docs: record hardening pass evidence (stage3, boot security, rollback)
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5 changed files with 188 additions and 36 deletions
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@ -3,6 +3,47 @@
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All notable changes are recorded here. The authoritative history is `git log`;
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this file is the curated, human-readable summary.
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## 2026-09-26 — Hardening pass: fail-closed stage3, truthful boot security, rollback acceptance
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- **Stage3 verification is fail-closed (security defect fixed).** The unpinned
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path previously warned and continued when the DIGESTS download failed, when
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no SHA-512 entry matched, when `gpg` or the Gentoo release key was missing,
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when the key import failed, and when `gpg` could not start. Every one of
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these now stops the install before extraction, as do a bad signature and a
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hash mismatch. The pinned path requires a valid 64-hex digest (placeholder
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refused) before any network use, and its trust is documented as coming from
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the independently supplied pin. `stage_install` requires
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`curl/tar/gpg/sha256sum/sha512sum` up front. 16 new regression tests cover
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every failure branch plus both positive paths.
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- **Live image carries the verifier.** `installer/live` ships `gnupg` and the
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trusted Gentoo release key (`/usr/share/openpgp-keys/gentoo-release.asc`),
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provisioned by `build.sh` and checked against Gentoo's published
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release-key fingerprints; the installer never fetches an unauthenticated
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key. Not yet VM-proven: no full install has run with the new binary, and
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the signed-DIGESTS VM proof needs a rebuilt ISO with the key.
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- **Boot security is truthful.** `kernel.uki`/`kernel.secureboot = true` are
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rejected at shared configuration validation (CLI/TUI/GUI bridge), and the
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plan preview always reports the real unsigned-BLS path. Authenticated boot
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remains an open limitation by design (separate opt-in milestone).
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- **Rollback acceptance PASSED with evidence**
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(`serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386`, PASS=11 FAIL=0, exit 0, no
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secret leak): snapshot → `app-misc/hello` install (package DB changed) →
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`sys undo <id>` → detached reboot (DB restored, root marker absent, `/home`
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survives, systemd running, recovery entry present). This corrects the
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2026-09-25 pass claim, which had no transcript and did not reproduce: the
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harness ran unprivileged, used pre-installed `nano`, restored "newest", and
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never asserted the marker. Fixed with sudo authentication, explicit
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`--legacy`, a verified break, targeted undo, and vacuous-pass guards.
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Recovery-entry offline boot stays a manual gate.
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- **Release candidate (local, isolated):** manifest/verify, tampered-artifact
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refusal, and publish refusal against the NotRun gate report all behave;
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`gates --execute` is 0 passed / 6 NotRun (all gates need VM/seat/model).
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Nothing published. Desktop-under-seat, live AI, and Snap
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strict-confinement/changed-revision remain explicitly open (see STATUS).
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- **Tests:** `cargo test --workspace` 712/712 (was 692), `test_vmsafety.py`
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18/18, `cargo fmt --check` and `clippy -D warnings` clean, release and
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static-pie builds pass.
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## 2026-09-26 — Code quality pass: boxed ExecError, warning-free Clippy, service/gui_bridge splits
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Structural work only; no behavior, wire-format, or serialized-plan change.
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@ -3,6 +3,48 @@
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Rolling note between work sessions. **Update this file before you finish**, then
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commit it. It should be short and current; use `git log` for detail.
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- **Hardening pass (2026-09-26):** stage3 fail-closed + truthful boot
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security + rollback acceptance PASS.
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1. **Stage3 (security defect, fixed):** the unpinned path warned and
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continued on DIGESTS-download failure, missing SHA-512 entry, missing
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gpg/key, failed key import, and gpg launch errors. All stop the install
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before extraction now; bad signature/hash also stop it. The pinned path
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requires a valid 64-hex pin (placeholder refused) before any network
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use. `stage_install` checks for `gpg`/`sha256sum`/`sha512sum` first.
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16 new regression tests (every failure branch, nonzero-exit and
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cannot-start doubles, both positive paths). The live image ships `gnupg`
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plus the Gentoo release key, fingerprint-checked at build time against
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Gentoo's published fingerprints (`13EB…2910` weekly, `D99E…2058`
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signing). Commits `2162670`, `744059b`.
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2. **Boot security (fixed):** `uki=true`/`secureboot=true` are rejected at
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`validate_config` (shared by CLI/TUI/GUI bridge); the plan preview
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always reports unsigned BLS. Parsing/validation/rendering regressions +
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golden updated. Commit `95e0d05`. Authenticated boot stays an open
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limitation (STATUS).
