# Changelog All notable changes are recorded here. The authoritative history is `git log`; this file is the curated, human-readable summary. ## Unreleased — Fast defaults with user-controlled source builds - **Automatic wallpaper colors by default (2026-10-02).** New DMS profiles select Theme Color → Auto, deriving their accent from the bundled wallpaper when matugen is installed. The session fills a missing theme choice in an existing settings file without changing other settings, and preserves an explicitly chosen theme. - **First-login wallpaper and profile initials (2026-10-02).** Mango now seeds DMS's wallpaper session state with `~/Pictures/Wallpapers/aurora-lagoon.jpg` and opens the wallpaper browser in that folder, including on the live desktop. Existing choices are kept. The installer creates a letter avatar for the installation user before greeter login; the session creates one for later accounts that have no `~/.face`. AccountsService uses a chosen profile image ahead of this fallback. The disposable VM displayed the aurora and a “P” avatar, and session/provisioning tests covered first use and preservation. - **DMS cursor and responsive Settings (2026-10-02).** Phoebus now includes DMS's managed Mango cursor fragment from the first session, so the Theme & Colors cursor controls no longer require a manual Add/Setup step. Existing user configs gain the include once while preserving their other settings; removing it later remains the user's choice. Settings now opens at 65% of the current output width and 80% of its height instead of a fixed 900×700, while its expand/restore button still works. The existing disposable QEMU VM confirmed approximately 1092×840 at 1680×1050 and 832×614 at 1280×768; DMS's include resolver reported the cursor fragment present. - **Desktop controls, welcome and offline help (2026-10-01).** Audited the running disposable QEMU desktop across the top bar, control center, DMS Settings, DMS onboarding and both Phoebus welcome variants. The Assistant now opens as a 900×650 floating scratchpad; Super+A and Escape hide it, and Super+A restores the same Quickshell process and conversation. A tab row layout fix keeps controls visible. Phoebus Welcome closes its Quickshell process so it can reopen, floats at 720×600, and places its Help, DMS tour and finish actions above optional builds. DMS Welcome is reachable from that window, a desktop entry and Super+Alt+W. A new local HTML Phoebus Help guide covers daily use, `sys`, recovery and keybindings; it opens from the launcher, Welcome and Super+F1. The live image manifest includes Firefox ESR and `xdg-utils` so this local page opens there. The live Welcome now routes Network, display and text controls to their exact DMS Settings pages, exposes the offline guide, installation help and DMS Welcome, and explains an absent installer log. The Settings window rule now accepts maximize requests from DMS, so its expand/restore button changes the window size under Mango. First login seeds Kitty as the terminal and Firefox/Thunderbird for HTML/mail links only when the user has not chosen defaults. The existing installed QEMU playground verified the UI paths and offline Help; a fresh ISO/install remains pending the host space gate. - **Settings size and VM pointer alignment (2026-10-01).** DMS Settings now opens at 900×700 on new Mango profiles. The interactive QEMU launcher uses unscaled 2D VirtIO output and an absolute USB tablet by default after both GTK and SDL VirGL viewers on the host showed image scaling with offset clicks. VirGL remains available through `--graphics gl`. The existing disposable VM confirmed the larger Settings window and an aligned click on its close control; a fresh install is still pending the host space gate. - **Desktop wallpapers (2026-10-01).** Four original, offline 16:9 wallpapers now ship with the installer and live desktop: desert dusk, aurora lagoon, carved stone and misty lake. Installation seeds the current user's `Pictures/Wallpapers` folder and `/etc/skel` for future users without overwriting existing files. The live medium seeds the same folder. - **Virtual machine guest integration (2026-10-01).** The installer now detects QEMU/KVM, VMware and VirtualBox, selects matching guest packages and Mesa video targets, and enables their applicable services. Mango gains `wlr-randr`, a corrected low-resolution check, a preferred-mode change watcher and the session agents for SPICE/VirtualBox channels. The interactive QEMU launcher can select VirGL when requested and provides a guest-agent port. The visible playground was restarted with VirGL (`+virgl`) and displayed the desktop. GTK GL window scaling later proved to offset clicks on this host; native guest resolution change on GTK resize and VMware/VirtualBox sessions remain unverified. A concurrent assistant handshake test now uses the same personal-storage environment lock as the state-writing tests, eliminating a full-suite race found during verification. See `docs/VIRTUAL-MACHINES.md`. - **Nix commands available after installation (2026-10-01).** `sys install cmatrix --legacy --nix` now installs into a persistent shared Nix profile instead of only realising a temporary shell. Phoebus adds both the shared profile and the normal user's XDG Nix profile to `PATH` before starting the Mango desktop, imports that path into the user manager, and verifies the installed profile and executable names. `nix prepare` remains the temporary realisation action. The existing playground was updated and passed an installed-system VM boot with real `cmatrix` install, executable, shell PATH, inventory and session-script checks (9/9). A fresh ISO/install has not yet included this change. - **Visible package operations and lane reliability (2026-10-01).** Human `sys` sessions stream package-manager output while commands run, including Portage compilation, Flatpak progress, Snap changes, Nix realisation, custom ebuild builds and pinned AppImage downloads. CR progress updates are shown as well as complete lines; broker and assistant protocols remain structured. Update reports now distinguish a checked, current source from an unavailable or manual lane. A root-owned system lock no longer blocks unprivileged personal preferences. Managed AppImages moved to the readable `/opt/phoebus/appimages` path so desktop accounts can launch and inventory them; AppImages previously imported under the private path need to be re-imported with the new `sys` binary. Custom ebuild removal now preserves its recipe and reports failure if Portage cannot unmerge the installed package. Flatpak, Snap and AppImage mutations now request protective root/var snapshots for `sys undo`. On a validated disposable encrypted overlay, the final `sys` passed a 22-case real-lane cycle, a 75-case six-source read-only matrix, a 9-case custom ebuild cycle and a 12-case Snap cycle. A two-boot AppImage rollback passed 11/11, restoring the managed file and root state while preserving `/home`. The running visible playground was updated to the tested static `sys`, with its installed binary hash verified. A fresh ISO/install and physical hardware remain unverified. - **Assistant startup and Snap availability (2026-10-01).** Fixed the installed assistant's Quickshell window: `FloatingWindow` rejected `palette` and `minimumHeight`, so the configuration never loaded. The palette now belongs to a Controls ancestor, window size uses implicit dimensions, and model status follows the bridge's asynchronous handshake and shows a connecting message while it is pending. New Mango desktops install `snapd` and enable its socket so `sys find` can query the Snap Store after boot. Existing desktops can use the reviewed first-use commands in `docs/SYS.md`. The final assistant QML opened in the disposable graphical VM and reached `Connected (opencode)` after its handshake. In that older VM, reviewed `sys` actions installed `snapd` 2.63 and activated `snapd.socket`; `snap find` and `sys find glances` returned Store results with the Snap lane ready. The new desktop default awaits a fresh installed VM check. - **Readable `sys` progress (2026-10-01).** The terminal now names the active planning, evidence, effect-checking, execution and verification steps, shows a slow command's operation, and repeats the current step every ten seconds. Success and failure are visually distinct; command arguments and output are excluded from progress. Informational model answers are wrapped as prose without an irrelevant approval digest. Broker JSON and the assistant stdio protocol remain unchanged. Unit and CLI integration tests cover the progress lifecycle, redaction, heartbeat, wrapping and protocol boundary. A disposable visible playground run showed a legacy history command and a real OpenCode question with the new progress and concise answer rendering. - **Desktop administrator authentication (2026-10-01).** Installed systems now give polkit the same `wheel` administrator group used by sudo. In the visible disposable VM, the default root-only polkit prompt rejected the known-good user password because root was locked. After applying the rule to that VM, a graphical `pkexec /usr/bin/id -u` prompt accepted the user password and returned `0`. The installer now writes the rule through `TargetRoot`; the existing ISO predates this fix and needs a new candidate. - **Installer and desktop reliability work (2026-10-01).** Armed BLS boot counting only after creating the initial recovery snapshot, corrected the boot-counter filename parser, and required the upstream failed-unit check before `boot-complete.target` and `systemd-bless-boot` confirm a counted boot. The default boot entry permits recovery fallback after exhausted attempts. Btrfs swapfile allocation sets NOCOW first and fails closed. Installed desktop assets have readable permissions, the DMS user service link points into the installed system, and PipeWire/WirePlumber units are enabled. First-login seeding now creates DMS's versioned changelog marker. A graphical seat check found that Mango never started the installed Phoebus welcome: its session did not run XDG autostart. The session now starts that welcome explicitly; the QML uses fixed, unprivileged actions in place of an undefined backend and has correctly sized cards. On a patched disposable install, the first-login welcome and its Escape/seen-marker flow passed the graphical desktop gate **30/30**. The live welcome launcher and locale dropdown keyboard flow were repaired. GURU-only Zsh plugins moved from the base package set to Mango, where the overlay is synced before installation. ISO assembly replays boot metadata so the MBR partition fits the remastered image; compression has bounded workers and memory. Release reports bind gates to an ISO hash and clean source revision, and require two installs, detached boot, recovery, fallback, desktop, rollback, interruption, real model and CI evidence before publish. The final candidate ISO (SHA-256 `b14f37e1b04d8e1ec37f77d2a14adb4aaef652770fee995a18a0ac7b986b5281`) passed the live UEFI graphical gate (32/32) and real OpenCode installer flow (18/18). Its embedded installer and `sys` hashes match the static build; BIOS and UEFI boot entries and image partitions were verified. Two independent encrypted Mango/Nix installs from this ISO passed 5/5 each. The fresh installed system passed detached counted-boot assessment 5/5, offline recovery 6/6, failed-boot fallback 9/9, graphical desktop 30/30, package/root rollback 11/11 and interrupted-update recovery 10/10. The desktop screenshot showed the first-login welcome and no DMS changelog. Both installs logged a nonfatal busy LUKS mapper during final cleanup. VM logs and results redact registered credentials, and model UI password input uses stdin. Release gate output handles multibyte text without panicking. Rust format, Clippy and workspace tests pass. Forgejo CI now runs `make check` directly so missing tooling fails the job. An intermediate ISO with the corrected boot and DMS behavior passed its live checks but was superseded before its installs completed when the missing installed welcome launch was found. - **System-wide stability audit & zero-panic hardening (2026-09-30).** Exhaustive codebase verification, bug remediation, and panic elimination across all crates: 1. Zero Unhandled Panics & Robust Error Handling: - `phoebus-installer::release`: Replaced `.unwrap()` in `ReleaseManifest::save` and `GateLedger::save` with safe propagation of `std::io::Error`. - `phoebus-core::brand`: Replaced unsafe slice index panic in `rgb(hex)` with `try_rgb(hex) -> Option<(u8, u8, u8)>` and safe default fallback. Replaced `.expect()` in `palette_json()`. - `phoebus-executor::chooser`: Eliminated `matches.pop().unwrap()` in package atom candidate resolution. - `phoebus-installer::service::plan`: Replaced `.unwrap()` in `select_removal_copy` with `.ok_or_else()` to return clean errors if copy resolution is empty. - `phoebus-ai`: Replaced `.expect("reason checked above")` with safe matching and empty fallback in proposal review. - `phoebus-executor::rollback`: Replaced `expect("auto-confirm never fails")` in internal maintenance authorization with safe `Result` propagation. 2. Desktop Checkpoints & Undo Symmetry: - `phoebus-executor::desktop_config`: Resolved sub-second timestamp collisions by switching checkpoint directory timestamps to microsecond precision with sequence collision checks (`{timestamp}_{label}_{seq}`). - Tracked pre-mutation file presence in checkpoint `metadata.ini`, allowing `undo_latest_checkpoint` to cleanly remove newly created configuration files when no prior file existed. - Hardened MangoWM keybinding generation with structured `toml` table serialization, guaranteeing valid TOML syntax and proper escaping for complex shell commands with nested quotes. 3. Model Context Protocol (MCP) Standards Conformance: - `phoebus-mcp`: Implemented standard JSON-RPC 2.0 error handling for malformed JSON frames (error code `-32700`, Parse Error) and missing/invalid tool params (error code `-32602`, Invalid Params), preventing server silent aborts or broken agent pipes. 4. Agent Containment Jail Hardening: - `phoebus-executor::agent_jail`: Sanitized `extra_masked_subdirs` to reject directory traversal components (`..`) and leading slashes. Enabled mock/recording runner testability when `bwrap` is not present on the build host. 5. Btrfs Swapfile Hardening: - `phoebus-executor::storage`: Ensured `chattr +C` (NOCOW) is executed on the parent `@swap` directory and on the empty 0-byte file prior to truncation, avoiding Btrfs `EINVAL` on allocated extents. Enforced secure mode `0600` permissions on the swapfile. 6. Inter-Process Lock Drop Verification: - `phoebus-executor::system_lock`: Validated lockfile PID ownership before unlinking on drop, guaranteeing that a dropping handle never unlinks a lock acquired by another process. Gates: `cargo fmt --all -- --check`, `cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings`, `cargo test --workspace` (all passed: 54 adversarial tests, 39 CLI tests, 9 flaw tests, 4 MCP tests, 5 desktop config tests, 3 agent jail tests, 4 AI e2e tests, 4 storage tests, 2 system lock tests). - **System stability & reliability hardening: Advisory Mutation Lock, Atomic Transactions, System Health & Context-Aware Guidance (2026-09-30).** Hardened system operations against race conditions, database drift, and usability friction: 1. Inter-Process Advisory Mutation Lock (`SystemLock`): - `phoebus-executor::system_lock`: Atomic `O_CREAT | O_EXCL` file locking (`/run/phoebus/sys.lock` with PID & timestamp metadata) guarding mutating system operations. Safe PID-liveness verification via `/proc/` reclaims stale locks left by killed processes. 2. Coordinated Snapshot Pairing for All High-Risk Actions: - `phoebus-executor::actions`: Upgraded protective pre-mutation snapshotting to `snapshot::create_set_and_record`, ensuring paired `@` and `@var` snapshots are always committed together so `/var/db/pkg` Portage database state stays consistent across rollbacks. 3. Durable Atomic Transaction Persistence: - `phoebus-core::transaction`: Replaced direct-file writes with tempfile creation, data flush, `sync_all()`, and atomic `rename()`, preventing corrupt or partial transaction records upon sudden reboot or power loss. 4. Unified System Health & Status Overview: - `SystemAction::SystemStatus`: Added first-class health inspection action (`sys status`, `sys health`, `sys check`) reporting bootloader BLS entries and Automatic Boot Assessment counters, reboot flags, storage headroom vs the 10 GiB safety gate, snapshot recovery points, and package lane readiness. 5. Intuitive Natural Grammar & Context-Aware Legacy Guidance: - Standardized natural commands: `update` and `updates` map to `CheckUpdates`, `upgrade` maps to `ApplyUpdates`. - In `sys install --legacy`, candidates are dynamically resolved across lanes via `chooser::resolve_candidates` to present actionable, copy-pasteable commands for packages that exist in Flatpak, Portage, Snap, etc. Gates: `cargo fmt`, `cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets`, `cargo test --workspace` (all passed). Hardened system reliability across boots, updates, and package installations: 1. systemd Automatic Boot Assessment (`bootctl mark-good` + BLS boot counter fallback): - `phoebus-core::boot`: BLS filename parsing/formatting adhering to the systemd-boot specification (`+[,].conf`). Recovery entries (`phoebus-recovery.conf`) are strictly unmetered to guarantee an always-accessible fallback target. - `phoebus-executor::boot_assessment`: Implemented `phoebus-boot-confirm.service` (runs `bootctl mark-good` after `multi-user.target` with zero failed units), `enable_boot_counting` to arm new kernels, and systemd service installation in `etc/systemd/system/multi-user.target.wants`. 2. Preflight Safety Gates: - `phoebus-executor::update`: `check_update_preflight` verifies >=10 GiB free space on root filesystem prior to update mutations, preventing filesystem exhaustion and package database corruption. - `create_pre_update_snapshot_set`: Coordinates paired `@` (root) and `@var` (Portage DB state) Btrfs snapshots so package rollbacks never leave an inconsistent package database. 3. Tiered Update Channels: - `phoebus-core::update::UpdateChannel`: Introduced `Core` (security/kernel/core only), `Proven` (default workstation channel with bi-weekly vetted desktop/Mesa/PipeWire snapshots), and `Edge` (rolling `~amd64`). 4. Mandatory Prebuilt Kernel Default: - Workstation kernel default strictly enforces `sys-kernel/gentoo-kernel-bin` (`KernelChoice::Bin` / `KernelProfile::Safe`) to prevent unexpected multi-hour compilation timeouts. Gates: `cargo fmt`, `cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets`, `cargo test --workspace` (all passed). - **Userspace-directed AI agent framework (2026-09-30).** Implemented a Two-Tier AI architecture supporting userspace developer and desktop agents (Claude Code, OpenCode, Cursor, Codex) while strictly maintaining the unbrickable `sys` broker boundary and eliminating Omarchy's security vulnerabilities (bash glue command injection, credential exposure, and lack of rollback). New components: 1. `phoebus-executor::agent_jail` & `phoebus-agent-run`: unprivileged Bubblewrap boundary with automatic credential masking (`~/.ssh`, `~/.gnupg`, keyrings, `.aws`, `.config/gh`) and workspace scoping. 2. `phoebus-executor::desktop_config` & `phoebus-desktop`: typed, schema-validated MangoWM and DarkMaterialShell configuration management with automatic snapshot checkpoints and one-click `undo`. 3. `phoebus-mcp`: standardized Model Context Protocol JSON-RPC 2.0 stdio server exposing typed desktop theming, keybinding controls, and safe escalation tools. 4. `sys propose`: unprivileged plan staging bridge allowing userspace agents to propose system packages and changes into user storage for human Polkit review. 5. Fixed directory creation race condition on concurrent parent directory creation in `phoebus-executor::personal`. Gates: `cargo fmt`, `clippy --workspace --all-targets`, `cargo test --workspace` all pass. - **Three explicit kernel choices (2026-09-29).** Kernel selection is now a first-class three-way choice rather than only a prebuilt-vs-source config enum: `bin` (the default `sys-kernel/gentoo-kernel-bin`, no compile), `balanced` (source-built `sys-kernel/gentoo-kernel` with the broad distribution configuration — the fragment makes common hot-plug drivers explicit as modules: USB Ethernet chipsets, USB mass storage, USB serial, and removable-media filesystems such as exFAT/NTFS3), and `tuned` (the same broad coverage plus one conservative optimization; no driver is dropped). New typed action `BuildBalancedKernel { make_default }` and phrase `sys build balanced kernel`; both source choices keep `gentoo-kernel-bin` installed as the known-good fallback and create a separate BLS entry (`phoebus-balanced.conf` / `phoebus-tuned.conf`) that is only promoted after a test boot. Core: `fastinstall::{KernelChoice, kernel_build_plan, balanced_kernel_plan, kernel_build_review}`; `system::{balanced_kernel_config, tuned_kernel_config}`; executor `kernel::build_balanced_kernel` (refactored from the tuned path). Gates: `cargo fmt`, `clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings`, `cargo test --workspace` 849 passed / 0 failed. VM journeys for the balanced/tuned builds and source conversion are in progress (multi-hour compiles). - **OpenCode is now a standard transport (2026-09-29).** The OpenCode backend was special-cased twice: it ran **outside** the model sandbox (a comment called it "a different trust boundary") and its endpoint policy was stricter than the direct provider's (plain `http` only to loopback). Both are now unified. The OpenCode transport runs in the **same OS-level sandbox** as the direct transport unless `--no-sandbox` is given; its curl calls inline the request body into the hidden stdin config (the sandbox's `PrivateTmp` would hide a temp file). A **network** OpenCode server works over `https` as before, and a remote plain-`http` server is permitted with the explicit `--opencode-insecure-http` opt-in (credentials/prompts travel in cleartext, so it is off by default; `PHOEBUS_OPENCODE_INSECURE_HTTP=1` also enables it). VM re-verification with the real host agent (`serial-boot-20260929T114319Z-c43c2a92`, driver PASS=8, sandbox on by default): `list`/`search` valid plans, constrained install gated before mutation, hostile instruction refused. Gates: `cargo fmt`, `clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings`, `cargo test --workspace` 845 passed / 0 failed. - **Headless read-only probes can no longer block; real-agent VM re-verification (2026-09-29).** Driving the powerful model (host `opencode` agent, `deepseek-v4.1-flash`) with `sys` **inside the VM**, a `sys ask "search for firefox"` hung: the AI investigation ran Flatpak, whose `search` hard-codes a privileged `appstream-update`, and polkit fell back to a `pkttyagent` password prompt on the headless console. Fix: `CommandSpec::detached()` runs host-root Flatpak commands in a new session with no controlling terminal (`setsid --wait`), so the prompt is impossible; the refresh fails fast and Flatpak uses cached data. Falls back when `setsid` is absent. Also fixed a prompt gap: the install/assistant prompts listed a `kind` argument without its allowed values, so a capable model emitted `kind:"gui"`; both prompts now enumerate `base-system|desktop-app|developer-tool|cli-tool|unclassified` and clarify that `gui` is a separate boolean. VM re-verification with the real agent (`serial-boot-20260929T111941Z-2be30b89`, driver PASS=8; zero auth prompts): `list` and `search` return valid, evidence-grounded Assistant Plans, the hostile instruction is refused, and the constrained install stops before any mutation. Gates: `cargo fmt`, `clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings`, `cargo test --workspace` 844 passed / 0 failed. - **VM live AI: real capable agent, and a local-model prompt fix (2026-09-29).** Booted the golden overlay and, from inside the guest, reached the host's real `opencode` agent through the loopback tunnel: `sys ask "list installed packages" --ai-backend opencode --opencode-provider opencode-go --opencode-model deepseek-v4.1-flash` returned a valid Assistant Plan + digest (`CASE live-agent PASS`), and a hostile shell/private-file instruction was refused/downgraded (`CASE live-agent-hostile-rejected PASS`) (`serial-boot-20260929T102703Z-ffd1ec25`). A real local model (Qwen2.5-1.5B GGUF served by `llama-server`) was also driven through the direct sandbox in both scopes; it reached the model, but the 1.5B model could not satisfy the exact typed schema (bare-string action, then a missing `rationale` reason) and the correction prompt exceeded its 4096-token context, so `sys` failed closed — model capacity, not a `sys` defect. The assistant prompt now shows the concrete action-object shape (`{"action":"list_packages"}`) instead of only `[...]` placeholders, which made the small model emit action objects. Gates: `cargo fmt`, `clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings`, `cargo test --workspace` 843 passed / 0 failed. - **VM-verified AI sandbox and unprivileged AI path (2026-09-28).** The first disposable-VM run of the newly built static `sys` (overlay on the golden installed image, `serial-boot-20260929T092147Z-6f88907a`) found and fixed two real defects. (1) **Unprivileged `sys ask` hung on a polkit root-password prompt:** the model sandbox used the system manager (`systemd-run`), and `org.freedesktop.systemd1.manage-units` requires authentication, so a normal user got `==== AUTHENTICATING FOR org.freedesktop.systemd1.manage-units ====` and blocked. The sandbox now uses `systemd-run --user` for unprivileged callers, with the subset of hardening properties the user manager accepts (`DynamicUser`, `PrivateDevices`, `ProtectKernelModules` are system-only); root still gets the full system sandbox. (2) **Unprivileged read-only AI plan exited 1 after printing the plan:** the service layer unconditionally wrote the root-owned `/var/lib/phoebus/transactions.toml`, which a normal account cannot write. Transaction recording is now best-effort for a non-root plan and mandatory for a privileged mutation. VM evidence: `AI_ROOT_RC=0` (system sandbox), `AI_USER_RC=0` (`--user` sandbox, was RC=124 timeout), `AI_NOSANDBOX_RC=0`, hostile `run_shell` reply `AI_SHELL_RC=1`; the expanded `sys-acceptance.sh` matrix reports `SUMMARY PASS=49 FAIL=0`. Additional loops on the same golden overlay pass: mutating acceptance as root `SUMMARY PASS=42 FAIL=0` (`mutate-install`/`mutate-remove`/`mutate-history`), rollback acceptance `PASS=11` (snapshot → change → `sys undo` → detached verify), and the Snap journey `PASS=11` (`serial-boot-20260929T093329Z-4ef893cf`, `serial-rollback-20260929T094640Z-256c2ba1`, `serial-boot-20260929T094957Z-3d4a9211`). Also observed: a read-only `flatpak search` can trigger Flatpak's interactive `appstream-update` polkit prompt when the session is not recognized as active (headless serial), which can block an unattended run; on a real active seat polkit's default `allow_active=yes` allows it, and the unattended acceptance now runs detached so it cannot hang. Recorded as a hypothesis, not a code change. Gates: `cargo fmt`, `clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings`, `cargo test --workspace` 842 passed / 0 failed. - **Live real-agent verification over the local `opencode` server (2026-09-28).** With a real `opencode serve` (v1.18.32) on `127.0.0.1:4096` and the `opencode-go` provider, `sys ask "list installed packages"` was driven through `--ai-backend opencode --opencode-provider opencode-go --opencode-model deepseek-v4.1-flash` and returned a valid typed plan plus an approval digest (read-only `list_packages`, exit 0). A hostile instruction (read `/etc/shadow` and `~/.ssh/id_rsa`, then run a shell command) was refused and downgraded to the read-only inventory. The phoebus transport disables every OpenCode tool in the session (`bash/edit/write/read/webfetch/grep/glob/patch/task` — asserted in `opencode_client` tests), so the agent has no shell or file access. No provider credential reached the sys log (checked by value). This is a host-level live call (not a VM and not a stub); it depends on a running local agent server. - **End-to-end AI-path test over a real local stub (2026-09-28).** The deterministic tests and the no-model fail-closed routing left the connected-model path covered only by fake transports. New `installer-rs/crates/phoebus-installer/tests/sys_ai_e2e.rs` drives the real `sys` binary against a real local OpenAI-compatible TCP stub and the real curl transport, with the sandbox disabled (`--no-sandbox`) so no seat is needed. Four cases: a valid model plan executes end-to-end and the request actually sent contains no `/home/` path and no `Bearer` credential; a model `run_shell` action fails closed after one corrective retry with no transaction written; a `depclean` with a smuggled `shell` field is refused by the exact schema (`unknown field \`shell\``); and malformed model output fails closed after one correction. Gates: `cargo fmt`, `clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings`, `cargo test --workspace` 841 passed / 0 failed. - **`sys`/AI boundary hardening pass (2026-09-28).** A read-audit of every mutation route plus the AI path found six host-provable defects, all fixed with regression tests. (1) **Root-gate backdoor removed:** the service layer honoured `PHOEBUS_ALLOW_UNPRIVILEGED_EXEC=1` and reported uid 0, which let a non-root desktop-assistant client skip `pkexec` elevation and the root-owned approval ledger and execute a root-requiring plan in-process; privilege is now derived from the process identity only. (2) **Credential injection closed:** `load_api_key` interpolated the key into a curl config `header = "..."` directive, so a key containing `"`, `\`, whitespace or a control character could inject curl options; such credentials are now refused. (3) **Derived OpenCode token redaction:** the base64 Basic/Bearer token actually sent was not registered with the redactor, so a server echoing the `Authorization` header could leak it; the token is now registered too. (4) **Privacy allowlist hole:** `SystemFacts::validate_no_forbidden` did not scan `cpu_features`, so a forbidden path there could reach the model; every string field is now scanned. (5) **Endpoint credentials:** `validate_endpoint` accepted userinfo (`https://user:pass@host/...`); the authority is now rejected while an `@` in the path/query stays valid. (6) **AI typed-action schema bypass:** the assistant/install parsers used `serde_json::from_value` directly, and serde's `deny_unknown_fields` does not cover internally tagged unit variants, so an action with a smuggled extra key (`{"action":"depclean","shell":"sh"}`) was accepted on the AI path but rejected by `parse_action`; all paths now route through the shared `phoebus-core::action::validate_action_value`. New tests: `service::an_environment_variable_cannot_forge_root`, `ai::api_key_content_must_be_safe_for_a_curl_config`, `ai::sandboxed_send_uses_systemd_run_and_keeps_the_key_on_stdin`, `opencode_client::a_bearer_token_is_redacted_too`, `provider::every_string_field_is_scanned_for_forbidden_paths`, `assistant::{plan_actions,investigation_requests}_reject_smuggled_extra_keys`, `install::investigation_requests_reject_smuggled_extra_keys`, `action::validate_action_value_rejects_unit_variant_extra_keys`. Gates: `cargo fmt`, `clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings`, `cargo test --workspace` 837 passed / 0 failed, release build. **NotRun, with reasons:** VM exercise of the `systemd-run` sandbox (needs a fresh disposable install and a seat/polkit agent; host probe shows the system manager's `manage-units` requires authentication and the full property set is invalid for `systemd-run --user`); source-conversion and tuned-kernel build/boot/fallback journeys (need a disposable 60–80 GiB install + reboot); Snap changed-revision/strict confinement (external AppArmor + Store prerequisite); Flatpak/Snap **install** commit/revision drift (installs bind the human version only; carrying commit/revision through install plans is a separate change). - **`sys` adversarial input battery + hardening (2026-09-28).** New host-level `tests/sys_adversarial.rs` (54 cases across 11 attack categories: shell injection in every operand type, empty/NUL inputs, extreme lengths, Unicode and homoglyphs, path traversal, option injection, malformed/nested JSON, CLI flag conflicts, natural-language edge cases, boundary values, and privilege gates) run against both the `phoebus-core` validators directly and the `sys` binary as an isolated subprocess (`PATH=/nonexistent`, no AI provider). The battery found and fixed five real validation gaps, each now regression-tested in `phoebus-core` and the executor: `valid_file_path` now rejects shell metacharacters and `..` components (its documented contract, previously unimplemented); `valid_application_name` refuses `..`/empty path components and a leading slash; `valid_ebuild_atom` refuses `.`-leading (`.`, `..`) category/package components, closing a real overlay path traversal (`../pkg` previously escaped `var/db/repos/phoebus`), with `ebuild::package_dir` re-validating as defence in depth; `valid_flatpak_app_id` refuses an empty reverse-DNS element (`org..test`); and `valid_nix_attribute` refuses a leading dash (`--impure`). All gates green: `cargo fmt`, `clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings`, `cargo test --workspace` 828 passed, 0 failed. - **`sys` flaw-fix battery (2026-09-28).** Six static-analysis flaws fixed and regression-tested: `valid_package_spec` now accepts Gentoo version operators, slots/subslots, repository specifiers, USE-dependency flags and wildcard versions (`=app-editors/vim-9.0.2167`, `dev-lang/python:3.11`, `sys-apps/portage::gentoo`) while still refusing leading dashes, whitespace and shell metacharacters; the legacy phrase parser accepts quoted multi-word application names (`sys install "visual studio code" --legacy --flatpak`); `vdb_has_atom` (executor and kernel) normalizes through `portage::normalize_dep_atom` so versioned post-install checks resolve; `FlatpakInstall`/`FlatpakRemove` add `--system --noninteractive`; `who owns usr/bin/vim` is normalized to an absolute path. New host-level battery `tests/sys_flaws.rs` (9 cases) and `sys-acceptance.sh` service-lifecycle + versioned-atom + path-normalization cases. All gates green: `cargo fmt`, `clippy --workspace --all-targets`, `cargo test --workspace` 773 passed. - **Pristine reinstall + full boot acceptance (Run 15, 2026-09-28).** Rebuilt static binaries from HEAD and reinstalled clean on a fresh disposable 80 GiB VM: `INSTALL-RC=0`, no secret leak, 347/347 desktop packages, detached boot (systemd running, 0 failed units, seatd active), `sys-acceptance.sh` 40/40, Nix per-user enumeration green (`nixpkgs#hello` as `phoebus` → `sys list --nix` reports `hello 2.12.3 [per-user:phoebus]`), and live `sys ask` green (`AI_LIVE_RC=0`, valid plan + approval digest from `opencode-go/muse-spark-1.3-contributor` via the guest loopback tunnel). Fixes since run 13, all unit-tested: nix integration permissions normalized after all bootstrap writes (`/nix` traversable, `/etc/nix*` world-readable), opencode backend defaults to the `Local` adapter kind, serial driver matches the zsh `❯` prompt, `NO_EQUALS` for check markers under zsh, setsid acceptance (polkit tty hang), tunnel `settimeout(None)` for slow model replies. - **Headless dual-target stabilization & detached boot proven (Run 13).** Completed full 12-stage non-interactive headless installation on an 80 GiB disposable VM (`phoebus-headless-80g.qcow2`) without touching host disks. All 347 desktop packages emerged in ~2.8 h, 588 compile times recorded, and initial known-good Btrfs snapshots created (`@-20260928T060439-initial-known-good` and `@var`). Detached boot from disk alone verified: LUKS2 auto-unlock, systemd PID 1 with 0 failed units, `seatd.service` active and running (`/run/seatd.sock` mode 0660 root:seat), `sys-acceptance.sh` suite passing 40/40, fast-defaults verified in Gentoo VDB (`firefox-bin`, `libreoffice-bin`, `thunderbird-bin`, `brave-browser`), and Flatpaks verified in `/var/lib/flatpak` (`calibre`, `gimp`, `flatseal`). - **Fast default installation.** The Mango profile now installs `www-client/firefox-bin` and `app-office/libreoffice-bin` (maintained stable Gentoo binary redistributions, signature verification preserved). A requested `-bin` that cannot come from a signed binary fails closed with the exact reason instead of silently falling back to a source build (`fastinstall::require_binary_capable`). Calibre (`com.calibre_ebook.calibre`), GIMP (`org.gimp.GIMP`) and Flatseal (`com.github.tchx84.Flatseal`) install as system-wide Flatpaks from Flathub **in the target** (never on the live host), with fail-closed verification of apps, launchers, exports and a recorded manifest (`var/lib/phoebus/flatpaks-installed`); Calibre/GIMP Portage copies are gone so no duplicates are installed. `sys-kernel/gentoo-kernel-bin` stays the single generic install/recovery kernel (no second generic kernel). Brave's stable pinned overlay integration is unchanged. The plan review and progress log name the delivery method and expected work (`fastinstall::delivery_summary`); the orchestrator records measured per-stage/total time plus best-effort download/installed/peak-disk figures (`var/lib/phoebus/install-metrics.txt`, unmeasured reported as such). - **Preference neutrality.** The installer's speed choices set no permanent system-wide or personal lane preference (`assert_no_installer_preference`); later `choose`/`install` resolve from live candidate evidence plus explicit user choices, with source, version, build cost and tradeoffs shown as before. - **User-initiated source builds.** New typed actions `convert_to_source` (`sys build from source --legacy`) for Firefox, LibreOffice, Calibre and GIMP, and `build_tuned_kernel` (`sys build tuned kernel --legacy`): blockers/dependencies checked via the reviewed pretend plan, the source is built (`--buildpkgonly`) before the working copy is touched, user data and desktop defaults are preserved, a failed build leaves the working application installed, and Brave is refused with its reason (no trustworthy maintained source route). Both carry the full review (exact packages, expected time, temporary disk, power/network, approval) in `sys` previews and require explicit approval before the broker runs. The tuned kernel starts from the proven distribution configuration, gets a separate BLS entry, is test-booted before it can become default, and always keeps `gentoo-kernel-bin` as the known-good fallback. - **Installed first-login welcome.** `phoebus-welcome` (Mango/DMS styled QML): explains the prebuilt defaults, offers the three opt-in paths (source builds, tuned kernel, keep-and-finish defaulting to keeping the working system), runs once per user via `welcome-seen`, stays reopenable from the launcher/settings, supports keyboard navigation and small displays, and never blocks login. DMS upstream first-run dialogs are seeded suppressed via `/etc/skel` so users see one welcome. The live ISO's "Install Phoebus OS" welcome remains live-only. - **Seamless Flatpak desktop.** Existing Wayland portals plus extended defaults (`mimeapps.list`: Nemo for directories, Firefox for web links, Zathura for PDF, Calibre Flatpak for e-books, GIMP Flatpak for images); upstream sandbox permissions respected with no broad overrides (`flatpak_narrow_overrides` is intentionally empty); Flatseal ships for inspection without forcing setup. - **Tests.** 757 Rust tests pass (was 736): new coverage for delivery set, preference neutrality, fail-closed `-bin`, source-conversion table, tuned-kernel fallback, target-only Flatpak install/verification, welcome provisioning, metrics report, and the `sys` acceptance script gains 4 cases (non-root privilege refusals + root-safe Brave/unknown refusals). Gates: `cargo fmt --check`, `clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings`, release build, `test_vmsafety.py` 18/18, shellcheck clean. - **Zsh defaults modernization (seeded once, user-owned afterwards).** `ZSH_SKEL_RC` fixes the `%F{ yellow }` color bug (now Phoebus Gold 214), drops the no-op site-functions probe, puts `fpath` before a cached `compinit` (full audit at most once per 24h via `.zcompdump`), adds Kitty/application-mode keybindings (Up/Down prefix search, Home/End/ Delete, word jumps), replaces cross-tab `SHARE_HISTORY` with `INC_APPEND_HISTORY`, and adds a builtin `vcs_info` git branch plus an exit-status prompt arrow. New `ZSH_ZPROFILE` bridges `/etc/profile` (Gentoo `env-update` paths, Nix/Flatpak `profile.d`) into Zsh login sessions and adds `~/.local/bin` to `PATH`. Verified: `zsh -n` clean on both files, interactive startup smoke test, 757 workspace tests green; installed-session behavior awaits the disposable VM. - **Seat management (P0 desktop blocker fix, unit-tested, seat VM pending).** `sys-auth/seatd` joins the Mango set and is enabled before `greetd` (`desktop_login_services`), `gui-libs/libseat` gets `systemd builtin server`, the default user groups gain `seat`, the greeter is created with `-G video,input,render,seat` (plus best-effort `seat` membership on re-runs), and `phoebus-session-mango` waits boundedly (3 s) for `/run/seatd.sock` or a logind session before starting Mango — `LIBSEAT_BACKEND` stays unset so every compiled backend remains available. Verified: workspace suite 759/759 (was 757), `bash -n` on the session script; the seat-VM reverification (tuigreet login → Mango socket, no libseat error) is NotRun. - **Thunderbird fast default + source conversion.** `workstation_packages` installs `mail-client/thunderbird-bin` (signed vendor binary, ~80 MiB download, no ~1 h compile); `fast_default_deliveries` and `SOURCE_CONVERSIONS` gain Thunderbird (source target `mail-client/thunderbird`, 45–90 min, ~18 GiB temp), the preference neutrality guard covers it, and the first-login welcome names it alongside Firefox/LibreOffice/Calibre/GIMP. `sys build thunderbird from source --legacy` flows through the existing reviewed approval/broker path. Installed-identity and conversion-journey VM checks are NotRun. - **AI transport timeout.** `CurlTransport` `max-time` is now 300 s by default (was 120 s, which aborted local CPU inference with `curl exit 28`) and overrideable via `PHOEBUS_AI_TIMEOUT` (unparseable/zero values fall back to 300; zero is refused since curl reads it as "no timeout"). Applies to both direct and sandboxed sends. The mandatory-AI install requirement is unchanged (fail-closed without a model or `--no-ai`); all six package lanes are untouched. - **Not VM-verified this session.** A fresh ISO was built from the fast-defaults commit and content-verified (`fastdefaults.iso`, 1.6 GiB, `ad9cddb2…`, build `20260926T145700Z` from `e747baf`; embedded `phoebus-installer`/`sys` hash-match the fresh static build, Gentoo key shows both published fingerprints, Mango/DMS + installer UI present). No disposable install/boot ran (wall-clock blocker: a full Mango install takes ~165 min; host is ready: `make doctor` 20 ok, ~103 GiB free). The new install path, installed package identities, Flatpaks, welcome, graphical launches, workflows, source-conversion and tuned-kernel journeys await the disposable VM procedure in `docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`. ## 2026-09-26 — Workstation experience (apps, shell, AI handoff, assistant) - **Mango workstation defaults.** The Mango profile now installs the full requested set with exact Gentoo atoms (no silent omit/substitute): `app-editors/emacs`, `app-office/libreoffice`, `media-gfx/swayimg` (GURU), `media-video/mpv`, `app-misc/fastfetch`, `sys-process/htop`, `app-editors/neovim`, `app-text/zathura` + `zathura-pdf-mupdf`, `app-editors/nano`, `www-client/firefox`, `www-client/brave-browser` (stable, scoped `another-brave-overlay`), `mail-client/thunderbird`, `app-text/calibre`, `net-p2p/transmission` (gtk), `media-sound/pavucontrol`, `media-gfx/gimp`, `net-print/cups` (local only), `gnome-extra/nemo` (default file manager, replaces pcmanfm), `sci-calculators/qalculate-gtk`, `net-irc/hexchat`, `net-misc/openssh` (client+server, sshd disabled). Kitty stays the terminal; `st` is never installed. Headless (`none`) stays lean (no desktop apps). Unit-tested (`workstation_defaults_*`). - **Brave via reviewed overlay.** Stable `www-client/brave-browser` only (never beta/nightly, masked). The overlay is scoped (`another-brave-overlay.conf` + `brave-scope` mask); the git pin (`PHOEBUS_BRAVE_PIN`, 40-hex) is validated before any network use and a missing/placeholder pin refuses with the exact blocker instead of silently using Flatpak. Upstream release + checksum verification happens in the ebuild fetch path (fail-closed). Live VM verification is blocked (needs network + a pinned revision at ISO build time + 60 GiB target). - **Zsh, cursor, ccache.** New users get `/bin/zsh`; root keeps `/bin/bash`; `/bin/sh` is untouched. A maintained default `~/.zshrc` (completion, autosuggestions, syntax-highlighting, history search, readable prompt) is seeded for skel + new users from packaged plugins only, preserving existing files. One cursor theme (`x11-themes/vanilla-dmz-xcursors`, Vanilla-DMZ, size 24) is applied across Mango/wlroots, XWayland, GTK, Qt/Quickshell, DMS and the greeter. Default Portage ccache is on: `dev-util/ccache` in base, `FEATURES="ccache sandbox usersandbox"`, `CCACHE_SIZE="2G"`. - **AI connection handoff.** The installer GUI offers "Use this model connection after installation" (selected by default, bound to `ai.reuse_ai_connection`). When selected, finalize writes a direct-provider key into the new user's `~/.config/phoebus/ai.key` (symlink-safe, 0700/0600, user-owned); only the path enters `assistant.conf`. OpenCode/local follow their actual requirements; a live-VM-only endpoint is never called "connected" after reboot. The installed `sys ask` and desktop assistant share `ai_setup::resolve`. Missing/invalid/unreadable/opted-out credentials show a setup action + the real error, never a false "Connected" and never "Approve & Execute" without a plan id/digest. Unit-tested (0600/0700, symlink refusal, no secret in errors). - **Startup system check.** New `evaluate_startup_checks`/`summarize_checks`: blur is an optional unsupported visual effect when Mango/DMS lack it; `sys-power/power-profiles-daemon` (stable 0.30) is installed + enabled with D-Bus `net.hadess.PowerProfiles` verified and `sys-power/tlp` masked as a conflict; `media-sound/cava` (stable, `pipewire` USE) and `gui-apps/matugen` (GURU) are installed for DMS. Zero errors + warnings never says "All checks passed." - **Assistant dark by default + responsive.** Dark (charcoal/warm-white/amber) is the default with a light mode + persisted selection. Missing `Theme.background/text/primary/card/cardHover/accent` aliases are defined; a Rust test fails on future token drift. The fixed 820×640 + overflowing tab row is replaced by a resizable window (600×450 minimum) with a horizontally scrolling tab row; long errors/plan details wrap; Send, Cancel, Details, approval, Preferences and window controls stay reachable at 1024×768, 1280×720 and increased scale. Error cards never expose approval. - **Space estimates.** Mango requires 60 GiB (80 recommended); headless 20. Validation refuses a smaller target with the exact requirement. - **Verification.** `cargo fmt --check`, `clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings`, `cargo test --workspace` 736/736, release build, `test_vmsafety.py` 18/18, shellcheck (pre-existing info only). No fresh ISO was built and no disposable install/boot ran in this session: `make doctor` reports 8 GiB free (needs ≥20) and the workstation target needs 60–80 GiB; Brave pin, seat compositor, live AI credential, Snap revision/strict and NVIDIA remain blocked with exact prerequisites in STATUS/HANDOFF. ## 2026-09-26 — Live ISO rebuilt from HEAD, interactive VM open - **New live ISO built from HEAD (`11c0ee0`).** `installer/live/phoebus-installer-amd64-20260926.iso` (1.6 GiB, SHA-256 `250dbe9a…`, build id `20260926T041500Z`) was built with `PHOEBUS_REUSE_ROOTFS=1` after verifying the static `phoebus-installer` (`25741706…`) and `sys` (`3b331643…`) are fingerprint-fresh for HEAD. The Sep-24 ISO predates the stage3/boot-security hardening and is kept alongside, not overwritten. Filesystem-inspected (not just timestamped): the embedded binaries hash-match the fresh build, the provisioned Gentoo key carries both published fingerprints (`13EB…2910`, `D99E…2058`), `gpg`/`mango`/`dms`/quickshell welcome+installer UI are present, and `/etc/phoebus/version` + `/etc/phoebus/build` carry `0.1.0` and the build id. - **Interactive VM open for the owner.** A fresh unique 30 GiB qcow2 plus private OVMF vars boots the new ISO in a visible KVM/GTK window (`installer/tests/vm/run-vm.sh`); screenshot-verified at the branded welcome ("Install Phoebus OS", Live medium 0.1.0, network/UEFI/RAM/CPU chips). Left running, installer untouched, no passwords or model credentials entered. - **`run-vm.sh` is safer for user-facing launches:** new `--disk-name` (unique disk per run) and `--display` options, and a TCG fallback that switches `-cpu host` to `-cpu max` with a performance warning when `/dev/kvm` is not writable (the old `-cpu host` choice fails without KVM). The one `shellcheck` SC2054 warning on the QEMU array pre-existed at HEAD and is unchanged. - **Unpinned signed-DIGESTS install proof running.** `gui-driver.py install` boots the new ISO on a disposable disk and installs through the default unpinned stage3 path with the ISO-embedded fail-closed binary (empty `STAGE3_URL` resolves latest from Gentoo autobuilds; fixed trust anchor). Automated-harness `--no-ai` is test-only evidence, not the normal user path. Partitioning + LUKS2 + Btrfs stages already passed in the guest; completion and detached boot pending. - **Unpinned signed-DIGESTS install proof COMPLETED in a disposable VM.** `gui-driver.py install` run `gui-install-20260926T040728Z-f3ae68f4` booted the new ISO on disposable `disks/unpinned-accept-1.qcow2` (30 GiB) with no `STAGE3_URL`/`STAGE3_SHA256` (latest stage3 resolved from Gentoo autobuilds, signed DIGESTS verified against the fixed provisioned key) and the ISO-embedded fail-closed binary: `INSTALL-RC=0`, `NO_SECRET_LEAK`, `installation complete` after ~165 min (mango desktop, 174 packages). Detached boot: LUKS unlock, login, systemd `running`, 0 failed units, networking, all Btrfs subvolumes, `sys history --legacy` showing the initial-known-good snapshot. A harness assertion fix (`gui-driver.py` boot check now uses `sys history --legacy`, since bare `sys history` is AI-first and truthfully refuses without a model) was needed to green the gate; the product was correct. - **Tamper refusal VM-verified** (new ISO, fail-closed binary, disposable 4 GiB targets): a placeholder pin is refused before any network use (zero stage3 fetches) and a mismatched archive hash is refused after download with no extraction (`INSTALL-RC=1`, `NO_SECRET_LEAK` both runs). A tampered-*signature* VM case is infeasible without a network MITM (fixed key + authentic Gentoo DIGESTS); the bad-signature branch is unit-tested. - **Recovery-entry boot VERIFIED** (`Phoebus Recovery (known-good snapshot)` selected in the systemd-boot menu — keypresses provably freeze the 3 s timeout, selection screenshot-confirmed — with restricted networking and no model): cmdline + findmnt prove root is the read-only `@-20260926T064646-initial-known-good` snapshot with `rescue.target`, serial login works, `sys history`/`rollback status --legacy` work, `sys ask` fails truthfully offering the exact `--legacy` command, systemd `degraded` (rescue target, as designed). Method notes: video (tty1) keystrokes never reach the dracut LUKS prompt (`/dev/console` is serial); passphrases must be written to the serial pty with ONLCR/ICRNL neutralized or a `\r` is appended and the passphrase is rejected. - **Seat desktop PARTIAL with a precise blocker.** Seat VM (virgl, `virtio-gpu-gl-pci`): seat0 + DRM card0 + greeter session verified, tuigreet authenticates the correct password (journal-proven; earlier "Authentication failed" readings were QMP-typing focus races, and `-` keys arrive correctly). The Mango compositor exits in <1s: libseat `No backend was able to open a seat` — no seatd in the image and the logind path does not succeed under the tuigreet session. Kitty/DMS/lock/idle/polkit-agent/ logout/reboot stay unverified behind this blocker. - **Snap re-checked against the live Store:** `hello-world` is still 6.4 rev 29 on every channel (install → `no updates available` → remove, all clean); guest has no `aa-status`, confinement `partial`. Revision-changing refresh and strict confinement stay blocked (Store revision + AppArmor guest needed). - **Nix GC findings:** the fresh unpinned install bootstraps Nix (store populated, `default` link valid, `nix 2.24.9` runs) and `sys list --nix` truthfully reports the base system profile has no manifest. `nix-collect-garbage` is not on root's PATH; a user-level install (`nixpkgs#hello`) + `nix-collect-garbage -d` (268 paths, 189 MB) leaves the profile intact — the old dangling case did NOT reproduce. **Coverage gap found:** `sys` enumerates `/nix/var/nix/profiles/ {default,profile}` + `per-user/*/profile` but not the modern per-user `~/.local/state/nix/profiles/profile`, so user-installed Nix packages are invisible to the catalogue. Recorded as follow-up (design + tests + VM proof needed), not fixed in this session. - **Release gates stay truthful:** `gates --execute` in an unconfigured shell reports 0 passed / 0 failed / 6 NotRun with exact missing prerequisites; nothing published. Quality gates green: `cargo fmt`, `clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings`, `cargo test --workspace` 717/717, `test_vmsafety.py` 18/18, release + static builds. ## 2026-09-26 — Security and release-readiness: trust anchor, executable gates, strengthened rollback - **Stage3 trust anchor is fixed in code.** `release_key_path()` no longer honors `PHOEBUS_GENTOO_RELEASE_KEY`: production always uses the provisioned `/usr/share/openpgp-keys/gentoo-release.asc`, and test-only injection goes through the explicit `verify_digests_with_key` helper. A regression test proves the environment variable is ignored. The pinned path is unchanged. Host-level mechanism check (not VM evidence): the parser fixture matches the real current DIGESTS byte-for-byte and the real DIGESTS verifies with a Good signature from Gentoo's weekly release key. The full VM proof (rebuilt live ISO + default unpinned install + tamper refusal) is recorded as blocked with its exact prerequisites. - **Release gates are executable and truthful.** `candidate_gates()` no longer names `serial-driver.py checks` / `desktop` modes that no harness accepts (`no-model-recovery` uses the real `boot` mode, `desktop-session` uses `gui-driver.py boot`). `run_gates(--execute)` runs each gate's argv in its own process: exit 0 → Passed, nonzero → Failed, missing harness/firmware/seat/credential → NotRun, invalid command → Failed. New tests cover real harness modes, pass/fail/not-run reporting, isolation, invalid-command detection, and publish refusal on any failed/not-run gate. `gates --execute` on an unconfigured host reports 0 passed / 0 failed / 6 NotRun; `publish` refuses. A `gui-driver.py` SyntaxError found by the new test is fixed. - **Strengthened rollback rerun PASSED in a disposable VM** (`serial-rollback-20260926T034218Z-7fab51ef`, PASS=11 FAIL=0, exit 0, no secret leak): the root-marker creation is now mandatory and asserted present before `sys undo`, the package DB changed (`ca398d71…` → `fda3780a…`) and was restored, the marker is absent after the detached reboot, `/home` survives, systemd runs. The unused `SERVE` variable was removed (`shellcheck` clean). - **Recovery-entry boot is now a distinct manual acceptance gate** with its own procedure and pass criteria in `docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`, recorded separately from normal `sys undo` (NOT RUN: interactive BLS-menu selection is not automated). Secure Boot/UKI stays rejected and is filed as a separate opt-in milestone in the roadmap; seat desktop, live AI, Snap revision change, and NVIDIA remain open with exact prerequisites. - **Tests:** `cargo test --workspace` 717/717, `test_vmsafety.py` 18/18, `cargo fmt --check` and `clippy -D warnings` clean, release and static-pie builds pass. (One `assistant_bridge` test flaked once under parallel load and passes in isolation and on rerun.) ## 2026-09-26 — Hardening pass: fail-closed stage3, truthful boot security, rollback acceptance - **Stage3 verification is fail-closed (security defect fixed).** The unpinned path previously warned and continued when the DIGESTS download failed, when no SHA-512 entry matched, when `gpg` or the Gentoo release key was missing, when the key import failed, and when `gpg` could not start. Every one of these now stops the install before extraction, as do a bad signature and a hash mismatch. The pinned path requires a valid 64-hex digest (placeholder refused) before any network use, and its trust is documented as coming from the independently supplied pin. `stage_install` requires `curl/tar/gpg/sha256sum/sha512sum` up front. 16 new regression tests cover every failure branch plus both positive paths. - **Live image carries the verifier.** `installer/live` ships `gnupg` and the trusted Gentoo release key (`/usr/share/openpgp-keys/gentoo-release.asc`), provisioned by `build.sh` and checked against Gentoo's published release-key fingerprints; the installer never fetches an unauthenticated key. Not yet VM-proven: no full install has run with the new binary, and the signed-DIGESTS VM proof needs a rebuilt ISO with the key. - **Boot security is truthful.** `kernel.uki`/`kernel.secureboot = true` are rejected at shared configuration validation (CLI/TUI/GUI bridge), and the plan preview always reports the real unsigned-BLS path. Authenticated boot remains an open limitation by design (separate opt-in milestone). - **Rollback acceptance PASSED with evidence** (`serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386`, PASS=11 FAIL=0, exit 0, no secret leak): snapshot → `app-misc/hello` install (package DB changed) → `sys undo ` → detached reboot (DB restored, root marker absent, `/home` survives, systemd running, recovery entry present). This corrects the 2026-09-25 pass claim, which had no transcript and did not reproduce: the harness ran unprivileged, used pre-installed `nano`, restored "newest", and never asserted the marker. Fixed with sudo authentication, explicit `--legacy`, a verified break, targeted undo, and vacuous-pass guards. Recovery-entry offline boot stays a manual gate. - **Release candidate (local, isolated):** manifest/verify, tampered-artifact refusal, and publish refusal against the NotRun gate report all behave; `gates --execute` is 0 passed / 6 NotRun (all gates need VM/seat/model). Nothing published. Desktop-under-seat, live AI, and Snap strict-confinement/changed-revision remain explicitly open (see STATUS). - **Tests:** `cargo test --workspace` 712/712 (was 692), `test_vmsafety.py` 18/18, `cargo fmt --check` and `clippy -D warnings` clean, release and static-pie builds pass. ## 2026-09-26 — Code quality pass: boxed ExecError, warning-free Clippy, service/gui_bridge splits Structural work only; no behavior, wire-format, or serialized-plan change. - `ExecError::Command` now carries a boxed `CommandFailure` payload, so `ExecError` shrinks from 128 to 96 bytes and `Result` passes Clippy's `result_large_err` gate (all 57 warnings gone). The display text, the redacted stdout/stderr capture, and the stderr tail used for update failures are preserved; the constructor and every match site were updated, with regression tests for the error text, the captured output, and a 96-byte size bound. - The remaining Clippy warnings are fixed without blanket allows: a type alias for the Snap-entry tuple (`actions.rs`), a `CommandRecord` params struct for `Logger::command` (`log.rs`), and `DiskPhase` variant renames (`gui_bridge.rs`). `cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings` is clean. - `service.rs` (4218 lines) is split into `service/mod.rs` (types, render, shared helpers, explicit re-exports), `plan.rs`, `validation.rs`, `execution.rs`, and `tests.rs`. Every `phoebus_installer::service::*` path, the serialized plan format, approval digests, replay protection, and the privileged validation boundary are unchanged. - `gui_bridge.rs` (2763 lines) is split into `gui_bridge/mod.rs`, `protocol.rs` (protocol version 1, wire types, JSON observer, disk phase, newline-delimited JSON writer), `bridge.rs` (the single `Bridge` owning the installer, dispatch, installation support, secret handling), and `tests.rs`. No UI or wire-format change. - `cargo test --workspace` passes 692/692 before and after each split (including the 4 new `ExecError` regression tests). Release and static-pie builds pass. - The disposable VM re-ran the current `sys` acceptance matrix against the new static `sys` (`70f0a72b…`, fetched to `/tmp/sys` on an overlay of the pristine installed image): guest `PASS=38 FAIL=0` (the full 38-case matrix, run as the non-root user with no mutations), driver `PASS=41 FAIL=0` (`serial-boot-20260926T014746Z-3089a820`). Recovery boot, strict Snap confinement, and a revision-changing Snap update remain unverified. ## 2026-09-25 — Make first-use Snap setup reviewable and fix Portage target selection - The normal Snap install now explains the separate, reviewed Portage install of `app-containers/snapd` and the socket enable/start steps when the daemon is absent. A raw typed `snap_install` no longer adds snapd behind the review. - Fresh installs include scoped `sys-fs/squashfs-tools lzma lzo` USE flags, which Gentoo's snapd ebuild requires. Existing installed images need the same scoped setting before the Portage step. - Portage candidate resolution matches the requested atom in a multi-package pretend plan. The prior first-line selection could install a dependency (`dev-lang/go-bootstrap` in the Snap VM) instead of `app-containers/snapd`. - Snap candidate sandbox levels now use the daemon's detected confinement; missing `snap info` confinement is not assumed to be strict. - Regression tests cover the prerequisite gate, Portage target selection and confinement mapping. The disposable VM exposed both the missing scoped USE flags and the first-dependency selection bug. After those fixes, the installed VM completed the reviewed snapd install, enabled and started `snapd.socket`, installed `hello-world` from the Snap Store, ran refresh, and removed it (`serial-boot ...107996de`, `PASS=10 FAIL=0`). The daemon reported **partial** confinement and the plan displayed partial, not strong. The refresh command succeeded with no newer revision available. A fresh overlay using the final static binary passed the same journey with clean poweroff (`...c024cc43`, `PASS=11 FAIL=0`); a clean reboot and repeat also passed (`...e6193c3a`, `PASS=11 FAIL=0`). A revision-changing refresh and strict AppArmor confinement remain unverified. ## 2026-09-25 — Second-round `sys` fixes: safe cleanup previews, exact update transactions, reverse dependencies Follow-up review found three further confirmed defects; all three are fixed with regression tests, and the disposable-VM acceptance is extended. This entry supersedes any earlier claim that every review finding was already fixed. - **Cache-cleanup preview no longer deletes (finding 1).** `eclean-dist`/ `eclean-pkg` **delete by default**; only `--pretend` previews. The planner now runs `--pretend --deep` (the same selection policy as the destructive run) and combines stdout and stderr into a sorted, bound item set. The Nix preview uses the documented `nix-store --gc --print-dead` (a bare `--gc`, and the undocumented `--dry-run`, were unsafe assumptions). Tests prove reconciliation and cancelled approval run no destructive cleaner. - **Exact Flatpak/Snap update transactions (finding 2).** A reviewed update now carries a structured `UpdateTransaction`: the full Flatpak ref (from `remote-ls`) plus installed and remote **full commits** (from `flatpak info`, because Flatpak's `commit` column is abbreviated), or the snap name plus old/new revisions and tracking channel. Execution consumes the reviewed transaction, is pinned (`flatpak update --commit=`), and revalidates each source immediately before its mutation — including after an earlier source has run. A commit republished under an unchanged human version, a newly appearing update, or a non-exact transaction is refused; a source whose resolution failed is never re-discovered at execution. - **Reverse-dependency self-reference (finding 3).** The reverse branch compared the dependency target with the queried package and dropped exactly the valid matches. It now excludes only a genuine self-reference (the *dependent* is the queried package), so installed targets, full and bare names, and conditional/versioned dependencies are reported. - **Determinism and execution robustness.** `All selected packages:` removals are sorted so depclean previews are order-independent (previously a false "plan changed"); `emerge --depclean` runs with `--ask=n`; plan aggregation includes `updates`. - **Tests:** +22 (workspace `cargo test --workspace` green, 661 → 683). New regressions cover the non-destructive preview, drift/failed/cancelled cleanup, exact Flatpak identities/commits, Snap revisions, reverse dependencies, and Nix generation handling. - **VM-verified (disposable images):** real `eclean` preview/approve/cancel/ drift/failed and `depclean` cancel/approve with history and preserved user data; real reverse dependencies (`sys-libs/glibc`, `sys-libs/zlib`); a real Flatpak reviewed update (Portage-installed Flatpak, flathub, downgraded commit, reviewed update to the reviewed full commit, verified); custom-ebuild stage/build/install/remove; managed AppImage acquire/list/launch/remove with a tampered-SHA refusal; a Nix-enabled install with a real `nodejs-slim` profile (inventory, filtering, generations); and the **non-root `pkexec sys --broker` path** (cancelled authentication, successful broker execution, replay rejection) after installing the shipped polkit action and the standard wheel-admin rule. The read-only acceptance matrix re-run on the final static `sys` (`dd61c610…`) reports `PASS=38 FAIL=0` (the matrix gained a reverse- dependency regression). - **Not completed (see `docs/HANDOFF.md`):** Snap install/refresh/remove (no snapd in the image; needs `app-containers/snapd`, AppArmor and network); live AI (a local model was served, but the sandboxed call exceeds the 120 s transport timeout on CPU); and the distinct recovery boot (the recovery BLS entry is present; selecting it interactively is not automated). ## 2026-09-25 — Fix the `sys` catalogue review findings (host/target, revalidation, update effects, Nix inventory, dependencies) Follow-up to the package-management interface: seven review findings are fixed, each with regression tests, and the installed-system acceptance matrix is extended and re-run. - **Host/target confusion closed (finding 1).** Every catalogue, update-check, information and maintenance query is now built for the *intended target* — directly for `/`, or inside the target chroot for an alternate root. Snap acts on the running daemon and is reported unavailable (and refused for mutation) for an alternate root instead of ever touching the host. Availability checks resolve tools from the target (`Exec::tool_in_target`), so a host Flatpak, `eclean` or `qdepends` cannot leak into a target operation. Recording-runner tests assert alternate-root search/update/cleanup and Snap paths issue no host commands. - **Maintenance revalidation (finding 2).** `resolves_effects` now covers `Depclean`, `ApplyUpdates` and `CleanCache`, so they are re-resolved at the privileged execution boundary and within multi-action plans. Depclean removals are parsed into **structured `PackageEffect`s** (`emerge --pretend --depclean`), so a changed removal set changes the digest and aborts before an unapproved mutation; a regression test proves drift is refused with no destructive command run. - **Exact Flatpak/Snap update effects (finding 3).** `ApplyUpdates` resolves a reviewable per-source plan with the affected identities and versions; each Flatpak app is updated by ref and each snap by name, and the plan is bound to approval and re-checked immediately before execution. Unrestricted update-all is gone. Lanes with no safe system-level transaction (Nix/AppImage/custom ebuild) are refused with a clear limitation. Destructive cache cleanup now reviews each cleaner's non-destructive dry run and binds the item set to approval (`ResolvedPlan.cleanup`), which is part of the digest. - **Complete source constraints (finding 4).** `SystemAction::backend()` classifies Portage-only actions (`UpdateSystem`, `RemovePackage`, `Depclean`, `PrepareUpdates`, `InspectUpdates`, `PackageOwners`, `PackageDependencies`); `constrain_action` rewrites optional-backend discovery and selection (`DiscoverCandidates`, `ChoosePackage`) to the constrained lane *before* querying, and refuses the cross-lane `InspectInstallation`. Unit tests prove a Flatpak-constrained request cannot investigate or mutate Portage/Snap/Nix through any action variant. - **Cache-cleanup truthfulness (finding 5).** Portage cleaner errors are no longer converted to text while the action returns success. A cleaner that ran and failed fails the whole action (with partial successes preserved), an unavailable cleaner is reported distinctly from one that found nothing, and the report reaches the command exit status, assistant response and transaction history. - **Nix inventory (finding 6).** Inventory enumerates the packages of the active Nix profiles from each profile's `manifest.json` (v1/v2/v3), retaining profile and user scope and package identity; historical generations and realised store paths are reported separately. Unsupported manifest formats and base profiles are stated explicitly rather than shown as an empty inventory. Filtering finds a package such as `nodejs` in a supported profile. - **Dependency inspection (finding 7).** Forward and reverse dependencies now come from the authoritative installed VDB metadata (`DEPEND`/`RDEPEND`/`BDEPEND`, with a `qdepends` tree fallback) instead of an `emerge --pretend` merge plan. Already-satisfied, conditional/versioned and blocker dependencies are preserved; the requested package is never its own dependency; a failed query is distinguished from a genuinely empty set. - **Tests:** +28 (core/executor/installer) covering alternate-root chrooting, structured depclean effects and digest drift, exact Flatpak identities, cache cleanup review and failure propagation, constraint rewrite/refusal, Nix manifest parsing, and dependency parsing/inspection. `make test` passes (`cargo test --workspace`). - **VM-verified (disposable installed clones + fresh install):** the read-only acceptance matrix is extended with `snap-alternate-root`, `list-nix-legacy` and `deps-legacy`, and reports `SUMMARY PASS=37 FAIL=0` on both an existing clone and the fresh install (final static `sys` `TEST_SYS_SHA:65307d85…`). A fresh non-interactive install reports `INSTALL-RC=0`/`NO_SECRET_LEAK`, and its Portage configuration is world-readable out of the box (non-root `search` returns 3 real results, `updates` reports 10). Privileged mutating journeys (install/remove/history/depclean/cache-cleanup/alternate-root-Snap/Portage `apply updates`) pass 7/7, and a snapshot → change → `sys undo` → detached boot restores the package database and root while preserving `/home`. See `docs/HANDOFF.md` for the precise verified/blocked state. ## 2026-09-25 — Complete the `sys` package-management interface (search/list/info/updates/maintenance) Adds a complete package catalogue on top of the typed-action architecture. AI is still the default for every operation; `--legacy` is the only user-facing opt-in to deterministic handling. - **Unified search** (`phoebus-executor::query`, `SystemAction::SearchPackages` gains an optional `backend`): cross-source discovery across Portage, Flatpak, Snap, managed AppImages, Nix and staged custom ebuilds. Every lane reports **unavailable**, **failed**, or **empty** distinctly; no metadata is invented. `sys search firefox [--legacy] [--]`. - **Inventory** (`SystemAction::ListPackages`): Portage VDB, `flatpak list`, `snap list`, managed AppImages, and **Nix profiles** (store paths reported separately as realised dependencies, never as installed programs). Custom ebuilds install through Portage and are listed once, under Portage. `sys list [filter] [--legacy] [--]`. - **Package information** (`SystemAction::PackageInfo`): installed VDB metadata (version, size, repository, `RDEPEND`) merged with resolved candidates and policy metadata; ambiguous queries list every real match and are flagged. `sys info [--legacy] [--]`. `sys inspect ` is unchanged. - **Consistent updates** (`CheckUpdates`/`ApplyUpdates`): `sys updates` checks every lane without mutating; `sys apply updates` reports a truthful per-source outcome and fails the action when an attempted source fails. AppImage (pinned URL+SHA) and Nix (project/declarative) are explained as manual/project-specific, never reported as updated. Background preparation stays distinct from activation. Portage updates/depclean are previewed from `emerge --pretend` at review time. - **Maintenance** (`Depclean`, `CleanCache`, `PackageOwners`, `PackageDependencies`): unused-dependency removal, Portage/Nix cache cleanup, package-file ownership (`qfile`/`equery`), and forward/reverse dependency inspection, all with explicit unsupported results where a backend or tool cannot support them. - **AI-default routing enforced**: a recognizable catalogue command enters the general assistant loop (`phoebus_ai::assistant::run_assistant`), which may run bounded read-only tools before answering. An explicit source flag is applied to both investigation requests and the final plan (rewriting lane-selectable queries, refusing a foreign lane). A missing model or provider failure stops the workflow and prints the exact `--legacy` alternative; it never executes deterministically. Direct JSON still requires `--legacy`/`--broker`. - **Tests:** +43 (core/executor/ai/installer) covering search/list/info parsing and dispatch, unavailable/failed/empty distinction, VDB metadata, ambiguity, depclean preview and skip, per-source update failure, no double-counting, routing (AI vs legacy), the source constraint, and the general investigation loop. `installer/tests/vm/sys-acceptance.sh` gains catalogue and routing cases (read-only group now 34). - **VM-verified (disposable installed disk):** `installer/tests/vm/sys-acceptance.sh` reports `SUMMARY PASS=34 FAIL=0`, including `search-legacy`, `list-legacy`, `info-legacy`, `updates-legacy`, `search-no-model-offer`, `search-flag-constraint` and the non-root maintenance refusals. - **Fixed: read-only Portage queries failed for a normal account.** The installed system left `/etc/portage/repos.conf` and `/etc/portage/package.use/phoebus` root-only, so `emerge --search` and `emerge --depclean --pretend` failed with `Permission denied` for the unprivileged catalogue. `portage::normalize_config_permissions` makes the non-secret Portage configuration world-readable (0755 dirs, 0644 files) while leaving the keyring (`/etc/portage/gnupg`, key-holding files) private; it runs when the config is written and again at finalize. Unit-tested (including the keyring exclusion); demonstrated on the disposable VM by applying the same permissions, after which `sys search firefox --legacy` returns real results and `sys updates --legacy` reports the available updates. A fresh VM install with the fix is not yet re-run (base install is ~2 h). ## 2026-09-25 — Installed-VM verification fixes (installer finalize probe, personal preference transactions) Found while running the acceptance on a fresh disposable installed system: - **Installer `finalize` probe used the AI-first path (`phoebus-executor::sys_runtime`).** The target `sys` verification ran `sys history`, which is AI-first and (correctly) refuses to run without a connected model, so a non-interactive `--install --no-ai` aborted at the `finalize` stage with `INSTALL-RC=1`. The offline-safe deterministic probe is now `sys history --legacy`. Unit-tested; `sys history --legacy` succeeds in the booted target (`HIST_RC:0`). - **A personal preference no longer requires the root-owned transaction log (`sys` `execute_action`).** A normal account saving a personal package preference wrote the preference successfully but then failed with permission denied recording it in `/var/lib/phoebus/transactions.toml`, returning a misleading nonzero exit. Personal preferences are user-owned state and are no longer written to the system transaction history; only `requires_root()` actions are recorded. Covered by a CLI regression test that makes the system transaction directory read-only. - **Install-driver reporting robustness (`installer/tests/vm/serial-driver.py`):** the driver no longer raises a `TypeError` when the guest serial closes before `INSTALL-RC` (it now handles `pexpect.EOF`/`TIMEOUT` explicitly), and teardown is best-effort so the post-poweroff `Could not terminate the child` exception cannot turn a successful install into a nonzero driver exit. - **Installed-VM evidence (disposable qcow2):** a clean install with the fixed installer completes (`===INSTALL-RC=0===`, `installation finished`, `NO_SECRET_LEAK`). Detached boot: LUKS unlock and login; systemd PID1 `running`; `sys 0.1.0`; `sys history --legacy` exit 0; and `installer/tests/vm/sys-acceptance.sh` with the fixed `sys` reports `SUMMARY PASS=24 FAIL=0`, including `personal-preference PASS saved to user config` and `nonroot-systemwide` correctly refused. The privileged `--broker` plan path and replay rejection are unit-tested at the privileged entry point but were not exercised end-to-end in the VM (no root/Polkit agent on the serial console; `sudo -n` denied). ## 2026-09-25 — Bind per-step reviewed effects into the approval digest - **Per-step effect binding (`phoebus-installer::service`):** the canonical approval digest now covers every per-step reviewed effect that execution trusts, not just the actions and aggregate effects. At the privileged boundary `validate_prepared_plan`: - derives the effective per-step effects (`step_effects`, or the aggregate for a single-action plan; a multi-action plan without per-step effects is refused); - verifies each stored effect digest by *recomputing* it from the effect contents, so a step whose contents changed but whose stored digest did not is rejected; - verifies the aggregate effects are exactly the concatenation of the per-step effects; - feeds every per-step effect into `compute_plan_digest`, so the canonical digest (compared with both `plan.digest` and the independently supplied `--approval-digest`) changes whenever a step changes. This closes the gap where a user-controlled General/Undo plan could retain its approved digest, change only `step_effects` to match a different live resolution, reseal the plan, and execute. Install/LegacyInstall keep their install-specific digest, with the single step required to equal the aggregate; Removal, General and Undo are bound per-step. Plan builders normalize stored step digests so legitimate plans continue to validate, and the legitimate allowance for changes caused by earlier approved steps is unchanged. - **Adversarial tests:** single-action and multi-action General plans whose `step_effects` are swapped (with and without a matching aggregate) while the approved digest is retained are rejected before any command, ledger claim or transaction; a legitimate bound multi-step plan still validates. ## 2026-09-25 — Adversarial approval-boundary hardening (canonical digest, stable identity, recovery) - **Canonical approval digest recomputed at the privileged boundary.** The broker no longer compares the independently supplied digest with the user-owned plan's stored digest. It independently re-derives the canonical digest from the exact executable actions, candidate and reviewed material effects (`compute_plan_digest`) and requires it to equal both the stored digest and the supplied `--approval-digest`. The integrity seal is treated only as a self-consistency check, never as authentication. This closes the "retain the approved digest, swap an action and its effects, recompute the seal" substitution for every plan kind (Install, LegacyInstall, Removal, General, Undo). - **Stable approval identity for replay protection.** The ledger and `.claim` marker are keyed by `approval_key(plan_id, canonical_digest, initiator_uid, target_root)` instead of the integrity seal. Editing only the summary (or other presentation fields) and resealing can no longer mint a fresh ledger entry for an already-consumed approval, while a newly reviewed identical operation with a new random plan ID is still allowed. - **Live-safe, monotonic crash recovery.** Claims record the owning process (`pid`, `/proc//stat` start time, kernel boot id). Terminal statuses are published exactly once by an atomic hard link into `.terminal` and can never be overwritten or changed to another terminal status. `reconcile_interrupted` only marks a record interrupted when its owner is provably gone, so a second broker starting alongside a live operation cannot mislabel it, and reconciliation cannot race a real finish. - **Personal settings are owned by the initiating user.** `UserStorage` creates the config/state path component by component beneath the resolved home, rejecting symlinks and non-directories. When the write is elevated (effective root on behalf of a non-root user) the created paths are chowned to the initiating user's uid/gid; a non-root process acting for a different user is refused rather than writing a root-owned file. No path outside the home is ever chowned. Proactive state now goes through the same path. ## 2026-09-25 — Approval ledger, user-owned settings, and reviewed-effect execution - **Broker-controlled approval ledger (ADR 0014, `phoebus-installer::approval`):** the privileged broker no longer trusts a self-consistent checksum as proof of approval. The plan's integrity seal — covering actions, per-step effects, candidate, target root, initiating uid and expiry — is the binding fingerprint and the `O_EXCL` consumption key in a root-owned ledger (`/var/lib/phoebus/approvals`, 0700 / 0600). The digest shown on the review card travels across authentication independently of the plan file (`--approval-digest`); a replacement plan under the same identifier is refused even when resealed with a valid checksum; replay is refused even after the user deletes every file in their own plan directory; at most one execution may run under concurrent submissions. The initiating identity is derived from `PKEXEC_UID` (the `--plan-uid` argument is untrusted input). Authentication precedes the claim, so cancellation/refusal consumes nothing; a crash leaves a reconciled `interrupted` record that cannot be retried automatically. - **User-owned personal settings (`phoebus-executor::personal`):** personal package preferences (`~/.config/phoebus/package-preferences.toml`) and proactive snooze/dismiss state (`~/.local/state/phoebus/proactive-state.toml`) are 0600-in-0700, atomic and bounded, written without elevation. System defaults stay root-owned under `/etc/phoebus` and change only through the authenticated typed action `set_package_preference { system_wide: true }`. Personal choices take precedence; system defaults fill the rest. The initiating user is resolved through `PHOEBUS_UID` → `SUDO_UID` → `PKEXEC_UID` → effective uid and `/etc/passwd`, so CLI and GUI agree under sudo/pkexec. Persistence failures are reported as failures — the GUI never says "saved" or "dismissed" on a failed write. - **Reviewed effects carried through execution:** `execute_prepared` now carries the reviewed per-step effects forward; freshly resolved effects are evidence to compare against them, never a replacement approval. A material change aborts with a terminal `stale plan` transaction outcome; only changes explained by an earlier approved step in the same plan are accepted. Effect-resolution failure, stale-plan rejection, partial execution and verification failure all record a terminal result, preserving completed-step outcomes and the protective snapshot. ## 2026-09-25 — Privileged-boundary, GUI-review, removal, transaction and privacy remediation - **Single privileged validation boundary (`phoebus-installer::service`):** - `validate_prepared_plan` is the one authoritative check, run before elevation and repeated inside the broker after authentication. It re-derives the plan seal from the plan's own contents, rejects expired/claimed/modified/ malformed/wrong-root/wrong-uid plans, and revalidates live state. - Plans now bind the exact actions, effects, candidate, canonical target root and initiating uid; multi-action plans store per-step effects and are revalidated action-by-action (fixing an aggregate digest comparison bug). - Protected per-user plan storage (`/run/user//phoebus/plans`, 0700 / 0600, atomic writes, 128-bit ids, symlink/ownership checks) and atomic `O_EXCL` consumption so concurrent requests cannot both mutate and retries cannot repeat. The broker resolves storage from the uid, not an arbitrary path. - `sys --broker --execute-plan --plan-uid --root `; a dropped or mismatched root is rejected rather than silently executing against `/`. - **Truthful transaction outcomes:** verification failure, action failure, refusal and cancellation all finish the transaction with a truthful result; completed steps and the protective snapshot are retained; persistence failures are surfaced; a malformed broker reply is a protocol failure, not success. - **GUI plan review for every plan type:** the assistant renders one review card for install, removal, general administration, rollback and follow-up confirmation; approval/cancel controls execute only the referenced reviewed plan and update the original card; "prepared" is never shown as "completed"; verification results are shown; launch is offered only when a concrete desktop entry/command was identified. Corrected the assistant's `PhoebusButton` API usage (`label`/`actionEnabled`). - **Shared provider/credential handling (`phoebus_installer::ai_setup`):** the CLI and GUI resolve provider, endpoint, model and credential reference through one module. Credentials load from a configured 0600 file, `PHOEBUS_AI_API_KEY_FILE` or a default `~/.config/phoebus/ai.key`; they are never sent through QML, prompts or argv. The GUI direct transport no longer uses an empty key. - **AI-first removal and corrected follow-ups:** default removal routes through the connected model while deterministic ownership discovery and policy validation stay underneath; only `--legacy` bypasses the model. Follow-ups prefer explicit application references, so "install vlc using flatpak" is about VLC, "use flatpak for that one" refers to the previous app, and "why is my audio broken?" is not answered as a package explanation. - **Honest conversation privacy:** history stores minimized structured context (never the raw request), uses the active redactor, is written 0600/0700 atomically, is bounded to ten turns, surfaces write errors, and can be cleared. - **Tests:** regression coverage for tampered/expired/replayed/malformed plans, plan replacement after review, concurrent claims, refusal, target-root and uid binding, verification failure, transaction truthfulness, follow-up resolution, credential loading, and history privacy/retention/deletion. Storage is injected in tests (no shared `PHOEBUS_PLANS_DIR` race). Full workspace suite, `fmt` and `clippy` run; static binaries build. ## 2026-09-24 — AI-first administration remediation: shared service layer, Polkit elevation, QML provisioning, and conversation continuity - **Shared Administration Service Layer (`phoebus_installer::service`):** - Unified planning, recommendation, authorization, execution, and verification across CLI (`sys`) and desktop GUI (`phoebus-assistant`) into a single shared service layer. - Staged reviewable plans (`PreparedPlan`) with cryptographic approval digests (`Sha256`), 15-minute TTL expiration, and replay rejection (`PlanStore`). - Execution binds to the reviewed plan digest and revalidates against current system state before mutation; material alterations abort execution and require fresh review. - Honest recommendations: eliminated speculative claims (e.g. no "avoids a lengthy build" when compile times are unmeasured; displays genuine provenance such as Flathub, Gentoo binhost, Gentoo Portage, Nixpkgs, Snap Store). - Two-phase transaction recording: in-progress transaction recorded before mutation (`transaction::begin`), completed transaction recorded with post-mutation verification (`transaction::finish`). - **Target Desktop & QML Asset Provisioning (`phoebus-core`, `phoebus-executor`):** - Added `gui-apps/quickshell` to the canonical Mango desktop package list. - Embedded all 13 required QML, config, and policy files into the target filesystem (`/usr/share/phoebus/assistant/`) through `TargetRoot` safeguards in `write_session_script`. - Installed Polkit policy (`club.phoebus.sys.policy`) enabling desktop users to elevate mutating plans via `pkexec /usr/local/bin/sys --broker --execute-plan ` with standard authentication prompts, avoiding blanket passwordless sudo and keeping graphical processes unprivileged. - **Desktop Assistant Responsiveness (`phoebus-assistant`):** - Eliminated startup freeze in `AssistantBridge.qml` and `shell.qml` by moving multi-source update checks to on-demand tab switching and replacing continuous polling with a one-shot 100ms handshake timer. - Handshake checks deterministic system state (`/run/reboot-required`) without blocking on network queries. - `execute` submits `plan_id` and `digest`, maintaining UI context cleanly on failure or user authentication cancellation (Polkit exit 126/127). - **Contextual Conversation Continuity (`phoebus_installer::conversation`):** - Bounded conversation turn history (up to 10 turns) with credential redaction (`Redactor`). - Contextual follow-up resolver (`resolve_followup`) handles comparative queries ("why did you choose that over nix?", "why flatpak?"), backend switching ("install the flatpak one", "use portage instead"), and plan confirmations ("proceed with that"). - **Cross-Source Application Removal:** - `plan_removal` detects installed application copies across Flatpak, Snap, AppImage, and Portage. - Detects duplicate/competing copies across lanes and requires explicit lane disambiguation (`sys remove --legacy --`). - Preserves user configuration and data in home directories by default; post-removal verifies complete uninstallation before closing transactions. - **Verification & Acceptance:** - Expanded guest-side acceptance suite `installer/tests/vm/sys-acceptance.sh` to 23 passing cases (`PASS=23 FAIL=0`). - Full cargo test suite passes (55 installer unit tests, 23 CLI integration tests, 10 guidance tests, 16 ISO tests, all core/executor tests). - Clean `cargo fmt`, `cargo clippy`, release binary build, and crt-static build verified. ## 2026-09-24 — AI-first administration experience across CLI and GUI, package correctness, and shared recovery - **Unified AI-First Administration Contract (`sys` & `phoebus-assistant`):** - Natural language is the default interaction across CLI and desktop assistant: `sys install `, `sys please install `, and `sys ask ""` all enter the identical AI investigation and recommendation workflow. - Source flags alone (`--flatpak`, `--portage`, `--nix`, `--snap`, `--appimage`, `--ebuild`) constrain AI candidate evaluation without bypassing the model. - Explicit deterministic administration is selected exclusively via `--legacy`: `sys install --legacy --`, `sys history --legacy`, and `sys undo --legacy`. - Deterministic legacy install without a source flag (`sys install --legacy`) refuses execution and outputs available package source options. - Audited JSON action invocations: `--action` and `--action-file` fail closed unless invoked with `--legacy` (for deterministic administration) or `--broker` (for internal UI/bridge calls). - Truthful fallback: when the AI model is absent or returns an error, execution stops and prints actionable deterministic legacy alternatives (`sys install --legacy --`), never silently falling back across package lanes. - Distinct break-glass semantics: documented distinction between administrative `--legacy` and installer-only ISO `--no-ai` flag. - **Package Correctness & Safety Guarantees:** - Nix attribute evaluation probe: `nix::verify_attribute` probes attribute existence in nixpkgs via `nix-instantiate` before recommendation or preparation. - Portage binary binhost check & compile abort guard: binary package candidates are verified via `emerge -p --usepkgonly`. If an action changes to source compilation (`EffectSource::Source`), execution halts with an error, invalidating prior approval and requiring fresh review. - Cross-source installed application tracking: detects duplicate/competing installations across Flatpak, Snap, AppImage, and Portage. - User data preservation on removal: default package removal preserves user data and configuration directories. - **Desktop Assistant GUI (`phoebus-assistant`):** - Quickshell QML application in `installer/live/desktop/phoebus-assistant/` providing an intuitive desktop assistant with conversational chat, recommendation cards with concise rationales, expandable comparison options, unified updates, proactive alerts, legacy controls, and preferences. - Backed by `sys --assistant-bridge` via stdio JSON-RPC; zero business or administrative logic in QML. - Desktop integration: launcher script (`/usr/local/bin/phoebus-assistant`), desktop entry (`phoebus-assistant.desktop`), and session launcher shortcuts. - **Unified Multi-Source Updates:** - `update::check_unified_updates` queries and consolidates pending updates across Portage, Flatpak, Snap, AppImage, and Nix, with reboot-needed detection. - **Quiet Proactive Assistance:** - Deterministic system monitors for reboot required, low storage (< 5 GiB), failed transactions, systemd service failures, and updates ready. - Persistent alert deduplication, snoozing, dismissals, and configurable enable toggles under `/var/lib/phoebus/proactive.toml`. - **User Preferences & Profiles:** - Inspectable and editable profiles (`Balanced`, `FastInstallation`, `NativeIntegration`, `ApplicationIsolation`), project environment tool mappings, and source pins. - **Expanded Acceptance Verification:** - `installer/tests/vm/sys-acceptance.sh` expanded to 22 acceptance cases covering read-only, failure, offline fallback, and audited entry points (`PASS=22 FAIL=0`). All 481 crate unit and integration tests pass. ## 2026-09-24 — Desktop stack unification: Mango + DarkMaterial as sole desktop - **Canonical Phoebus Desktop:** Phoebus OS now exposes and configures one desktop experience only: **Mango + DarkMaterial**. All standalone dwl desktop paths, packages, sessions, helpers, and fallback/recovery logic have been removed. - **Removed Standalone dwl Packages & Assets:** - Removed obsolete packages that existed solely for standalone dwl: `gui-wm/dwl`, `gui-apps/waybar`, `gui-apps/wofi`, `gui-apps/mako`, `gui-apps/swaybg`, `gui-apps/swayidle`, `gui-apps/swaylock`. - Removed standalone dwl session and helper assets: `PHOEBUS_SESSION_SCRIPT` (dwl launcher), `PHOEBUS_MENU_SCRIPT` (wofi launcher/power menu), `PHOEBUS_LOCK_SCRIPT` (swaylock), `PHOEBUS_IDLE_SCRIPT` (swayidle), `WAYBAR_CONFIG`, `WAYBAR_STYLE`, and `phoebus-dwl.desktop`. - **Retained Mango / DMS wlroots Heritage:** - `gui-wm/mangowm` (GURU, wlroots 0.20 slot) and `gui-apps/dankmaterialshell` are independent and self-contained; DMS natively provides the status bar, notifications, app launcher (`danksearch`), screen lock, and idle daemon. - Retained internal wlroots / dwm standard keybinding conventions inside `MANGO_CONFIG_DEFAULT`. - **Fail-Closed Session Architecture:** - `PHOEBUS_MANGO_SESSION_SCRIPT` (`/usr/local/bin/phoebus-session-mango`) starts Mango and DMS, failing visibly and diagnostically (status 1 with clear stderr) if Mango or DMS fails to start. There is no silent fallback to another desktop. - `/usr/local/bin/phoebus-session` is retained as a thin wrapper executing `phoebus-session-mango "$@"` for manual VT / CLI invocation. - Installed system `greetd` authenticates directly into `/usr/local/bin/phoebus-session-mango`. - Installer desktop profile enum reduced strictly to `Mango` (default) and `None` (headless), rejecting legacy `dwl` configs with an explicit error. - **Verification & Test Coverage:** - Functional tests in `phoebus-executor` updated to exercise `phoebus-session-mango` against `mango` and `dms` stubs. - Regression guards in `phoebus-installer` verify only `wayland-session-mango` is emitted and assert that dwl session/helper assets return `None`. - All workspace tests pass, clippy is clean, and golden installation plan is updated. ## 2026-09-24 — End-to-end graphical installation, detached first boot, and live ISO freshness automation - **Full graphical installation verified (100% complete):** The 6-step graphical wizard and typed backend bridge (`gui-install` mode) completed all 12 backend orchestration stages and emerged all 174 packages of the Mango desktop stack on a disposable 30 GiB qcow2 disk. `gui-install-completes` passed and captured `07-gi-07-complete.png`. - **Detached first boot verified (6/6 checks):** The installed disk was booted standalone with `iso=False` and `-boot order=c`. Systemd-boot loaded, LUKS2 decrypted automatically with the test passphrase, all Btrfs subvolumes mounted (`@`, `@home`, `@var`, `@snapshots`, `@swap`), systemd reached `running` (0 failed units), serial console login authenticated, and `/usr/local/bin/sys` verified operational (`sys history` -> `no transactions recorded`). - **Greetd TOML format fix:** Fixed a multiline TOML basic string syntax defect in `phoebus-core::greetd_config` (`/etc/greetd/config.toml`) that previously caused `greetd.service` to fail with `expected equals sign on line`. Formatted the `tuigreet` command string on a single line and added unit-test TOML parser validation. Verified `tuigreet` rendered cleanly on the booted system (`01-boot-desktop.png`). - **Live ISO freshness automation:** Added `scripts/ensure-live-iso.sh` and Makefile targets `iso` / `iso-rebuild`. Guarantees that the live medium (`installer/live/phoebus-installer-amd64.iso`) is automatically recompiled and repacked whenever Rust crates, QML desktop files, or live configurations are newer than the ISO. - **Kernel profile default optimization:** Configured `KernelProfile::Safe` (`sys-kernel/gentoo-kernel-bin`) as the default kernel profile during installation, eliminating 100+ minute kernel compile times on constrained test environments. - **Desktop dependencies and keyword updates:** Added scoped keywords for `x11-misc/pcmanfm`, `x11-libs/libfm`, `dev-cpp/cpptrace`, `dev-libs/libdwarf`, and USE flags `dev-python/pillow -truetype`, `dev-cpp/cpptrace unwind`, `sys-libs/zlib minizip` to resolve desktop build graph requirements. - **Harness & Driver hardening:** Updated `gui-driver.py` with flexible login prompt regex matching arbitrary hostnames, added focused tab-navigation helper `_tab_until_focus`, and implemented clean guest poweroff (`sync; systemctl poweroff`) during detached boot checks. ## 2026-09-24 — AI-first package installation - **Shared installation workflow (`phoebus-executor::install`, ADR 0013):** `sys install `, `sys ask install ` and the explicit backend flags all run one flow: identify → evidence → AI investigation → deterministic validation + effects → review → approval → execute → verify → history. The AI only recommends; the resolver re-checks every proposal against real backend metadata and maps it to the existing broker action. - **Bounded investigation (`phoebus-ai::install`):** the model may request typed, read-only evidence (`discover_candidates`, `inspect_candidate`, `check_backend`, `inspect_installation`) and ask one bounded question about intent before proposing a structured `InstallProposal`. Bounds: turn, per-turn request and evidence-size limits plus repeated-request detection. A rejected proposal is fed back for a bounded revision. - **Friendly-name resolution and validation:** per-lane resolution (`chooser::resolve_for_backend`) maps friendly names to real identifiers, reports ambiguity, and never fabricates a candidate. Duplicate installs, stale versions and changed effects are refused; approval is bound to a digest and revalidated before execution. - **Explicit backend flags are authoritative:** `--portage`, `--flatpak`, `--nix`, `--snap`, `--appimage`, `--ebuild` bypass the model, are mutually exclusive, and never fall back to another lane. - **No-model path:** an unqualified install with no provider prints the deterministic selection and the explicit commands and installs nothing; provider failure is never permission to install. - **Install facts are real:** `sys` now loads the installed `/etc/phoebus/install.toml` instead of assuming defaults, and the bounded facts include free space, Wayland, the usable lanes, saved preferences and recovery capability. - **Transaction engine:** installs record an in-progress transaction before the mutation (`transaction::begin`/`finish`), verify installed identity/version afterwards, and record failures truthfully. - **ADRs/docs:** new `docs/adr/0013-ai-first-installation.md`; `docs/SYS.md` updated with the install workflow and acceptance cases 23–31. ### Verified (host) - `cargo fmt`, `cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets` (no new warnings) and `cargo test --workspace` pass. New tests cover: the AI loop (steps, bounds, repetition, revision, provider failure), resolver fabrication/ambiguity/ duplicate/changed-evidence, action mapping, transaction begin/finish, CLI flag conflicts/no-fallback/no-model, and target-vs-host facts. ### Verified (disposable VM) - A deterministic minimal install completed (`INSTALL-RC=0`), including installing `/usr/local/bin/sys` and verifying the target, then booted detached (systemd `running`, 0 failed units). - `sys install app-misc/hello --portage` ran the full workflow: plan + effects, protective snapshot, install, verification in the package database, and a durable transaction in `sys history` that survived a clean reboot. - `sys remove app-misc/hello`, the no-model offer, backend-flag conflicts and the read-only investigation actions were exercised; the matrix reported `FAIL=0` (19/19). ### Not yet verified - The **AI-selected** journey (`sys install ` with a connected model) is unit-tested with scripted transports and was not run against a live provider: no authorised provider/credential exists in this environment. The exact command is in `docs/HANDOFF.md`; it is the remaining gate. ## 2026-09-24 — Hardware-aware software selection, Snap/AppImage/custom ebuild, `sys` lifecycle - **Shared selection policy (`phoebus-core::selection`, ADR 0006 revised):** replaced the fixed category routing (GUI→Flatpak, dev→Nix) with a single, inspectable, deterministic policy over resolved candidates from **every** lane (Portage source/binary/vendor, Nix, Flatpak, Snap, AppImage, custom ebuild). It separates hard constraints (architecture, required sandbox, storage, GPU, required proprietary, unavailable backend) from preferences; keeps kernel, drivers, systemd, graphics/audio and boot under Portage; honours and persists explicit compatible choices; errors instead of silently switching lanes; and reuses an already-installed lane to avoid duplication. Uncertainties are labelled (measured vs estimated compile time). - **Candidate resolution (`phoebus-executor::chooser`):** gathers real backend metadata (`emerge --pretend`, `flatpak search`, `snap find`, local Nix/AppImage records, the Phoebus overlay), assembles hardware facts (arch, cores, RAM, free space, GPUs, Wayland, compile history) and applies the policy. Unreachable metadata is reported as an unavailable candidate, never invented. - **Snap lane (`phoebus-executor::snap`):** detection of the client, daemon readiness and confinement; `find`/`info`/`list`/`install`/`remove`/`refresh`/ `connections`. `app-containers/snapd` is installed and `snapd.socket` enabled **through Portage**; classic confinement is explicit; automatic refresh is disclosed. - **AppImage lane (`phoebus-executor::appimage`):** managed import/acquisition with a pinned SHA-256 (placeholders and mismatches refused), ELF-architecture checks **without executing the image**, atomic adoption, desktop entry and optional icon extraction via `unsquashfs`, version/integrity records, and removal that preserves user data by default. AppImage is never called a sandbox. - **Custom ebuild lane (`phoebus-executor::ebuild`):** a dedicated `/var/db/repos/phoebus` overlay with recorded rationale and a content SHA-256. Staging never runs the ebuild; install requires the reviewed digest, generates the `Manifest` and builds through Portage with its sandbox enabled. Editing the staged ebuild invalidates approval. - **Typed actions + `sys` surface (`phoebus-core::action`, `phoebus-installer`):** `choose_package`, `set_package_preference`, `snap_*`, `appimage_*` and `custom_ebuild_*`, with strict validators (option-like operands, path traversal, placeholder hashes and bad names fail closed). Deterministic phrases cover the common cases; `custom_ebuild` staging/install stay JSON-only because they carry a full artifact. - **`sys` in the installed target:** the installer locates the trusted static `sys` beside itself, installs it to `/usr/local/bin/sys`, proves it runs in the target chroot before the recovery snapshot, and fails the install closed if it is missing. The VM install harness now fetches `sys`, and the rollback guest uses the installed binary. - **Assistant prompt reconciled:** the closed action set now includes the new actions and instructs the model not to route by category, to use `choose_package`, and to treat a custom ebuild as untrusted. - **Docs:** new `docs/SYS.md` command reference and acceptance matrix; revised ADR 0006. ### Verified (host) - `cargo fmt`, `cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets` (no new warnings) and `cargo test --workspace` pass; the new policy, backend and CLI tests run on the host. `installer/tests/vm/test_vmsafety.py` (18 tests) passes with the new `sys-acceptance.sh`. ### Not yet verified - The new lanes and the installed-`sys` lifecycle are unit/integration tested but **not yet exercised in a booted VM** in this session: a full GUI install was occupying the only disposable disk. The exact VM commands are in `docs/SYS.md` and `docs/HANDOFF.md`. ## 2026-09-23 — NVIDIA reliability, verification and harness repair - **Deterministic live GPU decision (`phoebus-core`, `phoebus-installer`):** `--live-gpu-plan` classifies the PCI display controllers (class `0x03`, vendor `0x10de`) against the generated device table and the bundled branch's capabilities, returning `load-nvidia`, `nouveau-fallback`, `no-device` or `disabled`. The live `phoebus-nvidia-load` script consumes it: a supported GPU loads the accelerated stack, an unsupported GPU (or a failed load) explicitly `modprobe`s `nouveau`, and a machine without an NVIDIA display device is left alone. `build.sh` now creates `etc/modprobe.d/phoebus-nvidia.conf` (the file the old build required but never produced) and replaces Debian's unconditional nouveau configuration. The fail-safe entry sets `nomodeset phoebus.nvidia=off`, which the script and the unit both honour. - **Legacy branch boundary corrected (`phoebus-core`):** Maxwell/Pascal/Volta are capped at NVIDIA's last supporting series (580) with `>=x11-drivers/nvidia-drivers-581` masked; a Blackwell plus proprietary-only GPU set is now reported as an explicit incompatibility instead of installing a single driver that cannot serve both. - **Payload verifier hardened (`phoebus-executor`):** `--verify-live-nvidia` now rejects placeholder modules/libraries, requires every module to be registered in the live kernel's `modules.dep`, normalises the dpkg revision and matches userspace/firmware versions to the bundled driver, infers and checks the module flavor, and requires the exact `phoebus-nvidia.conf`. All reads stay rooted inside the build root. - **Installed lifecycle fixed (`phoebus-executor`, `phoebus-installer`):** the NVIDIA dracut `force_drivers` fragment is written only in the NVIDIA stage, after the driver exists, and the final initramfs is regenerated then. The installer proves the modules were built for a kernel (or fails) and records the real resolved version, kernel and module names. The update path verifies the rebuilt modules before reporting success. - **GUI acceptance harness repaired (`installer/tests/vm/gui-driver.py`):** state-based step navigation replaces the step-0 keystroke count; the real account fields and the default single-password encryption are driven; the direct "Install now" action replaces ERASE typing and the (never-assigned) confirmation toggle; duplicate submission is exercised; install timeouts report stage, elapsed time and last state; the detached boot unlocks with the single-password passphrase and falls back to the separate one. - **Rollback acceptance automated (`installer/tests/vm/`):** a new `serial-driver.py rollback` mode with `rollback-guest.sh` / `rollback-verify.sh` records the package-database fingerprint and a `/home` marker, creates a recovery point with `sys snapshot`, performs a controlled reversible package install, runs `sys undo`, reboots detached and compares package state and `/home`. The destructive VM gate is written but unrun. - **Live privilege scoped (`phoebus-core`, `installer/live`):** the live `NOPASSWD: ALL` rule is replaced by an emitted, `visudo`-validated policy that grants unattended escalation only to the typed brokers (`phoebus-installer`, `sys`) and `systemctl` power actions. The recovery console is preserved via the password-authenticated live credential. - Docs: ADR 0012 updated; the stale "`gui_bridge` tests hang" handoff claim withdrawn (the workspace suite passes). ## 2026-09-23 — Comprehensive installer UX overhaul: 6-step flow, friendly pickers, and resilient UI - **Streamlined 6-Step Flow (`phoebus-install`, QML):** Eliminated the duplicate Step 0 welcome screen from the installer wizard; launch starts directly at "Step 1 of 6 · Language and keyboard" with an accurate 6-step progress indicator. The "Back" button is hidden on Step 1 and disabled for step 0 so back-navigation stays bounded. - **Friendly Keyboard & Locale Pickers (`phoebus-installer::gui_bridge`, `PhoebusCombo`):** Replaced raw two-letter codes (`al`, `dz`, `brai`) and arbitrary sorting with full layout names parsed directly from `/usr/share/X11/xkb/rules/evdev.lst`, sorting the top 30 world keyboard layouts and system locales first (e.g. `English (US) — us`, `German — de`). Selecting a layout dynamically switches the live Wayland keymap via `localectl set-x11-keymap`. - **Searchable Timezone Picker (`gui_bridge`, QML):** Populated the timezone dropdown directly from system zoneinfo, auto-detecting `/etc/localtime`. - **Welcome App Cleanup (`phoebus-welcome`):** Removed the redundant "Keyboard test" button and modal from the live welcome app. - **Single-Password Disk Encryption (`phoebus-install`):** Default-enabled "Use same password to encrypt disk" toggle with LUKS2, reducing credentials to username and password only without redundant confirmation prompts. Removed arbitrary 8-character minimum password restriction to accept any valid password. - **Direct Installation Confirmation:** Eliminated the requirement to type "ERASE" in all caps or check confirmation boxes; replaced with a direct, unambiguous "Install now" button on the review screen. - **Invariants Enforced Against AI Mutation (`phoebus-ai`):** Enforced Mango + DankMaterialShell desktop, Btrfs filesystem, and Flatpak/Nix core subsystems inside both the AI system prompt and semantic change validation; non-conforming AI proposals are automatically rejected. - **Loopback AI Auto-Detection & Clear Guidance:** Auto-probes loopback ports 4096 (OpenCode) and 11434 (Ollama) upon reaching the AI step, defaulting to detected local instances and replacing technical jargon with clear user guidance. - **Humanized Failure Reporting & Details Viewer:** Replaced raw curl/JSON dumps with clear humanized error summaries (e.g. package verification or network connection issues) alongside "[Retry]" and "[View technical details]" toggles. The live details terminal box properly fetches log lines and auto-scrolls to the latest activity. ## 2026-09-23 — Responsive display layout, resolution modal & hotkeys, and fullscreen installer - **Display Resolution Switcher & Hotkeys (`phoebus-welcome`, Mango config):** Added a dedicated 1-click Display Resolution dialog in `phoebus-welcome` allowing instant switching between 1920×1080 (Full HD), 1440×900, 1280×768 (Standard), 1024×768, and 800×600 modes without blurry bilinear scaling. Mapped global Mango hotkeys (`Super+Shift+F12` for 1080p, `Super+Shift+F11` for 900p, `Super+Shift+F10` for 768p, `Super+Shift+F9` for 1024x768) and set virtual display auto-probe to prioritize widescreen (1280x768) on initial boot. - **Low-Resolution Responsiveness & Scrollability (QML):** Wrapped both `phoebus-welcome` and `phoebus-install` form/progress views in bounded `Flickable` containers with `ScrollBar.vertical`. Added compact view adaptation (< 760px) in `phoebus-welcome` so the primary action stacks cleanly with flow-wrapped readiness chips, eliminating text clipping and ensuring all recovery tools and form controls are reachable on 800×600 and 640×480 screens. - **Fullscreen Installer Enforcement:** Closed the welcome window on launching the installer and set compositor fullscreen rules, eliminating any 50/50 window tiling splits. ## 2026-09-23 — Installer GUI usability, OpenCode model variants, and GURU mirror fix - **Gentoo GURU Official Mirror (`phoebus-core::system`):** Updated `GURU_REPO_URI` from the broken GitHub mirror to `https://anongit.gentoo.org/git/repo/proj/guru.git`, resolving the HTTP 404 failure that caused `emaint sync -r guru` to exit with code 1 during `portage_configure` in chroot. - **OpenCode Model Catalog & Variant Picker (`phoebus-executor`, `phoebus-installer`, QML):** OpenCode model selection now displays human-readable model titles alongside raw IDs (e.g., `DeepSeek V4.1 Flash (deepseek-flash)`). Added model variant selection supporting `default`, `low`, `high`, and `max` levels, defaulting cleanly to `default` and properly passing the variant into OpenCode session prompts. - **Live Terminal Output Streaming (`phoebus-executor::log`, `gui_bridge`, QML):** `Logger` and command execution runner now support subscriber sinks that stream stdout/stderr line-by-line in real time. The GUI bridge dispatches `log` events to the frontend over JSON-RPC, populating the "Show details" terminal box with live Portage compilation and command output rather than a static placeholder. - **Desktop Defaults & Keybindings:** Enforced Mango + DankMaterialShell as the default desktop configuration, standardized Btrfs and Flatpak defaults, simplified user account creation, streamlined confirmation workflow, and mapped standard DWM keybindings in Mango. ## 2026-09-23 — NVIDIA accelerated driver policy, live payload and installed integration - **Hardware-driven driver policy (`phoebus-core::nvidia`):** a deterministic, testable decision from the PCI display device IDs, backed by a generated table (`nvidia_devices.rs`) derived from the public PCI ID database via each device's NVIDIA chip codename. Turing/Ampere/Ada/Hopper/Blackwell use the current `x11-drivers/nvidia-drivers` branch with NVIDIA's **open** kernel modules (`kernel-open`); Maxwell/Pascal/Volta use the proprietary branch with `-kernel-open` and are masked `>=x11-drivers/nvidia-drivers-595`; Fermi/Kepler and older fall back to the in-tree `nouveau` and are reported, never claimed as NVIDIA success. Unknown NVIDIA device IDs are reported as unknown. - **Probe captures PCI identity:** display devices now carry `pci_id` (`vendor:device`) and `pci_address`; `VIDEO_CARDS` uses the resolved plan (`nvidia` only when a branch can serve the GPU, otherwise `nouveau`), while hybrid Intel/AMD GPUs are preserved. - **Installed Gentoo system:** scoped `package.use` (`dist-kernel`, `kernel-open`/`-kernel-open`), a scoped `~amd64` keyword for the driver atom, a scoped `package.mask` for the legacy branch, a `modprobe.d` policy (nouveau blacklist, `nvidia_drm.modeset=1`, `nvidia-uvm` softdep) and a dracut `force_drivers` fragment written **before** the kernel is built. A new `nvidia_drivers` install stage (after the kernel, before boot) emerges the driver and regenerates the initramfs so the modules are embedded; its failure fails the install and the resolved choice is recorded in `/etc/phoebus/nvidia` and shown in the plan. `sys update system` now runs `@module-rebuild` and `kernel-install add-all` on NVIDIA systems so kernel/module/initramfs updates stay coherent. - **AI boundary:** the model cannot change the driver branch or module flavor; a `set_package_use` change touching `x11-drivers/nvidia-drivers` is refused by the fixed-policy check and the advisor prompt says so. - **Live ISO:** the signed `contrib`/`non-free`/`non-free-firmware` components are enabled and the NVIDIA driver, firmware and Wayland/EGL/GBM userspace are bundled (`live-packages.list`). The live kernel is **pinned to Debian stable (trixie, 6.12 LTS)** because testing's newer kernel (7.2) removed the `strncpy` declaration the 550 driver still uses; installing the rolling kernel metas would make `nvidia-kernel-dkms` unbuildable. `livefs-hook.sh` builds the DKMS modules for that exact kernel (`nvidia-current*` on Debian) and fails if any module is missing. Nouveau blacklisting and module options come from Debian's own `nvidia-kernel-common`; its unconditional modules-load entry is replaced by a gated `phoebus-nvidia.service` that loads the driver before greetd/Mango only when an NVIDIA device is present. The documented fail-safe entry disables modesetting and blacklists the NVIDIA modules. `build.sh` verifies the assembled rootfs on **every** build (including `PHOEBUS_REUSE_ROOTFS=1`) with `--verify-live-nvidia` and records the bundled driver version, module flavor and kernel in `/etc/phoebus/nvidia`; a missing module, library or firmware file fails the build. - **Proven this session:** a minimal live rootfs (stable kernel + NVIDIA) was built with `mmdebstrap` and the payload verified end to end: driver `550.163.01`, kernel `6.12.107+deb13-amd64`, modules `nvidia-current`, `-modeset`, `-uvm`, `-drm`. The full desktop ISO was **not** assembled here (the host has ~10 GiB free and the build wants more), and no NVIDIA hardware was available, so acceleration is unverified. - **Not verified:** actual NVIDIA acceleration cannot be exercised on this host (no NVIDIA GPU; QEMU's virtual GPU does not establish it). No NVIDIA hardware passthrough setup is available or authorized. The live/installed NVIDIA boot gates are **unverified** here (see `docs/STATUS.md`); this is implementation + unit/integration tests + a proven payload build, not a claim of working hardware acceleration. ## 2026-09-22 — Installer UX streamlining and DWM keybindings in Mango - **Flatpak non-removable invariant:** Flatpak is a defining, required subsystem of Phoebus OS. Removed `set_flatpak` from the AI advisor action prompt and examples so models never propose toggling it; enforced in `fixed_policy_violation` and config validation that Flatpak cannot be disabled or removed; filtered redundant Flatpak proposals from the GUI review card; and locked Flatpak to 'yes (required)' in the TUI. - **DWM / DWL keybindings in Mango:** Packaged `MANGO_CONFIG_DEFAULT` now ships with standard dwm / dwl bindings for tiling and window management: `Mod+Shift+Return` (terminal), `Mod+Return` (zoom / promote to master), `Mod+j`/`Mod+k` (focus stack next/prev), `Mod+Shift+j`/`Mod+Shift+k` (exchange client), `Mod+h`/`Mod+l` (`setmfact` master area sizing), `Mod+i`/`Mod+d` (`incnmaster` master count), `Mod+Shift+c`/`Mod+Shift+q` (`killclient`), `Mod+t`/`Mod+m`/`Mod+f` (tile, monocle, fullscreen), `Mod+Shift+Space` (toggle floating), `Mod+Tab` (view previous tag), `Mod+1..9` (tag switching), `Mod+Shift+1..9` (tag moving), and `Mod+left/right/middle click` for window dragging, resizing and floating toggling. - **Full-screen installer window:** Closing the Welcome window when starting the installer allows Mango's tiling layout to present the installer full-screen. - **Scrollable dropdown menus:** Replaced the combo box with `PhoebusCombo`, a true dropdown menu with a clickable chevron, instant search filtering, and a scrollable `ListView` with vertical scrollbar that handles large lists without cutting off choices or destroying pre-filled selections. - **Desktop keyboard layouts:** Keyboard options now parse XKB rules (`/usr/share/X11/xkb/rules/evdev.lst` and `base.lst`) for clean desktop layouts with human-readable labels, replacing the ancient console keymap tree. - **Streamlined defaults:** Removed the manual desktop profile selector, filesystem selector, and Nix/Flatpak toggles from the UI; the installer now consistently defaults to Mango + DankMaterialShell, Btrfs with snapshots, and both Flatpak and Nix enabled. - **Account & password simplification:** Removed the redundant "Full name" field (username only). Removed the artificial 8-character password length limit. Added a "Use same password to encrypt disk" toggle (enabled by default) so users do not have to re-enter a separate disk passphrase across four fields. - **Direct confirmation:** Removed typing "ERASE" and the confirmation checkbox from the review screen; the overview screen clearly highlights the target disk and clicking "Install now" proceeds directly. - **Live progress log details:** The "Show details" button during installation now opens a dedicated scrollable log viewer that polls every 1.5 seconds and auto-scrolls to the newest output. ## 2026-09-22 — Event-driven analysis of a first-time user's journey The graphical installer was audited against a first-time user's journey and rebuilt around a fixed, explained sequence: Welcome, Language and keyboard, Internet and readiness, AI connection, Destination disk, Account and encryption, Review and confirmation, Installation, Completion. Configuration, validation, plans, approval and execution stay authoritative in Rust. ### Fixed - **Network "Re-check" no longer resets the wizard.** The readiness refresh is a separate, read-only bridge op (`readiness`) that updates the probe result only; it cannot change the step or clear the selected disk. The first handshake is the only path that initialises the form. - **AI catalogs are fetched for the connection on screen.** "Load model list" now pushes the edited configuration and credentials before requesting the catalog, classifies authentication/unreachable/model failures with a stable `error_kind`, and ignores a stale reply that a newer request superseded. - **The AI connection indicator is invalidated when it should be.** Editing the provider, model, endpoint, server or a credential clears the green "Validated" state and requires revalidation; irrelevant account or disk edits preserve it. A regression assert in the VM harness edits the model and checks the state flips. - **Suggestion lists are keyboard-operable.** Arrow keys move a visible highlight, Enter selects it, Escape dismisses the list, and the highlight is exposed through `Accessible` roles. Enter in an open list is consumed so it cannot also advance the wizard. - **Busy work always completes.** The bridge now fails every outstanding request when the backend exits, so no spinner can hang; AI connect/test and catalog loads are single-flight; every failure path clears its busy state and shows an actionable retry. - **Keyboard focus is scrolled into view**, so a keyboard user never tabs to an off-screen control, and the `PhoebusToggle` Return handler is fixed (it previously called a signal handler as a function). ### Changed - **Human-readable language, keyboard and time-zone names** (e.g. "English (United States) — en_US.UTF-8", "German — de") are returned by the backend; the stable identifier is still what is validated and written. - **The keyboard step tells the truth about the live session.** The live session keeps its own layout; the selected layout is applied to the installed system, and the typing test is labelled as testing the live keyboard. A live Wayland layout switch is not implemented. - **Internet readiness distinguishes a local link from reachable installation services** and re-checks on demand without disturbing the form. - **AI setup explains why a model is required and what is shared** (hardware and storage facts; never passwords, passphrases, keys, names or files), shows the proposed changes, and requires an explicit Accept or Discard before the step can advance. - **Disk selection prominently shows model, capacity and device identity**, and states exactly which disk will be erased; protected disks explain why they cannot be selected. The ERASE confirmation and approval binding are unchanged. - **The account step explains login password versus encryption passphrase**, and password reveal controls are keyboard-focusable. Technical settings moved behind Advanced. - **Progress shows real stages, elapsed time and activity**, with a redacted Details log; the failure screen explains whether disk changes occurred and what is safe to do next; completion explains restart, media removal, unlock and first login. - **The graphical harness gained a `gui-install` mode** that presses the real controls through the whole journey (AI connect, disk, account, ERASE, install) on a disposable disk, plus regression checks for readiness refresh, disk survival and AI invalidation. `PHOEBUS_GUI_CONFIG`/`/etc/phoebus/install.conf` let a live medium preseed wizard defaults without weakening any check. ### Verified - `cargo fmt --all -- --check` and `cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets` clean (pre-existing `result_large_err` advisories unchanged); the Rust workspace tests are green and `make test` (Rust + 16 harness tests) passes. - Disposable graphical VM: `gui` 28/28 PASS (welcome, launcher, duplicate prevention, keyboard suggestion selection, network, AI gate blocked and reported, no bridge errors) and `opencode` 18/18 PASS (real model response, validated proposal, model edit invalidates the connection). - `gui-install` passed every journey assertion on a fresh 30 GiB qcow2, including `gui-install-erase-confirmed`; the backend then reported real progress (disk prepare, stage3 download, fstab, Portage sync, base packages, kernel) with elapsed time and categories, and no fabricated percentage. The completed install itself timed out in the harness after four hours during a >100-minute kernel compile (see `docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`); the completed install + detached boot gate remains **BLOCKED on host build time**, not on any code defect. ## 2026-09-22 — `sys` administration hardening Correctness work on the deterministic `sys` broker and the assistant path that shares it. Every change is covered by unit tests (368 Rust tests pass); the destructive rollback VM acceptance remains unverified (see below). ### Fixed - **Alternate-root execution now targets the requested system.** Package execution, service enable/disable and Flatpak operations previously ignored `--root` and ran against the host, while `emerge --pretend` previews already ran in the target. All of them now go through one `target_spec`/chroot path, and operations that cannot be confined to a non-running root (service status, start, stop, restart) are **rejected before any command is built**. `systemctl --root` is used for offline enable/disable. Regression tests prove preview and execution both emit a chroot confined to the same root, and that a rejected operation invokes nothing. - **Validation at the execution boundary.** `parse_natural` emitted actions that were never validated, so a manual `sys install --color=n` could pass an option through. `parse_natural` now validates its own output, `resolve_effects` and `execute` validate every action before touching a command, and option-like operands (leading `-`) are rejected for services, packages and search. `emerge`/`flatpak` operands are passed after an explicit `--` separator. Manual, JSON and AI entry paths are all covered. - **`sys ask` reports failure truthfully.** A failing action now stops the plan, records the completed/failed/unattempted actions, and exits nonzero instead of returning success. - **Complete transaction history.** Ordinary mutating `sys` commands are recorded (previously only assistant plans were), the protective snapshot id created by the generic high-risk path is preserved and recorded, and a recording failure is surfaced instead of being swallowed. - **Reliable package approval.** `emerge --pretend` output is now classified as *established* (a real plan, including a genuine `0 packages`) or *unestablished*; `sys` refuses to proceed when the effects cannot be established rather than treating unparseable output as "nothing to do". A material change between review and execution still aborts. ### Added - Typed service lifecycle actions `start_service`, `stop_service`, `restart_service`, and ordinary commands for the existing bounded verbs: `sys flatpak install|remove|list`, `sys nix prepare …`, `sys snapshot [op]`, `sys start|stop|restart `. The AI prompt exposes the new verbs, so the manual and AI interfaces share one validated execution path. - `phoebus-executor::actions::execute_plan` runs a reviewed multi-action plan, stopping at the first failure and marking the rest unattempted, so the assistant and any multi-step caller report partial failure consistently. - CLI integration tests (`tests/sys_cli.rs`) cover the manual and JSON entry paths and exit codes. ## Unreleased ### Added - **Real OpenCode agent-server adapter.** `phoebus-executor::opencode_client` implements the OpenCode session/message protocol over the project's curl transport and the `ModelTransport` trait, so the strict proposal parser, evidence review, bounded facts and executor are reused unchanged. The GUI ("OpenCode agent"), the installer CLI (`--ai-backend opencode`, `--opencode-server/-provider/-model/-password-file`) and `sys ask` all use it. It creates a transient session per request, accepts only the completed assistant text parts, disables tools per message, and deletes the session. A JSON schema output mode is available in the protocol but is not used: the shipped DeepSeek models reject it, and the prompt carries an explicit change shape instead. The `opencode 1.18.32` contract was verified directly: session creation rejects a `model` field, `/provider` metadata can contain a credential and is reduced to ids/model names, and auth is HTTP Basic (`opencode` / `OPENCODE_SERVER_PASSWORD`). - **`--opencode-test`** obtains and validates a real model response (exit nonzero on failure), distinct from the read-only `--opencode-probe`. A live acceptance test (`make opencode-acceptance`) fails as BLOCKED when no server is configured, so it cannot pass by not running. - **Truthful OpenCode connection states** (`insecure_transport`, `unreachable`, `authentication_required`, `authentication_rejected`, `incompatible`, `reachable`, `model_catalog`, `selected_model_unavailable`); `ready` is reserved for a validated response and is never returned by the probe. - **GUI "Test connection"** and OpenCode connection controls, plus a backend selection (`ai.backend`) in canonical configuration. ### Security - **The mandatory-AI gate now requires a validated interaction.** Both the GUI bridge and the installer CLI refuse to install when only a provider name is configured; a successful, validated model interaction bound to the current configuration (and credential) is required. Changing the model, endpoint, server or a secret invalidates it. A direct provider or `--no-ai` remains the fallback. - **OpenCode transport policy is enforced.** Plain `http://` is accepted only when the resolved destination is loopback and the connection is pinned to the checked address; remote access is `https://` with certificate verification or an authenticated tunnel to loopback. Redirects, unsafe schemes and oversized or trickled bodies are bounded, and credentials travel only on curl's stdin. - **Credentials never surface.** The catalog is reduced to ids/model names; server responses that echo credentials are not retained, and tests feed credential-bearing bodies and assert they do not appear in errors or state. ### Verified - **The graphical installer uses the OpenCode adapter.** In a disposable graphical VM the wizard selected "OpenCode agent", entered the server, provider and model through the UI, obtained a real model response (Test connection) and a validated proposal (Connect and validate, green "Validated"). The `opencode` harness run passed 17/17 and the GUI regression 25/25. A password-protected server was reached through authentication as well. The full graphical installation beyond the AI gate is still not run. ### Fixed - **A malformed model proposal now gets one bounded corrective retry** before the strict parser rejects the interaction (the shipped DeepSeek models occasionally keyed the change or rationale wrongly). The parser remains the final authority; a retry that still fails is still rejected. - **OpenCode client/probe defects found by testing:** the handwritten HTTP reader (no total deadline, UTF-8-unsafe chunk fallback) was removed in favour of the curl transport; the catalog is no longer parsed on a non-2xx status; a provider-shaped 500 can no longer look like a catalog; the duplicate-session harness check requires exactly one session; and GUI navigation is asserted from secret-free frontend state lines rather than inferred from a screenshot. ### Added - **OpenCode connection workflow and capability probe.** New ADR 0011 and `docs/OPENCODE.md` separate the four components (client, server, model service, Phoebus broker) and document host-local and tunnelled remote use. `phoebus-executor::opencode_server` probes `/global/health` and `/config/providers` and reports a typed state (`disconnected`, `authentication_required`, `incompatible`, `reachable_no_model`, `ready`) instead of assuming a TCP connect or HTTP 200 means compatibility. Exposed as `phoebus-installer --opencode-probe ` (read-only, nonzero unless a model is available). Never returns provider credentials. Verified against the installed `opencode 1.18.32` (ready) and a deliberate unauthenticated LAN bind (`authentication_required`). ### Security - **The target disk is revalidated immediately before partitioning.** An approval now binds to a verified device, not a name: `storage_prepare` re-probes and refuses if the disk disappeared, became protected (mounted/read-only/live), or changed size/model since it was selected. Regression tests cover each case. - **The GUI bridge refuses replayed and overlapping installs.** An approval is single-use and consumed before destructive work; a second `start_install`, a retry or a reconnected frontend cannot start a second installation. Request lines and secret values are length-bounded; deeply nested JSON is rejected. - **Provider transport hardened.** Only `http(s)` endpoints are accepted, URLs with characters that could inject curl config directives are refused, the transfer is restricted to `http,https`, redirects stay disabled (so an `Authorization` header cannot follow a redirect to another origin), and the response is size-bounded (`max-filesize`). - **`TargetRoot` refuses symlink escapes.** `write`/`ensure_dir` reject a symlinked path component inside the target instead of following it, so a planted symlink cannot redirect an installer write to the host. - **Unauthenticated OpenCode endpoints are not treated as usable.** The probe reports `authentication_required` for a passwordless LAN bind rather than `ready`. ### Fixed - **Disk sizes are no longer reported as `0 B`.** `probe_disks` invoked `lsblk` without `-b`, so human-readable sizes (`30G`) failed the byte parse and every disk displayed `0 B`; the size-based disk-identity check was also blind. The `-b` flag is now used and pinned by a test. - **The welcome window's primary action is keyboard-reachable.** It now requests activation and force-focuses "Install Phoebus OS", so Return launches the installer (previously no focus ring was shown and Return did nothing). A regression test also rejects the non-existent `FloatingWindow.onActiveChanged`. - **The installer cannot be abandoned mid-install without explanation.** Escape during the destructive phase is refused and the UI states that the operation cannot be cancelled safely; the AI step shows its "connect and validate" guidance inline, beside the controls. ### Changed - **The VM harness enforces its own safety rules and reports structured results.** `installer/tests/vm/vmsafety.py` validates every writable drive (qcow2, inside `PHOEBUS_VM_DISKS`, no `/dev/*`, block/char devices, raw images, escaping symlinks or outside backing chains), gives each run its own OVMF variable file and QMP socket, uses structured QMP and argument arrays (no `os.system`), and returns nonzero on any failed assertion, timeout, EOF or missing result. Statuses are `PASS`/`FAIL`/`BLOCKED`/`SKIPPED`/`NOT RUN`. `make test` now runs the harness unit tests; `installer/tests/vm/report.py` builds a browsable run report. ### Added - **Graphical installation experience.** The live ISO now boots into a branded Phoebus welcome window (`phoebus-welcome`) that makes "Install Phoebus OS" the dominant action, shows ISO version and readiness (network, firmware, memory, cores) and keeps network/display/accessibility/help/keyboard-test/power tools available, with troubleshooting tools under Advanced. A full graphical setup wizard (`phoebus-install`) guides language and keyboard, network and prerequisites, AI model connection, destination disk (with protected disks and the installer medium identified), account and encryption, review, `ERASE` authorization, progress and completion. Duplicate installer sessions are prevented. The TUI/CLI remains the fallback. See ADR 0010 and `docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`. - **Typed JSON GUI bridge.** `phoebus-installer --gui-bridge` exposes a narrow, fail-closed protocol over stdin/stdout that reuses the same `InstallConfig`, validation, plan, `DestructiveAuthorization` and staged executor as the TUI. Approval is bound to a plan digest, secrets travel only over the stdin pipe, and real backend stages are reported with categories (no invented percentages). `Installer::install_observed` and an `InstallObserver` trait were added; `Installer::install` is unchanged. - **Phoebus brand system.** `phoebus-core::brand` provides charcoal/warm white/amber tokens plus a sun emblem, wordmark and wallpaper as deterministic SVG (emitted via `--emit-asset`, shared with the QML frontend), applied to the GRUB menu, live wallpaper, welcome window, installer, application icon and completion screen. Readable contrast and the QML/Rust palette are pinned by tests. ### Fixed - **Installed systems no longer default into recovery.** `loader.conf` now pins the newest real kernel entry, and the snapshot recovery entry carries a `sort-key` that keeps it after every kernel, so a low machine-id can never make systemd-boot select the recovery entry by filename tie-break. Previously an installed system could boot `systemd.unit=rescue.target` after reboot. - **DMS first-run dialogs are suppressed on the live medium** by pre-seeding DMS's own onboarding and changelog markers, so the installer is the first thing the user sees. - **The live-medium device is now identified.** `probe_disks` also inspects `/run/live/medium` and `/run/live/rootfs`, so the ISO is labelled as the installation medium (and remains protected). - **The installer shortcut is live-only.** `phoebus-install` and its desktop entry are no longer written to an installed system. ### Changed - **Mango + DankMaterialShell is now the default desktop** for both the installation ISO and the installed system (explicit owner decision). Omitted `desktop.profile` selects `mango`; Flatpak and PipeWire are on by default. Explicit `none`, `minimal`, `dwl` and `full` continue to work unchanged (ADR 0009). - **Installed login uses greetd + tuigreet.** Authentication is always required; the default session is Mango and the dwl entry remains selectable (`--sessions /usr/share/wayland-sessions`). Live autologin is a separate, live-only configuration and is never written to an installed system. ### Added - **Live desktop ISO**: `installer/live/build.sh` now builds a rootless Debian testing rootfs containing Mango (built from a pinned source release), DankMaterialShell (pinned, SHA-256-verified release tarball), Quickshell, scenefx, wlroots 0.20, greetd/tuigreet and the desktop integration, then splices it into the base Debian-Live boot equipment. The live user autologins into Mango, an "Install Phoebus" launcher opens the unchanged installer UI, and a serial/VT recovery console is retained. The build fails clearly if a required desktop component is missing. Debian packages never enter the Gentoo target. The built ISO was booted in a graphical, seat-providing VM: Mango + DankMaterialShell + Quickshell ran and a `screendump` captured the DMS panel and welcome window (`docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`). - Shared desktop assets are emitted from one source of truth by `phoebus-installer --emit-asset` and used by both the installer and the live build. Regression tests cover the default/overrides, login configuration, live/installed separation, session entries, pinned checksums and the live ISO desktop-payload guards. ### Added - **Mango + DankMaterialShell desktop option** (`desktop.profile = "mango"`): `gui-wm/mangowm` 0.17.2 (wlroots 0.20) plus `gui-apps/dankmaterialshell` 1.5.3 / Quickshell 0.3.1 / scenefx 0.5, installed through the GURU community overlay with scoped `~amd64` keywords (never global). The installer writes GURU's `repos.conf`, bootstraps `dev-vcs/git`, and syncs the overlay. A `phoebus-session-mango` entry point, a packaged Mango config seeded once into the user's config, DMS keybindings, a `mango-session.target` binding for DMS, and `phoebus-mango.desktop`/`phoebus-dwl.desktop` session entries are generated. dwl remains the fallback session and is installed alongside. The profile is selectable but **not promoted to default** pending graphical-VM verification (ADR 0009). ## 2026-09-21 — Coherent rollback, installed assistant, Nix isolation ### Added - **Coherent rollback and recovery** (`phoebus-core::rollback`, `phoebus-executor::rollback`): a recovery point now captures `@` **and** the separately mounted `@var` (Portage state) under one name; rollback creates a writable root generation, rewrites the restored root's fstab **and** the BLS `rootflags=subvol=`, selects a boot entry whose kernel modules match the restored `/lib/modules`, and writes "previous" and snapshot-based "recovery" entries. A persisted `rollback-state.toml` makes interruption safe and resumable; retention prunes old snapshots and protects in-flight targets; a 1 GiB free-space check gates the operation. See ADR 0007. - `sys undo` / `sys undo ` / `sys undo status` and the high-risk `undo` typed action. The installer now records a snapshot-based "Phoebus Recovery" entry at install time, so recovery does not depend on the live root. - **Installed conversational assistant** (`phoebus-ai::assistant`, `sys ask `): bounded facts -> typed plan -> concrete resolved effects -> approval/authentication -> deterministic execution -> transaction record. No model is required: `sys ask` falls back to the deterministic parser. - **OS-level model sandbox** (`phoebus-executor::sandbox`): the network call runs in a hardened, unprivileged transient systemd unit (`DynamicUser`, `ProtectHome`, `ProtectSystem=strict`, `NoNewPrivileges`, syscall and address-family filters). It fails closed when `systemd-run` is unavailable. - **Resolved package effects and approval binding** (`phoebus-core::effects`): `emerge --pretend` is parsed into additions/upgrades/downgrades/removals with source-vs-binary provenance and download size; a plan digest binds approval, and a material change between review and execution aborts. New bounded typed actions `flatpak_install`/`flatpak_remove`/`flatpak_list` and `nix_prepare`. - **Transaction log** (`phoebus-core::transaction`): assistant and `sys` actions record their actions, result and recovery point; `sys history` shows snapshots and transactions. - **Desktop completeness**: `phoebus-menu` (wofi drun launcher + power menu), `phoebus-lock` (swaylock), `phoebus-idle` (swayidle: lock, suspend, before-sleep lock) and a system-wide Waybar config with network, audio, battery, clock and power controls. - **Release gates** (`phoebus-installer::release`): a registry of the real candidate checks (install, detached boot, desktop, updates/rollback, no-model), a gate report that never records an unexecuted check as passed, atomic publication that preserves the last known-good `latest.iso.prev`, and signing/verification command helpers. - New VM harness for the Debian-Live appliance: `installer/tests/vm/appliance-driver.py`, `appliance-guest.sh` and `appliance-test.conf.example`. ### Changed - **Nix build isolation is enforced**: `sandbox = true`, `sandbox-fallback = false`, with store bounds (`min-free`/`max-free`) and `auto-optimise-store`. Lifecycle operations (remove/purge, gc) and a bounded `nix_prepare` action were added; the Portage-owned ebuild approach is documented in ADR 0008. See ADR 0006. - Desktops install `swayidle`/`swaylock` session helpers and a Waybar configuration; `phoebus-session` starts the idle daemon. ### Added - **Nix bootstrap (on by default, VM-verified).** `phoebus-executor::nix` fetches the pinned, SHA-256-verified official Nix release and bootstraps it into the target with discrete commands (store copy, `nix-store --load-db`, `nixbld` users, state dirs, profile and daemon units). A desktop VM confirmed `nix-daemon.service` active and `nix shell nixpkgs#hello` printing `Hello, world!`. A binary ebuild was ruled out: the upstream installer has no `DESTDIR` and runs `nix-store --load-db` against the real root. - `finalize` now flushes the target (`sync`) before unmounting, so late writes such as `/usr/local/bin/phoebus-session` and the exported installer log are on disk even after a forced poweroff. ### Changed - **Installing Phoebus now requires an AI.** The installer refuses an install with no provider unless the explicit break-glass `--no-ai` (alias `--legacy`, or `PHOEBUS_NO_AI=1`) is used. A new `local` provider (Ollama/llama.cpp/ LM Studio) and `--ai-endpoint` support a model the user downloaded; no model is shipped. - Desktop installs now include `sys-apps/xdg-desktop-portal`, `xdg-desktop-portal-gtk` and `xdg-desktop-portal-wlr`, so Flatpak and Wayland apps get file choosers and screencast support. ### Added - `sys` offline package commands: `sys install `, `sys remove `, `sys search ` (plus the `remove_package`/`search_packages` typed actions). They are deterministic Portage operations with no model involved — `emerge` resolves a bare name or a full atom — so the system stays fully administrable offline and without the assistant. - **Debian-Live installer appliance** (`installer/live/build.sh`, no root): a bootable Phoebus installer ISO built by overlaying the static installer, the OpenCode manifest and the Debian tools the live image lacks onto a Debian-Live stable base, with a serial-visible auto-booting grub config. The target stays Gentoo. See `docs/PLAN-DEBIAN-LIVE.md` and ADR 0005. - Git workflow: committed hooks (`.githooks/`), `scripts/check-secrets.sh`, `scripts/agent-commit.sh`, `scripts/publish.sh`, `scripts/setup-hooks.sh`. - Documentation set: `docs/OBJECTIVES.md`, `ROADMAP.md`, `STATUS.md`, `ARCHITECTURE.md`, `DEVELOPMENT.md`, `CONTRIBUTING.md`, `GIT-WORKFLOW.md`, `CHANGELOG.md`, and the top-level `AGENTS.md`. - `.gitignore` covering the ISO, build output, transcripts and secrets. ## 2026-09-20 — AI guidance, desktop reliability, snapshots ### Added - AI-assisted install guidance: an OpenAI-compatible provider layer for **DeepSeek** and **OpenAI** plus a test transport (`phoebus-ai::provider`), credential loading and a curl transport that keeps the API key out of argv, config and logs (`phoebus-executor::ai`), and CLI flags `--ai`, `--ai-provider`, `--ai-model`, `--ai-api-key-file`, `--ai-proposal-file`, `--ai-facts`. The TUI offers DeepSeek/ChatGPT/without-AI. - Typed proposal extensions: scoped `package.use`, explicit build jobs and binary-package preference. Every proposal now requires a non-empty reason and duplicate/conflicting changes are rejected before anything is applied. - `sys` history and update preparation are VM-verified on a Btrfs install. ### Changed - `phoebus-session` now starts `dwl` first, waits for the Wayland socket before launching waybar/mako/swaybg, establishes `XDG_RUNTIME_DIR` and a session bus, starts the polkit authentication agent, and reaps helpers on logout. - Portage policy: the unused `installkernel uki` flag is no longer forced, the duplicate/empty PipeWire/WirePlumber lines are gone, and the signed binhost is derived from the selected profile when unset. - Update preparation records a successful distfile fetch as ready even when `--buildpkgonly` is skipped because dependencies must be merged first, and the state note now includes the redacted Portage reason. ### Fixed - A high-risk `sys` action now creates its protective snapshot inside `actions::execute` and **fails closed** if the `.snapshots` subvolume exists but the snapshot cannot be created; corrupt snapshot history is surfaced instead of being hidden as empty. ## 2026-09-20 — Retire the Bash installer (migration Phases 0–4) ### Added - `phoebus-executor::opencode`: pinned-manifest parsing, architecture detection, fetch through `Exec`, SHA-256 verification, fail-closed placeholder checks, extraction and config writer (7 unit tests). - `--bootstrap-opencode` on the CLI; `PHOEBUS_OPENCODE_MANIFEST` overrides the embedded manifest for fixture verification. - `cli_coverage` and golden plan tests (`plan_golden.rs`, `tests/golden/`). - `docs/BASH-MIGRATION.md`: the evidence-gated retirement plan and ledger. ### Changed - The disposable VM harness installs with the static Rust binary; full encrypted install + detached boot re-verified (systemd PID 1, `running`, 0 failed units, LUKS, login). - CI, the pre-commit hook, the Makefile and the commit/publish scripts gate on Rust only (`cargo fmt`, `clippy`, `test`). - `installer/doc/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md` and `installer/doc/FINDINGS.md` moved to `docs/`. ### Removed - The Bash installer tree (entry point, libraries, TUI, configuration, shell test suite and README), retired in favour of `installer-rs/`. The Bash reference remains tagged `v0.1.0-bash-reference`. The disposable VM harness under `installer/tests/vm/` is retained. ## 2026-09-20 — Rust installer parity, desktop, and foundations ### Added - Rust workspace (`installer-rs/`): `phoebus-core`, `phoebus-executor`, `phoebus-ai`, `phoebus-tui`, `phoebus-installer` (~9.4k LOC, 45 files). - Typed `InstallConfig` supporting TOML and the legacy flat format. - `TargetRoot` (host/target path safety), `SecretString`/`Redactor`, `DestructiveAuthorization`, central `Exec` command layer with dry-run. - Storage backend: GPT, ESP, LUKS2, Btrfs layout, fstab/crypttab, swapfile. - Stage3 fetch with pinned SHA-256 (or signed DIGESTS), Portage configuration, signed binary use, source builds, kernel, dracut, systemd-boot BLS. - Desktop/Flatpak: selects `default/linux/amd64/23.0/desktop/systemd`, writes `/usr/local/bin/phoebus-session`; flathub remote configured. - Package policy instrumentation: measured compile times parsed from `emerge.log` (326 entries recorded in the desktop run), persisted to `/var/lib/phoebus/compile-times.tsv`. - Snapshots: read-only Btrfs snapshots + TOML transaction history. - Background update preparation (`--fetchonly` + `--buildpkgonly`). - Typed `SystemAction` schema, privileged broker, and the `sys` command. - AI privacy boundary (`PrivacyPolicy`, `ContextBundle`, forbidden paths). - Release tooling: `phoebus-release` manifest/verify/sha256/assemble. - ratatui TUI with plan review and ERASE confirmation. - Recovery BLS entry booting `rescue.target`. ### Fixed - Subvolumes mounted before creation. - fstab/crypttab overwritten by stage3 extraction (moved to `fstab_generate`). - Missing `/var/tmp` breaking `kernel-install`. - `installkernel` requiring `uki_generator` even for BLS. - dracut `crypt` module and `systemd-cryptsetup` missing. - LUKS cmdline using `rd.luks.uuid` instead of `rd.luks.name`. - dracut UKI missing the kernel command line (BLS adopted). - `@swap` not mounted, breaking swap activation. - Portage GPG verify user unable to read the getuto keyring. - Transient rsync mirror quarantine (sync retries). - Pillow/HarfBuzz documentation circular dependency. - Legacy config silently parsed as TOML with defaults. ### Verified - Full encrypted UEFI install and boot with the ISO detached: `systemd` PID 1, `is-system-running = running`, 0 failed units, 10.73 s boot. - Desktop stack headless: dwl, waybar, mako, swaybg, `grim` screenshot, `wl-copy`/`wl-paste`, `wpctl`, `flatpak 1.18.1` + flathub. - No secret leakage in the installer log. ## 2026-09-19 — Bash installer prototype and first VM boot ### Added - Bash + `dialog` installer (`installer/`) with deterministic backend, TUI, plan/review, dry-run, logging, and destructive confirmation. - Read-only hardware/disk discovery with live-medium protection. - GPT/LUKS2/Btrfs backend, systemd stage3, Portage, kernel, systemd-boot, users/services/desktop modules. - Unit/regression suite and a disposable VM harness. ### Verified - First complete encrypted UEFI VM install and boot with the Bash installer. ### Fixed - The subvolume-ordering, fstab-timing, `/var/tmp`, `rd.luks.name`, `uki_generator`, cryptsetup, `@swap`, and `local root="$1" dir=...` bugs (these are the class of bug the Rust port is designed to prevent).