load entry is replaced by a gated phoebus-nvidia.service that loads the driver before greetd/Mango only when an NVIDIA device is present. The documented fail-safe entry disables modesetting and blacklists the NVIDIA modules. build.sh verifies the assembled rootfs on every build (including PHOEBUS_REUSE_ROOTFS=1) with --verify-live-nvidia and records the bundled driver version, module flavor and kernel in /etc/phoebus/nvidia; a missing module, library or firmware file fails the build.
  • Proven this session: a minimal live rootfs (stable kernel + NVIDIA) was built with mmdebstrap and the payload verified end to end: driver 550.163.01, kernel 6.12.107+deb13-amd64, modules nvidia-current, -modeset, -uvm, -drm. The full desktop ISO was not assembled here (the host has ~10 GiB free and the build wants more), and no NVIDIA hardware was available, so acceleration is unverified.
  • Not verified: actual NVIDIA acceleration cannot be exercised on this host (no NVIDIA GPU; QEMU's virtual GPU does not establish it). No NVIDIA hardware passthrough setup is available or authorized. The live/installed NVIDIA boot gates are unverified here (see docs/STATUS.md); this is implementation + unit/integration tests + a proven payload build, not a claim of working hardware acceleration.

2026-09-22 — Installer UX streamlining and DWM keybindings in Mango

  • Flatpak non-removable invariant: Flatpak is a defining, required subsystem of Phoebus OS. Removed set_flatpak from the AI advisor action prompt and examples so models never propose toggling it; enforced in fixed_policy_violation and config validation that Flatpak cannot be disabled or removed; filtered redundant Flatpak proposals from the GUI review card; and locked Flatpak to 'yes (required)' in the TUI.
  • DWM / DWL keybindings in Mango: Packaged MANGO_CONFIG_DEFAULT now ships with standard dwm / dwl bindings for tiling and window management: Mod+Shift+Return (terminal), Mod+Return (zoom / promote to master), Mod+j/Mod+k (focus stack next/prev), Mod+Shift+j/Mod+Shift+k (exchange client), Mod+h/Mod+l (setmfact master area sizing), Mod+i/Mod+d (incnmaster master count), Mod+Shift+c/Mod+Shift+q (killclient), Mod+t/Mod+m/Mod+f (tile, monocle, fullscreen), Mod+Shift+Space (toggle floating), Mod+Tab (view previous tag), Mod+1..9 (tag switching), Mod+Shift+1..9 (tag moving), and Mod+left/right/middle click for window dragging, resizing and floating toggling.
  • Full-screen installer window: Closing the Welcome window when starting the installer allows Mango's tiling layout to present the installer full-screen.
  • Scrollable dropdown menus: Replaced the combo box with PhoebusCombo, a true dropdown menu with a clickable chevron, instant search filtering, and a scrollable ListView with vertical scrollbar that handles large lists without cutting off choices or destroying pre-filled selections.
  • Desktop keyboard layouts: Keyboard options now parse XKB rules (/usr/share/X11/xkb/rules/evdev.lst and base.lst) for clean desktop layouts with human-readable labels, replacing the ancient console keymap tree.
  • Streamlined defaults: Removed the manual desktop profile selector, filesystem selector, and Nix/Flatpak toggles from the UI; the installer now consistently defaults to Mango + DankMaterialShell, Btrfs with snapshots, and both Flatpak and Nix enabled.
  • Account & password simplification: Removed the redundant "Full name" field (username only). Removed the artificial 8-character password length limit. Added a "Use same password to encrypt disk" toggle (enabled by default) so users do not have to re-enter a separate disk passphrase across four fields.
  • Direct confirmation: Removed typing "ERASE" and the confirmation checkbox from the review screen; the overview screen clearly highlights the target disk and clicking "Install now" proceeds directly.
  • Live progress log details: The "Show details" button during installation now opens a dedicated scrollable log viewer that polls every 1.5 seconds and auto-scrolls to the newest output.

