docs: record hardening pass evidence (stage3, boot security, rollback)
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Phoebus 2026-09-25 20:13:16 -07:00
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@ -3,6 +3,47 @@
All notable changes are recorded here. The authoritative history is `git log`; All notable changes are recorded here. The authoritative history is `git log`;
this file is the curated, human-readable summary. this file is the curated, human-readable summary.
## 2026-09-26 — Hardening pass: fail-closed stage3, truthful boot security, rollback acceptance
- **Stage3 verification is fail-closed (security defect fixed).** The unpinned
path previously warned and continued when the DIGESTS download failed, when
no SHA-512 entry matched, when `gpg` or the Gentoo release key was missing,
when the key import failed, and when `gpg` could not start. Every one of
these now stops the install before extraction, as do a bad signature and a
hash mismatch. The pinned path requires a valid 64-hex digest (placeholder
refused) before any network use, and its trust is documented as coming from
the independently supplied pin. `stage_install` requires
`curl/tar/gpg/sha256sum/sha512sum` up front. 16 new regression tests cover
every failure branch plus both positive paths.
- **Live image carries the verifier.** `installer/live` ships `gnupg` and the
trusted Gentoo release key (`/usr/share/openpgp-keys/gentoo-release.asc`),
provisioned by `build.sh` and checked against Gentoo's published
release-key fingerprints; the installer never fetches an unauthenticated
key. Not yet VM-proven: no full install has run with the new binary, and
the signed-DIGESTS VM proof needs a rebuilt ISO with the key.
- **Boot security is truthful.** `kernel.uki`/`kernel.secureboot = true` are
rejected at shared configuration validation (CLI/TUI/GUI bridge), and the
plan preview always reports the real unsigned-BLS path. Authenticated boot
remains an open limitation by design (separate opt-in milestone).
- **Rollback acceptance PASSED with evidence**
(`serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386`, PASS=11 FAIL=0, exit 0, no
secret leak): snapshot → `app-misc/hello` install (package DB changed) →
`sys undo <id>` → detached reboot (DB restored, root marker absent, `/home`
survives, systemd running, recovery entry present). This corrects the
2026-09-25 pass claim, which had no transcript and did not reproduce: the
harness ran unprivileged, used pre-installed `nano`, restored "newest", and
never asserted the marker. Fixed with sudo authentication, explicit
`--legacy`, a verified break, targeted undo, and vacuous-pass guards.
Recovery-entry offline boot stays a manual gate.
- **Release candidate (local, isolated):** manifest/verify, tampered-artifact
refusal, and publish refusal against the NotRun gate report all behave;
`gates --execute` is 0 passed / 6 NotRun (all gates need VM/seat/model).
Nothing published. Desktop-under-seat, live AI, and Snap
strict-confinement/changed-revision remain explicitly open (see STATUS).
- **Tests:** `cargo test --workspace` 712/712 (was 692), `test_vmsafety.py`
18/18, `cargo fmt --check` and `clippy -D warnings` clean, release and
static-pie builds pass.
## 2026-09-26 — Code quality pass: boxed ExecError, warning-free Clippy, service/gui_bridge splits ## 2026-09-26 — Code quality pass: boxed ExecError, warning-free Clippy, service/gui_bridge splits
Structural work only; no behavior, wire-format, or serialized-plan change. Structural work only; no behavior, wire-format, or serialized-plan change.

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@ -3,6 +3,48 @@
Rolling note between work sessions. **Update this file before you finish**, then Rolling note between work sessions. **Update this file before you finish**, then
commit it. It should be short and current; use `git log` for detail. commit it. It should be short and current; use `git log` for detail.
- **Hardening pass (2026-09-26):** stage3 fail-closed + truthful boot
security + rollback acceptance PASS.
1. **Stage3 (security defect, fixed):** the unpinned path warned and
continued on DIGESTS-download failure, missing SHA-512 entry, missing
gpg/key, failed key import, and gpg launch errors. All stop the install
before extraction now; bad signature/hash also stop it. The pinned path
requires a valid 64-hex pin (placeholder refused) before any network
use. `stage_install` checks for `gpg`/`sha256sum`/`sha512sum` first.
