# `sys` — the Phoebus system interface `sys` is the typed, validated execution boundary shared by the desktop assistant (`phoebus-assistant`) and the offline/deterministic administrator. Whatever the assistant can do, a human can do by typing the same action; the assistant only makes it easier. The AI path emits the same closed action schema, and the LLM never holds privilege: every mutation is reviewed and authenticated by a human through the privileged broker. ```sh sys # natural language / AI workflow (default) sys please # natural conversational alias (same AI workflow) sys ask "" # assistant proposes the same typed actions sys --legacy # explicit deterministic mode (no model interaction) sys --legacy --action '' # one typed action in deterministic legacy mode sys --broker --action '' # internal broker invocation for shared UI / bridge sys --assistant-bridge # stdio JSON-RPC bridge for the desktop assistant ``` Run `sys --help` for the full list of flags. Mutating actions require root (`sudo sys ...`). Without a model, AI workflows stop and print the actionable deterministic legacy alternative (`sys install --legacy --`) instead of silently falling back or switching sources. ### Terminal feedback Interactive `sys` commands show the current phase on stderr: checking the system, investigating with the connected model, validating real package evidence, reviewing effects, applying each approved action, and verifying the result. A command that takes more than a moment shows its operation label; long steps repeat their current label and elapsed time every ten seconds. Progress never includes command arguments, command output, or credentials. Results remain on stdout. Broker JSON and the assistant's stdio protocol do not emit human progress. Informational model answers are wrapped as prose and omit the approval digest when no action is proposed. > [!NOTE] > `--legacy` is the administrative flag for `sys` deterministic operations. > `--no-ai` is an installer-only break-glass flag reserved exclusively for > non-interactive ISO installations (`installer-rs/tests/ai_guidance.rs`). ## AI-first installation (`sys install`) Natural language is the default interaction. Source flags alone constrain the AI investigation to a specific package source without bypassing the model: ```sh sys install firefox # AI investigates and recommends a package source sys please install firefox # identical AI workflow sys ask "install firefox" # identical AI workflow sys install firefox --flatpak # AI workflow constrained to Flatpak sys install firefox --portage # AI workflow constrained to Portage sys install nodejs --nix # AI workflow constrained to Nix sys install thunderbird --snap # AI workflow constrained to Snap sys install MyTool --appimage # AI workflow constrained to AppImage sys install app-misc/my-thing --ebuild # AI workflow constrained to custom ebuild ``` Removal is also AI-first by default. The deterministic ownership discovery and policy validation always run underneath; the connected model confirms the exact discovered copy. An ambiguous multi-lane install still requires an explicit source flag, and a model failure stops execution rather than silently removing deterministically: ```sh sys remove firefox # AI workflow: confirm target, then remove sys remove firefox --flatpak # AI workflow constrained to Flatpak sys remove firefox --legacy # deterministic removal, no model sys remove firefox --legacy --flatpak # deterministic removal from Flatpak ``` ### Deterministic administration (`--legacy`) Deterministic operation must be explicitly selected with `--legacy`: ```sh sys install firefox --legacy --flatpak # deterministic Flatpak workflow; no model interaction sys install firefox --legacy --portage # deterministic Portage workflow; no model interaction sys remove firefox --legacy # deterministic removal, no model interaction sys history --legacy # deterministic history without model sys undo --legacy # deterministic recovery without model sys install firefox --legacy # REFUSED: requires an explicit package source flag ``` When `--legacy` is used with `install` but without an explicit source flag, execution is refused and available package sources are displayed. `--legacy` never contacts a model. Direct JSON and action-file invocations (`--action` and `--action-file`) are audited entry points: they fail closed unless invoked with `--legacy` (for deterministic administrator usage) or `--broker` (for internal UI/bridge calls). One shared workflow (ADR 0013) is used by all installations: ``` identify -> evidence -> AI investigation -> proposed selection -> deterministic validation + effects -> review -> approve -> execute -> verify -> history ``` - **Unqualified** installation consults the connected model. The model may request bounded, read-only evidence (`discover_candidates`, `inspect_candidate`, `check_backend`, `inspect_installation`) and may ask one bounded question about your intent. It returns a structured proposal naming a real candidate id; the deterministic resolver independently confirms that candidate against backend metadata, computes the effects, and binds approval to a digest. A fabricated, stale, ambiguous or duplicating proposal is rejected and returned to the model for a bounded revision. - **Source flags without `--legacy`** constrain the AI investigation to the specified backend, ensuring the model evaluates and explains candidates for that source while preserving the full investigation, explanation, and approval cycle. - **Explicit backend flags with `--legacy`** bypass the model entirely, are mutually exclusive, and never fall back to another lane. If the lane cannot satisfy the request, the reason and alternatives are shown and nothing is installed. - **No model / Provider failure**: For an unqualified install without a model or upon provider error, the operation halts cleanly. The deterministic candidate selection and explicit `--legacy` commands are printed, and nothing is installed. A provider failure is never permission to install through a lane silently. - Every install is recorded in the transaction log **before** it runs (an interrupted run leaves an in-progress record) and verified afterwards (package database, `flatpak list`, `snap list`, or the managed AppImage record). A verification failure is a failed transaction. User data is preserved by default on removal. Read-only investigation is also directly available: | Phrase / JSON | Typed action | Kind | | --- | --- | --- | | *(JSON only)* | `discover_candidates` | read | | *(JSON only)* | `inspect_candidate` | read | | *(JSON only)* | `check_backend` | read | | *(JSON only)* | `inspect_installation` | read | Example: ```sh sys --action '{"action":"discover_candidates","query":"firefox","gui":true}' sys --action '{"action":"check_backend","backend":"snap"}' ``` ## Commands and typed actions ### Services (Portage/systemd ownership) | Phrase | Typed action | Kind | | --- | --- | --- | | `inspect sshd` | `inspect_service` | read | | `enable sshd` | `enable_service` | mutate | | `disable sshd` | `disable_service` | mutate | | `start sshd` | `start_service` | mutate | | `stop sshd` | `stop_service` | mutate | | `restart sshd` | `restart_service` | mutate | ### Packages (Portage) | Phrase | Typed action | Kind | | --- | --- | --- | | `install vim` / `add vim` | `install_package` | mutate | | `remove vim` / `uninstall vim` | `remove_package` | mutate | | `build firefox from source` | `convert_to_source` | mutate (High risk, protective snapshot) | | `build tuned kernel` | `build_tuned_kernel` | mutate (High risk, protective snapshot) | | `search firefox` / `find firefox` | `search_packages` | read | | `update` | `update_system` | mutate | | `prepare updates` | `prepare_updates` | mutate | | `what are you compiling` | `inspect_updates` | read | | *(JSON only)* | `inspect_package` | read | ### Source selection (all lanes) | Phrase | Typed action | Kind | | --- | --- | --- | | `choose firefox` | `choose_package` | read | | `choose firefox via flatpak` | `choose_package` | read | | `choose spotify as a gui sandboxed app` | `choose_package` | read | | `prefer firefox via flatpak` | `set_package_preference` | mutate (personal) | | `prefer firefox auto` | `set_package_preference` | mutate (personal) | | *(JSON only)* `system_wide: true` | `set_package_preference` | mutate (privileged) | `prefer ...` saves the invoking user's own preference; it needs no elevation and is stored under the user's config directory. The system-wide default is the same action with `"system_wide": true`, which requires the authenticated broker. At resolution time the personal choice wins and system defaults fill anything the user has not set. `choose` resolves real backend metadata, applies the shared policy (ADR 0006), and prints the selected lane, version, provenance, integrity, sandbox level, sizes, update behaviour and the rejected alternatives. It never installs anything and never fabricates a candidate. ### Flatpak | Phrase | Typed action | Kind | | --- | --- | --- | | `flatpak install org.chromium.Chromium` | `flatpak_install` | mutate | | `flatpak remove org.chromium.Chromium` | `flatpak_remove` | mutate | | `flatpak list` | `flatpak_list` | read | ### Nix (developer lane) | Phrase | Typed action | Kind | | --- | --- | --- | | `nix prepare nodejs python312` | `nix_prepare` | mutate | | `nix install cmatrix` | `nix_install` | mutate | `sys install cmatrix --legacy --nix` installs into the shared Phoebus Nix profile; its commands are on the graphical session's `PATH`. The Nix client's default profile remains separate. Direct `nix profile install nixpkgs#cmatrix` as a