2026-09-22 — Event-driven analysis of a first-time user's journey

The graphical installer was audited against a first-time user's journey and rebuilt around a fixed, explained sequence: Welcome, Language and keyboard, Internet and readiness, AI connection, Destination disk, Account and encryption, Review and confirmation, Installation, Completion. Configuration, validation, plans, approval and execution stay authoritative in Rust.

Fixed

  • Network "Re-check" no longer resets the wizard. The readiness refresh is a separate, read-only bridge op (readiness) that updates the probe result only; it cannot change the step or clear the selected disk. The first handshake is the only path that initialises the form.
  • AI catalogs are fetched for the connection on screen. "Load model list" now pushes the edited configuration and credentials before requesting the catalog, classifies authentication/unreachable/model failures with a stable error_kind, and ignores a stale reply that a newer request superseded.
  • The AI connection indicator is invalidated when it should be. Editing the provider, model, endpoint, server or a credential clears the green "Validated" state and requires revalidation; irrelevant account or disk edits preserve it. A regression assert in the VM harness edits the model and checks the state flips.
  • Suggestion lists are keyboard-operable. Arrow keys move a visible highlight, Enter selects it, Escape dismisses the list, and the highlight is exposed through Accessible roles. Enter in an open list is consumed so it cannot also advance the wizard.
  • Busy work always completes. The bridge now fails every outstanding request when the backend exits, so no spinner can hang; AI connect/test and catalog loads are single-flight; every failure path clears its busy state and shows an actionable retry.
  • Keyboard focus is scrolled into view, so a keyboard user never tabs to an off-screen control, and the PhoebusToggle Return handler is fixed (it previously called a signal handler as a function).

Changed

  • Human-readable language, keyboard and time-zone names (e.g. "English (United States) — en_US.UTF-8", "German — de") are returned by the backend; the stable identifier is still what is validated and written.
  • The keyboard step tells the truth about the live session. The live session keeps its own layout; the selected layout is applied to the installed system, and the typing test is labelled as testing the live keyboard. A live Wayland layout switch is not implemented.
  • Internet readiness distinguishes a local link from reachable installation services and re-checks on demand without disturbing the form.
  • AI setup explains why a model is required and what is shared (hardware and storage facts; never passwords, passphrases, keys, names or files), shows the proposed changes, and requires an explicit Accept or Discard before the step can advance.
  • Disk selection prominently shows model, capacity and device identity, and states exactly which disk will be erased; protected disks explain why they cannot be selected. The ERASE confirmation and approval binding are unchanged.
  • The account step explains login password versus encryption passphrase, and password reveal controls are keyboard-focusable. Technical settings moved behind Advanced.
  • Progress shows real stages, elapsed time and activity, with a redacted Details log; the failure screen explains whether disk changes occurred and what is safe to do next; completion explains restart, media removal, unlock and first login.
  • The graphical harness gained a gui-install mode that presses the real controls through the whole journey (AI connect, disk, account, ERASE, install) on a disposable disk, plus regression checks for readiness refresh, disk survival and AI invalidation. PHOEBUS_GUI_CONFIG//etc/phoebus/install.conf let a live medium preseed wizard defaults without weakening any check.

Verified

  • cargo fmt --all -- --check and cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets clean (pre-existing result_large_err advisories unchanged); the Rust workspace tests are green and make test (Rust + 16 harness tests) passes.
  • Disposable graphical VM: gui 28/28 PASS (welcome, launcher, duplicate prevention, keyboard suggestion selection, network, AI gate blocked and reported, no bridge errors) and opencode 18/18 PASS (real model response, validated proposal, model edit invalidates the connection).
  • gui-install passed every journey assertion on a fresh 30 GiB qcow2, including gui-install-erase-confirmed; the backend then reported real progress (disk prepare, stage3 download, fstab, Portage sync, base packages, kernel) with elapsed time and categories, and no fabricated percentage. The completed install itself timed out in the harness after four hours during a

    100-minute kernel compile (see docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md); the completed install + detached boot gate remains BLOCKED on host build time, not on any code defect.