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3. **Rollback acceptance PASSED for real**
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(`serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386`, PASS=11 FAIL=0, exit 0, no
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secret leak): fresh overlay `rollback-accept-7.qcow2` on
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`fresh-install-1.qcow2` — snapshot → `app-misc/hello` install (DB
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`ca39…`→`fda3…`) → `sys undo <id>` rc=0 → detached reboot (DB restored,
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root marker absent, `/home` survives, systemd running, recovery entry
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present). The 2026-09-25 pass claim had no transcript and did not
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reproduce; fixed harness defects: sudo auth (stale-prompt match bug
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found and fixed with unique markers), root phases, explicit `--legacy`,
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verified break (`nano` was pre-installed), targeted undo, marker-absent
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assertion, preserved phase-1 log. Commits `744059b`, `5f69996`.
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4. **Release candidate (local, isolated):** manifest (2 artifacts), verify,
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tamper refusal, and publish refusal against the NotRun report all behave;
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`gates --execute` is 0 passed / 6 NotRun (every gate needs VM/seat/model;
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`run_gates` never executes gate commands itself). Nothing published.
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5. Quality gates: `cargo fmt --check`, `cargo clippy --workspace
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--all-targets -- -D warnings`, `cargo test --workspace` 712/712,
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release + static-pie builds, `test_vmsafety.py` 18/18, `make doctor`
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19 ok / 1 disk-space warning.
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- **Interface contract (unchanged):** ordinary requests use AI; only explicit
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`--legacy` selects deterministic handling; source flags constrain the AI and
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never bypass it; a missing model stops the workflow and offers the exact
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`--legacy` command without executing it.
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- **Quality pass (2026-09-26):** boxed `ExecError::Command` details
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(`CommandFailure`, 128 → 96 bytes, measured with a path-dependent probe crate;
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constructor + all match sites updated, error text/redaction/stderr-tail
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@ -126,9 +168,21 @@ commit it. It should be short and current; use `git log` for detail.
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## Not completed / blocked
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- **Stage3 VM proof with the new binary:** unit-tested (19 stage3 tests) and
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the pinned path is unchanged for real pins, but no full install has run
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with the fail-closed binary yet; the next disposable install is the proof.
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The unpinned (signed-DIGESTS) VM proof additionally needs a rebuilt live
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ISO carrying the provisioned key (`installer/live/build.sh` now provisions
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it; no ISO was rebuilt in this session).
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- **Installed Mango + DMS session under a seat:** still needs a
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seat-providing graphical VM (or physical VT): login, kitty, DMS
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spotlight, lock/idle, polkit agent, logout, reboot
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(`docs/DEVELOPMENT.md` physical-VT procedure).
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- **Snap update to a different revision / strict confinement:** refresh with no
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newer revision and partial confinement were VM-verified. A revision-changing
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refresh and AppArmor-backed strict confinement were not.
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refresh and AppArmor-backed strict confinement were not (need an
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AppArmor-ready guest kernel with loaded policy, and a Store snap that
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actually has a newer revision than installed).
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- **Live AI:** a local OpenAI-compatible model (`llama-server` + a GGUF model)
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was served on the host; the AI workflow reached the model, but the sandboxed
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call exceeded the 120 s transport timeout on CPU (`curl` exit 28). Needs a
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@ -153,11 +207,15 @@ commit it. It should be short and current; use `git log` for detail.
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## Next actions (in order)
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1. **Recovery boot** by selecting the recovery BLS entry with the network down.
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2. **Live AI** with a faster local model/GPU or an authorized provider
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1. **Stage3 install proof:** next disposable install with the fail-closed
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binary (pinned path), then a rebuilt live ISO (with the provisioned
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Gentoo key) proving the signed-DIGESTS path in the VM.
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2. **Recovery boot** by selecting the recovery BLS entry with the network down.
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3. **Live AI** with a faster local model/GPU or an authorized provider
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credential (natural-language discovery, source constraints, reviewed install).
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3. **Nix profile GC stability** if the dangling re-run is reproducible.
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4. **Snap strict confinement and changed-revision update** in a disposable VM
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4. **Installed desktop under a seat** (Mango + DMS login through reboot).
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5. **Nix profile GC stability** if the dangling re-run is reproducible.
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6. **Snap strict confinement and changed-revision update** in a disposable VM
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when an AppArmor-ready kernel and a revision-changing Store test are available.
