phoebus_os/docs/ARCHITECTURE.md
Phoebus fc64793aec docs: update references after retiring the Bash installer
Point AGENTS.md, README.md and the docs at the Rust-only toolchain and the
moved VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md, and drop the Bash installer from DEVELOPMENT.md.
2026-09-20 04:00:19 -07:00

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# Architecture
Phoebus ships one installer implementation: the **Rust** workspace in
`installer-rs/`. It reproduces the proven encrypted UEFI VM boot path and is the
only implementation on the install path. The retired Bash prototype is kept in
git history, tagged `v0.1.0-bash-reference`; see `docs/BASH-MIGRATION.md` for
the evidence-gated retirement.
The disposable VM harness lives in `installer/tests/vm/` and drives the static
Rust binary.
## Layering
```
TUI / CLI / sys front-ends (phoebus-tui, phoebus-installer)
|
v
Orchestration + plan staged execution, single source of truth
|
v
Executor commands, storage, Portage, boot, services
|
v
Core typed config, models, policy, validation
```
### phoebus-core
Pure, non-privileged logic with no external commands except reading `/proc`,
`/sys` and small system files:
- `config` — `InstallConfig` (nested sections, enums for closed sets); TOML and
legacy flat-format loading (format is detected structurally).
- `validate` — hostname/username/locale/timezone/keymap/password checks.
- `disk` / `hardware` — models and protection classification (pure).
- `plan` — `InstallPlan` with the canonical step order and human rendering.
- `policy` — deterministic source/binary decisions + policy context.
- `emergelog` — parses Portage `emerge.log` into measured compile times.
- `target` — `TargetRoot`, which rejects absolute paths and `..` traversal.
- `secret` — `SecretString` (redacted `Debug`, zeroized on drop) + `Redactor`.
- `snapshot` — deterministic snapshot names + TOML transaction history.
- `action` — closed `SystemAction` schema and a small deterministic parser.
- `update` — preparation policy and real Portage argument builders.
### phoebus-executor
The only crate that runs privileged commands.
- `command` — `CommandSpec`, `ProcessRunner` (real / recording / never) with
arguments always separate; there is no `sh -c`.
- `exec` — `Exec` centralises logging, redaction, dry-run, chroot mounts and
target writes.
- `log` — file + optional stderr logging; every line is redacted.
- `auth` — `DestructiveAuthorization`, issued only after ERASE + final
confirmation.
- `storage`, `encryption`, `portage`, `kernel`, `boot`, `users`, `services`,
`desktop` — the install backend, mirroring the proven order.
- `probe` — read-only hardware and disk discovery.
- `snapshot`, `update`, `admin`, `actions` — post-install foundations.
### phoebus-ai
- Typed `AiProposal` / `SystemAction` (unknown actions fail closed; no shell).
- `privacy` — `PrivacyPolicy` + `ContextBundle`; forbidden-path checks. The
collector in `phoebus-executor::admin` only reads system sources.
### phoebus-installer
- `orchestrate` — `Installer` runs the plan stages and stops on first failure.
- `release` — `ReleaseManifest` create/verify, assemble command.
- Binaries: `phoebus-installer`, `sys`, `phoebus-release`.
## Safety model
- Every command goes through `Exec`, which logs a redacted command line, exit
status and duration, and honours dry-run centrally.
- Destructive functions take `&DestructiveAuthorization`; the token is created
only after the destructive preview and confirmations.
- All target writes go through `TargetRoot`; host-versus-target mistakes are
caught by construction and covered by tests.
- Secrets travel over stdin only and are registered with the redactor before
any logging. They never enter the config.
- The AI cannot execute; it can only propose typed changes that the backend
validates and the user approves.
## Installation order (do not regress)
```
storage_prepare -> stage_install -> fstab_generate -> portage_configure
-> packages_base -> kernel_install -> boot_install -> users_configure
-> services_configure -> desktop_install -> finalize
```
Storage order: partition GPT, create ESP, LUKS format/open, `mkfs.btrfs`, mount
top-level, create subvolumes, unmount, mount the subvolume layout. `fstab` and
`crypttab` are generated **after** stage3 extraction (stage3 ships its own
`/etc/fstab`).
## Configuration and plan
`InstallConfig` is canonical data; the plan and all rendering derive from it.
The same plan drives the review screen, the destructive preview, dry-run and
the actual execution, so the UI cannot diverge from the backend.
## Post-install foundations
- **Snapshots**: read-only Btrfs snapshots under `/.snapshots`, recorded in a
TOML history. `/home` is intentionally not snapshotted by default.
- **Background updates**: `emerge --fetchonly` then `--buildpkgonly` stage
distfiles and reusable local binary packages without installing; activation
stays explicit.
- **Kernel/boot**: `sys-kernel/gentoo-kernel-bin` (safe) or `gentoo-kernel`
(optimized), dracut initramfs, systemd-boot BLS entries, plus a recovery
entry booting `rescue.target`.
## Extension points
- `ProcessRunner` — swap the real runner for a recording/never runner in tests,
or for a different execution backend.
- `InstallStep` — add stages in `plan.rs` and handle them in `orchestrate.rs`.
- `SystemAction` — add closed verbs; the policy engine classifies and previews
them, and the broker executes them after approval.