16 new regression tests (every failure branch, nonzero-exit and
cannot-start doubles, both positive paths). The live image ships `gnupg`
plus the Gentoo release key, fingerprint-checked at build time against
Gentoo's published fingerprints (`13EB…2910` weekly, `D99E…2058`
signing). Commits `2162670`, `744059b`.
2. **Boot security (fixed):** `uki=true`/`secureboot=true` are rejected at
`validate_config` (shared by CLI/TUI/GUI bridge); the plan preview
always reports unsigned BLS. Parsing/validation/rendering regressions +
golden updated. Commit `95e0d05`. Authenticated boot stays an open
limitation (STATUS).
3. **Rollback acceptance PASSED for real**
(`serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386`, PASS=11 FAIL=0, exit 0, no
secret leak): fresh overlay `rollback-accept-7.qcow2` on
`fresh-install-1.qcow2` — snapshot → `app-misc/hello` install (DB
`ca39…`→`fda3…`) → `sys undo <id>` rc=0 → detached reboot (DB restored,
root marker absent, `/home` survives, systemd running, recovery entry
present). The 2026-09-25 pass claim had no transcript and did not
reproduce; fixed harness defects: sudo auth (stale-prompt match bug
found and fixed with unique markers), root phases, explicit `--legacy`,
verified break (`nano` was pre-installed), targeted undo, marker-absent
assertion, preserved phase-1 log. Commits `744059b`, `5f69996`.
4. **Release candidate (local, isolated):** manifest (2 artifacts), verify,
tamper refusal, and publish refusal against the NotRun report all behave;
`gates --execute` is 0 passed / 6 NotRun (every gate needs VM/seat/model;
`run_gates` never executes gate commands itself). Nothing published.
5. Quality gates: `cargo fmt --check`, `cargo clippy --workspace
--all-targets -- -D warnings`, `cargo test --workspace` 712/712,
release + static-pie builds, `test_vmsafety.py` 18/18, `make doctor`
19 ok / 1 disk-space warning.
- **Interface contract (unchanged):** ordinary requests use AI; only explicit
`--legacy` selects deterministic handling; source flags constrain the AI and
never bypass it; a missing model stops the workflow and offers the exact
`--legacy` command without executing it.
- **Quality pass (2026-09-26):** boxed `ExecError::Command` details - **Quality pass (2026-09-26):** boxed `ExecError::Command` details
(`CommandFailure`, 128 → 96 bytes, measured with a path-dependent probe crate; (`CommandFailure`, 128 → 96 bytes, measured with a path-dependent probe crate;
constructor + all match sites updated, error text/redaction/stderr-tail constructor + all match sites updated, error text/redaction/stderr-tail
@ -126,9 +168,21 @@ commit it. It should be short and current; use `git log` for detail.
## Not completed / blocked ## Not completed / blocked
- **Stage3 VM proof with the new binary:** unit-tested (19 stage3 tests) and
the pinned path is unchanged for real pins, but no full install has run
with the fail-closed binary yet; the next disposable install is the proof.
The unpinned (signed-DIGESTS) VM proof additionally needs a rebuilt live
ISO carrying the provisioned key (`installer/live/build.sh` now provisions
it; no ISO was rebuilt in this session).
- **Installed Mango + DMS session under a seat:** still needs a
seat-providing graphical VM (or physical VT): login, kitty, DMS
spotlight, lock/idle, polkit agent, logout, reboot
(`docs/DEVELOPMENT.md` physical-VT procedure).
- **Snap update to a different revision / strict confinement:** refresh with no - **Snap update to a different revision / strict confinement:** refresh with no
newer revision and partial confinement were VM-verified. A revision-changing newer revision and partial confinement were VM-verified. A revision-changing
refresh and AppArmor-backed strict confinement were not. refresh and AppArmor-backed strict confinement were not (need an
AppArmor-ready guest kernel with loaded policy, and a Store snap that
actually has a newer revision than installed).
