# Agentic boundary hardening — 2026-10-12 The implementation review identified seven concrete gaps. All seven have code changes and regression coverage. Native package and sandbox acceptance passed on an installed-system overlay; a fresh installer run remains pending. This is not a new ISO release. | Gap | Implemented change | Evidence | | --- | --- | --- | | Raw OpenCode provider credentials entered logs before catalog parsing | Sensitive output suppresses both streaming sinks, logged bodies and attached command failure bodies; curl ignores user configuration | Unknown synthetic provider credential tested on success and failure; real HTTP fixture suite | | Investigation evidence could carry registered secrets and service journals/argv | Shared evidence boundary redacts, removes private-path lines and bounds UTF-8 output; service evidence uses only enumerated state properties | Registered service token absent from the second scripted model request | | Approval digest omitted execution context | Versioned envelope binds id, kind, creation/expiry, root, uid, privilege, source, application, full candidate and material effects; lifetime limited to 900 seconds | Context substitutions and expiry extensions refused after resealing, including recomputed digests against retained approvals | | Developer jail exposed home and could unmask credentials | Synthetic home, clean environment, private PID/IPC/UTS namespaces, no capabilities, only a selected writable workspace; mask overlaps refused; workspace bound by an open descriptor | Real Bubblewrap denied synthetic private files, environment, host processes and offline network; a post-review workspace symlink swap still bound the original workspace | | Target writes checked paths and later reopened them | Root and parent descriptors, no-follow component traversal, atomic temporary-file replacement and descriptor chmod; root symlinks refused, hardlinks cannot receive writes | Root replacement, hardlink and concurrent atomic directory/symlink exchange tests | | Installation verification only proved presence | Portage exact atom/version with explicit source/binary mode; Flatpak ref/commit, Snap revision/version/channel, Nix active-profile store path, AppImage bytes/version checks | Wrong Portage identity/version and wrong Flatpak commit refused; mocked install success/failure transactions remain truthful | | PID-based per-action locking raced and allowed plan interleaving | Persistent inode plus kernel flock; transaction-wide reentrant ownership through revalidation, execution, verification and outcome recording | Competing acquisition, nested guard lifetime, other-thread exclusion, killed-process recovery, and a worker lease that survives broker death | ## Additional enforced limits The process runner drains stdout/stderr concurrently with nonblocking stdin, limits capture per stream (16 MiB by default), bounds log emission, and applies wall-clock deadlines. Streaming builds retain a bounded tail. Oversized query responses fail. Provider limits/deadlines also apply to sandboxed calls, and the systemd manager receives RuntimeMaxSec so the actual service worker is bounded. Model units have MemoryMax=256M and TasksMax=64. Commands issued under a mutation hold inherit a duplicate lock descriptor; broker death cannot release exclusion while an inheriting worker still runs. A real-process crash regression proves that ownership passes to the worker and ends when it exits. Long build commands retain a 24-hour default; common catalogue, candidate and verification reads use 120 seconds. Service evidence uses 30 seconds and 64 KiB. Actual negative testing exposed a further gap: the original systemd user unit could read a synthetic file beneath home. The unprivileged model path now uses explicit Bubblewrap filesystem/PID isolation inside the transient user unit. Systemd retains process/syscall/address-family restrictions. Its user-manager filesystem properties were removed because they implied a namespace that prevented Bubblewrap creating its jail. Root model calls retain the hardened DynamicUser system-unit path. Missing tools or namespace failures stop the request; there is no unconfined fallback. Effective uid is read from the kernel, and developer home comes from the account database, rather than PATH or HOME. ## Artifact semantics Flatpak does not support an install --commit option. The reviewed flow downloads without deployment, uses OSTree's native REF@COMMIT pull with the configured remote's signature policy, then deploys with Flatpak --no-pull and checks the active commit. Phoebus now installs dev-util/ostree with its Flatpak lane. Snap installs with --revision. Nix evaluates from an immutable path flake and verifies its active store path. These pins bind the selected application; backend-managed runtime/dependency closures are not claimed to be completely content-pinned. Portage exact-version selection is not an immutable repository snapshot. Portage, Flatpak and Nix were exercised in a disposable installed-system VM; native Snap revision acceptance remains pending. Primary command references: [Flatpak](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/flatpak-command-reference.html), [OSTree pull](https://ostreedev.github.io/ostree/man/ostree-pull.html), [Snap revisions](https://snapcraft.io/docs/revisions), [Nix profile install](https://nix.dev/manual/nix/2.18/command-ref/new-cli/nix3-profile-install.html), [Portage emerge](https://dev.gentoo.org/~zmedico/portage/doc/man/emerge.1.html). ## Verification and remaining acceptance Real host denial tests are intentionally ignored by the portable suite and run explicitly with: ```sh cd installer-rs cargo test -p phoebus-executor --test isolation_acceptance -- --ignored --skip model_system_unit # The system-manager probe is run separately as root only in the disposable VM. ``` Both user probes passed on the development host. The system-manager probe also passed as root in the disposable Gentoo VM. They use only synthetic fixture files, never account credentials. Their fixtures are deleted at test completion. Portable gates pass: 981 Rust tests, 22 VM-harness safety tests, strict Clippy, fmt, repository checks and staged secret scan. Dynamic and static release builds passed. No physical disk was touched. The native run `serial-boot-20261012T105530Z-9c09094e` passed all 14 driver cases: detached generic boot/login, running systemd, developer/user/root isolation, deterministic history, descriptor-backed Btrfs snapshot, exact Portage install and removal, persistent lock permissions, Flatpak commit install and removal, Nix active store-path install, and clean poweroff. It used a separate qcow2 backing overlay; the source-build base image and local ISO are unchanged. Two preceding attempts exposed fixture errors (password mapping and the KVM virtualization identifier); neither is claimed as a product acceptance pass. Initially doctor found 6 GiB free. Compiler-cache cleanup restored sufficient space and host doctor passed with a tight-space warning. A fresh installation was not repeated. Native pins/isolation/snapshot behavior were exercised on the installed Gentoo overlay. The subsequent lock-lease addition has its own real crash-process regression. Final static binary smoke `serial-boot-20261012T112454Z-47d3cfae` passed 8/8 with clean poweroff, repeating sandbox denials and executing history and a Btrfs snapshot in an explicitly network-free namespace. Its SHA-256 was `1ea91f6f0ac82d88e9a8c400f510819aefaf73251778b248ef2443fdf18e2b62`. Remaining acceptance: a fresh encrypted installation with descriptor I/O; native Snap revision installation and adversarial metadata drift across the lanes; interrupted native package-worker recovery and broader network-free repair/undo acceptance beyond the verified history/snapshot commands. Older staged approvals must be reviewed again because the envelope digest has changed. Developer tools/auth state outside the selected workspace are intentionally hidden; narrowly scoped explicit grants are future work, rather than silently exposing the whole home directory.