2026-09-22 — sys administration hardening

Correctness work on the deterministic sys broker and the assistant path that shares it. Every change is covered by unit tests (368 Rust tests pass); the destructive rollback VM acceptance remains unverified (see below).

Fixed

  • Alternate-root execution now targets the requested system. Package execution, service enable/disable and Flatpak operations previously ignored --root and ran against the host, while emerge --pretend previews already ran in the target. All of them now go through one target_spec/chroot path, and operations that cannot be confined to a non-running root (service status, start, stop, restart) are rejected before any command is built. systemctl --root is used for offline enable/disable. Regression tests prove preview and execution both emit a chroot confined to the same root, and that a rejected operation invokes nothing.
  • Validation at the execution boundary. parse_natural emitted actions that were never validated, so a manual sys install --color=n could pass an option through. parse_natural now validates its own output, resolve_effects and execute validate every action before touching a command, and option-like operands (leading -) are rejected for services, packages and search. emerge/flatpak operands are passed after an explicit -- separator. Manual, JSON and AI entry paths are all covered.
  • sys ask reports failure truthfully. A failing action now stops the plan, records the completed/failed/unattempted actions, and exits nonzero instead of returning success.
  • Complete transaction history. Ordinary mutating sys commands are recorded (previously only assistant plans were), the protective snapshot id created by the generic high-risk path is preserved and recorded, and a recording failure is surfaced instead of being swallowed.
  • Reliable package approval. emerge --pretend output is now classified as established (a real plan, including a genuine 0 packages) or unestablished; sys refuses to proceed when the effects cannot be established rather than treating unparseable output as "nothing to do". A material change between review and execution still aborts.

Added

  • Typed service lifecycle actions start_service, stop_service, restart_service, and ordinary commands for the existing bounded verbs: sys flatpak install|remove|list, sys nix prepare …, sys snapshot [op], sys start|stop|restart <unit>. The AI prompt exposes the new verbs, so the manual and AI interfaces share one validated execution path.
  • phoebus-executor::actions::execute_plan runs a reviewed multi-action plan, stopping at the first failure and marking the rest unattempted, so the assistant and any multi-step caller report partial failure consistently.
  • CLI integration tests (tests/sys_cli.rs) cover the manual and JSON entry paths and exit codes.

Unreleased

Added

  • Real OpenCode agent-server adapter. phoebus-executor::opencode_client implements the OpenCode session/message protocol over the project's curl transport and the ModelTransport trait, so the strict proposal parser, evidence review, bounded facts and executor are reused unchanged. The GUI ("OpenCode agent"), the installer CLI (--ai-backend opencode, --opencode-server/-provider/-model/-password-file) and sys ask all use it. It creates a transient session per request, accepts only the completed assistant text parts, disables tools per message, and deletes the session. A JSON schema output mode is available in the protocol but is not used: the shipped DeepSeek models reject it, and the prompt carries an explicit change shape instead. The opencode 1.18.32 contract was verified directly: session creation rejects a model field, /provider metadata can contain a credential and is reduced to ids/model names, and auth is HTTP Basic (opencode / OPENCODE_SERVER_PASSWORD).
  • --opencode-test obtains and validates a real model response (exit nonzero on failure), distinct from the read-only --opencode-probe. A live acceptance test (make opencode-acceptance) fails as BLOCKED when no server is configured, so it cannot pass by not running.
  • Truthful OpenCode connection states (insecure_transport, unreachable, authentication_required, authentication_rejected, incompatible, reachable, model_catalog, selected_model_unavailable); ready is reserved for a validated response and is never returned by the probe.
  • GUI "Test connection" and OpenCode connection controls, plus a backend selection (ai.backend) in canonical configuration.

Security

  • The mandatory-AI gate now requires a validated interaction. Both the GUI bridge and the installer CLI refuse to install when only a provider name is configured; a successful, validated model interaction bound to the current configuration (and credential) is required. Changing the model, endpoint, server or a secret invalidates it. A direct provider or --no-ai remains the fallback.
  • OpenCode transport policy is enforced. Plain http:// is accepted only when the resolved destination is loopback and the connection is pinned to the checked address; remote access is https:// with certificate verification or an authenticated tunnel to loopback. Redirects, unsafe schemes and oversized or trickled bodies are bounded, and credentials travel only on curl's stdin.
  • Credentials never surface. The catalog is reduced to ids/model names; server responses that echo credentials are not retained, and tests feed credential-bearing bodies and assert they do not appear in errors or state.