- **Live AI:** a local OpenAI-compatible model (`llama-server` + a GGUF model) - **Live AI:** a local OpenAI-compatible model (`llama-server` + a GGUF model)
was served on the host; the AI workflow reached the model, but the sandboxed was served on the host; the AI workflow reached the model, but the sandboxed
call exceeded the 120 s transport timeout on CPU (`curl` exit 28). Needs a call exceeded the 120 s transport timeout on CPU (`curl` exit 28). Needs a
@ -153,11 +207,15 @@ commit it. It should be short and current; use `git log` for detail.
## Next actions (in order) ## Next actions (in order)
1. **Recovery boot** by selecting the recovery BLS entry with the network down. 1. **Stage3 install proof:** next disposable install with the fail-closed
2. **Live AI** with a faster local model/GPU or an authorized provider binary (pinned path), then a rebuilt live ISO (with the provisioned
Gentoo key) proving the signed-DIGESTS path in the VM.
2. **Recovery boot** by selecting the recovery BLS entry with the network down.
3. **Live AI** with a faster local model/GPU or an authorized provider
credential (natural-language discovery, source constraints, reviewed install). credential (natural-language discovery, source constraints, reviewed install).
3. **Nix profile GC stability** if the dangling re-run is reproducible. 4. **Installed desktop under a seat** (Mango + DMS login through reboot).
4. **Snap strict confinement and changed-revision update** in a disposable VM 5. **Nix profile GC stability** if the dangling re-run is reproducible.
6. **Snap strict confinement and changed-revision update** in a disposable VM
when an AppArmor-ready kernel and a revision-changing Store test are available. when an AppArmor-ready kernel and a revision-changing Store test are available.
## Definition of a good stopping point ## Definition of a good stopping point

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@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ more interesting. Status vocabulary: **Done**, **Partial**, **Next**, **Later**.
| 7 | Finish Flatpak | Partial | `flatpak 1.18.1` installed, flathub configured; bounded typed `flatpak_*` actions added; no app installed yet | | 7 | Finish Flatpak | Partial | `flatpak 1.18.1` installed, flathub configured; bounded typed `flatpak_*` actions added; no app installed yet |
| 8 | Instrument source/binary policy | Done | measured compile times harvested from `emerge.log` (326 entries); resolved-effect previews added | | 8 | Instrument source/binary policy | Done | measured compile times harvested from `emerge.log` (326 entries); resolved-effect previews added |
| 9 | Background update preparation | Partial | distfile fetch VM-verified; `--buildpkgonly` skipped while deps need merging (recorded Ready); activation explicit | | 9 | Background update preparation | Partial | distfile fetch VM-verified; `--buildpkgonly` skipped while deps need merging (recorded Ready); activation explicit |
| 10 | Snapshots / rollback | Partial | snapshot sets + history VM-verified on Btrfs; coordinated rollback, `sys undo`, recovery entry, retention and free-space gate implemented + unit-tested; destructive VM acceptance test pending | | 10 | Snapshots / rollback | Partial | snapshot sets + history VM-verified on Btrfs; `sys undo` acceptance PASSED on a fresh disposable clone (`serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386` PASS=11 FAIL=0: DB changed then restored, root marker gone, `/home` survives, boot running); retention + free-space gate unit-tested; offline recovery-entry boot remains a manual gate |
| 11 | AI privilege and privacy architecture | Partial | typed actions + enforced privacy boundary + guided proposal review + OS-level sandbox (systemd-run hardening) + approval-bound resolved effects; live call/sandbox not VM-verified | | 11 | AI privilege and privacy architecture | Partial | typed actions + enforced privacy boundary + guided proposal review + OS-level sandbox (systemd-run hardening) + approval-bound resolved effects; live call/sandbox not VM-verified |
