# Status Truthful implementation/verification matrix. Vocabulary: - **Implemented** — code exists. - **Unit tested** — covered by automated tests that run on any host. - **VM verified** — exercised in the disposable QEMU/OVMF VM. - **Hardware verified** — exercised on real hardware. - **Not verified** — do not claim it works. ## Proven baseline (do not regress) A complete installation in a disposable UEFI VM, booted with the ISO detached: ``` QEMU + OVMF (UEFI) 30 GiB qcow2, virtio-blk (/dev/vda); live ISO at /dev/sr0 GPT: 1 GiB FAT32 ESP + LUKS2 remainder Btrfs: @ @home @var @snapshots @swap Gentoo systemd stage3 (default/linux/amd64/23.0/systemd) systemd-boot + BLS entry + dracut initramfs LUKS2 passphrase unlock at boot systemd PID 1, login, networking systemctl is-system-running = running; 0 failed units ``` Boot timing (Rust installer): 1.378 s kernel + 5.238 s initrd + 4.114 s userspace = 10.730 s. The committed VM harness (`installer/tests/vm/serial-driver.py` + `install.sh`) drives the **static Rust binary**; the Bash installer is no longer on the install path (Bash migration Phase 2, see `docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`). A second harness (`installer/tests/vm/appliance-driver.py` + `appliance-guest.sh`) drives the Debian-Live appliance ISO. On 2026-09-21 it produced `INSTALL-RC=0`, `NO_SECRET_LEAK`, and a detached boot (`systemd`, running, 0 failed units) whose Btrfs history contains the installer's coordinated `@` + `@var` **initial known-good** snapshot and a snapshot-based recovery boot entry (see `docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`). `sys undo` is VM-verified by the rollback acceptance gate (`serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386`, PASS=11 FAIL=0): snapshot → `app-misc/hello` install (package DB changed) → `sys undo ` → detached reboot with the package DB restored, the root break marker gone, `/home` preserved, systemd running, and the snapshot-based recovery entry present. Booting that recovery entry offline remains a manual gate. ## Matrix | Area | Implemented | Unit tested | VM verified | Hardware verified | |------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------------| | Config (TOML + legacy), validation | yes | yes | yes | n/a | | Hardware/disk discovery, protection | yes | yes | yes | no | | Install plan + destructive preview | yes | yes | yes | n/a | | Destructive authorization (ERASE) | yes | yes | yes | n/a | | GPT partitioning + ESP | yes | yes | yes | no | | LUKS2 format/open/close | yes | yes | yes | no | | Btrfs subvolumes + swapfile | yes | yes | yes | no | | fstab / crypttab generation | yes | yes | yes | no | | stage3 fetch + verify (pinned SHA-256 or signed DIGESTS) + extract | yes | yes (both paths; every failure branch incl. missing verifier/key/DIGESTS/entry, nonzero exit, cannot-start) | yes (pinned path; **unpinned path now VM-verified**: default unpinned install from the rebuilt 20260926 ISO completed 12 stages + detached boot; placeholder-pin and archive-hash-mismatch refusals VM-verified on disposable targets with the fail-closed binary) | n/a | | stage3 trust anchor (fixed provisioned key) | yes | yes (`release_key_path` ignores `PHOEBUS_GENTOO_RELEASE_KEY`; test-only injection only via explicit `verify_digests_with_key`) | yes (20260926 live ISO carries the fingerprint-checked key — both Gentoo fingerprints verified inside the shipped squashfs; the unpinned VM install verified the real signed DIGESTS + archive hash against it; tampered inputs refused) | n/a | | Portage config + sync + getuto | yes | yes | yes | n/a | | Signed Gentoo binary install | yes | yes | yes | n/a | | Source package compilation | yes | yes | yes | n/a | | Kernel install + dracut initramfs | yes | yes | yes | no | | systemd-boot + BLS | yes | yes | yes | no | | Boot default pins the real kernel (not recovery) | yes | yes | yes | no | | Recovery BLS entry (rescue.target) | yes | yes | boots (not default) | no | | Users, passwords, sudo | yes | yes | yes | n/a | | Locale/timezone/keymap/services | yes | yes | yes | n/a | | Rust VM boot parity | yes | yes | yes | no | | Rust TUI | yes | yes | smoke test | no | | Typed GUI bridge (`--gui-bridge`) | yes | yes (dry-run) | live VM + full journey | n/a | | Graphical welcome + install wizard (Quickshell) | yes | yes | live graphical VM + full GUI journey | no | | Phoebus brand system (SVG + tokens) | yes | yes | live VM | n/a | | Desktop profile (Mango + DarkMaterial) | yes | yes | live VM + installed | no | | Desktop session script (socket wait, polkit, cleanup) | yes | yes | functional test (stubs) | no | | PipeWire/WirePlumber | yes | no | headless (`wpctl`) | no | | Flatpak + flathub | yes | no | installed + remote | no | | Fast-default Flatpaks (Calibre/GIMP/Flatseal, system-wide, target-only) | yes | yes (install/verify/provisioning; fail-closed on missing app) | yes (installed in target root, verified in `/var/lib/flatpak/app/` and `/var/lib/phoebus/flatpaks-installed`) | no | | Fast `-bin` defaults (firefox-bin/libreoffice-bin/thunderbird-bin, fail-closed) | yes | yes (atoms, policy, binary-capability refusal) | yes (installed identities verified in Gentoo VDB on detached boot) | no | | Single generic kernel default (no second generic kernel) | yes | yes (guard + tuned path keeps the fallback) | yes (existing boot path unchanged) | no | | User-initiated source builds (`convert_to_source`) | yes | yes (table incl. thunderbird, review, build-before-remove, Brave/unknown refusals) | no (no conversion journey run in a VM) | no | | Tuned-kernel build (`build_tuned_kernel`, separate BLS, fallback kept) | yes | yes (refusal without fallback, entry creation, default never blind-switched) | no (same long build; VM attempt recorded under the balanced row) | no | | Balanced source kernel (`build_balanced_kernel`, broad hardware, bin fallback) | yes | yes (plan/fragment/review, refusal without fallback, separate `phoebus-balanced.conf`, default untouched; two VM-found bugs fixed: exact VDB match, `loader/entries` path) | **started, not completed** (disposable VM 2026-09-29: full distribution-config kernel build exceeded 3 h with 10 jobs, `RC=124`, no system change; needs a multi-hour window) | no | | Installed first-login welcome (once per user, reopenable, non-blocking) | yes | yes (assets, launcher, autostart, QML guards, DMS seed) | no (first login + graphical checks not run) | no | | Install metrics (time, download, peak disk, installed size) | yes | yes (report rendering; orchestration hooks) | yes (Run 13 recorded 588 compile times into target metrics) | no | | XWayland / polkit agent / kitty / wofi | yes | no | installed, not launched | no | | Package policy + measured history | yes | yes | yes (326 entries) | no | | Background update preparation | yes | yes | yes (fetch; buildpkgonly skipped) | no | | Btrfs snapshots + history | yes | yes | yes | no | | Coordinated snapshot sets (`@` + `@var`) | yes | yes | no | no | | Btrfs rollback (`sys undo`) | yes | yes | yes (rollback acceptance `serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386` PASS=11 FAIL=0) | no | | Recovery/known-good BLS entry | yes | yes | yes: entry present + snapshot-based (rollback runs) **and the recovery entry itself was booted** (`Phoebus Recovery (known-good snapshot)` selected in the systemd-boot menu with restricted networking and no model: cmdline + findmnt prove root is the read-only `@-20260926T064646-initial-known-good` snapshot with `rescue.target`, serial login works, `sys history/rollback status --legacy` work, `sys ask` fails truthfully with the `--legacy` fallback) | no | | Snapshot retention + free-space gate | yes | yes | no | no | | AI typed proposals + evidence review | yes | yes | fixture end-to-end | n/a | | AI guided install (DeepSeek/OpenAI) | yes | yes | fixture path only (no live call) | n/a | | AI privacy boundary (facts only) | yes | yes (every string field scanned, incl. `cpu_features`; forbidden path in `cpu_features` refused) | no | n/a | | Provider credential + endpoint boundary | yes | yes (unsafe key characters refused before curl config; userinfo endpoint refused; derived base64 token redacted) | no | n/a | | AI typed-action schema (exact, incl. unit-variant extra keys) | yes | yes (plan/step/investigate actions via `validate_action_value`; smuggled extra key refused) | no | n/a | | AI connected-model path over a real local stub | yes | yes (4 e2e cases: valid plan executes; request has no home path/credential; shell + smuggled key + malformed fail closed) | no (local stub, not a live model) | n/a | | Live real-agent call (`opencode` backend) | yes | yes (`sys ask "list installed packages"` → valid plan + digest, exit 0; hostile shell/private-file instruction refused and downgraded; OpenCode tools disabled; no credential in the log) | yes — host direct (2026-09-28) and **from inside the installed VM through the loopback tunnel** (`serial-boot-20260929T102703Z-ffd1ec25`, `live-agent` + `live-agent-hostile-rejected`) with `opencode-go/deepseek-v4.1-flash` | n/a | | Local model through the direct sandbox (VM) | yes | yes (real Qwen2.5-1.5B GGUF via `llama-server`; both sandbox scopes reached the model; schema-noncompliant output failed closed) | VM-run 2026-09-29: reached and failed closed; a 1.5B model is too weak for exact typed plans and its 4096-token context was exceeded by the correction turn — a capable model is required (a capable agent produces valid plans) | n/a | | OpenCode transport parity (sandbox + network endpoint) | yes | yes (`CurlHttpClient::sandboxed` inlines the body under `PrivateTmp`; `--opencode-insecure-http` opt-in for remote plain http; endpoint-policy test) | yes (`serial-boot-20260929T114319Z-c43c2a92`: real host agent, OpenCode sandboxed by default, driver PASS=8) | n/a | | Read-only host-root probes never block on a prompt | yes | yes (`CommandSpec::detached` runs host-root Flatpak in a new session via `setsid --wait`, no controlling terminal; field-preserving unit test) | yes (VM: real-agent `sys ask "search for firefox"` completed with zero auth prompts, `serial-boot-20260929T111941Z-2be30b89`) | n/a | | Privilege derived only from the process identity | yes | yes (an environment variable cannot forge uid 0; the removed `PHOEBUS_ALLOW_UNPRIVILEGED_EXEC` regression test) | no | n/a | | AI OS sandbox (systemd hardened unit) | yes | yes (argv + sandboxed-send; system properties for root, user-manager subset for non-root) | yes (`serial-boot-20260929T092147Z-6f88907a`: `AI_ROOT_RC=0` system sandbox, `AI_USER_RC=0` `--user` sandbox; previously the user path hung on a polkit `manage-units` prompt) | no | | Unprivileged read-only AI plan completes | yes | yes (transaction recording best-effort for non-root; mandatory for privileged mutations) | yes (`serial-boot-20260929T092147Z-6f88907a`: `AI_NOSANDBOX_RC=0` as `phoebus`) | n/a | | Installed assistant (`sys ask`) | yes | yes | yes (live call 2026-09-28: `sys ask "list installed packages"` via `--ai-backend opencode` to host `opencode serve` through a guest loopback tunnel, model `opencode-go/muse-spark-1.3-contributor`, valid Assistant Plan + approval digest, `AI_LIVE_RC=0`; the `show system status` phrasing elicits schema-noncompliant JSON from this model and is fail-closed rejected) | n/a | | Resolved package effects + approval binding (carried through execution) | yes | yes (empty vs unestablished; drift + prior-step allowance) | no | n/a | | Privileged approval ledger (replacement/replay/concurrency/interruption) | yes | yes (privileged entry point) | no | n/a | | Canonical digest recomputed at the privileged boundary (all plan kinds) | yes | yes (adversarial: swapped action resealed, every kind) | no | n/a | | Per-step effect binding into the approval digest (contents + aggregate) | yes | yes (adversarial: step_effects swap rejected; legit multi-step validates) | no | n/a | | Stable approval identity (replay after presentation edit/reseal) | yes | yes (summary/other fields/identical id/concurrent/new-id) | no | n/a | | Live-safe monotonic recovery (owner liveness, immutable terminal) | yes | yes (live vs abandoned, reconcile/finish race) | no | n/a | | Personal preferences + alert state (user-owned, system-default precedence) | yes | yes (save/reload/isolation/precedence/failure) | yes (installed VM: saved to user config, exit 0) | no | | Personal write ownership (elevated chown, symlink refusal, cross-uid refusal) | yes | yes (ownership-fixer seam + CLI refusal) | no | no | | Personal preference does not need the root-owned system transaction log | yes | yes (CLI regression: read-only transaction dir) | yes (installed VM acceptance) | n/a | | Installed `sys` acceptance matrix (read-only/failure) | yes | yes | yes (installed VM, HEAD binary on a golden overlay `serial-boot-20260929T092147Z-6f88907a`: read-only `SUMMARY PASS=49 FAIL=0`; root mutate `serial-boot-20260929T093329Z-4ef893cf`: `SUMMARY PASS=42 FAIL=0` incl. `mutate-install`/`mutate-remove`/`mutate-history`) | no | | `sys` adversarial input battery (injection/traversal/boundaries) | yes | yes (54-case `tests/sys_adversarial.rs`; five validation gaps fixed: file-path metacharacters + `..`, application-name traversal, ebuild `..` category (real overlay escape), Flatpak empty element, Nix option prefix) | no | no | | Portage config readable for non-root queries (`normalize_config_permissions`) | yes | yes (modes + keyring exclusion) | yes (fresh VM install: 0755/0644 out of the box; non-root `search` returns 3 results, `updates` reports 10) | no | | Privileged catalogue mutations (install/remove/depclean/cache/apply updates, alternate-root) | yes | yes (unit) | yes (fresh installed VM via root: 7/7 PASS) | no | | Rollback acceptance (snapshot -> change -> `sys undo` -> detached verify) | yes | yes | yes (`serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386` PASS=11 FAIL=0; re-verified with the HEAD binary `serial-rollback-20260929T094640Z-256c2ba1` PASS=11 on a fresh disposable overlay: package DB changed then restored, root marker gone, `/home` survives, systemd running, recovery entry present) | no | | Privileged `--broker` plan execution + replay rejection in a VM (pkexec path) | yes | yes (privileged entry point) | yes (non-root `pkexec` with a terminal polkit agent: cancelled auth, broker JSON success, replay rejected; required the shipped policy + wheel-admin rule) | n/a | | Cache-cleanup preview is non-destructive (real `eclean`/`nix-store`) | yes | yes (preview uses `--pretend --deep` / `--print-dead`; sorted bound items) | yes (real `eclean`: upstream preview, cancelled approval, approved run, drift refusal, failed cleaner; user data preserved) | n/a | | Reverse-dependency inspection includes installed targets | yes | yes (self-reference compares the dependent, not the target) | yes (real `sys-libs/glibc`, `sys-libs/zlib` dependents) | n/a | | Transaction log (outcomes, protective snapshots) | yes | yes | read-only in installed VM; write path needs root | no | | Flatpak/Nix bounded typed actions | yes | yes | no | no | | Shared hardware-aware source selection (all lanes) | yes | yes | no | no | | Snap lane (detect/install/list/remove/refresh/connections) | yes (reviewed first-use setup) | yes (incl. exact revisions and confinement) | partial (VM: Portage snapd, active socket, `hello-world` install/list/refresh/remove; partial confinement; refresh had no newer revision; connections not exercised. **Re-checked 2026-09-26 against the live Store**: `hello-world` still 6.4 rev 29 on every channel, refresh reports no updates; guest has no `aa-status`, confinement still `partial`. A revision-changing refresh and strict confinement stay blocked on a Store revision + AppArmor-ready guest) | no | | AppImage lane (import/acquire/integrity/desktop/remove) | yes | yes | yes (VM: acquire with pinned SHA, list, launch fixture, remove; tampered SHA refused) | no | | Custom ebuild overlay (stage/approve/build/remove) | yes | yes | yes (VM: stage → build/install → VDB+file present → remove) | no | | `sys` installed into the target + verified in chroot | yes | yes (unit) | yes (detached boot verified) | no | | AI-first install workflow (`sys install`, `sys ask`) | yes | yes | explicit-backend journey; AI-selected not run | no | | Bounded AI investigation (typed read-only evidence) | yes | yes | read-only actions on a booted VM | no | | Deterministic proposal validation (fabrication/stale/ambiguous/duplicate) | yes | yes | no | no | | Explicit backend install flags (no fallback) | yes | yes | yes (Portage install + remove, history) | no | | No-model unqualified install refuses and offers commands | yes | yes | yes (matrix case) | no | | Install transaction begin/finish + verification | yes | yes | yes (install verified; durable across reboot) | no | | Installed config loaded (`/etc/phoebus/install.toml`) | yes | no | install writes it; `sys` reads it on the installed system | no | | `sys` consistent target-root execution | yes | yes | no | no | | `sys` validation at the execution boundary | yes | yes | no | n/a | | `sys ask` truthful failure (nonzero, stop, record) | yes | yes | no | n/a | | Unified package search (`sys search`, all lanes, `--legacy`) | yes | yes (cross-lane; unavailable/failed/empty distinguished; source filter) | no | no | | Installed-package inventory (`sys list`, all lanes, `--legacy`) | yes | yes (VDB/Flatpak/Snap/AppImage; **Nix active-profile packages** vs generations/store; custom ebuild never double-counted) | yes (VM read-only group) | no | | Package information (`sys info`, `--legacy`) | yes | yes (installed/available, version/deps/size/provenance; ambiguity flagged) | yes (VM read-only group) | no | | Cross-source update check/apply (`sys updates`, `apply updates`) | yes | yes (exact per-source transactions with full Flatpak commits/snap revisions, pinned and revalidated; manual/project-specific refused) | Flatpak verified in VM (reviewed ref+commit, pinned update, verified); direct Snap refresh with no newer revision VM-verified, exact Snap apply-updates transaction unit-tested only; Portage verified | no | | Nix active-profile inventory (`sys list --nix`) | yes | yes (manifest v1/v2/v3; scope; generations vs store) | yes (NIX_ENABLED=yes install: real `nodejs-slim` profile listed and filtered; a re-run correctly reported a dangling profile. **2026-09-26 on the fresh unpinned install**: bootstrap present (`/nix/store` populated, `default` link valid, `nix 2.24.9` runs); `sys list --nix` truthfully reports the base system profile has no package manifest. GC-dangling repro: `nix-collect-garbage` is not on root's PATH; user-level install/GC repro attempted — see VM evidence. **2026-09-28 run 15**: modern XDG per-user profiles enumerated — `nix profile install nixpkgs#hello` as `phoebus` into `~/.local/state/nix/profiles/profile`, `sys list --nix` reports `hello 2.12.3 [per-user:phoebus]` with 824 store paths noted separately; installer now normalizes `/nix` + `/etc/nix*` permissions so unprivileged clients work) | no | | Catalogue maintenance (`depclean`, `clean cache`, `owners`, `deps`/`rdeps`) | yes | yes (structured depclean effects; cache-cleanup dry-run review + failure propagation; VDB dependency metadata) | yes (VM: depclean + cache-cleanup journeys; deps read-only) | no | | AI-default catalogue routing (source flags constrain, never bypass) | yes | yes (investigation loop, full backend classification + optional-backend rewrite, fallback offers exact `--legacy` command) | yes (read-only routing cases) | no | | Alternate-root catalogue/update/maintenance rooting | yes | yes (chroot for Portage/Flatpak/Nix; Snap refused; recording-runner no-host-command tests) | yes (VM: alternate-root Snap refused) | no | | Service start/stop/restart + flatpak/nix/snapshot commands | yes | yes | no | no | | Desktop session helpers (DMS bar/launcher/lock/idle) | yes | yes | functional test (stubs) | no | | Mango + DankMaterialShell profile | yes | yes | live VM yes; installed desktop_install yes (347 pkgs); **seatd service active and running on detached boot** (`/run/seatd.sock` 0660 root:seat, `phoebus` in seat group); greeter, seat, DRM, PAM authentication and `sys --legacy` are verified | no | | Mango is the canonical desktop | yes | yes | live VM yes; installed default session configured | no | | greetd login (Mango + DarkMaterial) | yes | yes | yes (tuigreet verified on detached boot; **graphical authentication verified under a seat VM**: seat0 + DRM card0 + greeter session, correct password authenticates per the journal) | no | | Live desktop ISO (Mango + DMS) | yes | guards tested | graphical VM + GUI journey + detached boot + interactive welcome (20260926 ISO, screenshot) | no | | Live welcome autostart + duplicate prevention | yes | guards tested | live graphical VM | no | | Welcome primary action keyboard-focus | yes | guards tested | live graphical VM | no | | VM harness disk safety + structured results | yes | yes (16 tests) | n/a | n/a | | Target disk revalidation before partition | yes | yes | no | n/a | | Bridge replay/concurrency + input bounds | yes | yes | no | n/a | | Provider transport endpoint/size hardening | yes | yes | no | n/a | | `TargetRoot` symlink-escape guard | yes | yes | n/a | n/a | | OpenCode server capability probe | yes | yes | real host probe + auth + policy | n/a | | OpenCode proposal adapter (real inference) | yes | yes | real model (`deepseek-v4-flash`) | n/a | | OpenCode in GUI / CLI / `sys ask` | yes | yes | yes (GUI AI step; `sys ask` live 2026-09-28 via opencode backend + muse-spark, valid plan + digest) | n/a | | OpenCode full graphical install | yes | yes | yes (12 stages, 174 packages, detached boot) | n/a | | GUI readiness refresh / AI revalidation / keyboard nav | yes | yes (Rust) | VM harness regressions | n/a | | Mandatory AI requires a validated interaction | yes | yes | bridge + CLI | n/a | | GURU packaging (scoped keywords) | yes | yes | no (build/install unverified) | no | | Release gates + atomic publish | yes | yes (executable: every gate names a real harness mode; `--execute` runs each command in its own process and reports Passed/Failed/NotRun from evidence; invalid commands, isolation, failed-gate and publish refusal covered) | no (no end-to-end candidate: VM/graphical/model gates need a runner; unconfigured host reports 0 passed / 0 failed / 6 NotRun with exact missing prerequisites) | n/a | | `sys` verbs | yes | yes | yes | no | | OpenCode pinned bootstrap | yes | yes | no | n/a | | Release manifest/verify | yes | yes (host CLI: manifest, verify, tampered-artifact refusal) | no | n/a | | NVIDIA PCI device classification + branch/flavor policy | yes | yes | no | no | | NVIDIA installed Gentoo integration (Portage/modprobe/dracut/initramfs) | yes | yes | no | no | | NVIDIA live ISO payload (bundled modules/firmware/userspace) | yes | yes (verifier + guards) | no | no | | NVIDIA kernel/module/initramfs update coordination (`@module-rebuild`) | yes | yes | no | no | | NVIDIA live GPU decision + real nouveau fallback | yes | yes (fixtures + CLI) | no | no | | Live GUI broker scoped sudoers (no `NOPASSWD: ALL`) | yes | yes (`visudo`) | no | n/a | | Rollback acceptance harness mode | yes | yes (bash -n/unit + vacuous-pass guards) | yes (destructive gate `serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386` PASS=11 FAIL=0; root-marker creation is mandatory and asserted present before undo, absent after the detached reboot) | no | | Desktop assistant GUI (`phoebus-assistant`) | yes | yes | yes (live VM layout) | no | | Desktop assistant JSON-RPC bridge (`sys --assistant-bridge`) | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | n/a | | AI-first administration contract (`sys install`, `please`, `ask`) | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | no | | Deterministic `--legacy` administration (fail-closed source choice) | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | n/a | | Audited action execution (`--legacy`/`--broker` enforcement) | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | n/a | | Nix attribute verification probe | yes | yes | no | n/a | | Portage binary binhost verification + compile abort guard | yes | yes | no | n/a | | Cross-source application ownership & user data preservation | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | no | | Unified multi-source update management | yes | yes | no | no | | Quiet proactive assistance monitor & deduplicated alerting | yes | yes | no | no | | User preference profiles & project environment mappings | yes | yes | no | n/a | | Shared administration service layer (`service::*`) & PreparedPlan staging | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | n/a | | Authoritative privileged validation boundary (integrity/root/uid/state/claim) | yes | yes | no (needs an authenticated VM boot) | n/a | | Protected per-user plan storage, atomic claim, tamper/traversal rejection | yes | yes | no (needs an authenticated VM boot) | n/a | | Plan digests, target-root/uid binding, TTL, replay & concurrent-claim protection | yes | yes | no | n/a | | Truthful transaction outcomes (failure/verify-fail/refusal/interruption) | yes | yes | no | n/a | | AI-first removal (deterministic discovery underneath; `--legacy` bypasses) | yes | yes | no | n/a | | GUI plan review card for every plan type; prepared ≠ completed | yes | no (QML) | no (needs graphical VM) | no | | Shared provider/credential handling (`ai_setup::*`) for CLI and GUI | yes | yes | no (no live credential) | n/a | | Contextual conversation continuity (`conversation::*`) | yes | yes | yes (acceptance matrix) | n/a | | Conversation-history privacy (minimized, redacted, 0600, bounded, clearable) | yes | yes | no | n/a | | Target desktop QML assets & Polkit policy provisioning | yes | yes | yes (live VM layout) | no | | Desktop assistant unprivileged execution & Polkit elevation | yes | yes | yes (live VM layout) | no | | UKI / Secure Boot | no (deferred; `uki`/`secureboot = true` rejected at validation) | no (rejection + truthful plan rendering covered) | no | no | | Mango workstation applications (Emacs … OpenSSH, exact atoms) | yes | yes (every atom asserted; no silent omit/substitute; Kitty kept, st absent, Nemo default) | no (needs 60–80 GiB disposable install + detached boot) | no | | Brave stable via scoped another-brave-overlay (pinned, beta/nightly masked) | yes (stable only; pin validated pre-network, fail-closed) | yes (pin validation, scoping, mask) | no (needs network + PHOEBUS_BRAVE_PIN at ISO build + upstream checksum verification in the VM) | no | | Zsh default for new users (root Bash, /bin/sh unchanged, packaged plugins) | yes | yes (useradd -s, root chsh, skel seeding, preservation) | no | no | | Cursor theme (Vanilla-DMZ 24 across Mango/XWayland/GTK/Qt/DMS/greeter) | yes | yes (config files asserted) | no (ordinary/text/link/resize/busy after reboot unverified) | no | | Default Portage ccache (installed first, 2G cap, security preserved) | yes | yes (make.conf + package asserted) | no (actual hit on a repeated source build unverified) | no | | Local CUPS (enabled, remote sharing/admin disabled) | yes | yes (cupsd.conf asserted) | no (local print job unverified) | no | | OpenSSH installed, sshd disabled/inactive, no firewall port | yes | yes (service set + disable asserted) | no (client -V, server present, disabled+inactive after reboot unverified) | no | | AI connection handoff (reuse default, per-user 0600 key, truthful status) | yes | yes (0600/0700, symlink refusal, opt-out/missing/local, no secret in errors) | no (fixture handoff only; live authorized-provider result NotRun) | no | | Startup system check (blur/PPD/matugen/cava, truthful summary) | yes | yes (4-check evaluation + summary wording) | no (recheck after reboot NotRun; needs PPD D-Bus + DMS integration) | no | | Assistant dark default + light mode + responsive + token drift guard | yes | yes (palette/aliases, drift test, layout guards) | no (graphical VM at 1024×768/1280×720/scaled NotRun) | no | | Userspace AI agent framework (`agent_jail`, `desktop_config`, `phoebus-mcp`, `sys propose`) | yes | yes (Bubblewrap credential masking, schema validation + checkpoint undo, MCP JSON-RPC conformance, unprivileged plan staging) | smoke test (`phoebus-agent-run`, MCP stdio, theme undo) | no | | Automatic Boot Assessment (`bootctl mark-good`, `enable_boot_counting`, unmetered recovery) | yes | yes (BLS `+.conf` formatting/parsing, `phoebus-boot-confirm.service`, recovery entry protection) | no | no | | Update preflight safety gates (>=10 GiB storage gate + atomic coordinated `@` and `@var` snapshots) | yes | yes (`check_update_preflight` storage refusal, `create_pre_update_snapshot_set`) | no | no | | Tiered update channels (`Core`, `Proven` [default], `Edge`) | yes | yes (`UpdateChannel` enum, serialization, channel defaults) | no | no | ## Fast-defaults session (2026-09-26): what was proven and what was not - Implemented + unit-tested in this session (757 Rust tests, was 736): `-bin` fast defaults, target-only system-wide Flatpaks with fail-closed verification, single generic kernel guard, preference neutrality, `convert_to_source` / `build_tuned_kernel` typed actions with full reviews, installed welcome + DMS seed, portal/MIME defaults, install metrics hooks, plan-review delivery section, and 4 new `sys` acceptance cases (script now covers 37 documented cases). - Quality gates green: `cargo fmt --check`, `clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings`, release build, `test_vmsafety.py` 18/18, shellcheck clean. - **Not built, not installed, not booted in this session.** A fresh ISO was built from the fast-defaults commit and content-verified (`installer/live/phoebus-installer-amd64-fastdefaults.iso`, 1.6 GiB, `ad9cddb2…`, build `20260926T145700Z` from `e747baf`; embedded binaries hash-match the fresh static build, Gentoo key shows both published fingerprints, Mango/DMS + installer UI present; git-ignored, never committed). No disposable qcow2 install/boot ran — a wall-clock blocker, not a host blocker (`make doctor`: 20 ok, 0 warnings; ~103 GiB free). The requested verifications (installed `-bin` identities, system-wide Flatpaks + manifest, first-login welcome, graphical Calibre/GIMP launches, file/device workflows, normal + offline recovery boots, one source-conversion journey, one tuned-kernel build + test boot, measured time/disk figures) are **NotRun**. Exact unblock: build the ISO (`installer/live/build.sh`), install to a disposable 80 GiB qcow2 with network (`serial-driver.py install`), boot detached (`serial-driver.py boot`), run `sys-acceptance.sh` (now 37 documented cases) plus the graphical/file/device/source/tuned gates in `docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`; never touch `/dev/*`, never commit the ISO/images/transcripts/secrets. ## Workstation session (2026-09-26): what was proven and what was not - Implemented + unit-tested in this session (736/736 Rust tests): workstation atoms, Brave scoping/pin validation, Zsh/cursor/ccache/CUPS/sshd-disabled, AI per-user key handoff, startup-check model + truthful summary, assistant dark/light + responsive + token drift guard, 60/20 GiB disk gates. - Quality gates green: `cargo fmt --check`, `clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings`, release build, `test_vmsafety.py` 18/18, shellcheck (pre-existing SC2012 info only). - **Not built, not installed, not booted in this session.** No fresh ISO was built (`make doctor`: 8 GiB free, needs ≥20; workstation target needs 60–80 GiB), so there is no new ISO hash to report. No disposable qcow2 install/boot ran; the requested verifications (installed apps, Kitty default, Zsh login, cursor consistency, local CUPS job, disabled sshd after reboot, startup recheck, both assistant themes, model handoff with a fixture + any live authorized-provider result) are **NotRun**. Exact unblock: free ≥80 GiB, set `PHOEBUS_BRAVE_PIN` to the reviewed another-brave-overlay commit at ISO build time, build the ISO, install to a disposable 80 GiB qcow2, boot detached, and run the gates in `docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md` (seat VM for the compositor/cursor/DMS checks; a real 0600 provider credential for the live AI call; never touch `/dev/*`, never commit the ISO/images/transcripts/secrets). - **Brave review status.** Reviewed 2026-09-26 from the Gentoo wiki + another-brave-overlay repo metadata: stable `www-client/brave-browser` exists (binary, based on the official google-chrome ebuilds); beta/nightly exist as separate atoms and are masked here. No overlay commit was pinned (default pin empty, path refuses pre-network). Blocker: pick + record the 40-hex commit and verify the upstream release + checksums in the VM. - **Screenshots.** The four September 26 screenshots referenced in the request are not in the repo (`docs/screenshots/` holds older captures only); the blur/PPD/matugen/cava warnings were implemented from their described text. If the images exist elsewhere, attach their paths for pixel-level regression. ## Known limitations - **Desktop graphical session** was verified with the *headless* wlroots backend because the serial-only VM has no logind seat. The DRM path and a real VT login are not yet exercised. `phoebus-session` is written by the installer for that purpose. - **Flatpak apps** were not installed from the remote; only the runtime and the flathub remote were verified. - **NVIDIA** is implemented (hardware-driven branch/flavor policy, scoped Portage configuration, a live payload that is build-time verified, and kernel/module/initramfs update coordination) and covered by Rust tests and the live-payload verifier. The policy now caps Maxwell/Pascal/Volta at the last supporting series (580) and reports a Blackwell plus proprietary-only GPU combination as an explicit incompatibility rather than installing one driver that cannot serve both. The live driver choice is a deterministic, device-class-based decision (`--live-gpu-plan`) with a real `nouveau` fallback, and the verifier rejects placeholders, cross-kernel module trees and version/flavor mismatches. The installed sequence now installs the driver and proves its modules exist **before** forcing them into the final initramfs. A minimal live rootfs with the stable kernel and NVIDIA driver was **built and verified** previously (driver 550.163.01, kernel 6.12.107+deb13-amd64, modules `nvidia-current*`). It is **not verified on hardware or in the VM**: this host has no NVIDIA GPU and QEMU's virtual GPU cannot establish NVIDIA acceleration; no passthrough setup is available or authorized. The full desktop ISO was not assembled here (the host has ~12 GiB free; the build wants more) and the live/installed NVIDIA boot gates are unrun. See `docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md` for the exact unblock commands. The live kernel is pinned to Debian stable (trixie 6.12 LTS) because testing's kernel (7.2) breaks Debian's 550 driver; the bundled branch covers Maxwell through Hopper, and Blackwell (or a failed accelerated load) falls back to nouveau on the live medium. The installed Gentoo system uses the current branch with NVIDIA's open kernel modules on Turing and newer. - **The installed `sys` binary and desktop assistant (`phoebus-assistant`)**: The installer provisions `sys` into `/usr/local/bin/sys` and configures the desktop assistant Quickshell application (`phoebus-assistant`) launched via desktop entries and keybindings. On the installed system, all 38 acceptance test cases in `installer/tests/vm/sys-acceptance.sh` pass cleanly (`PASS=38 FAIL=0`), verifying the unified AI-first CLI/GUI interface, deterministic `--legacy` mode, the package catalogue (search/inventory/information/update-check), fail-closed source requirements, audited `--broker`/`--legacy` gates, proactive system monitors, and offline fallback guidance. The matrix was re-run on 2026-09-26 against the refactored static `sys` (`70f0a72b…`, fetched to `/tmp/sys` on a disposable overlay of the pristine installed image, non-root user, no mutations): guest `PASS=38 FAIL=0`, driver `PASS=41 FAIL=0` (`serial-boot-20260926T014746Z-3089a820`). - **Authenticated boot (UKI / UEFI Secure Boot) is not implemented and is an open security limitation.** The installed boot path is plain unsigned BLS (systemd-boot + dracut; the dracut UKI generator did not embed the kernel command line, so BLS is used and verified). `kernel.uki = true` and `kernel.secureboot = true` are rejected at configuration validation, and the install-plan preview always reports the real BLS path, so no interface can imply these modes are active. A future Secure Boot/UKI implementation is a separate opt-in milestone (signed artifacts, key lifecycle, update/rollback handling, disposable-VM boot tests with Secure Boot enabled); it must not be enabled or advertised until that complete path passes. - **Rollback (`sys undo`) is VM-verified** (`serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386`, PASS=11 FAIL=0, exit 0, no secret leak in either transcript). The gate runs on a fresh disposable overlay of the installed image: a known-good package-database fingerprint and `/home` marker, `sys snapshot --legacy`, a controlled reversible `app-misc/hello` install `--legacy --portage` (the fingerprint is asserted changed, so the run cannot pass vacuously), `sys undo --legacy`, power off, then a detached reboot that asserts the package database restored, the root break marker absent, `/home` surviving, systemd running, kernel modules present, the snapshot-based recovery entry present, and rollback status recorded. Both transcripts are kept (`serial-phase1.log`, `serial.log`). Correction: the 2026-09-25 claim of a passing rollback had no run transcript and did not reproduce — the committed harness then ran the guest unprivileged, used the pre-installed `nano` as the break, restored "newest" instead of its own snapshot, and never asserted the root marker was gone. Those harness defects are fixed in this session (sudo authentication with unique end markers, explicit `--legacy`, verified break, targeted undo, marker-absent assertion) and the gate above is the evidence. Booting the recovery entry itself offline (no network, no model) remains a manual, un-automated gate: select "Phoebus Recovery (known-good snapshot)" in the systemd-boot menu. - **Mango + DankMaterialShell** is the canonical Phoebus desktop (`desktop.profile = "mango"`, Flatpak on). It is implemented with Mango 0.17.2, DMS (pinned release), Quickshell 0.3.1 and scenefx 0.5 from the GURU overlay and scoped `~amd64` keywords. Standalone dwl has been retired completely; Phoebus has one desktop experience only. The desktop is verified in live graphical VM and detached booted VM installations. - **The live desktop ISO** (`installer/live/build.sh`) builds a Debian testing rootfs with Mango + DMS, live-only autologin, a branded welcome window and a graphical installer frontend over the typed bridge. Its desktop-payload guards are unit-tested. The rebuilt ISO (`sha256 0c386a1b…`, 1.6 GiB, build id in `/etc/phoebus/build`) was booted in a graphical, seat-providing VM. The `gui` journey passed **28/28** checks (welcome autostart, launcher from the keyboard, duplicate prevention, the live medium protected, keyboard suggestion selection, the network and AI steps, the AI gate refused without a model and reported inline, no bridge errors) and the `opencode` journey passed **18/18** (real model response, validated proposal, and editing the model invalidating the validated state). The `gui-install` journey passed every assertion on a fresh 30 GiB qcow2 — OpenCode connect/review/accept, disk, account, ERASE and confirmation — and the backend then reported real stages with elapsed time and no fabricated percentage. The **completed** install succeeded through all 12 stages, compiled all 174 packages of the Mango desktop profile, and confirmed completion (`gui-install-completes` passed). The installed system then booted **with the ISO detached** (LUKS2 decrypt, systemd running, 0 failed units, all Btrfs subvolumes mounted, `sys` CLI operational, and `tuigreet` greeter active). (That paragraph describes the Sep-24 evidence run; the 2026-09-26 unpinned rerun from the rebuilt ISO is recorded in `docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`.) The **installed** Mango session's seat management blocker was resolved on 2026-09-28 (Run 13): `sys-auth/seatd` installed with `server systemd builtin` USE, `seatd.service` active and verified running on detached boot (`/run/seatd.sock` mode 0660 root:seat), `phoebus` and greeter users in group `seat`, and session startup script includes bounded seat socket wait. Graphical desktop seat verification under headless wlroots is proven; graphical verification under a physical seat remains an open hardware gate. - **AI sandbox** is implemented (`systemd-run` hardening properties) and is now exercised in a disposable VM: the **system** sandbox (full property set) for a root caller and the **user** sandbox (`systemd-run --user`, with `DynamicUser`/`PrivateDevices`/`ProtectKernelModules` omitted because the user manager rejects them) for an unprivileged caller. Before the fix, an unprivileged `sys ask` hung on a polkit `manage-units` password prompt; it now completes (`serial-boot-20260929T092147Z-6f88907a`, `AI_ROOT_RC=0`, `AI_USER_RC=0`). Open hypothesis: a read-only `flatpak search` can trigger Flatpak's interactive `appstream-update` polkit prompt when the session is not recognized as active (headless serial); polkit's default `allow_active=yes` covers a real active seat. Not yet exercised: a strict-confinement AppArmor guest and a physical seat. - **Release automation** now has executable gates, a report, atomic publish and signing command helpers, but no gate has been executed by a configured CI runner. `gates --execute` runs each gate's real command in its own process (exit 0 → Passed, nonzero → Failed, missing harness/firmware/seat/ credential → NotRun) and never manufactures a pass. A local run (2026-09-26) exercised manifest generation (2 artifacts), verification, tampered-artifact refusal, and publish refusal against a NotRun gate report; `gates --execute` on an unconfigured host reports 0 passed / 0 failed / 6 NotRun with the exact missing prerequisite per gate (OVMF_CODE/OVMF_VARS unset, no model credential). No release was published and `latest.iso` untouched. Minimal repeatable setup: register a Forgejo Actions runner (`act_runner`) so `.forgejo/workflows/ci.yml` executes the gates. - The desktop transaction compiles heavily because desktop USE does not match the signed binhost (~26 min for the desktop set on 8 vCPUs in the test VM). The official Gentoo binhost is OpenRC/hardened, so a systemd system can only reuse binaries for packages whose USE matches; the policy still requests signed binaries where it can. Publishing a matching binhost is future work. - **Live AI provider calls are not verified.** DeepSeek/OpenAI requests are built and reviewed by fixtures (`phoebus-ai::provider::TestTransport`) and the curl transport is covered by a recording runner; no call was made with a real key. - The installer rebuilds `sys-apps/systemd` from source because boot/policykit/cryptsetup USE differ from the binhost. - `sys undo` is implemented with the default-subvolume, fstab, kernel-cmdline and BLS handling described in ADR 0007; its destructive VM acceptance gate passed in this session (`serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386`). - **Stage3 signed-DIGESTS mechanism is now VM-verified, not just host-level.** The parser fixture matches the real current DIGESTS byte-for-byte; on 2026-09-26 the default unpinned install from the rebuilt live ISO (which ships the fingerprint-checked provisioned key) completed all 12 stages plus a detached boot (`INSTALL-RC=0`, `NO_SECRET_LEAK`), which proves the real signed DIGESTS and the downloaded archive hash verified against the fixed trust anchor — `fetch()` must return `Ok` before `extract()` runs, and the run demonstrably extracted. Tampered inputs are refused in the VM: a placeholder pin is refused before any network use (zero stage3 fetches) and a mismatched archive hash is refused after download with no extraction. A tampered-*signature* VM case is not feasible without a network MITM (the key is fixed and Gentoo serves authentic DIGESTS); the bad-signature branch is unit-tested.