Verified

  • The graphical installer uses the OpenCode adapter. In a disposable graphical VM the wizard selected "OpenCode agent", entered the server, provider and model through the UI, obtained a real model response (Test connection) and a validated proposal (Connect and validate, green "Validated"). The opencode harness run passed 17/17 and the GUI regression 25/25. A password-protected server was reached through authentication as well. The full graphical installation beyond the AI gate is still not run.

Fixed

  • A malformed model proposal now gets one bounded corrective retry before the strict parser rejects the interaction (the shipped DeepSeek models occasionally keyed the change or rationale wrongly). The parser remains the final authority; a retry that still fails is still rejected.
  • OpenCode client/probe defects found by testing: the handwritten HTTP reader (no total deadline, UTF-8-unsafe chunk fallback) was removed in favour of the curl transport; the catalog is no longer parsed on a non-2xx status; a provider-shaped 500 can no longer look like a catalog; the duplicate-session harness check requires exactly one session; and GUI navigation is asserted from secret-free frontend state lines rather than inferred from a screenshot.

Added

  • OpenCode connection workflow and capability probe. New ADR 0011 and docs/OPENCODE.md separate the four components (client, server, model service, Phoebus broker) and document host-local and tunnelled remote use. phoebus-executor::opencode_server probes /global/health and /config/providers and reports a typed state (disconnected, authentication_required, incompatible, reachable_no_model, ready) instead of assuming a TCP connect or HTTP 200 means compatibility. Exposed as phoebus-installer --opencode-probe <url> (read-only, nonzero unless a model is available). Never returns provider credentials. Verified against the installed opencode 1.18.32 (ready) and a deliberate unauthenticated LAN bind (authentication_required).

Security

  • The target disk is revalidated immediately before partitioning. An approval now binds to a verified device, not a name: storage_prepare re-probes and refuses if the disk disappeared, became protected (mounted/read-only/live), or changed size/model since it was selected. Regression tests cover each case.
  • The GUI bridge refuses replayed and overlapping installs. An approval is single-use and consumed before destructive work; a second start_install, a retry or a reconnected frontend cannot start a second installation. Request lines and secret values are length-bounded; deeply nested JSON is rejected.
  • Provider transport hardened. Only http(s) endpoints are accepted, URLs with characters that could inject curl config directives are refused, the transfer is restricted to http,https, redirects stay disabled (so an Authorization header cannot follow a redirect to another origin), and the response is size-bounded (max-filesize).
  • TargetRoot refuses symlink escapes. write/ensure_dir reject a symlinked path component inside the target instead of following it, so a planted symlink cannot redirect an installer write to the host.
  • Unauthenticated OpenCode endpoints are not treated as usable. The probe reports authentication_required for a passwordless LAN bind rather than ready.

Fixed

  • Disk sizes are no longer reported as 0 B. probe_disks invoked lsblk without -b, so human-readable sizes (30G) failed the byte parse and every disk displayed 0 B; the size-based disk-identity check was also blind. The -b flag is now used and pinned by a test.
  • The welcome window's primary action is keyboard-reachable. It now requests activation and force-focuses "Install Phoebus OS", so Return launches the installer (previously no focus ring was shown and Return did nothing). A regression test also rejects the non-existent FloatingWindow.onActiveChanged.
  • The installer cannot be abandoned mid-install without explanation. Escape during the destructive phase is refused and the UI states that the operation cannot be cancelled safely; the AI step shows its "connect and validate" guidance inline, beside the controls.

