# Verification and findings register Companion to `docs/STATUS.md`. The machine-readable per-run results live outside git under `/var/tmp/phoebus-vm//results.json`; this file is the human-readable register of what was found, fixed and still unverified. ## Run matrix (this session, 2026-09-22) ```json { "source_revision": "7e9fa9c", "iso_sha256": "428dbd7547db8690596bf5c3a0d7a6fa8aee4c9f9eca1e926c216712dd050b36", "static_binary_sha256": "2f9cd4b36a12e469d2b6187166acaf8b11f7f382cc19f7ad08bb2a809c855591", "runs": [ {"scenario": "gui", "result": "PASS 23/23", "exit_code": 0, "artifacts": "/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/gui-gui-20260922T025537Z-69f754cf"}, {"scenario": "make test (rust + vmsafety)", "result": "PASS", "exit_code": 0}, {"scenario": "cargo fmt --check", "result": "PASS", "exit_code": 0}, {"scenario": "cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets", "result": "PASS (warnings only)", "exit_code": 0}, {"scenario": "opencode probe (live 1.18.32)", "result": "ready", "exit_code": 0}, {"scenario": "opencode probe (unauth LAN bind)", "result": "authentication_required", "exit_code": 1}, {"scenario": "noninteractive install + detached boot", "result": "NOT RUN on the final ISO", "exit_code": null}, {"scenario": "full graphical install past AI", "result": "BLOCKED", "exit_code": null}, {"scenario": "rollback VM acceptance", "result": "NOT RUN", "exit_code": null}, {"scenario": "AI sandbox canary VM test", "result": "NOT RUN", "exit_code": null}, {"scenario": "second physical computer OpenCode transport", "result": "BLOCKED", "exit_code": null} ] } ``` ## Confirmed defects fixed | ID | Defect | Symptom | Fix | Regression test | |----|--------|---------|-----|-----------------| | D1 | Disk safety was not revalidated before destroying the target | A disk that disappeared, was mounted, became the live medium, or was replaced under the same name between selection and install would be partitioned on the strength of a stale review | `Installer::revalidate_target_disk` re-probes and compares identity in `storage_prepare` | `orchestrate::tests::{revalidation_refuses_a_disappeared_disk,revalidation_refuses_a_now_protected_disk,revalidation_refuses_reused_device_name_with_a_new_size,...}` | | D2 | `probe_disks` parsed human-readable `lsblk` sizes as bytes | Every disk displayed `0 B`; the size-identity check was blind | pass `-b` to `lsblk` | `probe::tests::probe_disks_classifies_optical_as_protected` asserts the byte size | | D3 | The bridge could replay or overlap a destructive install | A second `start_install` (retry, second frontend, reconnect) could re-run storage preparation | approval is single-use, consumed before work; `installing`/`installed` guards | `start_install_cannot_be_replayed_after_success` | | D4 | The welcome's primary action was not keyboard-focused | No focus ring; Return did not open the installer | request activation + `forceActiveFocus()`; regression test also rejects the invalid `onActiveChanged` signal | `welcome_primary_action_is_keyboard_reachable` | | D5 | Escape during installation silently closed the frontend | A destructive operation could be abandoned with no explanation | Escape is refused during progress and the UI says so | `progress_cannot_be_abandoned_silently` | | D6 | Provider transport accepted unsafe URL schemes / unbounded responses / followed no protocol allowlist | A config-supplied endpoint could target `file:`, inject curl config, or return a huge body | `validate_endpoint`, `proto = "=http,https"`, `max-filesize`, redirects disabled | `endpoint_validation_rejects_unsafe_schemes_and_injection`, `curl_transport_refuses_an_unsafe_endpoint`, `curl_transport_bounds_the_response_and_disables_redirects` | | D7 | `TargetRoot` followed symlinks out of the target | A planted symlink could redirect an installer write to the host | `reject_symlink_components` in `write`/`ensure_dir` | `target::tests::{refuses_to_write_through_an_escaping_symlink,refuses_a_symlinked_leaf}` | | D8 | The VM harness documented disk safety but did not enforce it, and reported observations rather than results | A mistyped `DISK` could point at a real device; a timeout could look like success; shell interpolation in screenshot conversion | `vmsafety.py`; per-run OVMF/QMP; structured results; argument arrays | `test_vmsafety.py` (16 tests), run by `make test` | ## Suspected risks (reproduced or bounded) - **Prompt injection in device labels / model output.** Typed proposals pass `deny_unknown_fields` and a closed action set; device labels are display-only. Bounded by tests (`phoebus-ai` parse/allowlist). No VM canary run. - **Live sudoers is `NOPASSWD: ALL` (live-only).** It does not reach the installed system, but the GUI bridge uses it. Narrowing is a recorded follow-up. - **OpenCode `/config/providers` returns provider credentials in cleartext.** Upstream behaviour; the probe keeps only counts and docs mandate loopback + tunnel. Not a Phoebus defect, but a deployment hazard. ## Missing verification (blocked / not run) - Full graphical installation past the AI step and two fresh-disk graphical installs: **BLOCKED** — no provider key and no local model; normal install requires a connected model. - `install`/`boot` modes on the final ISO: **NOT RUN** (the earlier appliance build passed `INSTALL-RC=0` + detached boot; the final ISO's binary changed, so this is not automatically re-verified). - Rollback acceptance, AI sandbox canary, installed Mango/dwl, physical seat, NVIDIA: **NOT RUN / unverified**. - Second physical computer OpenCode transport: **BLOCKED**; host-local forwarded hop and unauthenticated-LAN refusal were tested instead.