diff --git a/docs/CHANGELOG.md b/docs/CHANGELOG.md index 760dfd6..5be2dc2 100644 --- a/docs/CHANGELOG.md +++ b/docs/CHANGELOG.md @@ -3,6 +3,47 @@ All notable changes are recorded here. The authoritative history is `git log`; this file is the curated, human-readable summary. +## 2026-09-26 — Hardening pass: fail-closed stage3, truthful boot security, rollback acceptance + +- **Stage3 verification is fail-closed (security defect fixed).** The unpinned + path previously warned and continued when the DIGESTS download failed, when + no SHA-512 entry matched, when `gpg` or the Gentoo release key was missing, + when the key import failed, and when `gpg` could not start. Every one of + these now stops the install before extraction, as do a bad signature and a + hash mismatch. The pinned path requires a valid 64-hex digest (placeholder + refused) before any network use, and its trust is documented as coming from + the independently supplied pin. `stage_install` requires + `curl/tar/gpg/sha256sum/sha512sum` up front. 16 new regression tests cover + every failure branch plus both positive paths. +- **Live image carries the verifier.** `installer/live` ships `gnupg` and the + trusted Gentoo release key (`/usr/share/openpgp-keys/gentoo-release.asc`), + provisioned by `build.sh` and checked against Gentoo's published + release-key fingerprints; the installer never fetches an unauthenticated + key. Not yet VM-proven: no full install has run with the new binary, and + the signed-DIGESTS VM proof needs a rebuilt ISO with the key. +- **Boot security is truthful.** `kernel.uki`/`kernel.secureboot = true` are + rejected at shared configuration validation (CLI/TUI/GUI bridge), and the + plan preview always reports the real unsigned-BLS path. Authenticated boot + remains an open limitation by design (separate opt-in milestone). +- **Rollback acceptance PASSED with evidence** + (`serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386`, PASS=11 FAIL=0, exit 0, no + secret leak): snapshot → `app-misc/hello` install (package DB changed) → + `sys undo ` → detached reboot (DB restored, root marker absent, `/home` + survives, systemd running, recovery entry present). This corrects the + 2026-09-25 pass claim, which had no transcript and did not reproduce: the + harness ran unprivileged, used pre-installed `nano`, restored "newest", and + never asserted the marker. Fixed with sudo authentication, explicit + `--legacy`, a verified break, targeted undo, and vacuous-pass guards. + Recovery-entry offline boot stays a manual gate. +- **Release candidate (local, isolated):** manifest/verify, tampered-artifact + refusal, and publish refusal against the NotRun gate report all behave; + `gates --execute` is 0 passed / 6 NotRun (all gates need VM/seat/model). + Nothing published. Desktop-under-seat, live AI, and Snap + strict-confinement/changed-revision remain explicitly open (see STATUS). +- **Tests:** `cargo test --workspace` 712/712 (was 692), `test_vmsafety.py` + 18/18, `cargo fmt --check` and `clippy -D warnings` clean, release and + static-pie builds pass. + ## 2026-09-26 — Code quality pass: boxed ExecError, warning-free Clippy, service/gui_bridge splits Structural work only; no behavior, wire-format, or serialized-plan change. diff --git a/docs/HANDOFF.md b/docs/HANDOFF.md index f7b7fc0..bd23357 100644 --- a/docs/HANDOFF.md +++ b/docs/HANDOFF.md @@ -3,6 +3,48 @@ Rolling note between work sessions. **Update this file before you finish**, then commit it. It should be short and current; use `git log` for detail. +- **Hardening pass (2026-09-26):** stage3 fail-closed + truthful boot + security + rollback acceptance PASS. + 1. **Stage3 (security defect, fixed):** the unpinned path warned and + continued on DIGESTS-download failure, missing SHA-512 entry, missing + gpg/key, failed key import, and gpg launch errors. All stop the install + before extraction now; bad signature/hash also stop it. The pinned path + requires a valid 64-hex pin (placeholder refused) before any network + use. `stage_install` checks for `gpg`/`sha256sum`/`sha512sum` first. + 16 new regression tests (every failure branch, nonzero-exit and + cannot-start doubles, both positive paths). The live image ships `gnupg` + plus the Gentoo release key, fingerprint-checked at build time against + Gentoo's published fingerprints (`13EB…2910` weekly, `D99E…2058` + signing). Commits `2162670`, `744059b`. + 2. **Boot security (fixed):** `uki=true`/`secureboot=true` are rejected at + `validate_config` (shared by CLI/TUI/GUI bridge); the plan preview + always reports unsigned BLS. Parsing/validation/rendering regressions + + golden updated. Commit `95e0d05`. Authenticated boot stays an open + limitation (STATUS). + 3. **Rollback acceptance PASSED for real** + (`serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386`, PASS=11 FAIL=0, exit 0, no + secret leak): fresh overlay `rollback-accept-7.qcow2` on + `fresh-install-1.qcow2` — snapshot → `app-misc/hello` install (DB + `ca39…`→`fda3…`) → `sys undo ` rc=0 → detached reboot (DB restored, + root marker absent, `/home` survives, systemd running, recovery entry + present). The 2026-09-25 pass claim had no transcript and did not + reproduce; fixed harness defects: sudo auth (stale-prompt match bug + found and fixed with unique markers), root phases, explicit `--legacy`, + verified break (`nano` was pre-installed), targeted undo, marker-absent + assertion, preserved phase-1 log. Commits `744059b`, `5f69996`. + 4. **Release candidate (local, isolated):** manifest (2 artifacts), verify, + tamper refusal, and publish refusal against the NotRun report all behave; + `gates --execute` is 0 passed / 6 NotRun (every gate needs VM/seat/model; + `run_gates` never executes gate commands itself). Nothing published. + 5. Quality gates: `cargo fmt --check`, `cargo clippy --workspace + --all-targets -- -D warnings`, `cargo test --workspace` 712/712, + release + static-pie builds, `test_vmsafety.py` 18/18, `make doctor` + 19 ok / 1 disk-space warning. +- **Interface contract (unchanged):** ordinary requests use AI; only explicit + `--legacy` selects deterministic handling; source flags constrain the AI and + never bypass it; a missing model stops the workflow and offers the exact + `--legacy` command without executing it. + - **Quality pass (2026-09-26):** boxed `ExecError::Command` details (`CommandFailure`, 128 → 96 bytes, measured with a path-dependent probe crate; constructor + all match sites updated, error text/redaction/stderr-tail @@ -126,9 +168,21 @@ commit it. It should be short and current; use `git log` for detail. ## Not completed / blocked +- **Stage3 VM proof with the new binary:** unit-tested (19 stage3 tests) and + the pinned path is unchanged for real pins, but no full install has run + with the fail-closed binary yet; the next disposable install is the proof. + The unpinned (signed-DIGESTS) VM proof additionally needs a rebuilt live + ISO carrying the provisioned key (`installer/live/build.sh` now provisions + it; no ISO was rebuilt in this session). +- **Installed Mango + DMS session under a seat:** still needs a + seat-providing graphical VM (or physical VT): login, kitty, DMS + spotlight, lock/idle, polkit agent, logout, reboot + (`docs/DEVELOPMENT.md` physical-VT procedure). - **Snap update to a different revision / strict confinement:** refresh with no newer revision and partial confinement were VM-verified. A revision-changing - refresh and AppArmor-backed strict confinement were not. + refresh and AppArmor-backed strict confinement were not (need an + AppArmor-ready guest kernel with loaded policy, and a Store snap that + actually has a newer revision than installed). - **Live AI:** a local OpenAI-compatible model (`llama-server` + a GGUF model) was served on the host; the AI workflow reached the model, but the sandboxed call exceeded the 120 s transport timeout on CPU (`curl` exit 28). Needs a @@ -153,11 +207,15 @@ commit it. It should be short and current; use `git log` for detail. ## Next actions (in order) -1. **Recovery boot** by selecting the recovery BLS entry with the network down. -2. **Live AI** with a faster local model/GPU or an authorized provider +1. **Stage3 install proof:** next disposable install with the fail-closed + binary (pinned path), then a rebuilt live ISO (with the provisioned + Gentoo key) proving the signed-DIGESTS path in the VM. +2. **Recovery boot** by selecting the recovery BLS entry with the network down. +3. **Live AI** with a faster local model/GPU or an authorized provider credential (natural-language discovery, source constraints, reviewed install). -3. **Nix profile GC stability** if the dangling re-run is reproducible. -4. **Snap strict confinement and changed-revision update** in a disposable VM +4. **Installed