diff --git a/docs/HANDOFF.md b/docs/HANDOFF.md index 72bbedd..3cd8d6d 100644 --- a/docs/HANDOFF.md +++ b/docs/HANDOFF.md @@ -12,10 +12,11 @@ commit it. It should be short and current; use `git log` for detail. default. - **Last verified:** static Rust binary install + detached boot (`docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`); in this session additionally: a fresh - Debian-Live appliance install on a disposable qcow2 (recorded in - `docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md` when it completes), plus unit/functional tests - for rollback, effects, transactions, the assistant schema, the sandbox argv, - and the desktop helpers. + Debian-Live appliance install on a disposable qcow2 (`INSTALL-RC=0`, + `NO_SECRET_LEAK`, detached boot with 0 failed units and the coordinated + initial known-good snapshot + recovery entry), plus unit/functional tests for + rollback, effects, transactions, the assistant schema, the sandbox argv, and + the desktop helpers. - **Public repo:** (remote `origin`, SSH port 2222). diff --git a/docs/STATUS.md b/docs/STATUS.md index 2f9cf23..1c4d699 100644 --- a/docs/STATUS.md +++ b/docs/STATUS.md @@ -32,6 +32,14 @@ The committed VM harness (`installer/tests/vm/serial-driver.py` + on the install path (Bash migration Phase 2, see `docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`). +A second harness (`installer/tests/vm/appliance-driver.py` + +`appliance-guest.sh`) drives the Debian-Live appliance ISO. On 2026-09-21 it +produced `INSTALL-RC=0`, `NO_SECRET_LEAK`, and a detached boot +(`systemd`, running, 0 failed units) whose Btrfs history contains the installer's +coordinated `@` + `@var` **initial known-good** snapshot and a snapshot-based +recovery boot entry (see `docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`). `sys undo` itself is +still not VM-verified. + ## Matrix | Area | Implemented | Unit tested | VM verified | Hardware verified | diff --git a/docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md b/docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md index 374687c..9b71ab4 100644 --- a/docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md +++ b/docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md @@ -347,6 +347,58 @@ never configuration. been re-run end to end (host disk pressure). Until it is, treat the session script as **unverified** in the shipped ISO. +## 2026-09-21 appliance baseline (rollback/recovery foundations) + +A fresh install of the committed code was run in a disposable qcow2 (24 GiB) +with the rebuilt Debian-Live appliance ISO, then booted with the ISO detached. +This validates the coordinated-snapshot and recovery-entry code on a real Btrfs +system; it does **not** validate a rollback (that gate is still pending). + +- Build: static `phoebus-installer` from the tree, appliance ISO + `206551ec21e13753fb97f6d65bfc01e3642b0167908807f64d6ca5a80141adab`. +- Config: `DESKTOP_PROFILE=none`, `KERNEL_PROFILE=safe`, LUKS2 + Btrfs, + `NIX_ENABLED=no`; the host served the stage3 + (`sha256 6a3d85ee...f77d44d5`), config and 0600 secret files over HTTP. +- Harness: `installer/tests/vm/appliance-driver.py install` then `boot` + (new in this session). + +Install: + +- `===NO_SECRET_LEAK===`, `===INSTALL-RC=0===`, clean poweroff + (`reboot: Power down`). Target grew to 6.3 GiB. + +Detached boot (no ISO, no `-kernel`): + +- UEFI ran systemd-boot; its menu listed `Gentoo Linux`, + **`Phoebus Recovery (known-good snapshot)`** and `Reboot Into Firmware + Interface`; the default booted. +- `systemd-cryptsetup` prompted for the LUKS2 passphrase and unlocked + `phoebus-root (cryptroot)`. +- `cat /proc/1/comm` -> `systemd`; `systemctl is-system-running` -> **running**; + `systemctl --failed` -> **0 loaded units listed**. +- Networking: `enp0s2 UP 10.0.2.15/24`. +- The target's transaction history contains the **initial coordinated snapshot**: + + ```toml + [[records]] + id = "@-20260921T110110-initial-known-good" + operation = "initial known-good" + source_subvol = "/mnt/phoebus" + snapshot_subvol = "@-20260921T110110-initial-known-good" + var_snapshot = "@var-20260921T110110-initial-known-good" + status = "committed" + ``` + + This confirms `@` and the separately mounted `@var` are captured together and + that the installer writes a snapshot-based recovery entry (not one that + depends on the live root). Reading the recovery entry and + `btrfs subvolume list` as the unprivileged user was refused; the menu entry + above is the evidence that it exists. + +Not yet verified for this baseline: `sys undo`, a deliberately broken update, a +detached rollback reboot, and recovery with no network/model (the rollback +acceptance gate). + ## Mango + DankMaterialShell acceptance (NOT RUN) The `mango` profile (ADR 0009) is implemented and source-tested but has not been