| 12 | `sys` operations | Done | history, enable/disable, inspect, install, prepare-updates VM-verified; target-root consistency, execution-boundary validation, truthful `ask` failure, full transaction outcomes, empty-vs-unestablished plans, start/stop/restart + flatpak/nix/snapshot commands, deterministic `--legacy` administration, audited `--broker`/`--legacy` gates, unified multi-source updates, quiet proactive assistance, shared service layer (`phoebus_installer::service`), and 23-case VM acceptance suite (`sys-acceptance.sh` 23/23 PASS) | | 12 | `sys` operations | Done | history, enable/disable, inspect, install, prepare-updates VM-verified; target-root consistency, execution-boundary validation, truthful `ask` failure, full transaction outcomes, empty-vs-unestablished plans, start/stop/restart + flatpak/nix/snapshot commands, deterministic `--legacy` administration, audited `--broker`/`--legacy` gates, unified multi-source updates, quiet proactive assistance, shared service layer (`phoebus_installer::service`), and 23-case VM acceptance suite (`sys-acceptance.sh` 23/23 PASS) |
| 13 | Kernel optimization policy | Later | conservative fragments only; SAFE/OPTIMIZED/AGGRESSIVE selection exists | | 13 | Kernel optimization policy | Later | conservative fragments only; SAFE/OPTIMIZED/AGGRESSIVE selection exists |

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@ -37,8 +37,13 @@ A second harness (`installer/tests/vm/appliance-driver.py` +
produced `INSTALL-RC=0`, `NO_SECRET_LEAK`, and a detached boot produced `INSTALL-RC=0`, `NO_SECRET_LEAK`, and a detached boot
(`systemd`, running, 0 failed units) whose Btrfs history contains the installer's (`systemd`, running, 0 failed units) whose Btrfs history contains the installer's
coordinated `@` + `@var` **initial known-good** snapshot and a snapshot-based coordinated `@` + `@var` **initial known-good** snapshot and a snapshot-based
recovery boot entry (see `docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`). `sys undo` itself is recovery boot entry (see `docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`). `sys undo` is
still not VM-verified. VM-verified by the rollback acceptance gate
(`serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386`, PASS=11 FAIL=0): snapshot →
`app-misc/hello` install (package DB changed) → `sys undo <id>` → detached
reboot with the package DB restored, the root break marker gone, `/home`
preserved, systemd running, and the snapshot-based recovery entry present.
Booting that recovery entry offline remains a manual gate.
## Matrix ## Matrix
@ -52,7 +57,7 @@ still not VM-verified.
| LUKS2 format/open/close | yes | yes | yes | no | | LUKS2 format/open/close | yes | yes | yes | no |
| Btrfs subvolumes + swapfile | yes | yes | yes | no | | Btrfs subvolumes + swapfile | yes | yes | yes | no |
| fstab / crypttab generation | yes | yes | yes | no | | fstab / crypttab generation | yes | yes | yes | no |
| stage3 fetch + SHA-256 verify + extract | yes | yes | yes | n/a | | stage3 fetch + verify (pinned SHA-256 or signed DIGESTS) + extract | yes | yes (both paths; every failure branch incl. missing verifier/key/DIGESTS/entry, nonzero exit, cannot-start) | yes (pinned path; unpinned path needs the live-image key) | n/a |
| Portage config + sync + getuto | yes | yes | yes | n/a | | Portage config + sync + getuto | yes | yes | yes | n/a |
| Signed Gentoo binary install | yes | yes | yes | n/a | | Signed Gentoo binary install | yes | yes | yes | n/a |
| Source package compilation | yes | yes | yes | n/a | | Source package compilation | yes | yes | yes | n/a |
@ -76,8 +81,8 @@ still not VM-verified.
| Background update preparation | yes | yes | yes (fetch; buildpkgonly skipped) | no | | Background update preparation | yes | yes | yes (fetch; buildpkgonly skipped) | no |
| Btrfs snapshots + history | yes | yes | yes | no | | Btrfs snapshots + history | yes | yes | yes | no |
| Coordinated snapshot sets (`@` + `@var`) | yes | yes | no | no | | Coordinated snapshot sets (`@` + `@var`) | yes | yes | no | no |
| Btrfs rollback (`sys undo`) | yes | yes | no | no | | Btrfs rollback (`sys undo`) | yes | yes | yes (rollback acceptance `serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386` PASS=11 FAIL=0) | no |
| Recovery/known-good BLS entry | yes | yes | no | no | | Recovery/known-good BLS entry | yes | yes | present + snapshot-based (asserted in the rollback run; offline boot is a manual gate) | no |
| Snapshot retention + free-space gate | yes | yes | no | no | | Snapshot retention + free-space gate | yes | yes | no | no |
| AI typed proposals + evidence review | yes | yes | fixture end-to-end | n/a | | AI typed proposals + evidence review | yes | yes | fixture end-to-end | n/a |
| AI guided install (DeepSeek/OpenAI) | yes | yes | fixture path only (no live call) | n/a | | AI guided install (DeepSeek/OpenAI) | yes | yes | fixture path only (no live call) | n/a |
@ -96,7 +101,7 @@ still not VM-verified.