normal user uses the user's own profile, which is also on `PATH`. `nix prepare` only realises packages for temporary `nix shell` use. ### Snap (`app-containers/snapd` through Portage) | Phrase | Typed action | Kind | | --- | --- | --- | | `snap find notes` | `snap_find` | read | | `snap info thunderbird` | `snap_info` | read | | `snap install thunderbird [channel]` | `snap_install` | mutate | | `snap remove thunderbird` | `snap_remove` | mutate | | `snap list` | `snap_list` | read | | `snap refresh [name]` | `snap_refresh` | mutate | | `snap connections thunderbird` | `snap_connections` | read | New Phoebus desktop installs include `snapd` and enable `snapd.socket`; systemd starts the socket on boot. Snap application installs still receive their own review and approval. Systems installed before this change, and minimal installations, need a separate reviewed setup step: ```sh sys install app-containers/snapd --legacy --portage sys enable snapd.socket --legacy sys start snapd.socket --legacy sys install --legacy --snap ``` Run these on the installed system, not on the live installer. The resolver prints the setup commands when the daemon is missing. AppArmor availability determines the confinement reported by `snap debug confinement`; a running daemon alone does not imply strict confinement. New installs include the scoped `sys-fs/squashfs-tools lzma lzo` USE settings required by Gentoo's snapd ebuild. An existing installation made before that setting was added may need the same line in `/etc/portage/package.use/phoebus-snap` before the Portage step. Confinement is detected (`strict`/`partial`/`none`); `--classic` is only used when the typed action sets `"classic": true` and is shown in the review. The plan notes that snapd also refreshes automatically. ### AppImage (opt-in; managed, not sandboxed) | Phrase | Typed action | Kind | | --- | --- | --- | | `appimage import /path/App.AppImage` | `appimage_import` | mutate | | *(JSON only)* | `appimage_acquire` | mutate | | *(JSON only)* | `appimage_update` | mutate | | `appimage remove name` | `appimage_remove` | mutate | | `appimage info name` | `appimage_info` | read | | `appimage list` | `appimage_list` | read | Acquisition requires a pinned SHA-256 and a public URL without credentials, query or fragment; a placeholder or mismatch is refused and the download is discarded. Architecture is read from the ELF header without executing the image. Managed files live in `/opt/phoebus/appimages`, where a normal desktop account can launch them and read their inventory. Desktop entries are installed, and user data is preserved on removal unless `"purge_data": true`. AppImage provides **no application sandbox** and is described as such. Images imported by older builds into the private `/var/lib/phoebus/appimages` directory must be re-imported by an administrator from that original file; the current import writes the accessible path and replaces its desktop entry. The old file is left in place for explicit cleanup. ### Custom ebuilds (Phoebus overlay) | Phrase | Typed action | Kind | | --- | --- | --- | | `ebuilds` / `custom ebuilds` | `custom_ebuild_list` | read | | *(JSON only)* | `custom_ebuild_prepare` | mutate | | *(JSON only)* | `custom_ebuild_install` | mutate | | *(JSON only)* | `custom_ebuild_remove` | mutate | A custom ebuild is untrusted executable code. `custom_ebuild_prepare` writes it to `/var/db/repos/phoebus` with a rationale and the SHA-256 of its exact content; it does not build it. `custom_ebuild_install` requires that same digest, regenerates the `Manifest` and builds through Portage with its sandbox enabled. Editing the staged ebuild invalidates the approval. ### Package catalogue: search, inventory, information, updates, maintenance These are AI-first like every other operation. Without `--legacy` the request enters the connected model, which answers from **bounded, read-only evidence** (search, inventory, information, update checks). A source flag (`--portage`/`--flatpak`/`--nix`/`--snap`/`--appimage`/`--ebuild`) constrains the AI workflow: lane-selectable queries are rewritten to that lane and an action for any other lane is refused. It never bypasses the model. `--legacy` runs the same typed action deterministically with no model interaction. Every result distinguishes three honest states per lane: **unavailable** (tooling absent), **failed** (the tool ran and did not answer), and **empty** (a successful query with no results). Package facts are never invented. | Phrase | Typed action | Kind | | --- | --- | --- | | `search firefox` / `find firefox` | `search_packages` | read | | `list` / `list installed` / `list vim` | `list_packages` | read | | `info firefox` | `package_info` | read | | `updates` / `check updates` | `check_updates` | read | | `apply updates` / `upgrade` | `apply_updates` | mutate | | `depclean` / `autoremove` | `depclean` | mutate | | `clean cache` / `clean distfiles` | `clean_cache` | mutate | | `who owns /usr/bin/vim` | `package_owners` | read | | `deps vim` | `package_dependencies` (reverse=false) | read | | `rdeps vim` | `package_dependencies` (reverse=true) | read | Deterministic forms: On the desktop, launch **Phoebus Updates** or press Super+U. The update view checks sources without a model, and **Review & Apply** opens the same interactive `sudo sys apply updates --legacy` flow in Kitty. Portage compiles and other package progress stay visible through completion. DankMaterialShell is updated as a normal Portage package; the default DMS bar does not use its separate updater widget. ```sh sys search firefox --legacy # every source sys search firefox --legacy --flatpak # one source sys list --legacy # installed inventory, all lanes sys list vim --legacy --portage # inventory, source + text filter sys info firefox --legacy # version/source/status/deps/size sys updates --legacy # check only, no mutation sys apply updates --legacy # apply, per-source outcome sys depclean --legacy # Portage unused-dependency removal sys clean cache --legacy --nix # Nix GC sys who owns /usr/bin/vim --legacy # Portage file ownership sys deps vim --legacy # forward dependencies sys rdeps vim --legacy # reverse dependencies (equery) ``` During a terminal mutation, `sys` shows the package manager's output as it arrives: Portage build and merge logs, Flatpak transaction progress, Snap operations, Nix realisation, custom ebuild builds, and AppImage downloads. Carriage-return progress updates are displayed as well as complete lines. The current phase and slow-step heartbeat remain visible. Read-only queries return a composed report; the broker and assistant protocols keep their structured output. - **Search** covers Portage (`emerge --search`), Flatpak remote search, the Snap Store, Phoebus-managed AppImages, Nix (`nix search`, when online) and staged custom ebuilds. Entries show source, identity, version, description and installed status where the backend provides them. - **Inventory** covers the Portage VDB, `flatpak list`, `snap list`, Phoebus-managed AppImages and the **packages of the active Nix profiles** (parsed from each profile's `manifest.json`; historical generations and realised store paths are reported separately, never as installed programs). Custom ebuilds install through Portage and are listed once, under Portage. - **Information** combines installed copies (VDB metadata: version, size, repository, `DEPEND`/`RDEPEND`/`BDEPEND`) with resolved candidates and policy metadata. When more than one real package matches, the report is marked **ambiguous** and lists every match instead of guessing. - **Updates** check every supported lane. Applying a Flatpak or Snap update **executes exactly the reviewed transaction**: the plan binds the full Flatpak ref (`app/…/arch/branch`, from `remote-ls`) plus the installed and remote **full commits** (from `flatpak info`, since Flatpak's `commit` column is abbreviated), or the snap name plus its old/new revisions and tracking channel. Execution is pinned (`flatpak update --commit=`) and the source is revalidated immediately before its mutation — including after an earlier source has run — so a commit republished under an unchanged human version, a newly appearing update, or a change in the active installation aborts as stale. A source whose resolution failed is never re-discovered and executed later. `flatpak` and `snap` both require backend prerequisites and are refused explicitly when they cannot run. AppImage (pinned URL+SHA) and Nix (project/declarative) are refused as a system-level transaction rather than reported as updated. A source that was attempted and failed fails the whole action while the report still shows the sources that succeeded. Background **preparation** (`prepare updates`, `what are you compiling`) remains distinct from **activation**. - **Maintenance**: `depclean` records its removal set as **structured package effects** (not only prose) from `emerge --pretend --depclean` at review time, so a changed removal set is caught before execution; it refuses when the selection cannot be established, and preserves config files and user data. `clean cache` reviews each cleaner's real **non-destructive preview** (`eclean-dist`/`eclean-pkg` delete by default, so the preview passes `--pretend` with the same `--deep` selection as the destructive run; `nix-store --gc`'s documented preview is `--print-dead`) and binds the item set to approval; a cleaner that ran and failed propagates as a failed action while partial successes are preserved, and an unavailable cleaner is reported distinctly from one that found nothing. `package_owners` and `package_dependencies` use the installed VDB metadata (forward dependencies include already-satisfied and conditional/versioned dependencies, never the requested package itself; reverse dependencies exclude only a genuine self-reference where the *dependent* is the queried package) with `qdepends`/`equery` as the tree fallback, and report an explicit unsupported error when the tool is absent. - **Rooting**: every catalogue, update-check and maintenance command is built for the *intended target* — directly for `/`, or inside the target chroot for an alternate root. Snap acts on the running daemon and is therefore reported unavailable (and refused for mutation) for an alternate root rather than ever touching the host. - `sys inspect --legacy` is unchanged: `inspect` always means service inspection (use `info` for packages). Read-only catalogue actions (`search_packages`, `list_packages`, `package_info`, `check_updates`, `package_owners`, `package_dependencies`) need no root and write no transaction. `apply_updates`, `depclean` and `clean_cache` are mutating, require root, take a protective snapshot where available, and are recorded. ### Snapshots and rollback | Phrase | Typed action | Kind | | --- | --- | --- | | `snapshot before update` | `create_snapshot` | mutate | | `undo` / `rollback` | `undo` | mutate | | `undo status` | `rollback_status` | read | | `history` | `history` | read | Portage, Flatpak, Snap, Nix profile, managed AppImage and custom ebuild package changes take a protective coordinated root/var snapshot before mutation. `sys undo` restores a chosen snapshot on the next boot; `/home` remains outside that snapshot. Nix `prepare` only realises a development attribute and does not install it into a persistent profile. Direct user-managed Nix profile changes and snapd's automatic background refreshes are outside a `sys` transaction. ## Desktop assistant bridge (`sys --assistant-bridge`) The desktop assistant GUI (`phoebus-assistant`) is a lightweight Quickshell QML interface that delegates all logic to `sys --assistant-bridge`. The bridge runs a stdio JSON-RPC server speaking newline-delimited JSON messages: - `handshake`: validates client identity and checks active AI model connectivity. - `ask`: submits a conversational request (`install firefox`, `why is audio broken?`) into the shared AI workflow, returning a reviewed plan card for install, removal, general administration, or a follow-up confirmation. Every plan type carries the same `plan_id`/`digest` review and approval state; information and clarification replies carry no execution control. Removal is AI-first by default. - `execute`: executes exactly the referenced reviewed plan by plan ID and plan digest. The privileged broker repeats the full validation. - `legacy_install`: performs deterministic installation with an explicit backend. - `legacy_execute`: executes typed actions deterministically. - `clear_conversation`: deletes the persisted, minimized follow-up context. - `updates`: queries the unified multi-source update system across Portage, Flatpak, Snap, AppImage, and Nix. - `proactive_alerts`, `proactive_snooze`, `proactive_dismiss`: interacts with the quiet proactive system monitor. - `get_preferences`, `set_preferences`: inspects and edits the invoking user's package source profiles, project environment tool mappings, and keep-existing-source pins. Personal preferences are stored 0600/0700 under the user's own config (`~/.config/phoebus/package-preferences.toml`) without elevation; system defaults stay root-owned. When the write runs elevated the created paths are chowned to the initiating user, a non-root process acting for a different user is refused, and symlinked path components are rejected. A failed write is reported as an error, never as "saved". - `history`, `undo`: queries transaction logs and initiates recovery. Zero business logic lives in the GUI: equivalent CLI and GUI requests produce identical validated plans given the same facts and preferences. ## Privileged execution boundary A mutating plan is stored as a `PreparedPlan` in per-user storage (`/run/user//phoebus/plans`, mode 0700; a 0600 plan file; atomic write; a 128-bit unpredictable identifier). The plan is sealed with an integrity digest over the reviewed fields, the target root and the initiating uid. That seal is only a self-consistency check: the owner of the plan file can recompute it, so it is never treated as authentication. `execute_plan` validates the plan before elevation and again — authoritatively — inside the privileged broker (`sys --broker --execute-plan --plan-uid --approval-digest --root `). The broker: - **independently recomputes the canonical approval digest** from the exact executable actions, candidate and reviewed material effects, and requires it to equal both the digest stored in the plan and the independently supplied `--approval-digest`. Retaining