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Replace the fixed category routing (ADR 0006) with a shared, inspectable,
hardware- and preference-aware selection policy over resolved candidates from
Portage (source/binary/vendor), Nix, Flatpak, Snap, AppImage and the Phoebus
overlay. The policy keeps base components under Portage, separates hard
constraints from preferences, honours and persists explicit choices, errors
instead of silently switching lanes, and reuses an already-installed lane.
- phoebus-core::selection: the pure policy (16 tests: base-system, low-memory
vs high-core, sandbox requirement, GPU/arch/storage rejection, explicit
preference, unavailable backend, reproducibility, render).
- phoebus-executor::chooser: resolves real metadata and hardware facts.
- phoebus-executor::{snap,appimage,ebuild}: new lanes. Snap detects daemon and
confinement and installs app-containers/snapd through Portage; AppImage
adopts images with a pinned SHA-256, checks the ELF architecture without
executing, integrates a desktop entry and preserves user data on removal; the
custom ebuild overlay binds approval to the ebuild content digest and builds
through Portage's sandbox.
- Typed actions choose_package / set_package_preference / snap_* / appimage_* /
custom_ebuild_* with strict validators; the assistant prompt and schema are
reconciled (no category routing; custom ebuilds are untrusted).
- Installed sys: the installer locates the trusted static binary, copies it to
/usr/local/bin/sys and proves it runs in the target chroot before the
recovery snapshot, failing closed if absent; the VM harness fetches sys.
- docs/SYS.md: command/action reference and acceptance matrix; ADR 0006 revised.
Host gates pass: fmt, clippy (no new warnings), workspace tests, make test,
release and static sys builds. VM lane journeys remain pending (see HANDOFF).
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| crates | ||
| Cargo.lock | ||
| Cargo.toml | ||
| README.md | ||
Phoebus OS installer (Rust)
The production installer/backend for Phoebus OS. It is being built beside the proven Bash implementation and only becomes primary once it reproduces the known-good encrypted UEFI VM boot.
Workspace
crates/
phoebus-core configuration types, validation, plan, package policy,
hardware/disk models, target-root safety, secrets,
snapshot history, typed system actions, update policy
phoebus-executor command runner, logging, storage, encryption, Btrfs,
stage3, Portage, kernel, boot, users, services, desktop,
snapshots, background-update preparation, admin context
phoebus-ai typed AI proposals + enforced privacy boundary
phoebus-tui ratatui terminal UI
phoebus-installer CLI, `sys`, orchestration
Binaries: phoebus-installer (installer) and sys (typed system interface).
sys
sys enable sshd # deterministic phrase -> typed action
sys disable bluetooth
sys history # snapshot/transaction history
sys what are you compiling # background update status
sys install vim # Portage (bare name or category/name)
sys search firefox
sys remove vim
sys --action '{"action":"inspect_service","name":"ssh"}'
sys --action-file proposal.json # the AI path: same typed schema
Mutating actions require root (run under sudo); the model never receives the
password. High-risk actions are preceded by a Btrfs snapshot when available.
There is no run_shell action; unknown actions fail closed.
Snapshots and background updates
phoebus-core::snapshotdefines deterministic snapshot names and a TOML transaction history.phoebus-executor::snapshotcreates read-only Btrfs snapshots./homeis intentionally not snapshotted by default.phoebus-core::update/phoebus-executor::updateimplement preparation only:emerge --fetchonlythenemerge --buildpkgonlystage distfiles and reusable local binary packages without installing. Activation stays explicit.
Building
cargo test --workspace
cargo build --release -p phoebus-installer
# A static binary is preferred for the live installer environment:
RUSTFLAGS="-C target-feature=+crt-static" \
cargo build --release -p phoebus-installer --target x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu
Formatting and lints are part of the gate:
cargo fmt --all -- --check
cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets
CLI
phoebus-installer --config FILE --plan
phoebus-installer --config FILE --dry-run --install
phoebus-installer --config FILE --install --yes \
--luks-passphrase-file /run/luks.pw \
--user-password-file /run/user.pw
Both TOML and the legacy flat KEY='value' format are supported. Format is
detected structurally (the flat format is also valid TOML because single
quotes are TOML literal strings).
[system]
hostname = "phoebus"
timezone = "UTC"
[storage]
disk = "/dev/vda"
filesystem = "btrfs"
[encryption]
mode = "luks2"
Secrets are never stored in the configuration. They are supplied through 0600 files and registered with the redactor before anything is logged.
Safety model
- Every command goes through
phoebus-executor::Exec, which logs redacted arguments, exit status and duration, and honours dry-run centrally. - Arguments are always passed separately; there is no
sh -c. TargetRootrejects absolute paths and..traversal, so host-versus-target bugs are caught by construction and covered by tests.- Destructive functions require a
DestructiveAuthorizationtoken produced only after the ERASE confirmation and a final confirmation. phoebus-aican only emit a closed set of typed configuration changes; unknown actions fail closed and there is no shell action.
Package policy
phoebus-core::policy implements the deterministic source/binary rule and
records measured compile times parsed from Portage's emerge.log
(phoebus-core::emergelog). No performance value is ever invented.
Verification
crates/phoebus-installer/tests/plan_golden.rs pins the rendered plan and
destructive preview to golden files under tests/golden/ (regenerate with
UPDATE_GOLDEN=1). crates/phoebus-installer/tests/cli_coverage.rs pins the
command-line surface to the reference Bash installer. The disposable VM harness
in ../installer/tests/vm drives the static binary through a full encrypted
install and boot.