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## Definition of a good stopping point
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@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ more interesting. Status vocabulary: **Done**, **Partial**, **Next**, **Later**.
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| 7 | Finish Flatpak | Partial | `flatpak 1.18.1` installed, flathub configured; bounded typed `flatpak_*` actions added; no app installed yet |
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| 8 | Instrument source/binary policy | Done | measured compile times harvested from `emerge.log` (326 entries); resolved-effect previews added |
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| 9 | Background update preparation | Partial | distfile fetch VM-verified; `--buildpkgonly` skipped while deps need merging (recorded Ready); activation explicit |
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| 10 | Snapshots / rollback | Partial | snapshot sets + history VM-verified on Btrfs; coordinated rollback, `sys undo`, recovery entry, retention and free-space gate implemented + unit-tested; destructive VM acceptance test pending |
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| 10 | Snapshots / rollback | Partial | snapshot sets + history VM-verified on Btrfs; `sys undo` acceptance PASSED on a fresh disposable clone (`serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386` PASS=11 FAIL=0: DB changed then restored, root marker gone, `/home` survives, boot running); retention + free-space gate unit-tested; offline recovery-entry boot remains a manual gate |
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| 11 | AI privilege and privacy architecture | Partial | typed actions + enforced privacy boundary + guided proposal review + OS-level sandbox (systemd-run hardening) + approval-bound resolved effects; live call/sandbox not VM-verified |
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| 12 | `sys` operations | Done | history, enable/disable, inspect, install, prepare-updates VM-verified; target-root consistency, execution-boundary validation, truthful `ask` failure, full transaction outcomes, empty-vs-unestablished plans, start/stop/restart + flatpak/nix/snapshot commands, deterministic `--legacy` administration, audited `--broker`/`--legacy` gates, unified multi-source updates, quiet proactive assistance, shared service layer (`phoebus_installer::service`), and 23-case VM acceptance suite (`sys-acceptance.sh` 23/23 PASS) |
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| 13 | Kernel optimization policy | Later | conservative fragments only; SAFE/OPTIMIZED/AGGRESSIVE selection exists |
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@ -37,8 +37,13 @@ A second harness (`installer/tests/vm/appliance-driver.py` +
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produced `INSTALL-RC=0`, `NO_SECRET_LEAK`, and a detached boot
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(`systemd`, running, 0 failed units) whose Btrfs history contains the installer's
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coordinated `@` + `@var` **initial known-good** snapshot and a snapshot-based
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recovery boot entry (see `docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`). `sys undo` itself is
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still not VM-verified.
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recovery boot entry (see `docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`). `sys undo` is
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VM-verified by the rollback acceptance gate
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(`serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386`, PASS=11 FAIL=0): snapshot →
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`app-misc/hello` install (package DB changed) → `sys undo <id>` → detached
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reboot with the package DB restored, the root break marker gone, `/home`
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preserved, systemd running, and the snapshot-based recovery entry present.
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Booting that recovery entry offline remains a manual gate.
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## Matrix
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@ -52,7 +57,7 @@ still not VM-verified.
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| LUKS2 format/open/close | yes | yes | yes | no |
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| Btrfs subvolumes + swapfile | yes | yes | yes | no |
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| fstab / crypttab generation | yes | yes | yes | no |
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| stage3 fetch + SHA-256 verify + extract | yes | yes | yes | n/a |
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| stage3 fetch + verify (pinned SHA-256 or signed DIGESTS) + extract | yes | yes (both paths; every failure branch incl. missing verifier/key/DIGESTS/entry, nonzero exit, cannot-start) | yes (pinned path; unpinned path needs the live-image key) | n/a |
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| Portage config + sync + getuto | yes | yes | yes | n/a |
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| Signed Gentoo binary install | yes | yes | yes | n/a |
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| Source package compilation | yes | yes | yes | n/a |
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@ -76,8 +81,8 @@ still not VM-verified.