Changed

  • The VM harness enforces its own safety rules and reports structured results. installer/tests/vm/vmsafety.py validates every writable drive (qcow2, inside PHOEBUS_VM_DISKS, no /dev/*, block/char devices, raw images, escaping symlinks or outside backing chains), gives each run its own OVMF variable file and QMP socket, uses structured QMP and argument arrays (no os.system), and returns nonzero on any failed assertion, timeout, EOF or missing result. Statuses are PASS/FAIL/BLOCKED/SKIPPED/NOT RUN. make test now runs the harness unit tests; installer/tests/vm/report.py builds a browsable run report.

Added

  • Graphical installation experience. The live ISO now boots into a branded Phoebus welcome window (phoebus-welcome) that makes "Install Phoebus OS" the dominant action, shows ISO version and readiness (network, firmware, memory, cores) and keeps network/display/accessibility/help/keyboard-test/power tools available, with troubleshooting tools under Advanced. A full graphical setup wizard (phoebus-install) guides language and keyboard, network and prerequisites, AI model connection, destination disk (with protected disks and the installer medium identified), account and encryption, review, ERASE authorization, progress and completion. Duplicate installer sessions are prevented. The TUI/CLI remains the fallback. See ADR 0010 and docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md.
  • Typed JSON GUI bridge. phoebus-installer --gui-bridge exposes a narrow, fail-closed protocol over stdin/stdout that reuses the same InstallConfig, validation, plan, DestructiveAuthorization and staged executor as the TUI. Approval is bound to a plan digest, secrets travel only over the stdin pipe, and real backend stages are reported with categories (no invented percentages). Installer::install_observed and an InstallObserver trait were added; Installer::install is unchanged.
  • Phoebus brand system. phoebus-core::brand provides charcoal/warm white/amber tokens plus a sun emblem, wordmark and wallpaper as deterministic SVG (emitted via --emit-asset, shared with the QML frontend), applied to the GRUB menu, live wallpaper, welcome window, installer, application icon and completion screen. Readable contrast and the QML/Rust palette are pinned by tests.

Fixed

  • Installed systems no longer default into recovery. loader.conf now pins the newest real kernel entry, and the snapshot recovery entry carries a sort-key that keeps it after every kernel, so a low machine-id can never make systemd-boot select the recovery entry by filename tie-break. Previously an installed system could boot systemd.unit=rescue.target after reboot.
  • DMS first-run dialogs are suppressed on the live medium by pre-seeding DMS's own onboarding and changelog markers, so the installer is the first thing the user sees.
  • The live-medium device is now identified. probe_disks also inspects /run/live/medium and /run/live/rootfs, so the ISO is labelled as the installation medium (and remains protected).
  • The installer shortcut is live-only. phoebus-install and its desktop entry are no longer written to an installed system.

Changed

  • Mango + DankMaterialShell is now the default desktop for both the installation ISO and the installed system (explicit owner decision). Omitted desktop.profile selects mango; Flatpak and PipeWire are on by default. Explicit none, minimal, dwl and full continue to work unchanged (ADR 0009).
  • Installed login uses greetd + tuigreet. Authentication is always required; the default session is Mango and the dwl entry remains selectable (--sessions /usr/share/wayland-sessions). Live autologin is a separate, live-only configuration and is never written to an installed system.

Added

  • Live desktop ISO: installer/live/build.sh now builds a rootless Debian testing rootfs containing Mango (built from a pinned source release), DankMaterialShell (pinned, SHA-256-verified release tarball), Quickshell, scenefx, wlroots 0.20, greetd/tuigreet and the desktop integration, then splices it into the base Debian-Live boot equipment. The live user autologins into Mango, an "Install Phoebus" launcher opens the unchanged installer UI, and a serial/VT recovery console is retained. The build fails clearly if a required desktop component is missing. Debian packages never enter the Gentoo target. The built ISO was booted in a graphical, seat-providing VM: Mango + DankMaterialShell + Quickshell ran and a screendump captured the DMS panel and welcome window (docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md).
  • Shared desktop assets are emitted from one source of truth by phoebus-installer --emit-asset and used by both the installer and the live build. Regression tests cover the default/overrides, login configuration, live/installed separation, session entries, pinned checksums and the live ISO desktop-payload guards.

Added

  • Mango + DankMaterialShell desktop option (desktop.profile = "mango"): gui-wm/mangowm 0.17.2 (wlroots 0.20) plus gui-apps/dankmaterialshell 1.5.3 / Quickshell 0.3.1 / scenefx 0.5, installed through the GURU community overlay with scoped ~amd64 keywords (never global). The installer writes GURU's repos.conf, bootstraps dev-vcs/git, and syncs the overlay. A phoebus-session-mango entry point, a packaged Mango config seeded once into the user's config, DMS keybindings, a mango-session.target binding for DMS, and phoebus-mango.desktop/phoebus-dwl.desktop session entries are generated. dwl remains the fallback session and is installed alongside. The profile is selectable but not promoted to default pending graphical-VM verification (ADR 0009).

2026-09-21 — Coherent rollback, installed assistant, Nix isolation

Added

  • Coherent rollback and recovery (phoebus-core::rollback, phoebus-executor::rollback): a recovery point now captures @ and the separately mounted @var (Portage state) under one name; rollback creates a writable root generation, rewrites the restored root's fstab and the BLS rootflags=subvol=, selects a boot entry whose kernel modules match the restored /lib/modules, and writes "previous" and snapshot-based "recovery" entries. A persisted rollback-state.toml makes interruption safe and resumable; retention prunes old snapshots and protects in-flight targets; a 1 GiB free-space check gates the operation. See ADR 0007.
  • sys undo / sys undo <id> / sys undo status and the high-risk undo typed action. The installer now records a snapshot-based "Phoebus Recovery" entry at install time, so recovery does not depend on the live root.
  • Installed conversational assistant (phoebus-ai::assistant, sys ask <request>): bounded facts -> typed plan -> concrete resolved effects -> approval/authentication -> deterministic execution -> transaction record. No model is required: sys ask falls back to the deterministic parser.
  • OS-level model sandbox (phoebus-executor::sandbox): the network call runs in a hardened, unprivileged transient systemd unit (DynamicUser, ProtectHome, ProtectSystem=strict, NoNewPrivileges, syscall and address-family filters). It fails closed when systemd-run is unavailable.
  • Resolved package effects and approval binding (phoebus-core::effects): emerge --pretend is parsed into additions/upgrades/downgrades/removals with source-vs-binary provenance and download size; a plan digest binds approval, and a material change between review and execution aborts. New bounded typed actions flatpak_install/flatpak_remove/flatpak_list and nix_prepare.
  • Transaction log (phoebus-core::transaction): assistant and sys actions record their actions, result and recovery point; sys history shows snapshots and transactions.
  • Desktop completeness: phoebus-menu (wofi drun launcher + power menu), phoebus-lock (swaylock), phoebus-idle (swayidle: lock, suspend, before-sleep lock) and a system-wide Waybar config with network, audio, battery, clock and power controls.
  • Release gates (phoebus-installer::release): a registry of the real candidate checks (install, detached boot, desktop, updates/rollback, no-model), a gate report that never records an unexecuted check as passed, atomic publication that preserves the last known-good latest.iso.prev, and signing/verification command helpers.
  • New VM harness for the Debian-Live appliance: installer/tests/vm/appliance-driver.py, appliance-guest.sh and appliance-test.conf.example.

Changed

  • Nix build isolation is enforced: sandbox = true, sandbox-fallback = false, with store bounds (min-free/max-free) and auto-optimise-store. Lifecycle operations (remove/purge, gc) and a bounded nix_prepare action were added; the Portage-owned ebuild approach is documented in ADR 0008. See ADR 0006.
  • Desktops install swayidle/swaylock session helpers and a Waybar configuration; phoebus-session starts the idle daemon.

Added

  • Nix bootstrap (on by default, VM-verified). phoebus-executor::nix fetches the pinned, SHA-256-verified official Nix release and bootstraps it into the target with discrete commands (store copy, nix-store --load-db, nixbld users, state dirs, profile and daemon units). A desktop VM confirmed nix-daemon.service active and nix shell nixpkgs#hello printing Hello, world!. A binary ebuild was ruled out: the upstream installer has no DESTDIR and runs nix-store --load-db against the real root.
  • finalize now flushes the target (sync) before unmounting, so late writes such as /usr/local/bin/phoebus-session and the exported installer log are on disk even after a forced poweroff.