| Installed `sys` acceptance matrix (read-only/failure) | yes | yes | yes (installed VM: `PASS=38 FAIL=0`, catalogue + regression group) | no | | Installed `sys` acceptance matrix (read-only/failure) | yes | yes | yes (installed VM: `PASS=38 FAIL=0`, catalogue + regression group) | no |
| Portage config readable for non-root queries (`normalize_config_permissions`) | yes | yes (modes + keyring exclusion) | yes (fresh VM install: 0755/0644 out of the box; non-root `search` returns 3 results, `updates` reports 10) | no | | Portage config readable for non-root queries (`normalize_config_permissions`) | yes | yes (modes + keyring exclusion) | yes (fresh VM install: 0755/0644 out of the box; non-root `search` returns 3 results, `updates` reports 10) | no |
| Privileged catalogue mutations (install/remove/depclean/cache/apply updates, alternate-root) | yes | yes (unit) | yes (fresh installed VM via root: 7/7 PASS) | no | | Privileged catalogue mutations (install/remove/depclean/cache/apply updates, alternate-root) | yes | yes (unit) | yes (fresh installed VM via root: 7/7 PASS) | no |
| Rollback acceptance (snapshot -> change -> `sys undo` -> detached verify) | yes | yes | yes (clone: package DB restored, root marker gone, `/home` survives, boot running) | no | | Rollback acceptance (snapshot -> change -> `sys undo` -> detached verify) | yes | yes | yes (`serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386` PASS=11 FAIL=0 on a fresh disposable clone: package DB changed then restored, root marker gone, `/home` survives, boot running, no secret leak) | no |
| Privileged `--broker` plan execution + replay rejection in a VM (pkexec path) | yes | yes (privileged entry point) | yes (non-root `pkexec` with a terminal polkit agent: cancelled auth, broker JSON success, replay rejected; required the shipped policy + wheel-admin rule) | n/a | | Privileged `--broker` plan execution + replay rejection in a VM (pkexec path) | yes | yes (privileged entry point) | yes (non-root `pkexec` with a terminal polkit agent: cancelled auth, broker JSON success, replay rejected; required the shipped policy + wheel-admin rule) | n/a |
| Cache-cleanup preview is non-destructive (real `eclean`/`nix-store`) | yes | yes (preview uses `--pretend --deep` / `--print-dead`; sorted bound items) | yes (real `eclean`: upstream preview, cancelled approval, approved run, drift refusal, failed cleaner; user data preserved) | n/a | | Cache-cleanup preview is non-destructive (real `eclean`/`nix-store`) | yes | yes (preview uses `--pretend --deep` / `--print-dead`; sorted bound items) | yes (real `eclean`: upstream preview, cancelled approval, approved run, drift refusal, failed cleaner; user data preserved) | n/a |
| Reverse-dependency inspection includes installed targets | yes | yes (self-reference compares the dependent, not the target) | yes (real `sys-libs/glibc`, `sys-libs/zlib` dependents) | n/a | | Reverse-dependency inspection includes installed targets | yes | yes (self-reference compares the dependent, not the target) | yes (real `sys-libs/glibc`, `sys-libs/zlib` dependents) | n/a |
@ -145,17 +150,17 @@ still not VM-verified.