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| Background update preparation | yes | yes | yes (fetch; buildpkgonly skipped) | no |
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| Btrfs snapshots + history | yes | yes | yes | no |
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| Coordinated snapshot sets (`@` + `@var`) | yes | yes | no | no |
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| Btrfs rollback (`sys undo`) | yes | yes | no | no |
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| Recovery/known-good BLS entry | yes | yes | no | no |
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| Btrfs rollback (`sys undo`) | yes | yes | yes (rollback acceptance `serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386` PASS=11 FAIL=0) | no |
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| Recovery/known-good BLS entry | yes | yes | present + snapshot-based (asserted in the rollback run; offline boot is a manual gate) | no |
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| Snapshot retention + free-space gate | yes | yes | no | no |
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| AI typed proposals + evidence review | yes | yes | fixture end-to-end | n/a |
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| AI guided install (DeepSeek/OpenAI) | yes | yes | fixture path only (no live call) | n/a |
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@ -96,7 +101,7 @@ still not VM-verified.
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| Installed `sys` acceptance matrix (read-only/failure) | yes | yes | yes (installed VM: `PASS=38 FAIL=0`, catalogue + regression group) | no |
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| Portage config readable for non-root queries (`normalize_config_permissions`) | yes | yes (modes + keyring exclusion) | yes (fresh VM install: 0755/0644 out of the box; non-root `search` returns 3 results, `updates` reports 10) | no |
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| Privileged catalogue mutations (install/remove/depclean/cache/apply updates, alternate-root) | yes | yes (unit) | yes (fresh installed VM via root: 7/7 PASS) | no |
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| Rollback acceptance (snapshot -> change -> `sys undo` -> detached verify) | yes | yes | yes (clone: package DB restored, root marker gone, `/home` survives, boot running) | no |
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| Rollback acceptance (snapshot -> change -> `sys undo` -> detached verify) | yes | yes | yes (`serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386` PASS=11 FAIL=0 on a fresh disposable clone: package DB changed then restored, root marker gone, `/home` survives, boot running, no secret leak) | no |
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| Privileged `--broker` plan execution + replay rejection in a VM (pkexec path) | yes | yes (privileged entry point) | yes (non-root `pkexec` with a terminal polkit agent: cancelled auth, broker JSON success, replay rejected; required the shipped policy + wheel-admin rule) | n/a |
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| Cache-cleanup preview is non-destructive (real `eclean`/`nix-store`) | yes | yes (preview uses `--pretend --deep` / `--print-dead`; sorted bound items) | yes (real `eclean`: upstream preview, cancelled approval, approved run, drift refusal, failed cleaner; user data preserved) | n/a |
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| Reverse-dependency inspection includes installed targets | yes | yes (self-reference compares the dependent, not the target) | yes (real `sys-libs/glibc`, `sys-libs/zlib` dependents) | n/a |
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@ -145,17 +150,17 @@ still not VM-verified.
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| GUI readiness refresh / AI revalidation / keyboard nav | yes | yes (Rust) | VM harness regressions | n/a |
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| Mandatory AI requires a validated interaction | yes | yes | bridge + CLI | n/a |
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| GURU packaging (scoped keywords) | yes | yes | no (build/install unverified) | no |
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| Release gates + atomic publish | yes | yes | no | n/a |
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| Release gates + atomic publish | yes | yes (NotRun-is-not-pass; tamper/publish-refusal exercised via host CLI) | no (no end-to-end candidate: VM/graphical/model gates need a runner) | n/a |
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| `sys` verbs | yes | yes | yes | no |
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| OpenCode pinned bootstrap | yes | yes | no | n/a |
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| Release manifest/verify | yes | yes | no | n/a |
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| Release manifest/verify | yes | yes (host CLI: manifest, verify, tampered-artifact refusal) | no | n/a |
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| NVIDIA PCI device classification + branch/flavor policy | yes | yes | no | no |
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| NVIDIA installed Gentoo integration (Portage/modprobe/dracut/initramfs) | yes | yes | no | no |
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| NVIDIA live ISO payload (bundled modules/firmware/userspace) | yes | yes (verifier + guards) | no | no |
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| NVIDIA kernel/module/initramfs update coordination (`@module-rebuild`) | yes | yes | no | no |
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| NVIDIA live GPU decision + real nouveau fallback | yes | yes (fixtures + CLI) | no | no |
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| Live GUI broker scoped sudoers (no `NOPASSWD: ALL`) | yes | yes (`visudo`) | no | n/a |
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| Rollback acceptance harness mode | yes | yes (bash -n/unit) | destructive gate unrun | no |
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| Rollback acceptance harness mode | yes | yes (bash -n/unit + vacuous-pass guards) | yes (destructive gate `serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386` PASS=11 FAIL=0) | no |
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| Desktop assistant GUI (`phoebus-assistant`) | yes | yes | yes (live VM layout) | no |
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| Desktop assistant JSON-RPC bridge (`sys --assistant-bridge`) | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | n/a |
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| AI-first administration contract (`sys install`, `please`, `ask`) | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | no |
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@ -179,7 +184,7 @@ still not VM-verified.
