phoebus_os/installer/tests/vm
2026-09-26 14:36:38 -07:00
..
appliance-driver.py test(vm): enforce harness disk safety and structured results 2026-09-21 20:01:50 -07:00
appliance-guest-gui.sh feat(installer): graphical welcome and install wizard over a typed bridge 2026-09-21 13:13:40 -07:00
appliance-guest.sh feat(desktop): add Mango + DankMaterialShell profile with rollback, assistant and release foundations 2026-09-21 03:46:52 -07:00
appliance-test.conf.example fix(core): reject unimplemented secureboot/uki at validation 2026-09-25 19:49:41 -07:00
gui-driver.py docs(vm): record 20260926 ISO rebuild, unpinned install, tamper, recovery, seat and nix evidence 2026-09-26 02:05:41 -07:00
install.sh test(vm): run the deterministic install with the --no-ai break-glass 2026-09-23 20:31:07 -07:00
launch-interactive.py feat(gui): verify full graphical install, fix greetd TOML, and automate ISO freshness 2026-09-24 11:42:16 -07:00
live-driver.py fix(live): scope the live privilege policy to the typed brokers 2026-09-23 06:22:19 -07:00
live-sys-install-check.sh feat(install): AI-first sys install workflow 2026-09-23 20:30:13 -07:00
oc-forward.py test(gui): drive the OpenCode AI step through the real UI 2026-09-22 03:32:07 -07:00
README.md fix(vm): provision Gentoo release key; truthful rollback gate 2026-09-25 19:49:50 -07:00
report.py test(vm): enforce harness disk safety and structured results 2026-09-21 20:01:50 -07:00
rollback-guest.sh fix(security): fixed trust anchor, executable release gates, strengthened rollback 2026-09-25 20:48:07 -07:00
rollback-verify.sh fix(vm): provision Gentoo release key; truthful rollback gate 2026-09-25 19:49:50 -07:00
run-vm.sh feat(vm): rebuild live ISO from HEAD, harden run-vm.sh, open interactive VM 2026-09-25 21:14:59 -07:00
serial-driver.py fix(vm): rollback gate proves a real mutation and restore 2026-09-25 20:02:43 -07:00
snap-guest.sh fix(sys): make Snap first-use setup reviewable and VM-tested 2026-09-25 18:07:13 -07:00
sys-acceptance.sh feat(install): fast prebuilt defaults with user-controlled source builds 2026-09-26 14:36:38 -07:00
test.conf.example fix(core): reject unimplemented secureboot/uki at validation 2026-09-25 19:49:41 -07:00
test_vmsafety.py fix(vm): rollback gate proves a real mutation and restore 2026-09-25 20:02:43 -07:00
vmsafety.py test(vm): enforce harness disk safety and structured results 2026-09-21 20:01:50 -07:00

Disposable UEFI VM harness

Proves that the installer produces a bootable encrypted system without ever touching a physical disk. The target is always a qcow2 file.

Files

  • run-vm.sh interactive QEMU launcher (manual testing).
  • install.sh guest-side, non-interactive installation (run in the VM).
  • serial-driver.py host-side pexpect driver (install, boot and rollback modes).
  • rollback-guest.sh, rollback-verify.sh guest-side rollback acceptance (fetch sys, snapshot, break, undo, verify).
  • snap-guest.sh guest-side Snap setup/install/refresh/remove acceptance.
  • test.conf.example installer configuration used by the driver.

Host prerequisites

  • qemu-system-x86_64, qemu-img, OVMF firmware, Python pexpect.
  • The reference Gentoo ISO.
  • The static Rust installer (the guest never runs the Bash tree):
cd installer-rs
RUSTFLAGS="-C target-feature=+crt-static" \
  cargo build --release -p phoebus-installer --target x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu

Procedure

Serve the static installer, the stage3 and the config to the guest:

cd /path/to/serve
cp /path/to/phoebus_os/installer-rs/target/x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/release/phoebus-installer .
cp /path/to/phoebus_os/installer/tests/vm/install.sh .
cp /path/to/phoebus_os/installer/tests/vm/test.conf.example test.conf  # edit TARGET_DISK etc.
sha256sum stage3.tar.xz                               # set STAGE3_SHA256
python3 -m http.server 8000 --bind 127.0.0.1

Run the installation (driver boots the ISO kernel/initrd directly and drives the serial console):

QEMU_BIN=/path/to/qemu-system-x86_64 \
QEMU_LIBDIR=/path/to/qemu/libs \
QEMU_DATADIR=/path/to/qemu/share \
OVMF_CODE=/path/to/OVMF_CODE_4M.fd \
OVMF_VARS=/path/to/OVMF_VARS.fd \
DISK=/tmp/phoebus/target.qcow2 \
ISO=/path/to/livegui-amd64.iso \
KERNEL=/tmp/live/boot/gentoo INITRD=/tmp/live/boot/gentoo.igz \
INSTALL_URL=http://10.0.2.2:8000/install.sh \
python3 installer/tests/vm/serial-driver.py install

Then boot the disk alone (ISO detached) and verify:

DISK=/tmp/phoebus/target.qcow2 OVMF_CODE=... OVMF_VARS=... \
python3 installer/tests/vm/serial-driver.py boot

To patch a console into an existing entry for observation, the BLS entry in /efi/loader/entries/*.conf takes an options line; the installer can also embed a console via KERNEL_CONSOLE (GENTOO_KERNEL_CONSOLE equivalent).

