# Disposable UEFI VM boot verification This records the first successful end-to-end install and boot of Phoebus OS against a disposable qcow2 disk. No physical disk was ever touched. ## Exact tested path Host (Ubuntu, no root required): - QEMU `qemu-system-x86_64` (extracted locally under `/tmp/opencode/qemudeb`), OVMF (`OVMF_CODE_4M.fd` + `OVMF_VARS_4M.fd`). - Target disk: `/tmp/opencode/vm/work/target.qcow2`, 30 GiB, virtio-blk (`/dev/vda` in the guest). - Live boot: the reference ISO's own `boot/gentoo` + `boot/gentoo.igz`, with `-append "root=live:CDLABEL=gentoo-amd64-livegui rd.live.dir=/ rd.live.squashimg=image.squashfs cdroot console=ttyS0,115200"`. - A host `python3 -m http.server` serves the installer tarball, the pinned stage3 and the test config to the guest over QEMU user networking. Phase 1 (install): 1. Boot the live ISO headless; get a root shell on the serial console. 2. Download the installer and test config from the host. 3. Write secrets to `0600` files and run the installer binary (the original run used the Bash prototype; the harness now serves `phoebus-installer`): `phoebus-installer --config test.conf --install --yes --luks-passphrase-file FILE --user-password-file FILE` 4. Stages executed in order: `preflight, storage, stage3, fstab, portage, base packages, kernel, bootloader, users, services, desktop, finalize`. Phase 2 (boot the disk alone, ISO detached): 5. Power off, then start a new QEMU with **no ISO and no `-kernel`**, boot `order=c`, same OVMF NVRAM. 6. Firmware runs `\EFI\systemd\systemd-bootx64.efi`; systemd-boot boots the "Gentoo Linux" BLS entry from the ESP. 7. `systemd-cryptsetup` prompts for the LUKS2 passphrase, unlocks `/dev/vda2`, mounts the Btrfs `@` subvolume as `/`. 8. systemd (PID 1) starts, serial getty appears, user login succeeds. ## Verified results - Firmware booted the disk's own systemd-boot (Boot000C "Linux Boot Manager"). - LUKS2 passphrase prompt and successful unlock. - Btrfs subvolumes mounted: `/`, `/home`, `/var`, `/.snapshots`, `/swap` (later fix), ESP at `/efi`. - `cat /proc/1/comm` -> `systemd`. - `systemd-analyze`: 1.442s kernel + 5.755s initrd + 2.942s userspace. - Login as `phoebus` with the configured password; groups: `wheel audio video render input plugdev power network libinput`. - Networking up (`enp0s2 10.0.2.15/24`). - `systemctl --failed`: exactly one unit, `swap-swapfile.swap` (fixed after this run; see below). ## Bugs found and fixed during this work 1. **Subvolumes created after mounting `@`** - `storage_prepare` mounted `subvol=@` before `@` existed (mount exit 32). Added `btrfs_create_layout` (mount top-level, create subvols, unmount, then mount layout) and a regression test (`tests/test_btrfs_order.sh`). 2. **Generated fstab overwritten by stage3** - fstab/crypttab were generated during storage, then the stage3 tarball replaced `/etc/fstab`. Moved generation to a new `fstab_generate` stage after extraction. 3. **`/var/tmp` absent in the target** - systemd's `kernel-install` needs a temporary directory; `/var/tmp` was missing. The fstab stage now creates `/var/tmp`, `/tmp`, `/root`, `/home`, and chroot commands set `TMPDIR=/tmp`. 4. **installkernel needs `uki_generator` even for BLS** - with an explicit `/etc/kernel/install.conf`, `05-check-config.install` always requires a `uki_generator`. BLS now writes `uki_generator=none`. 5. **dracut could not build the `crypt` module** - the target lacked `sys-fs/cryptsetup`. Added `sys-fs/cryptsetup` and `sys-fs/btrfs-progs` to the base package set. 6. **No `systemd-cryptsetup`** - `sys-apps/systemd` was built without the `cryptsetup` USE flag, so the encrypted root could not be unlocked. Added `cryptsetup` (and `policykit`) to the systemd package.use entry. 7. **Kernel command line used unnamed LUKS** - `rd.luks.uuid` yields `luks-`, not the configured name. Switched to `rd.luks.name==`. 8. **Dracut UKI did not embed the command line** - the dracut `uki_generator` produced a UKI with no `.cmdline`, so it booted with no `root=`. Deferred UKI in favour of a reliable BLS entry carrying `options`. UKI remains future work. 9. **fstab did not mount `@swap`** - the swapfile unit failed because `/swap` was never the `@swap` subvolume. Added the `subvol=@swap` fstab entry. 10. **`local root="$1" dir="$root/..."` class bug** - reintroduced in `boot_write_dracut_conf`; split into two `local` statements. This class of bug is now covered by the regression suite. 11. **Wrong package atoms** - `gui-apps/fuzzel` (not in Gentoo) -> `gui-apps/wofi`, `app-misc/brightnessctl` (not packaged) removed, `app-crypt/gnome-keyring` -> `gnome-base/gnome-keyring`, `gui-apps/polkit-gnome` -> `gnome-extra/polkit-gnome`. 12. **Package policy compiled too much** - unknown packages defaulted to source. `balanced` now compiles cheap builds and uses signed Gentoo binaries for everything else, which cut installer time substantially. ## Rust installer parity (same VM path) The Rust installer (`installer-rs`) reproduced the entire path on a fresh disposable qcow2 disk using the static binary `phoebus-installer` (`x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu`, crt-static): - Same config (legacy flat format), same pinned stage3 URL + SHA-256. - `INSTALL_RC=0`; stages: storage, stage3, fstab, portage, base packages, kernel, bootloader, users, services, desktop (none), finalize. - Policy decisions matched Bash: `sudo`/`networkmanager`/`polkit` binary, `cryptsetup`/`btrfs-progs` source. - The installer recorded **81 then 97 measured compile times** from Portage's `emerge.log` (real data, not estimates). - `NO_SECRET_LEAK` from the log secret scan. Booted with the ISO detached: - UEFI firmware ran systemd-boot; BLS entry booted. - LUKS2 unlock, Btrfs `@` root, `/home`, `/var`, `/swap`, ESP at `/efi`. - `cat /proc/1/comm` -> `systemd`. - `systemctl is-system-running` -> **running** (not degraded). - `systemctl --failed` -> **0 loaded units listed**. - `systemd-analyze`: 1.378s kernel + 5.238s initrd + 4.114s userspace = 10.730s. - Login as `phoebus` succeeded; networking up (`10.0.2.15/24`). This is the point at which the Rust installer satisfies the parity criteria and may become the primary installer. The Bash implementation remains the reference/fallback until the desktop milestone is also verified. ## Desktop and Flatpak (Rust installer, verified) The Rust installer, running the desktop profile, installed the full Wayland desktop and Flatpak successfully (`INSTALL_RC=0`; 326 measured compile times recorded). Key change: a desktop install now selects the supported stable Gentoo profile `default/linux/amd64/23.0/desktop/systemd` instead of reconstructing X/Wayland/dbus USE by hand from the minimal systemd profile. This resolved the earlier `cairo[X]`/`libglvnd[X]`/`libxkbcommon[X]` conflicts, and `sys-fs/{btrfs-progs,cryptsetup} -man` avoided a Sphinx/Pillow circular dependency. Booted with the ISO detached and logged in: - `systemctl is-system-running` -> `running`; `systemctl --failed` -> 0 units. - `flatpak --version` -> **Flatpak 1.18.1**; `flatpak remotes` -> **flathub configured**. - Binaries present and runnable: `dwl 0.7`, `Waybar v0.15.0`, `wofi 1.4.1`, `mako`, `swaybg`, `pipewire`, `wireplumber`, `grim`, `wl-clipboard`. Session verification. The VM's serial session has **no logind seat**, so wlroots' DRM backend correctly refuses (`Failed to start a DRM session`). This is a headless-harness limitation, not an installer defect. Using `WLR_BACKENDS=headless WLR_RENDERER=pixman`: - `dwl` started (pid observed), created the `wayland-0` socket. - `mako`, `waybar`, and `swaybg` started and connected (`swaybg` found output `HEADLESS-1`). - `wl-copy`/`wl-paste` round-tripped `phoebus-clip`. - `grim /tmp/shot.png` produced a **14401-byte PNG**, proving the compositor renders and captures. - `wpctl status` reported the PipeWire graph; `systemctl --user --failed` -> 0. - `waybar` logged a non-fatal warning about a missing power-menu file and power-profiles-daemon. The installer writes `/usr/local/bin/phoebus-session`, which starts waybar, mako and swaybg and then execs dwl, with a software-render fallback when no render node is present. ## Official harness on the static binary (Bash migration, Phase 2) The committed harness (`installer/tests/vm/serial-driver.py` + `installer/tests/vm/install.sh`) now drives the **static Rust binary** and no longer runs the Bash installer. Re-verified end to end on a fresh disposable qcow2 (24 GiB, virtio-blk `/dev/vda`): ```sh # Build: cd installer-rs && RUSTFLAGS="-C target-feature=+crt-static" \ cargo build --release -p phoebus-installer --target x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu # Install in the disposable VM, then boot the disk detached: python3 installer/tests/vm/serial-driver.py install python3 installer/tests/vm/serial-driver.py boot ``` Install (`INSTALL-RC=0`): - The guest fetched `/tmp/phoebus-installer` and printed `phoebus-installer 0.1.0` (the Rust binary, not Bash). - Stages completed in proven order: `storage_prepare`, `stage_install`, `fstab_generate`, `portage_configure`, `packages_base`, `kernel_install`, `boot_install`, `users_configure`, `services_configure`, `desktop_install` (none), `finalize`. - Policy matched Bash: `crypto`/`btrfs-progs` source build, `sudo`/ `networkmanager`/`polkit` binary. - `NO_SECRET_LEAK`; the run powered off cleanly. Boot with the ISO detached (`serial-driver.py boot`): - UEFI firmware ran `\EFI\systemd\systemd-bootx64.efi` (Boot0002 "Linux Boot Manager"); the BLS "Gentoo Linux" entry booted. - `systemd-cryptsetup` prompted for the LUKS2 passphrase and unlocked `phoebus-root (cryptroot)`. - Login as `phoebus` succeeded. - `cat /proc/1/comm` -> `systemd`. - `systemctl is-system-running` -> **running**. - `systemctl --failed` -> **0 loaded units listed**. - Networking: `enp0s2 UP 10.0.2.15/24`. - Mounts: `/` (btrfs `@`), `/home`, `/var`, `/.snapshots`, `/swap`, ESP `/efi`; `vda2` is `crypto_LUKS`. This satisfies the Phase 2 exit gate of `docs/BASH-MIGRATION.md`: the only proven boot path no longer depends on the retired Bash installer. ## Snapshots and safe updates (four-workstream session) Verified on the installed Btrfs system from the static-binary harness, driving the new `sys` binary fetched into the guest: - `sys history` before -> `no transaction history`. - `sys -y --action '{"action":"create_snapshot","operation":"vm test"}'` -> `protective snapshot: @-20260920T114917-vm-test`. - `sys history` after -> `@-20260920T114917-vm-test Committed vm test`. - `btrfs subvolume list /` shows `@snapshots/@-20260920T114917-vm-test` as a real subvolume (read-only snapshot). - `sys -y prepare-updates` fetched distfiles successfully; `--buildpkgonly` was refused by Portage with `--buildpkgonly requires all dependencies to be merged`, which the installer now records as `status: Ready` with the reason (`distfiles fetched; binary prebuild skipped: ...`) instead of a hard failure. - `sys inspect-updates` reports the state and timestamp. Unit regression tests cover the failure paths that a VM cannot easily force: corrupt snapshot history is an error, and a high-risk action aborts when the protective snapshot fails. ## Desktop session on an installed VM A full dwl desktop install was built with the static Rust binary (`DESKTOP_PROFILE=dwl`, `FLATPAK=no`) and booted with the ISO detached: `INSTALL_RC=0`, all stages, `NO_SECRET_LEAK`, `systemctl is-system-running` -> `running`, `0 failed units`. Running the installed `/usr/local/bin/phoebus-session` under the headless wlroots backend (the serial VM has no logind seat): - the `wayland-0` socket is created before any helper starts; - after startup the process tree is `dwl`, `waybar`, `mako`, `swaybg -c #1e1e2e` and `/usr/libexec/polkit-gnome-authentication-agent-1` (the polkit agent, which the previous script never started); - dwl reports the `HEADLESS-1` output; - after `dwl` exits, **all session processes are reaped**. Installed and on `PATH`: `dwl`, `waybar`, `mako`, `swaybg`, `kitty`, `wofi`, `Xwayland`. The polkit agent lives at `/usr/libexec/polkit-gnome-authentication-agent-1`; the session script's fallback finds it because it is not on `PATH`. This is headless verification. A physical VT / real logind seat remains to be exercised interactively (`docs/DEVELOPMENT.md` -> "Physical VT / real-seat check"). ## Signed binary reuse analysis The desktop transaction's installer log (`emerge` grouping) shows the policy already requests signed binaries for the expensive set: - source group: `sys-fs/cryptsetup sys-fs/btrfs-progs`; - binary groups: base tools, `gentoo-kernel-bin`/firmware, and the dwl/waybar/ wofi/mako/sway*/gtk-layer-shell/xwayland set. The desktop install in this session took ~1h49m wall time (12:01–13:50 UTC) on 8 vCPUs. Most of that is Portage falling back to source because the OpenRC/ hardened binhost cannot satisfy the systemd/desktop USE set, even though the policy requested binaries. Two comparable data points are now recorded: the base-only install took ~44 min and the desktop install ~1h49m. The code changes here remove forced flags but cannot raise reuse without a matching binhost, so no new time saving is claimed. The remaining source builds are caused by the **official Gentoo binhost being built for the OpenRC/hardened profile** (`PROFILE: default/linux/amd64/17.0/ hardened`), which cannot satisfy a systemd/desktop USE set. The safe changes made here are: stop forcing the unused `installkernel uki` flag, remove the duplicate PipeWire and empty WirePlumber `package.use` lines, and derive the binhost URI from the selected profile when it is not set. Signature verification remains enabled. Publishing a matching systemd/desktop binhost is the remaining step; no time estimate is claimed beyond the recorded ~26 min. ## Debian-Live installer appliance (actual ISO) An appliance ISO was built **without root** by `installer/live/build.sh` (Debian-Live 13.7 standard base + `/phoebus` overlay). The full-install evidence below was recorded with build `c0105bc9a282fddcbefab42baa577ea99843060f00fa45a75bcbc8358186bfd5`. A desktop install was re-run and verified with build `c1846f0d18ed9813e5ef3e699b9110f4fb04ab09a4c5ed800970b1d54971d114`: - mandatory-AI gate refused the install until `--no-ai` was passed (`GATE_REFUSED_OK`); - Nix: `/nix/store/2nhrwv91g6ycpyxvhmvc0xs8p92wp4bk-nix-2.24.9` present, `nix (Nix) 2.24.9`, `nix-daemon.service` **enabled and active**, and `nix shell nixpkgs#hello` downloaded from `cache.nixos.org` and printed `Hello, world!`; - desktop portals: `xdg-desktop-portal 1.20.4`, `-gtk 1.15.3`, `-wlr 0.7.1`; - desktop binaries present: `dwl`, `waybar`, `kitty`, `wofi`, `Xwayland`; - hostname `phoebus`, networking `enp0s2 UP 10.0.2.15/24`, systemd PID 1, `running`, `0 loaded units listed`. The current build is `3ba913ba660fb7436e26e587e9777f1f65ed10dcc9b50d17458ebb3d3a739b5c`: Nix is now on by default, and `finalize` flushes the target (`sync`) before unmounting. That build was **not** re-run end to end because the host root filesystem reached ~98% and the base emerge became pathologically slow. Treat `c1846f0d` as the verified artifact and `3ba913ba` as the current one. Firmware boot (UEFI/OVMF, no `-kernel`; the ISO's own grub chain): - auto-boots the live system on the serial console; - login `user` / `live` (passwordless sudo); - the overlaid tools run: `cryptsetup 2.7.5`, `sgdisk 1.0.10`, `partprobe 3.6`, `mkfs.btrfs 6.14`, `mkfs.fat`. Full install to a fresh 24 GiB qcow2 driven from the appliance: - `INSTALL_RC=0`, all stages, `NO_SECRET_LEAK`. Detached boot of the installed disk (ISO removed): - systemd-boot -> LUKS2 unlock -> `phoebus` login; - `systemctl is-system-running` -> `running`; `0 loaded units listed`; - **Gentoo-only**: `Gentoo Base System release 2.18`, Portage 3.0.82.2, `no-apt`; systemd PID 1; - `cryptroot` Btrfs mounted at `/`, `/home`, `/var`, `/.snapshots`, `/swap`, ESP `/efi`. This is Bash-free and Gentoo-target-only: the appliance contributes tooling, never configuration. ### Open items found in this run - **Resolved:** the earlier `gentoo` hostname anomaly did not recur; the target boots as `phoebus` with `/etc/hostname` set, and DHCP comes up (`enp0s2 UP 10.0.2.15/24`) once awaited. - **Implemented, not re-verified:** `/usr/local/bin/phoebus-session` (and the exported installer log) were absent after boot in the earlier runs. The installer wrote and existence-checked them, and the root unmounted cleanly, but comparison with a boot-time-created file showed the **finalize writes were not on disk**: Btrfs commits lazily and the harness used `poweroff -f`. The fix is a `sync` in `finalize` before unmounting (build `3ba913ba`). It has not been re-run end to end (host disk pressure). Until it is, treat the session script as **unverified** in the shipped ISO. ## 2026-09-21 appliance baseline (rollback/recovery foundations) A fresh install of the committed code was run in a disposable qcow2 (24 GiB) with the rebuilt Debian-Live appliance ISO, then booted with the ISO detached. This validates the coordinated-snapshot and recovery-entry code on a real Btrfs system; it does **not** validate a rollback (that gate is still pending). - Build: static `phoebus-installer` from the tree, appliance ISO `206551ec21e13753fb97f6d65bfc01e3642b0167908807f64d6ca5a80141adab`. - Config: `DESKTOP_PROFILE=none`, `KERNEL_PROFILE=safe`, LUKS2 + Btrfs, `NIX_ENABLED=no`; the host served the stage3 (`sha256 6a3d85ee...f77d44d5`), config and 0600 secret files over HTTP. - Harness: `installer/tests/vm/appliance-driver.py install` then `boot` (new in this session). Install: - `===NO_SECRET_LEAK===`, `===INSTALL-RC=0===`, clean poweroff (`reboot: Power down`). Target grew to 6.3 GiB. Detached boot (no ISO, no `-kernel`): - UEFI ran systemd-boot; its menu listed `Gentoo Linux`, **`Phoebus Recovery (known-good snapshot)`** and `Reboot Into Firmware Interface`; the default booted. - `systemd-cryptsetup` prompted for the LUKS2 passphrase and unlocked `phoebus-root (cryptroot)`. - `cat /proc/1/comm` -> `systemd`; `systemctl is-system-running` -> **running**; `systemctl --failed` -> **0 loaded units listed**. - Networking: `enp0s2 UP 10.0.2.15/24`. - The target's transaction history contains the **initial coordinated snapshot**: ```toml [[records]] id = "@-20260921T110110-initial-known-good" operation = "initial known-good" source_subvol = "/mnt/phoebus" snapshot_subvol = "@-20260921T110110-initial-known-good" var_snapshot = "@var-20260921T110110-initial-known-good" status = "committed" ``` This confirms `@` and the separately mounted `@var` are captured together and that the installer writes a snapshot-based recovery entry (not one that depends on the live root). Reading the recovery entry and `btrfs subvolume list` as the unprivileged user was refused; the menu entry above is the evidence that it exists. Not yet verified for this baseline: `sys undo`, a deliberately broken update, a detached rollback reboot, and recovery with no network/model (the rollback acceptance gate). **2026-09-22 update — rollback acceptance still NOT run.