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| Conversation-history privacy (minimized, redacted, 0600, bounded, clearable) | yes | yes | no | n/a |
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| Target desktop QML assets & Polkit policy provisioning | yes | yes | yes (live VM layout) | no |
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| Desktop assistant unprivileged execution & Polkit elevation | yes | yes | yes (live VM layout) | no |
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| UKI | no (deferred) | no | no | no |
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| UKI / Secure Boot | no (deferred; `uki`/`secureboot = true` rejected at validation) | no (rejection + truthful plan rendering covered) | no | no |
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## Known limitations
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@ -226,23 +231,37 @@ still not VM-verified.
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fetched to `/tmp/sys` on a disposable overlay of the pristine installed
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image, non-root user, no mutations): guest `PASS=38 FAIL=0`, driver
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`PASS=41 FAIL=0` (`serial-boot-20260926T014746Z-3089a820`).
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- **UKI** is deferred; the dracut UKI generator did not embed the kernel
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command line, so BLS is used (and verified).
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- **Rollback (`sys undo`) is NOT VM-verified.** It is implemented and
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unit-tested end to end at the command/text layer (snapshot sets, root/var
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generation, fstab and BLS rewriting, kernel selection, interruption resume,
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retention, free-space gate). The harness now **automates the acceptance
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sequence** (`serial-driver.py rollback` + `rollback-guest.sh` /
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`rollback-verify.sh`): a known-good package-database fingerprint and `/home`
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marker, `sys snapshot`, a controlled reversible package install, `sys undo`,
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detached reboot, then package-state/home comparison, kernel-module check and
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recovery-entry/status evidence. The destructive gate itself is **unrun in
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this session**: a full GUI install was occupying the only disposable disk.
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`make doctor` now reports ~29 GiB free (the disk blocker recorded in the last
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handoff has eased), but the acceptance run needs a dedicated already-installed
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disposable clone; the exact commands are in `docs/HANDOFF.md`. Booting the
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recovery entry offline is still a manual step. `sys undo` is present; treat the
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VM gate as unpassed before relying on it.
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- **Authenticated boot (UKI / UEFI Secure Boot) is not implemented and is an
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open security limitation.** The installed boot path is plain unsigned BLS
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(systemd-boot + dracut; the dracut UKI generator did not embed the kernel
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command line, so BLS is used and verified). `kernel.uki = true` and
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`kernel.secureboot = true` are rejected at configuration validation, and the
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install-plan preview always reports the real BLS path, so no interface can
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imply these modes are active. A future Secure Boot/UKI implementation is a
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separate opt-in milestone (signed artifacts, key lifecycle, update/rollback
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handling, disposable-VM boot tests with Secure Boot enabled); it must not be
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enabled or advertised until that complete path passes.
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- **Rollback (`sys undo`) is VM-verified** (`serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386`,
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PASS=11 FAIL=0, exit 0, no secret leak in either transcript). The gate runs on
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a fresh disposable overlay of the installed image: a known-good
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package-database fingerprint and `/home` marker, `sys snapshot --legacy`, a
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controlled reversible `app-misc/hello` install `--legacy --portage` (the
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fingerprint is asserted changed, so the run cannot pass vacuously),
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`sys undo <snapshot-id> --legacy`, power off, then a detached reboot that
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asserts the package database restored, the root break marker absent, `/home`
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surviving, systemd running, kernel modules present, the snapshot-based
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recovery entry present, and rollback status recorded. Both transcripts are
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kept (`serial-phase1.log`, `serial.log`).
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Correction: the 2026-09-25 claim of a passing rollback had no run transcript
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and did not reproduce — the committed harness then ran the guest
|
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unprivileged, used the pre-installed `nano` as the break, restored "newest"
|
||||
instead of its own snapshot, and never asserted the root marker was gone.
|
||||
Those harness defects are fixed in this session (sudo authentication with
|
||||
unique end markers, explicit `--legacy`, verified break, targeted undo,
|
||||
marker-absent assertion) and the gate above is the evidence. Booting the
|
||||
recovery entry itself offline (no network, no model) remains a manual,
|
||||
un-automated gate: select "Phoebus Recovery (known-good snapshot)" in the
|
||||
systemd-boot menu.