an approved digest while swapping an action and resealing is therefore rejected for every plan kind (Install, LegacyInstall, Removal, General, Undo) before any command runs; - carries the digest the review card showed the user across authentication independently of the plan file, so a replacement plan under the same identifier is rejected even when it is resealed with a valid, self-consistent checksum; - rejects expired, modified, malformed, wrong-root or wrong-uid plans; - derives the initiating identity from the authenticated caller context (`PKEXEC_UID`), treating `--plan-uid` as untrusted input; - revalidates the current package/removal state after authentication, and again action-by-action at the execution boundary against the reviewed effects; - anchors consumption in a **root-owned approval ledger** (`/var/lib/phoebus/approvals`, 0700 / 0600, ADR 0014), keyed by a stable approval identity (plan id, canonical digest, initiating uid, target root). The key is claimed with `O_EXCL`, so at most one execution may run under concurrent submissions; a retry is refused even after the user deletes every file in their own plan directory; and editing only presentation fields (summary, rationale, verification) and resealing cannot mint a fresh record. A newly reviewed identical operation has a new plan id and is allowed. Each claim records its owning process; terminal statuses are published atomically once, are immutable, and recovery only marks an owner that is provably gone; - treats the plan file and its contents as untrusted input, resolving storage from the uid rather than an arbitrary path. Authentication happens outside model context through Polkit (`pkexec`), never passwordless sudo. Cancelling or refusing authentication performs no mutation and consumes nothing: authentication precedes the ledger claim. A failed, stale-plan, verification-failed or interrupted operation reaches a truthful terminal status. Each transaction records the outcome per action (`completed`, `failed`, `unattempted`) plus the protective snapshot, so a partial execution is visible and never reported as success. ## Transaction truthfulness Every mutation is recorded as an in-progress transaction **before** it runs. On action failure, verification failure, refusal or cancellation the same record is finished with a truthful result (`failed: …` / `verify failed: …`); completed steps and their protective snapshot are retained. A record that never reaches a terminal result is an interrupted operation, and its consumed plan cannot be replayed. A malformed broker reply is a protocol failure, never fabricated success. History persistence failures are surfaced, not swallowed. ## Conversation privacy Follow-up context is minimized before persistence: the raw request is never stored, only structured context (kind, application, candidate, rationale), and registered secrets are scrubbed with the active redactor. The history file is 0600 inside a 0700 directory, written atomically, bounded to ten turns, and can be cleared (`clear_conversation`) so it no longer informs later follow-ups. Redaction removes known secrets; it does not claim to detect arbitrary sensitive text, which is why raw requests are not persisted. ## Acceptance matrix The matrix below is the repeatable acceptance suite. `installer/tests/vm/sys-acceptance.sh` runs the deterministic, legacy, and JSON acceptance cases inside a booted, installed, detached VM and prints a machine-readable summary; it is safe to run with no network and no model. `sys-lane-operations.sh` exercises real Portage, Flatpak, AppImage and Nix mutations; `sys-custom-ebuild-operations.sh` stages, builds and removes a harmless package; `snap-guest.sh` covers Snap first use and refresh; and the `appimage-rollback-*` fixtures verify a non-Portage change across a detached rollback boot. All mutation fixtures require a validated disposable qcow2 VM. | # | Case | Command | Expected | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1 | Identity | `sys --version` | prints the version, exit 0 | | 2 | Read-only history (legacy) | `sys history --legacy` | state, exit 0, no mutation | | 3 | Undo status (legacy) | `sys undo status --legacy` | idle rollback state, exit 0 | | 4 | Non-root undo | `sys undo --legacy` (non-root) | requires root, exit nonzero | | 5 | AppImage inventory (empty) | `sys --legacy appimage list` | "no managed AppImages", exit 0 | | 6 | Ebuild inventory (empty) | `sys --legacy ebuilds` | "no custom ebuilds", exit 0 | | 7 | Invalid natural operand | `sys --legacy -- install --color=n` | rejected, nonzero | | 8 | Unknown phrase | `sys --legacy frobnicate` | rejected, nonzero, examples shown | | 9 | Audited action without legacy/broker | `sys --action '{"action":"history"}'` | fail closed, requires `--legacy` or `--broker` | | 10 | Legacy install without source | `sys install firefox --legacy` | refused: requires explicit source flag | | 11 | JSON unknown action | `--legacy --action '{"action":"run_shell"}'` | fail closed, nonzero | | 12 | JSON unknown field | `--legacy --action '{"action":"history","x":1}'` | fail closed, nonzero | | 13 | Option-like operand (JSON) | `install_package atom="-C"` | rejected before any command | | 14 | Invalid Snap name | `snap_install name="Bad Name"` | rejected, nonzero | | 15 | Invalid AppImage hash | `appimage_acquire sha256="00"` | rejected, nonzero | | 16 | Ebuild path traversal | `custom_ebuild_prepare atom="../../x"` | rejected, nonzero | | 17 | System-wide policy as non-root | `set_package_preference system_wide:true` | refused: needs root | | 17b | Personal preference as non-root | `set_package_preference` | saved to user config, no `/etc` write | | 18 | Offline `sys ask` | `sys ask ""` with no provider | deterministic fallback, nonzero | | 19 | Choose with no lane | `sys --root / choose unused-xyz --legacy` | selection or clear failure, never invented | | 20 | Conflicting backend flags | `sys install x --flatpak --nix` | rejected by CLI | | 21 | Source flag without install | `sys --flatpak history --legacy` | rejected by CLI | | 22 | Unqualified with no model | `sys install firefox` (no provider) | deterministic offer printed, nothing installed | | 23 | Read-only investigation | `--legacy --action '{"action":"check_backend",...}'` | structured JSON evidence returned | | 24 | Legacy unified search | `sys search firefox --legacy` | "Package catalogue", exit 0 | | 25 | Legacy inventory | `sys list --legacy` | "Package catalogue", exit 0 | | 26 | Legacy package information | `sys info bash --legacy` | "Package information", exit 0 | | 27 | Legacy update check | `sys updates --legacy` | "Unified Update Overview", exit 0 | | 28 | Legacy JSON search | `--legacy --action '{"action":"search_packages","query":"firefox"}'` | catalogue, exit 0 | | 29 | Search without a model | `sys search firefox` (no provider) | nonzero; exact `sys search firefox --legacy` offered; nothing searched | | 30 | Source flag constrains the AI | `sys search firefox --flatpak` (no provider) | nonzero; `... --legacy --flatpak` offered; not bypassed | | 31 | Non-root depclean | `sys depclean --legacy` (non-root) | requires root, nonzero | | 32 | Non-root apply updates | `sys apply updates --legacy` (non-root) | requires root, nonzero | | 33 | Non-root cache cleanup | `sys clean cache --legacy` (non-root) | requires root, nonzero | | 34 | Non-root source build | `sys --legacy --action '{"action":"convert_to_source","app":"firefox"}'` (non-root) | requires root, nonzero | | 35 | Non-root tuned kernel | `sys build tuned kernel --legacy` (non-root) | requires root, nonzero | | 36 | Brave source refusal (root, no mutation) | `--legacy --action '{"action":"convert_to_source","app":"brave"}'` (root) | nonzero, "no trustworthy source route"; refused before approval/commands | | 37 | Unknown source refusal (root, no mutation) | `--legacy --action '{"action":"convert_to_source","app":"definitely-not-an-app-xyz"}'` (root) | nonzero, "no supported source build" | ### Mutating acceptance cases (disposable VM only) When `SYS_ACCEPTANCE_MUTATE=1` is set in the disposable VM: - `mutate-install`: `sys -y install app-misc/hello --legacy --portage` installs and verifies via `emerge -p`. - `mutate-remove`: `sys -y remove app-misc/hello --legacy` uninstalls cleanly. - `mutate-history`: `sys history --legacy` confirms both install and remove are logged. The read-only and failure acceptance cases (37, including the personal-preference case and the catalogue group) are exercised by the test suite (`installer/tests/vm/sys-acceptance.sh`); the broker approval/replay regression is covered by `phoebus-installer` unit tests. Host unit and integration tests in `crates/phoebus-installer/tests/sys_cli.rs`, `crates/phoebus-core/`, and `crates/phoebus-executor/` cover proposal validation, digest matching, lane policy, cross-source removal, catalogue parsing, per-source failures/ambiguity, the AI-default routing contract, and the source constraint. ## Security properties - **No shell.** Every command is an argument vector through `phoebus-executor::Exec`; there is no `sh -c` on any path. - **Validated at the boundary.** Every action (manual, JSON, or AI) is re-validated before a command is built; option-like operands are rejected. - **Target-root isolation.** Alternate-root operations are chrooted; runtime operations (services, Snap) refuse an alternate root. - **Approval binding.** A resolved plan has a digest; a material change between review and execution aborts. A custom ebuild binds approval to its content digest. - **Secrets** travel only through mode-0600 files/stdin and are redacted from logs and history.