desktop under a seat** (Mango + DMS login through reboot). +5. **Nix profile GC stability** if the dangling re-run is reproducible. +6. **Snap strict confinement and changed-revision update** in a disposable VM when an AppArmor-ready kernel and a revision-changing Store test are available. ## Definition of a good stopping point diff --git a/docs/ROADMAP.md b/docs/ROADMAP.md index a8bd71f..7bf43b6 100644 --- a/docs/ROADMAP.md +++ b/docs/ROADMAP.md @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ more interesting. Status vocabulary: **Done**, **Partial**, **Next**, **Later**. | 7 | Finish Flatpak | Partial | `flatpak 1.18.1` installed, flathub configured; bounded typed `flatpak_*` actions added; no app installed yet | | 8 | Instrument source/binary policy | Done | measured compile times harvested from `emerge.log` (326 entries); resolved-effect previews added | | 9 | Background update preparation | Partial | distfile fetch VM-verified; `--buildpkgonly` skipped while deps need merging (recorded Ready); activation explicit | -| 10 | Snapshots / rollback | Partial | snapshot sets + history VM-verified on Btrfs; coordinated rollback, `sys undo`, recovery entry, retention and free-space gate implemented + unit-tested; destructive VM acceptance test pending | +| 10 | Snapshots / rollback | Partial | snapshot sets + history VM-verified on Btrfs; `sys undo` acceptance PASSED on a fresh disposable clone (`serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386` PASS=11 FAIL=0: DB changed then restored, root marker gone, `/home` survives, boot running); retention + free-space gate unit-tested; offline recovery-entry boot remains a manual gate | | 11 | AI privilege and privacy architecture | Partial | typed actions + enforced privacy boundary + guided proposal review + OS-level sandbox (systemd-run hardening) + approval-bound resolved effects; live call/sandbox not VM-verified | | 12 | `sys` operations | Done | history, enable/disable, inspect, install, prepare-updates VM-verified; target-root consistency, execution-boundary validation, truthful `ask` failure, full transaction outcomes, empty-vs-unestablished plans, start/stop/restart + flatpak/nix/snapshot commands, deterministic `--legacy` administration, audited `--broker`/`--legacy` gates, unified multi-source updates, quiet proactive assistance, shared service layer (`phoebus_installer::service`), and 23-case VM acceptance suite (`sys-acceptance.sh` 23/23 PASS) | | 13 | Kernel optimization policy | Later | conservative fragments only; SAFE/OPTIMIZED/AGGRESSIVE selection exists | diff --git a/docs/STATUS.md b/docs/STATUS.md index 037d286..faa9615 100644 --- a/docs/STATUS.md +++ b/docs/STATUS.md @@ -37,8 +37,13 @@ A second harness (`installer/tests/vm/appliance-driver.py` + produced `INSTALL-RC=0`, `NO_SECRET_LEAK`, and a detached boot (`systemd`, running, 0 failed units) whose Btrfs history contains the installer's coordinated `@` + `@var` **initial known-good** snapshot and a snapshot-based -recovery boot entry (see `docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`). `sys undo` itself is -still not VM-verified. +recovery boot entry (see `docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`). `sys undo` is +VM-verified by the rollback acceptance gate +(`serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386`, PASS=11 FAIL=0): snapshot → +`app-misc/hello` install (package DB changed) → `sys undo ` → detached +reboot with the package DB restored, the root break marker gone, `/home` +preserved, systemd running, and the snapshot-based recovery entry present. +Booting that recovery entry offline remains a manual gate. ## Matrix @@ -52,7 +57,7 @@ still not VM-verified. | LUKS2 format/open/close | yes | yes | yes | no | | Btrfs subvolumes + swapfile | yes | yes | yes | no | | fstab / crypttab generation | yes | yes | yes | no | -| stage3 fetch + SHA-256 verify + extract | yes | yes | yes | n/a | +| stage3 fetch + verify (pinned SHA-256 or signed DIGESTS) + extract | yes | yes (both paths; every failure branch incl. missing verifier/key/DIGESTS/entry, nonzero exit, cannot-start) | yes (pinned path; unpinned path needs the live-image key) | n/a | | Portage config + sync + getuto | yes | yes | yes | n/a | | Signed Gentoo binary install | yes | yes | yes | n/a | | Source package compilation | yes | yes | yes | n/a | @@ -76,8 +81,8 @@ still not