| GUI readiness refresh / AI revalidation / keyboard nav | yes | yes (Rust) | VM harness regressions | n/a | | GUI readiness refresh / AI revalidation / keyboard nav | yes | yes (Rust) | VM harness regressions | n/a |
| Mandatory AI requires a validated interaction | yes | yes | bridge + CLI | n/a | | Mandatory AI requires a validated interaction | yes | yes | bridge + CLI | n/a |
| GURU packaging (scoped keywords) | yes | yes | no (build/install unverified) | no | | GURU packaging (scoped keywords) | yes | yes | no (build/install unverified) | no |
| Release gates + atomic publish | yes | yes | no | n/a | | Release gates + atomic publish | yes | yes (NotRun-is-not-pass; tamper/publish-refusal exercised via host CLI) | no (no end-to-end candidate: VM/graphical/model gates need a runner) | n/a |
| `sys` verbs | yes | yes | yes | no | | `sys` verbs | yes | yes | yes | no |
| OpenCode pinned bootstrap | yes | yes | no | n/a | | OpenCode pinned bootstrap | yes | yes | no | n/a |
| Release manifest/verify | yes | yes | no | n/a | | Release manifest/verify | yes | yes (host CLI: manifest, verify, tampered-artifact refusal) | no | n/a |
| NVIDIA PCI device classification + branch/flavor policy | yes | yes | no | no | | NVIDIA PCI device classification + branch/flavor policy | yes | yes | no | no |
| NVIDIA installed Gentoo integration (Portage/modprobe/dracut/initramfs) | yes | yes | no | no | | NVIDIA installed Gentoo integration (Portage/modprobe/dracut/initramfs) | yes | yes | no | no |
| NVIDIA live ISO payload (bundled modules/firmware/userspace) | yes | yes (verifier + guards) | no | no | | NVIDIA live ISO payload (bundled modules/firmware/userspace) | yes | yes (verifier + guards) | no | no |
| NVIDIA kernel/module/initramfs update coordination (`@module-rebuild`) | yes | yes | no | no | | NVIDIA kernel/module/initramfs update coordination (`@module-rebuild`) | yes | yes | no | no |
| NVIDIA live GPU decision + real nouveau fallback | yes | yes (fixtures + CLI) | no | no | | NVIDIA live GPU decision + real nouveau fallback | yes | yes (fixtures + CLI) | no | no |
| Live GUI broker scoped sudoers (no `NOPASSWD: ALL`) | yes | yes (`visudo`) | no | n/a | | Live GUI broker scoped sudoers (no `NOPASSWD: ALL`) | yes | yes (`visudo`) | no | n/a |
| Rollback acceptance harness mode | yes | yes (bash -n/unit) | destructive gate unrun | no | | Rollback acceptance harness mode | yes | yes (bash -n/unit + vacuous-pass guards) | yes (destructive gate `serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386` PASS=11 FAIL=0) | no |
| Desktop assistant GUI (`phoebus-assistant`) | yes | yes | yes (live VM layout) | no | | Desktop assistant GUI (`phoebus-assistant`) | yes | yes | yes (live VM layout) | no |
| Desktop assistant JSON-RPC bridge (`sys --assistant-bridge`) | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | n/a | | Desktop assistant JSON-RPC bridge (`sys --assistant-bridge`) | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | n/a |
| AI-first administration contract (`sys install`, `please`, `ask`) | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | no | | AI-first administration contract (`sys install`, `please`, `ask`) | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | no |
@ -179,7 +184,7 @@ still not VM-verified.
| Conversation-history privacy (minimized, redacted, 0600, bounded, clearable) | yes | yes | no | n/a | | Conversation-history privacy (minimized, redacted, 0600, bounded, clearable) | yes | yes | no | n/a |
| Target desktop QML assets & Polkit policy provisioning | yes | yes | yes (live VM layout) | no | | Target desktop QML assets & Polkit policy provisioning | yes | yes | yes (live VM layout) | no |
| Desktop assistant unprivileged execution & Polkit elevation | yes | yes | yes (live VM layout) | no | | Desktop assistant unprivileged execution & Polkit elevation | yes | yes | yes (live VM layout) | no |
| UKI | no (deferred) | no | no | no | | UKI / Secure Boot | no (deferred; `uki`/`secureboot = true` rejected at validation) | no (rejection + truthful plan rendering covered) | no | no |
## Known limitations ## Known limitations
@ -226,23 +231,37 @@ still not VM-verified.
fetched to `/tmp/sys` on a disposable overlay of the pristine installed fetched to `/tmp/sys` on a disposable overlay of the pristine installed
image, non-root user, no mutations): guest `PASS=38 FAIL=0`, driver image, non-root user, no mutations): guest `PASS=38 FAIL=0`, driver
`PASS=41 FAIL=0` (`serial-boot-20260926T014746Z-3089a820`). `PASS=41 FAIL=0` (`serial-boot-20260926T014746Z-3089a820`).
