docs: record the 2026-09-21 appliance baseline (INSTALL-RC=0, detached boot, initial snapshot)
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Phoebus 2026-09-21 04:22:21 -07:00
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@ -12,10 +12,11 @@ commit it. It should be short and current; use `git log` for detail.
default.
- **Last verified:** static Rust binary install + detached boot
(`docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`); in this session additionally: a fresh
Debian-Live appliance install on a disposable qcow2 (recorded in
`docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md` when it completes), plus unit/functional tests
for rollback, effects, transactions, the assistant schema, the sandbox argv,
and the desktop helpers.
Debian-Live appliance install on a disposable qcow2 (`INSTALL-RC=0`,
`NO_SECRET_LEAK`, detached boot with 0 failed units and the coordinated
initial known-good snapshot + recovery entry), plus unit/functional tests for
rollback, effects, transactions, the assistant schema, the sandbox argv, and
the desktop helpers.
- **Public repo:** <https://git.phoebus.club/phoebus/phoebus_os>
(remote `origin`, SSH port 2222).

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@ -32,6 +32,14 @@ The committed VM harness (`installer/tests/vm/serial-driver.py` +
on the install path (Bash migration Phase 2, see
`docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`).
A second harness (`installer/tests/vm/appliance-driver.py` +
`appliance-guest.sh`) drives the Debian-Live appliance ISO. On 2026-09-21 it
produced `INSTALL-RC=0`, `NO_SECRET_LEAK`, and a detached boot
(`systemd`, running, 0 failed units) whose Btrfs history contains the installer's
coordinated `@` + `@var` **initial known-good** snapshot and a snapshot-based
recovery boot entry (see `docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`). `sys undo` itself is
still not VM-verified.
## Matrix
| Area | Implemented | Unit tested | VM verified | Hardware verified |

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@ -347,6 +347,58 @@ never configuration.
been re-run end to end (host disk pressure). Until it is, treat the session
script as **unverified** in the shipped ISO.
## 2026-09-21 appliance baseline (rollback/recovery foundations)
A fresh install of the committed code was run in a disposable qcow2 (24 GiB)
with the rebuilt Debian-Live appliance ISO, then booted with the ISO detached.
This validates the coordinated-snapshot and recovery-entry code on a real Btrfs
system; it does **not** validate a rollback (that gate is still pending).
- Build: static `phoebus-installer` from the tree, appliance ISO
`206551ec21e13753fb97f6d65bfc01e3642b0167908807f64d6ca5a80141adab`.
- Config: `DESKTOP_PROFILE=none`, `KERNEL_PROFILE=safe`, LUKS2 + Btrfs,
`NIX_ENABLED=no`; the host served the stage3
(`sha256 6a3d85ee...f77d44d5`), config and 0600 secret files over HTTP.
- Harness: `installer/tests/vm/appliance-driver.py install` then `boot`
(new in this session).
Install:
- `===NO_SECRET_LEAK===`, `===INSTALL-RC=0===`, clean poweroff
(`reboot: Power down`). Target grew to 6.3 GiB.
Detached boot (no ISO, no `-kernel`):
- UEFI ran systemd-boot; its menu listed `Gentoo Linux`,
**`Phoebus Recovery (known-good snapshot)`** and `Reboot Into Firmware
Interface`; the default booted.
- `systemd-cryptsetup` prompted for the LUKS2 passphrase and unlocked
`phoebus-root (cryptroot)`.
- `cat /proc/1/comm` -> `systemd`; `systemctl is-system-running` -> **running**;
`systemctl --failed` -> **0 loaded units listed**.
- Networking: `enp0s2 UP 10.0.2.15/24`.
- The target's transaction history contains the **initial coordinated snapshot**:
```toml
[[records]]
id = "@-20260921T110110-initial-known-good"
operation = "initial known-good"
source_subvol = "/mnt/phoebus"
snapshot_subvol = "@-20260921T110110-initial-known-good"
var_snapshot = "@var-20260921T110110-initial-known-good"
status = "committed"
```
This confirms `@` and the separately mounted `@var` are captured together and
that the installer writes a snapshot-based recovery entry (not one that
depends on the live root). Reading the recovery entry and
`btrfs subvolume list` as the unprivileged user was refused; the menu entry
above is the evidence that it exists.
Not yet verified for this baseline: `sys undo`, a deliberately broken update, a
detached rollback reboot, and recovery with no network/model (the rollback
acceptance gate).
## Mango + DankMaterialShell acceptance (NOT RUN)
The `mango` profile (ADR 0009) is implemented and source-tested but has not been