VM-verified. | Background update preparation | yes | yes | yes (fetch; buildpkgonly skipped) | no | | Btrfs snapshots + history | yes | yes | yes | no | | Coordinated snapshot sets (`@` + `@var`) | yes | yes | no | no | -| Btrfs rollback (`sys undo`) | yes | yes | no | no | -| Recovery/known-good BLS entry | yes | yes | no | no | +| Btrfs rollback (`sys undo`) | yes | yes | yes (rollback acceptance `serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386` PASS=11 FAIL=0) | no | +| Recovery/known-good BLS entry | yes | yes | present + snapshot-based (asserted in the rollback run; offline boot is a manual gate) | no | | Snapshot retention + free-space gate | yes | yes | no | no | | AI typed proposals + evidence review | yes | yes | fixture end-to-end | n/a | | AI guided install (DeepSeek/OpenAI) | yes | yes | fixture path only (no live call) | n/a | @@ -96,7 +101,7 @@ still not VM-verified. | Installed `sys` acceptance matrix (read-only/failure) | yes | yes | yes (installed VM: `PASS=38 FAIL=0`, catalogue + regression group) | no | | Portage config readable for non-root queries (`normalize_config_permissions`) | yes | yes (modes + keyring exclusion) | yes (fresh VM install: 0755/0644 out of the box; non-root `search` returns 3 results, `updates` reports 10) | no | | Privileged catalogue mutations (install/remove/depclean/cache/apply updates, alternate-root) | yes | yes (unit) | yes (fresh installed VM via root: 7/7 PASS) | no | -| Rollback acceptance (snapshot -> change -> `sys undo` -> detached verify) | yes | yes | yes (clone: package DB restored, root marker gone, `/home` survives, boot running) | no | +| Rollback acceptance (snapshot -> change -> `sys undo` -> detached verify) | yes | yes | yes (`serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386` PASS=11 FAIL=0 on a fresh disposable clone: package DB changed then restored, root marker gone, `/home` survives, boot running, no secret leak) | no | | Privileged `--broker` plan execution + replay rejection in a VM (pkexec path) | yes | yes (privileged entry point) | yes (non-root `pkexec` with a terminal polkit agent: cancelled auth, broker JSON success, replay rejected; required the shipped policy + wheel-admin rule) | n/a | | Cache-cleanup preview is non-destructive (real `eclean`/`nix-store`) | yes | yes (preview uses `--pretend --deep` / `--print-dead`; sorted bound items) | yes (real `eclean`: upstream preview, cancelled approval, approved run, drift refusal, failed cleaner; user data preserved) | n/a | | Reverse-dependency inspection includes installed targets | yes | yes (self-reference compares the dependent, not the target) | yes (real `sys-libs/glibc`, `sys-libs/zlib` dependents) | n/a | @@ -145,17 +150,17 @@ still not VM-verified. | GUI readiness refresh / AI revalidation / keyboard nav | yes | yes (Rust) | VM harness regressions | n/a | | Mandatory AI requires a validated interaction | yes | yes | bridge + CLI | n/a | | GURU packaging (scoped keywords) | yes | yes | no (build/install unverified) | no | -| Release gates + atomic publish | yes | yes | no | n/a | +| Release gates + atomic publish | yes | yes (NotRun-is-not-pass; tamper/publish-refusal exercised via host CLI) | no (no end-to-end candidate: VM/graphical/model gates need a runner) | n/a | | `sys` verbs | yes | yes | yes | no | | OpenCode pinned bootstrap | yes | yes | no | n/a | -| Release manifest/verify | yes | yes | no | n/a | +| Release manifest/verify | yes | yes (host CLI: manifest, verify, tampered-artifact refusal) | no | n/a | | NVIDIA PCI device classification + branch/flavor policy | yes | yes | no | no | | NVIDIA installed Gentoo integration (Portage/modprobe/dracut/initramfs) | yes | yes | no | no | | NVIDIA live ISO payload (bundled modules/firmware/userspace) | yes | yes (verifier + guards) | no | no | | NVIDIA kernel/module/initramfs update coordination (`@module-rebuild`) | yes | yes | no | no | | NVIDIA live GPU decision + real nouveau fallback | yes | yes (fixtures + CLI) | no | no | | Live GUI broker scoped sudoers (no `NOPASSWD: ALL`) | yes | yes (`visudo`) | no | n/a | -| Rollback acceptance harness mode | yes | yes (bash -n/unit) | destructive gate unrun | no | +| Rollback acceptance harness mode | yes | yes (bash -n/unit + vacuous-pass guards) | yes (destructive gate `serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386` PASS=11 FAIL=0) | no | | Desktop assistant GUI (`phoebus-assistant`) | yes | yes | yes (live VM layout) | no | | Desktop assistant JSON-RPC bridge (`sys --assistant-bridge`) | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | n/a | | AI-first administration contract (`sys install`, `please`, `ask`) | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | no | @@ -179,7 +184,7 @@ still not VM-verified. | Conversation-history privacy (minimized, redacted, 0600, bounded, clearable) | yes | yes | no | n/a | | Target desktop QML assets & Polkit policy provisioning | yes | yes | yes (live VM layout) | no | | Desktop assistant unprivileged execution & Polkit elevation | yes | yes | yes (live VM layout) | no | -| UKI | no (deferred) | no | no | no | +| UKI / Secure Boot | no (deferred; `uki`/`secureboot = true` rejected at validation) | no (rejection + truthful plan rendering covered) | no | no | ## Known limitations @@ -226,23 +231,37 @@ still not VM-verified. fetched to `/tmp/sys` on a disposable overlay of the pristine installed image, non-root user, no mutations): guest `PASS=38 FAIL=0`, driver `PASS=41 FAIL=0` (`serial-boot-20260926T014746Z-3089a820`). -- **UKI** is deferred; the dracut UKI generator did not embed the kernel - command line, so BLS is used (and verified). -- **Rollback (`sys undo`) is NOT VM-verified.** It is implemented and - unit-tested end to end at the command/text layer (snapshot sets, root/var - generation, fstab and BLS rewriting, kernel selection, interruption resume, - retention, free-space gate). The harness now **automates the acceptance - sequence** (`serial-driver.py rollback` + `rollback-guest.sh` / - `rollback-verify.sh`): a known-good package-database fingerprint and `/home` - marker, `sys snapshot`, a controlled reversible package install, `sys undo`, - detached reboot, then package-state/home comparison, kernel-module check and - recovery-entry/status evidence. The destructive gate itself is **unrun in - this session**: a full GUI install was occupying the only disposable disk. - `make doctor` now reports ~29 GiB free (the disk blocker recorded in the last - handoff has eased), but the acceptance run needs a dedicated already-installed - disposable clone; the exact commands are in `docs/HANDOFF.md`. Booting the - recovery entry offline is still a manual step. `sys undo` is present; treat the - VM gate as unpassed before relying on it. +- **Authenticated boot (UKI / UEFI Secure Boot) is not implemented and is an + open security limitation.** The installed boot path is plain unsigned BLS + (systemd-boot + dracut; the dracut UKI generator did not embed the kernel + command line, so BLS is used and verified). `kernel.uki = true` and + `kernel.secureboot = true` are rejected at configuration validation, and the + install-plan preview always reports the real BLS path, so no interface can + imply these modes are active. A future Secure Boot/UKI implementation is a + separate opt-in milestone (signed artifacts, key lifecycle, update/rollback + handling, disposable-VM boot tests with Secure Boot enabled); it must not be + enabled or advertised until that complete path passes. +- **Rollback (`sys undo`) is VM-verified** (`serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386`, + PASS=11 FAIL=0, exit 0, no secret leak in either transcript). The gate runs on + a fresh disposable overlay of the installed image: a known-good + package-database fingerprint and `/home` marker, `sys snapshot --legacy`, a + controlled reversible `app-misc/hello` install `--legacy --portage` (the + fingerprint is asserted changed, so the run cannot pass vacuously), + `sys undo --legacy`, power off, then a detached reboot that + asserts the package database restored, the root break marker absent, `/home` + surviving, systemd running, kernel modules present, the snapshot-based + recovery entry present, and rollback status recorded. Both transcripts are + kept (`serial-phase1.log`, `serial.log`). + Correction: the 2026-09-25 claim of a passing rollback had no run transcript + and did not reproduce — the committed harness then ran the guest + unprivileged, used the pre-installed `nano` as the break, restored "newest" + instead of its own snapshot, and never asserted the root marker was gone. + Those harness defects are fixed in this session (sudo authentication with + unique end markers, explicit `--legacy`, verified break, targeted undo, + marker-absent assertion) and