- **UKI** is deferred; the dracut UKI generator did not embed the kernel - **Authenticated boot (UKI / UEFI Secure Boot) is not implemented and is an
command line, so BLS is used (and verified). open security limitation.** The installed boot path is plain unsigned BLS
- **Rollback (`sys undo`) is NOT VM-verified.** It is implemented and (systemd-boot + dracut; the dracut UKI generator did not embed the kernel
unit-tested end to end at the command/text layer (snapshot sets, root/var command line, so BLS is used and verified). `kernel.uki = true` and
generation, fstab and BLS rewriting, kernel selection, interruption resume, `kernel.secureboot = true` are rejected at configuration validation, and the
retention, free-space gate). The harness now **automates the acceptance install-plan preview always reports the real BLS path, so no interface can
sequence** (`serial-driver.py rollback` + `rollback-guest.sh` / imply these modes are active. A future Secure Boot/UKI implementation is a
`rollback-verify.sh`): a known-good package-database fingerprint and `/home` separate opt-in milestone (signed artifacts, key lifecycle, update/rollback
marker, `sys snapshot`, a controlled reversible package install, `sys undo`, handling, disposable-VM boot tests with Secure Boot enabled); it must not be
detached reboot, then package-state/home comparison, kernel-module check and enabled or advertised until that complete path passes.
recovery-entry/status evidence. The destructive gate itself is **unrun in - **Rollback (`sys undo`) is VM-verified** (`serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386`,
this session**: a full GUI install was occupying the only disposable disk. PASS=11 FAIL=0, exit 0, no secret leak in either transcript). The gate runs on
`make doctor` now reports ~29 GiB free (the disk blocker recorded in the last a fresh disposable overlay of the installed image: a known-good
handoff has eased), but the acceptance run needs a dedicated already-installed package-database fingerprint and `/home` marker, `sys snapshot --legacy`, a
disposable clone; the exact commands are in `docs/HANDOFF.md`. Booting the controlled reversible `app-misc/hello` install `--legacy --portage` (the
recovery entry offline is still a manual step. `sys undo` is present; treat the fingerprint is asserted changed, so the run cannot pass vacuously),
VM gate as unpassed before relying on it. `sys undo <snapshot-id> --legacy`, power off, then a detached reboot that
asserts the package database restored, the root break marker absent, `/home`
surviving, systemd running, kernel modules present, the snapshot-based
recovery entry present, and rollback status recorded. Both transcripts are
kept (`serial-phase1.log`, `serial.log`).
Correction: the 2026-09-25 claim of a passing rollback had no run transcript
and did not reproduce — the committed harness then ran the guest
unprivileged, used the pre-installed `nano` as the break, restored "newest"
instead of its own snapshot, and never asserted the root marker was gone.
Those harness defects are fixed in this session (sudo authentication with
unique end markers, explicit `--legacy`, verified break, targeted undo,
marker-absent assertion) and the gate above is the evidence. Booting the
recovery entry itself offline (no network, no model) remains a manual,
un-automated gate: select "Phoebus Recovery (known-good snapshot)" in the
systemd-boot menu.
- **Mango + DankMaterialShell** is the canonical Phoebus desktop - **Mango + DankMaterialShell** is the canonical Phoebus desktop
(`desktop.profile = "mango"`, Flatpak on). It is implemented with Mango (`desktop.profile = "mango"`, Flatpak on). It is implemented with Mango
0.17.2, DMS (pinned release), Quickshell 0.3.1 and scenefx 0.5 from the GURU 0.17.2, DMS (pinned release), Quickshell 0.3.1 and scenefx 0.5 from the GURU
@ -276,7 +295,13 @@ still not VM-verified.
enforced. enforced.