|
||||
- **Mango + DankMaterialShell** is the canonical Phoebus desktop
|
||||
(`desktop.profile = "mango"`, Flatpak on). It is implemented with Mango
|
||||
0.17.2, DMS (pinned release), Quickshell 0.3.1 and scenefx 0.5 from the GURU
|
||||
|
|
@ -276,7 +295,13 @@ still not VM-verified.
|
|||
enforced.
|
||||
- **Release automation** now has gates, a report, atomic publish and signing
|
||||
command helpers, but no gate has been executed by a configured CI runner; the
|
||||
report records unexecuted gates as `NotRun`.
|
||||
report records unexecuted gates as `NotRun`. A local isolated candidate run
|
||||
(2026-09-26) exercised manifest generation (2 artifacts), verification,
|
||||
tampered-artifact refusal, and publish refusal against a NotRun gate report;
|
||||
`gates --execute` reports 0 passed / 6 NotRun because every candidate gate
|
||||
requires a VM, a graphical seat, or a model. No release was published and
|
||||
`latest.iso` untouched. Minimal repeatable setup: register a Forgejo Actions
|
||||
runner (`act_runner`) so `.forgejo/workflows/ci.yml` executes the gates.
|
||||
- The desktop transaction compiles heavily because desktop USE does not match
|
||||
the signed binhost (~26 min for the desktop set on 8 vCPUs in the test VM).
|
||||
The official Gentoo binhost is OpenRC/hardened, so a systemd system can only
|
||||
|
|
@ -289,5 +314,5 @@ still not VM-verified.
|
|||
- The installer rebuilds `sys-apps/systemd` from source because
|
||||
boot/policykit/cryptsetup USE differ from the binhost.
|
||||
- `sys undo` is implemented with the default-subvolume, fstab, kernel-cmdline
|
||||
and BLS handling described in ADR 0007; its destructive VM acceptance test is
|
||||
the remaining safety gate.
|
||||
and BLS handling described in ADR 0007; its destructive VM acceptance gate
|
||||
passed in this session (`serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386`).
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -409,6 +409,34 @@ harness requires, and no already-installed disposable clone is available.
|
|||
Booting the recovery entry offline is still a manual step. `sys undo` therefore
|
||||
remains **unverified**, not passing.
|
||||
|
||||
**2026-09-26 update — rollback acceptance PASSED.**
|
||||
`serial-driver.py rollback` on a fresh disposable overlay
|
||||
(`rollback-accept-7.qcow2`, backing `fresh-install-1.qcow2`, original
|
||||
preserved; backing chain validated with `qemu-img info --backing-chain`):
|
||||
driver `serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386` **PASS=11 FAIL=0**,
|
||||
exit 0, no secret leak in either transcript (both kept:
|
||||
`serial-phase1.log`, `serial.log` under
|
||||
`/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-23d1bc0c/`).
|
||||
|
||||
- Phase 1: known-good DB fingerprint `ca398d71…`, `sys snapshot --legacy`
|
||||
→ `@-20260926T030259-rollback-acceptance`, controlled
|
||||
`app-misc/hello` install `--legacy --portage` → fingerprint changed to
|
||||
`fda3780a…` (a no-op break would fail the gate here), root marker written,
|
||||
`sys undo @-20260926T030259-rollback-acceptance --legacy` → rc=0.
|
||||
- Phase 2 (detached): DB fingerprint back to `ca398d71…`, `/home` marker
|
||||
identical, root marker **absent**, `systemctl is-system-running` →
|
||||
`running`, kernel modules present, `phoebus-recovery.conf` present with
|
||||
`systemd.unit=rescue.target` and a `@snapshots/` root, rollback status
|
||||
recorded.
|
||||
- Harness defects fixed to earn this (all previously allowed vacuous
|
||||
passes): sudo authentication with unique end markers and a verified
|
||||
timestamp, both phases as root, explicit `--legacy`, break package
|
||||
verified absent then verified changed (`nano` was already in the base
|
||||
image), undo targeting the recorded snapshot id, driver assertions for a
|
||||
changed break and an absent root marker.
|
||||
- Still manual: booting the recovery entry itself offline (select it in the
|
||||
systemd-boot menu with no network).
|
||||
|
||||
**2026-09-23 update — NVIDIA gates still NOT run.** The live driver decision,
|
||||
the hardened payload verifier and the installed lifecycle are implemented and
|
||||
covered by Rust/fixture tests, but no NVIDIA-accelerated boot has been observed:
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Add table
Reference in a new issue