the gate above is the evidence. Booting the + recovery entry itself offline (no network, no model) remains a manual, + un-automated gate: select "Phoebus Recovery (known-good snapshot)" in the + systemd-boot menu. - **Mango + DankMaterialShell** is the canonical Phoebus desktop (`desktop.profile = "mango"`, Flatpak on). It is implemented with Mango 0.17.2, DMS (pinned release), Quickshell 0.3.1 and scenefx 0.5 from the GURU @@ -276,7 +295,13 @@ still not VM-verified. enforced. - **Release automation** now has gates, a report, atomic publish and signing command helpers, but no gate has been executed by a configured CI runner; the - report records unexecuted gates as `NotRun`. + report records unexecuted gates as `NotRun`. A local isolated candidate run + (2026-09-26) exercised manifest generation (2 artifacts), verification, + tampered-artifact refusal, and publish refusal against a NotRun gate report; + `gates --execute` reports 0 passed / 6 NotRun because every candidate gate + requires a VM, a graphical seat, or a model. No release was published and + `latest.iso` untouched. Minimal repeatable setup: register a Forgejo Actions + runner (`act_runner`) so `.forgejo/workflows/ci.yml` executes the gates. - The desktop transaction compiles heavily because desktop USE does not match the signed binhost (~26 min for the desktop set on 8 vCPUs in the test VM). The official Gentoo binhost is OpenRC/hardened, so a systemd system can only @@ -289,5 +314,5 @@ still not VM-verified. - The installer rebuilds `sys-apps/systemd` from source because boot/policykit/cryptsetup USE differ from the binhost. - `sys undo` is implemented with the default-subvolume, fstab, kernel-cmdline - and BLS handling described in ADR 0007; its destructive VM acceptance test is - the remaining safety gate. + and BLS handling described in ADR 0007; its destructive VM acceptance gate + passed in this session (`serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386`). diff --git a/docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md b/docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md index 83d1db0..07e30a8 100644 --- a/docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md +++ b/docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md @@ -409,6 +409,34 @@ harness requires, and no already-installed disposable clone is available. Booting the recovery entry offline is still a manual step. `sys undo` therefore remains **unverified**, not passing. +**2026-09-26 update — rollback acceptance PASSED.** +`serial-driver.py rollback` on a fresh disposable overlay +(`rollback-accept-7.qcow2`, backing `fresh-install-1.qcow2`, original +preserved; backing chain validated with `qemu-img info --backing-chain`): +driver `serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386` **PASS=11 FAIL=0**, +exit 0, no secret leak in either transcript (both kept: +`serial-phase1.log`, `serial.log` under +`/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-23d1bc0c/`). + +- Phase 1: known-good DB fingerprint `ca398d71…`, `sys snapshot --legacy` + → `@-20260926T030259-rollback-acceptance`, controlled + `app-misc/hello` install `--legacy --portage` → fingerprint changed to + `fda3780a…` (a no-op break would fail the gate here), root marker written, + `sys undo @-20260926T030259-rollback-acceptance --legacy` → rc=0. +- Phase 2 (detached): DB fingerprint back to `ca398d71…`, `/home` marker + identical, root marker **absent**, `systemctl is-system-running` → + `running`, kernel modules present, `phoebus-recovery.conf` present with + `systemd.unit=rescue.target` and a `@snapshots/` root, rollback status + recorded. +- Harness defects fixed to earn this (all previously allowed vacuous + passes): sudo authentication with unique end markers and a verified + timestamp, both phases as root, explicit `--legacy`, break package + verified absent then verified changed (`nano` was already in the base + image), undo targeting the recorded snapshot id, driver assertions for a + changed break and an absent root marker. +- Still manual: booting the recovery entry itself offline (select it in the + systemd-boot menu with no network). + **2026-09-23 update — NVIDIA gates still NOT run.** The live driver decision, the hardened payload verifier and the installed lifecycle are implemented and covered by Rust/fixture tests, but no NVIDIA-accelerated boot has been observed: