phoebus_os/installer-rs
Phoebus 565521564c feat(executor): implement the OpenCode agent-server adapter
OpenCode is an agent server, not an OpenAI endpoint. Add a session/
message client over the established curl transport that implements
ModelTransport, so the strict proposal parser, facts and review are
reused. The probe enforces the loopback/TLS transport policy, pins the
resolved address, supports basic auth, checks HTTP status before parsing,
and reports truthful connection states (ready is reserved for a validated
response). Accept only completed assistant text parts and delete the
transient session on every path. Tests cover endpoint/policy, auth, a
misleading 500, credential non-leakage and the request shape.
2026-09-22 02:36:22 -07:00
..
crates feat(executor): implement the OpenCode agent-server adapter 2026-09-22 02:36:22 -07:00
Cargo.lock feat(desktop): add Mango + DankMaterialShell profile with rollback, assistant and release foundations 2026-09-21 03:46:52 -07:00
Cargo.toml chore: import Phoebus OS installer and Rust migration 2026-09-20 02:07:33 -07:00
README.md feat(sys): add offline Portage install/remove/search commands 2026-09-20 14:28:35 -07:00

Phoebus OS installer (Rust)

The production installer/backend for Phoebus OS. It is being built beside the proven Bash implementation and only becomes primary once it reproduces the known-good encrypted UEFI VM boot.

Workspace

crates/
  phoebus-core       configuration types, validation, plan, package policy,
                     hardware/disk models, target-root safety, secrets,
                     snapshot history, typed system actions, update policy
  phoebus-executor   command runner, logging, storage, encryption, Btrfs,
                     stage3, Portage, kernel, boot, users, services, desktop,
                     snapshots, background-update preparation, admin context
  phoebus-ai         typed AI proposals + enforced privacy boundary
  phoebus-tui        ratatui terminal UI
  phoebus-installer  CLI, `sys`, orchestration

Binaries: phoebus-installer (installer) and sys (typed system interface).

sys

sys enable sshd                       # deterministic phrase -> typed action
sys disable bluetooth
sys history                           # snapshot/transaction history
sys what are you compiling            # background update status
sys install vim                       # Portage (bare name or category/name)
sys search firefox
sys remove vim
sys --action '{"action":"inspect_service","name":"ssh"}'
sys --action-file proposal.json       # the AI path: same typed schema

Mutating actions require root (run under sudo); the model never receives the password. High-risk actions are preceded by a Btrfs snapshot when available. There is no run_shell action; unknown actions fail closed.

Snapshots and background updates

  • phoebus-core::snapshot defines deterministic snapshot names and a TOML transaction history. phoebus-executor::snapshot creates read-only Btrfs snapshots. /home is intentionally not snapshotted by default.
  • phoebus-core::update / phoebus-executor::update implement preparation only: emerge --fetchonly then emerge --buildpkgonly stage distfiles and reusable local binary packages without installing. Activation stays explicit.

Building

cargo test --workspace
cargo build --release -p phoebus-installer

# A static binary is preferred for the live installer environment:
RUSTFLAGS="-C target-feature=+crt-static" \
  cargo build --release -p phoebus-installer --target x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu

Formatting and lints are part of the gate:

cargo fmt --all -- --check
cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets

CLI

phoebus-installer --config FILE --plan
phoebus-installer --config FILE --dry-run --install
phoebus-installer --config FILE --install --yes \
    --luks-passphrase-file /run/luks.pw \
    --user-password-file /run/user.pw

Both TOML and the legacy flat KEY='value' format are supported. Format is detected structurally (the flat format is also valid TOML because single quotes are TOML literal strings).

[system]
hostname = "phoebus"
timezone = "UTC"

[storage]
disk = "/dev/vda"
filesystem = "btrfs"

[encryption]
mode = "luks2"

Secrets are never stored in the configuration. They are supplied through 0600 files and registered with the redactor before anything is logged.

Safety model

  • Every command goes through phoebus-executor::Exec, which logs redacted arguments, exit status and duration, and honours dry-run centrally.
  • Arguments are always passed separately; there is no sh -c.
  • TargetRoot rejects absolute paths and .. traversal, so host-versus-target bugs are caught by construction and covered by tests.
  • Destructive functions require a DestructiveAuthorization token produced only after the ERASE confirmation and a final confirmation.
  • phoebus-ai can only emit a closed set of typed configuration changes; unknown actions fail closed and there is no shell action.

Package policy

phoebus-core::policy implements the deterministic source/binary rule and records measured compile times parsed from Portage's emerge.log (phoebus-core::emergelog). No performance value is ever invented.

Verification

crates/phoebus-installer/tests/plan_golden.rs pins the rendered plan and destructive preview to golden files under tests/golden/ (regenerate with UPDATE_GOLDEN=1). crates/phoebus-installer/tests/cli_coverage.rs pins the command-line surface to the reference Bash installer. The disposable VM harness in ../installer/tests/vm drives the static binary through a full encrypted install and boot.