Rollback acceptance (serial-driver.py rollback)

rollback drives the real rollback path end to end on an already-installed disposable disk:

  1. boot the installed disk, unlock LUKS and log in;
  2. fetch sys and rollback-guest.sh from the host (the installed system carries /usr/local/bin/sys; the host copy is a fallback), authenticate sudo (the password is sent only at sudo's own no-echo prompt, never on a command line), record the /var/db/pkg fingerprint and a /home marker, create a recovery point with sys snapshot, install a small package (a controlled, reversible update) and run sys undo — all as root, because unprivileged runs would be refused and prove nothing;
  3. power off, boot the disk detached, and run rollback-verify.sh (also as root), comparing the package fingerprint and the /home marker, checking kernel modules, systemd state, and reading the snapshot recovery entry and sys rollback status.

Both transcripts are kept (serial-phase1.log, serial.log). The guest scripts refuse to run unprivileged (ROLLBACK-NEEDS-ROOT / AFTER-NEEDS-ROOT) so a lost sudo timestamp fails loudly instead of recording vacuous passes.

Serve the fixtures as well as the installer:

cp installer/tests/vm/rollback-guest.sh installer/tests/vm/rollback-verify.sh /path/to/serve/
cp installer-rs/target/x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/release/sys /path/to/serve/
DISK=/tmp/phoebus/installed-clone.qcow2 OVMF_CODE=... OVMF_VARS=... \
python3 installer/tests/vm/serial-driver.py rollback

Point DISK at a disposable clone of the evidence image so the original is preserved. Booting the recovery entry itself with the network removed remains a manual gate; the harness records the entry but does not select it.

Snap acceptance on an installed disposable image

Serve the current static sys binary and snap-guest.sh from a small local directory. Boot an installed qcow2 overlay with serial-driver.py boot, setting BOOT_AUTHENTICATE=1, BOOT_POWEROFF=1, CHECKS_TIMEOUT=7200, and the following checks. BOOT_POWEROFF cleanly shuts down the guest after mutating checks so a later boot observes committed state:

BOOT_REQUIRE_CASES=snap-sys,snap-portage,snap-socket,snap-confinement,snap-install,snap-refresh,snap-remove
BOOT_CHECKS='echo ===CHECKS-$(printf START)===; echo SYSTEMD_STATUS:$(systemctl is-system-running); curl -fsSL http://10.0.2.2:8000/snap-guest.sh -o /tmp/snap-guest.sh; sudo bash /tmp/snap-guest.sh; echo ===CHECKS-$(printf END)==='

The guest script adds only the scoped sys-fs/squashfs-tools lzma lzo USE setting to the disposable image, then uses sys for the reviewed Portage install, socket activation and Snap actions. The boot driver logs only guest output, not the test passwords it sends for LUKS, login and sudo.

Safety (enforced, not just documented)

vmsafety.py validates every writable drive before QEMU starts:

  • DISK/DISKS must name qcow2 files inside the disposable directory PHOEBUS_VM_DISKS (default $PHOEBUS_VM_STATE/disks).
  • /dev/* paths, block and character devices, non-regular files, raw images, symlinks that resolve outside the directory, and disks whose backing chain reaches outside it are refused with a nonzero exit.
  • Each run gets a private state directory (mode 0700), its own writable OVMF variable file and a unique QMP monitor socket.
  • Screenshots use structured QMP and argument arrays; there is no shell interpolation (os.system) in the harness.
  • Secrets are passed through 0600 files and checked for leakage in the installer log by the guest script.

Results

Every driver writes results.json (and a screenshot-manifest.json for the GUI driver) under its run directory and exits nonzero on any FAIL (and, with PHOEBUS_VM_STRICT=1, on BLOCKED/NOT RUN). Statuses are PASS, FAIL, BLOCKED, SKIPPED and NOT RUN; a timeout is always a FAIL, never a pass.

make test-vm          # unit-test the safety and result logic (no VM needed)
PHOEBUS_VM_DISKS=/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/disks \
OVMF_CODE=/usr/share/OVMF/OVMF_CODE_4M.fd \
OVMF_VARS=/usr/share/OVMF/OVMF_VARS_4M.fd \
DISK=/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/disks/target.qcow2 \
ISO=installer/live/phoebus-installer-amd64.iso \
python3 installer/tests/vm/gui-driver.py gui