- **Release automation** now has gates, a report, atomic publish and signing - **Release automation** now has gates, a report, atomic publish and signing
command helpers, but no gate has been executed by a configured CI runner; the command helpers, but no gate has been executed by a configured CI runner; the
report records unexecuted gates as `NotRun`. report records unexecuted gates as `NotRun`. A local isolated candidate run
(2026-09-26) exercised manifest generation (2 artifacts), verification,
tampered-artifact refusal, and publish refusal against a NotRun gate report;
`gates --execute` reports 0 passed / 6 NotRun because every candidate gate
requires a VM, a graphical seat, or a model. No release was published and
`latest.iso` untouched. Minimal repeatable setup: register a Forgejo Actions
runner (`act_runner`) so `.forgejo/workflows/ci.yml` executes the gates.
- The desktop transaction compiles heavily because desktop USE does not match - The desktop transaction compiles heavily because desktop USE does not match
the signed binhost (~26 min for the desktop set on 8 vCPUs in the test VM). the signed binhost (~26 min for the desktop set on 8 vCPUs in the test VM).
The official Gentoo binhost is OpenRC/hardened, so a systemd system can only The official Gentoo binhost is OpenRC/hardened, so a systemd system can only
@ -289,5 +314,5 @@ still not VM-verified.
- The installer rebuilds `sys-apps/systemd` from source because - The installer rebuilds `sys-apps/systemd` from source because
boot/policykit/cryptsetup USE differ from the binhost. boot/policykit/cryptsetup USE differ from the binhost.
- `sys undo` is implemented with the default-subvolume, fstab, kernel-cmdline - `sys undo` is implemented with the default-subvolume, fstab, kernel-cmdline
and BLS handling described in ADR 0007; its destructive VM acceptance test is and BLS handling described in ADR 0007; its destructive VM acceptance gate
the remaining safety gate. passed in this session (`serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386`).

View file

@ -409,6 +409,34 @@ harness requires, and no already-installed disposable clone is available.
Booting the recovery entry offline is still a manual step. `sys undo` therefore Booting the recovery entry offline is still a manual step. `sys undo` therefore
remains **unverified**, not passing. remains **unverified**, not passing.
**2026-09-26 update — rollback acceptance PASSED.**
`serial-driver.py rollback` on a fresh disposable overlay
(`rollback-accept-7.qcow2`, backing `fresh-install-1.qcow2`, original
preserved; backing chain validated with `qemu-img info --backing-chain`):
driver `serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386` **PASS=11 FAIL=0**,
exit 0, no secret leak in either transcript (both kept:
`serial-phase1.log`, `serial.log` under
`/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-23d1bc0c/`).
- Phase 1: known-good DB fingerprint `ca398d71…`, `sys snapshot --legacy`
→ `@-20260926T030259-rollback-acceptance`, controlled
`app-misc/hello` install `--legacy --portage` → fingerprint changed to
`fda3780a…` (a no-op break would fail the gate here), root marker written,
`sys undo @-20260926T030259-rollback-acceptance --legacy` → rc=0.
- Phase 2 (detached): DB fingerprint back to `ca398d71…`, `/home` marker
identical, root marker **absent**, `systemctl is-system-running` →
`running`, kernel modules present, `phoebus-recovery.conf` present with
`systemd.unit=rescue.target` and a `@snapshots/` root, rollback status
recorded.
- Harness defects fixed to earn this (all previously allowed vacuous
passes): sudo authentication with unique end markers and a verified
timestamp, both phases as root, explicit `--legacy`, break package
verified absent then verified changed (`nano` was already in the base
image), undo targeting the recorded snapshot id, driver assertions for a
changed break and an absent root marker.
- Still manual: booting the recovery entry itself offline (select it in the
systemd-boot menu with no network).
**2026-09-23 update — NVIDIA gates still NOT run.** The live driver decision, **2026-09-23 update — NVIDIA gates still NOT run.** The live driver decision,
the hardened payload verifier and the installed lifecycle are implemented and the hardened payload verifier and the installed lifecycle are implemented and
covered by Rust/fixture tests, but no NVIDIA-accelerated boot has been observed: covered by Rust/fixture tests, but no NVIDIA-accelerated boot has been observed: