# Handoff Rolling note between work sessions. **Update this file before you finish**, then commit it. It should be short and current; use `git log` for detail. - **Last updated:** this session (2026-09-25), adversarial hardening of the privileged approval boundary: (1) the broker recomputes the canonical approval digest for every plan kind, (2) the ledger uses a stable approval identity instead of the editable integrity seal, (3) crash recovery is live-safe and terminal transitions are atomic/monotonic, and (4) personal writes are owned by the initiating user. See ADR 0014. Supersedes the `0be3010` approval design; that commit's UX/docs changes are preserved. - **Current focus:** 1. **Canonical digest at the privileged boundary (`service::validate_prepared_plan`):** - Independently re-derives `compute_plan_digest(actions, candidate, effects, step_effects)` and requires it to equal both `plan.digest` and the supplied `--approval-digest`. Covers Install, LegacyInstall, Removal, General and Undo. The stored `integrity` seal is only a self-consistency check and is never treated as authentication. - **Per-step effect binding:** execution trusts `step_effects`, so the canonical digest now hashes every step (contents recomputed, not read from the stored digest); each stored step digest must match its contents, and the aggregate must be the concatenation of the steps. A multi-action plan without per-step effects is refused. Install/LegacyInstall keep the install-specific digest with the single step required to equal the aggregate. This closes the "retain the approved digest, change only `step_effects`, recompute the seal" gap; rejected before any command runs or approval is consumed. The earlier-step allowance in `approval_holds` is unchanged. 2. **Stable approval identity (`phoebus_installer::approval`, ADR 0014):** - Ledger + `.claim` key = `approval_key(plan_id, canonical_digest, initiator_uid, target_root)`. Presentation fields (summary, rationale, verification) are excluded, so editing them and resealing cannot mint a fresh record for a consumed approval; a newly reviewed identical operation with a new plan id is allowed. - Claims record the owning process (`pid`, `/proc//stat` start ticks, boot id). Terminal status is published once via an atomic hard link into `.terminal` and is immutable. `reconcile_interrupted` only marks a record interrupted when the owner is provably gone, so a live operation (or a second broker starting concurrently) is never mislabelled, and it cannot race a real `finish`. 3. **Personal write ownership (`phoebus_executor::personal`):** - `write_private` creates the config/state path one component at a time under the resolved home, rejecting symlinks and non-directories. - Elevated writes (effective root on behalf of a non-root user) chown the created paths to the initiating user's uid/gid (via a standard-library `chown` behind an injectable `OwnerFixer`). A non-root process acting for a different user is refused. Proactive state now routes through the same path. 4. **Reviewed effects + terminal transactions** (`service::execute_prepared`, unchanged this session): reviewed per-step effects are carried forward and freshly resolved effects are evidence compared with `phoebus_core::effects::approval_holds`; every path after `transaction::begin` reaches a terminal result. - **Last verified (this session):** - `cargo fmt --all -- --check` clean. - `cargo test --workspace`: 602 passed, 0 failed. New per-step binding adversarial tests: single-action and multi-action General plans with `step_effects` swapped (with and without a matching aggregate) while the approved digest is retained are rejected before any command, ledger claim or transaction; a legitimate bound multi-step plan still validates. New CLI regression: a personal preference succeeds when the system transaction directory is read-only. The prior session's adversarial tests all still pass. - `cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets` exits 0 (only the pre-existing `result_large_err`, one arg-count and one `DiskPhase` lints remain). - `cargo build --release -p phoebus-installer` clean. - **Disposable installed VM (qcow2, detached boot):** LUKS unlock + login; PID 1 `systemd`, `systemd is-system-running = running`; `sys 0.1.0`; `sys history --legacy` exit 0; `installer/tests/vm/sys-acceptance.sh` with the fixed `sys` reports `SUMMARY PASS=24 FAIL=0` (includes `personal-preference PASS saved to user config` and `nonroot-systemwide` correctly refused). - Two defects found and fixed by the VM run: (a) the installer `finalize` `sys` probe ran the AI-first `sys history` and aborted a `--no-ai` install; it now runs `sys history --legacy` (`phoebus-executor::sys_runtime`, unit-tested); (b) a personal preference wrote the preference but then failed recording it in the root-owned `/var/lib/phoebus/transactions.toml`; personal preferences are now excluded from the system transaction history. - **Not yet verified this session (BLOCKED):** - The privileged `sys --broker --execute-plan` path and replay rejection were **not** exercised end-to-end in the VM: the serial console has no root access and no Polkit agent (`sudo -n` denied), so `pkexec` elevation cannot complete. These paths remain unit-tested at the `execute_plan_privileged` entry point (replacement, recomputed digest, step_effects tampering, replay, concurrency, interruption). A graphical/seat-providing VM or a passwordless-sudo test image is required for the end-to-end run. - The existing `test-disk.qcow2` still cannot be unlocked (unknown passphrase); do not guess or brute-force. A clean re-install with the fixed installer is running at the time of writing (`verify-disk2.qcow2`); its result is recorded in the follow-up if it completes. - No AI provider credential is present; do not invent one. - A real privileged `chown` (running as root) could not be exercised on this unprivileged host; verified through the injectable fixer seam and the cross-uid refusal test. - **Public repo:** (remote `origin`, SSH port 2222). ## Next actions (in order) 1. **Unlock or rebuild the installed VM (blocker).** The installed disk reaches the LUKS prompt but its passphrase is unknown; the committed harness default is rejected. Either supply the real passphrase or perform a fresh disposable install (~2 h) to obtain an installed system, then run the full 12-step acceptance list below. 2. **Installed `sys` acceptance** on the booted disk: ```sh # serve the static sys first: cp installer-rs/target/x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/release/sys /home/dominic/vmlab/serve/ env DISK=/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/disks/.qcow2 \ OVMF_CODE=/usr/share/OVMF/OVMF_CODE_4M.fd \ OVMF_VARS=/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/OVMF_VARS.fd \ BOOT_CHECKS='... curl .../sys ...; SYS_BIN=/tmp/sys bash .../sys-acceptance.sh ...' \ python3 installer/tests/vm/serial-driver.py boot ``` The new broker behaviour (replacement during authentication, replay after deleting user plan state, cancellation) is already covered by `phoebus-installer` unit tests; the installed run confirms the sealed elevation path and the personal-preference acceptance case. 3. **AI-selected install journey (needs an authorised provider)**: boot the installed disk, serve the built `sys` and a 0600 key file, then: ```sh sudo sys --ai-provider deepseek --ai-api-key-file /run/phoebus/ai.key \ install # and the no-model control in the same run: PHOEBUS_AI_PROVIDER= sudo sys install ``` Confirm the model requests evidence, the resolver confirms the candidate, the plan is presented before approval, and the transaction is recorded. No credential is available here; do not invent one. 4. **Rollback VM acceptance** (`serial-driver.py rollback`) on a cloned disposable image of the installed system. 5. **NVIDIA hardware acceptance (BLOCKED)**: needs an NVIDIA GPU. 6. **Interactive graphical user session** login into Mango / DankMaterialShell under a physical seat or nested Wayland compositor. ## Known blockers / risks - **A full VM install still takes hours** (base stage ~116 min). Use the already installed disposable disk (clone it) for `sys install` journeys rather than a fresh install. - **No NVIDIA GPU** (and no authorised passthrough). - **Snap needs network and AppArmor** for meaningful confinement; the lane detects confinement honestly. - **AppImage provides no sandbox**; do not describe it as one. - **Custom ebuilds remain separately reviewed, untrusted artifacts**; the install workflow never builds one during investigation. - **OpenCode transport** concatenates messages, so multi-turn investigation is best-effort there; the direct providers carry the full conversation. - Harness artifacts live under `/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/` (outside git). ## Environment notes - Dev host: Ubuntu 26.04. QEMU/OVMF/xorriso/rustfmt/clippy/ImageMagick/visudo present. `flatpak` and `snap` clients are present on the host (not proof of the VM lanes). - VM harnesses: `installer/tests/vm/{gui-driver,serial-driver,appliance-driver,live-driver}.py` and `sys-acceptance.sh`. `DISK` must be a disposable qcow2; never `/dev/*`. - Serve fixtures from `/home/dominic/vmlab/serve` with `python3 -m http.server 8000 --bind 127.0.0.1` (reachable as `10.0.2.2:8000`). - The static binaries for the VM: `make static` builds `phoebus-installer` and `sys` under `installer-rs/target/x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/release/`. ## Definition of a good stopping point - `make test` passes; `docs/STATUS.md` and `docs/CHANGELOG.md` updated; `docs/HANDOFF.md` updated; committed (via `scripts/agent-commit.sh`) and pushed (`scripts/publish.sh`).