Changed

  • Installing Phoebus now requires an AI. The installer refuses an install with no provider unless the explicit break-glass --no-ai (alias --legacy, or PHOEBUS_NO_AI=1) is used. A new local provider (Ollama/llama.cpp/ LM Studio) and --ai-endpoint support a model the user downloaded; no model is shipped.
  • Desktop installs now include sys-apps/xdg-desktop-portal, xdg-desktop-portal-gtk and xdg-desktop-portal-wlr, so Flatpak and Wayland apps get file choosers and screencast support.

Added

  • sys offline package commands: sys install <name>, sys remove <name>, sys search <query> (plus the remove_package/search_packages typed actions). They are deterministic Portage operations with no model involved — emerge resolves a bare name or a full atom — so the system stays fully administrable offline and without the assistant.
  • Debian-Live installer appliance (installer/live/build.sh, no root): a bootable Phoebus installer ISO built by overlaying the static installer, the OpenCode manifest and the Debian tools the live image lacks onto a Debian-Live stable base, with a serial-visible auto-booting grub config. The target stays Gentoo. See docs/PLAN-DEBIAN-LIVE.md and ADR 0005.
  • Git workflow: committed hooks (.githooks/), scripts/check-secrets.sh, scripts/agent-commit.sh, scripts/publish.sh, scripts/setup-hooks.sh.
  • Documentation set: docs/OBJECTIVES.md, ROADMAP.md, STATUS.md, ARCHITECTURE.md, DEVELOPMENT.md, CONTRIBUTING.md, GIT-WORKFLOW.md, CHANGELOG.md, and the top-level AGENTS.md.
  • .gitignore covering the ISO, build output, transcripts and secrets.

2026-09-20 — AI guidance, desktop reliability, snapshots

Added

  • AI-assisted install guidance: an OpenAI-compatible provider layer for DeepSeek and OpenAI plus a test transport (phoebus-ai::provider), credential loading and a curl transport that keeps the API key out of argv, config and logs (phoebus-executor::ai), and CLI flags --ai, --ai-provider, --ai-model, --ai-api-key-file, --ai-proposal-file, --ai-facts. The TUI offers DeepSeek/ChatGPT/without-AI.
  • Typed proposal extensions: scoped package.use, explicit build jobs and binary-package preference. Every proposal now requires a non-empty reason and duplicate/conflicting changes are rejected before anything is applied.
  • sys history and update preparation are VM-verified on a Btrfs install.

Changed

  • phoebus-session now starts dwl first, waits for the Wayland socket before launching waybar/mako/swaybg, establishes XDG_RUNTIME_DIR and a session bus, starts the polkit authentication agent, and reaps helpers on logout.
  • Portage policy: the unused installkernel uki flag is no longer forced, the duplicate/empty PipeWire/WirePlumber lines are gone, and the signed binhost is derived from the selected profile when unset.
  • Update preparation records a successful distfile fetch as ready even when --buildpkgonly is skipped because dependencies must be merged first, and the state note now includes the redacted Portage reason.

Fixed

  • A high-risk sys action now creates its protective snapshot inside actions::execute and fails closed if the .snapshots subvolume exists but the snapshot cannot be created; corrupt snapshot history is surfaced instead of being hidden as empty.

2026-09-20 — Retire the Bash installer (migration Phases 0–4)

Added

  • phoebus-executor::opencode: pinned-manifest parsing, architecture detection, fetch through Exec, SHA-256 verification, fail-closed placeholder checks, extraction and config writer (7 unit tests).
  • --bootstrap-opencode on the CLI; PHOEBUS_OPENCODE_MANIFEST overrides the embedded manifest for fixture verification.
  • cli_coverage and golden plan tests (plan_golden.rs, tests/golden/).
  • docs/BASH-MIGRATION.md: the evidence-gated retirement plan and ledger.

Changed

  • The disposable VM harness installs with the static Rust binary; full encrypted install + detached boot re-verified (systemd PID 1, running, 0 failed units, LUKS, login).
  • CI, the pre-commit hook, the Makefile and the commit/publish scripts gate on Rust only (cargo fmt, clippy, test).
  • installer/doc/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md and installer/doc/FINDINGS.md moved to docs/.

Removed

  • The Bash installer tree (entry point, libraries, TUI, configuration, shell test suite and README), retired in favour of installer-rs/. The Bash reference remains tagged v0.1.0-bash-reference. The disposable VM harness under installer/tests/vm/ is retained.

2026-09-20 — Rust installer parity, desktop, and foundations

Added

  • Rust workspace (installer-rs/): phoebus-core, phoebus-executor, phoebus-ai, phoebus-tui, phoebus-installer (~9.4k LOC, 45 files).
  • Typed InstallConfig supporting TOML and the legacy flat format.
  • TargetRoot (host/target path safety), SecretString/Redactor, DestructiveAuthorization, central Exec command layer with dry-run.
  • Storage backend: GPT, ESP, LUKS2, Btrfs layout, fstab/crypttab, swapfile.
  • Stage3 fetch with pinned SHA-256 (or signed DIGESTS), Portage configuration, signed binary use, source builds, kernel, dracut, systemd-boot BLS.
  • Desktop/Flatpak: selects default/linux/amd64/23.0/desktop/systemd, writes /usr/local/bin/phoebus-session; flathub remote configured.
  • Package policy instrumentation: measured compile times parsed from emerge.log (326 entries recorded in the desktop run), persisted to /var/lib/phoebus/compile-times.tsv.
  • Snapshots: read-only Btrfs snapshots + TOML transaction history.
  • Background update preparation (--fetchonly + --buildpkgonly).
  • Typed SystemAction schema, privileged broker, and the sys command.
  • AI privacy boundary (PrivacyPolicy, ContextBundle, forbidden paths).
  • Release tooling: phoebus-release manifest/verify/sha256/assemble.
  • ratatui TUI with plan review and ERASE confirmation.
  • Recovery BLS entry booting rescue.target.

Fixed

  • Subvolumes mounted before creation.
  • fstab/crypttab overwritten by stage3 extraction (moved to fstab_generate).
  • Missing /var/tmp breaking kernel-install.
  • installkernel requiring uki_generator even for BLS.
  • dracut crypt module and systemd-cryptsetup missing.
  • LUKS cmdline using rd.luks.uuid instead of rd.luks.name.
  • dracut UKI missing the kernel command line (BLS adopted).
  • @swap not mounted, breaking swap activation.
  • Portage GPG verify user unable to read the getuto keyring.
  • Transient rsync mirror quarantine (sync retries).
  • Pillow/HarfBuzz documentation circular dependency.
  • Legacy config silently parsed as TOML with defaults.

Verified

  • Full encrypted UEFI install and boot with the ISO detached: systemd PID 1, is-system-running = running, 0 failed units, 10.73 s boot.
  • Desktop stack headless: dwl, waybar, mako, swaybg, grim screenshot, wl-copy/wl-paste, wpctl, flatpak 1.18.1 + flathub.
  • No secret leakage in the installer log.

2026-09-19 — Bash installer prototype and first VM boot

Added

  • Bash + dialog installer (installer/) with deterministic backend, TUI, plan/review, dry-run, logging, and destructive confirmation.
  • Read-only hardware/disk discovery with live-medium protection.
  • GPT/LUKS2/Btrfs backend, systemd stage3, Portage, kernel, systemd-boot, users/services/desktop modules.
  • Unit/regression suite and a disposable VM harness.

Verified

  • First complete encrypted UEFI VM install and boot with the Bash installer.

Fixed

  • The subvolume-ordering, fstab-timing, /var/tmp, rd.luks.name, uki_generator, cryptsetup, @swap, and local root="$1" dir=... bugs (these are the class of bug the Rust port is designed to prevent).