** A session of `sys` administration hardening did not run the destructive acceptance test. The blockers are unchanged and exact: `make doctor` reports ~13 GiB free versus the >=20 GiB the VM harness requires (the root filesystem has ~12 GiB free), and the committed harness (`appliance-driver.py`, `serial-driver.py`) implements only `install` and `boot`, with no automated break-update / `sys undo` / recovery-boot mode. `sys undo` therefore remains **unverified**, not passing. ## Mango + DankMaterialShell verification (IN PROGRESS) ### Live ISO — graphical VM (verified 2026-09-21) Artifact: `installer/live/build.sh` output `phoebus-mango-amd64.iso`, sha256 `c235b873bc04a90c91ff4be361a605907997c509c4021e611645336c23f924d9` (1.6 GiB). The image was built rootlessly from the signed Debian testing archive plus pinned Mango 0.17.2 and DankMaterialShell 1.6.2 releases (`installer/live/releases.sha256`). Booted in a disposable QEMU/OVMF VM with a **graphical device** (`-device virtio-gpu-pci`, no `-vga`, serial console still attached) — a real DRM node and logind seat, not a headless compositor: - `uname -r` -> `7.1.13+deb14-amd64`; `systemctl is-system-running` -> running; `/dev/dri/card0` and `/dev/dri/renderD128` present. - Live autologin ran as an unprivileged `phoebus` user in session `c1` on `seat0`/tty7; `mango` (compositor), `/usr/bin/dms run --session` and `qs` (Quickshell) were running under the user manager (`mango-session.target` and `dms.service` both **active**). - No dwl helpers (`waybar`/`mako`/`swayidle`/`swaylock`) were started. - A framebuffer `screendump` showed the DankMaterialShell desktop: the DMS panel (clock, weather, tray, network/battery/volume/power) and the DMS first-run "Welcome to DankMaterialShell" window, composited by Mango. This is the acceptance evidence for "the ISO boots into a usable Mango + DankMaterialShell live desktop". - The "Install Phoebus" application entry and `/usr/local/bin/phoebus-install` are installed by the build; the launcher runs the installer UI and passes no `--yes`/`--install`/`--no-ai` (unit-tested), so opening it cannot start a destructive operation automatically. The serial console and a spare VT remain available as a recovery path. Fixes found by this test (all committed): the live kernel/initrd must replace the base ISO's **versioned** `/live/vmlinuz-*` paths; setuid bits must be restored when packing as an unprivileged user (for `sudo`); `virtio_gpu` must be autoloaded; greetd's `greeter` account must exist even with an `initial_session`; greetd must run on VT7 to avoid the `getty@tty1` conflict; live-config autologin (`noautologin`) must be disabled in favour of greetd; and the Mango session must not export `WAYLAND_DISPLAY` before the compositor starts (wlroots would pick its nested backend instead of DRM) and needs the Qt Wayland shell-integration packages for Quickshell. ### Installed system — not yet run A default install (`desktop.profile = "mango"`; the default) and a detached encrypted boot to the greetd login are **not yet verified in a VM**: the Mango transaction syncs the GURU overlay and compiles Quickshell/DMS/scenefx/Qt, which was not feasible here. The configuration and login behaviour are covered by unit tests (`live_iso.rs`, `system::installed_login_*`, `desktop.rs`), and the plan renders the session. Verify with the harness once a full Mango build is affordable: ```sh python3 installer/tests/vm/appliance-driver.py install # DESKTOP_PROFILE=mango python3 installer/tests/vm/appliance-driver.py boot ``` Remaining graphical checks (installed system and live): panel interactions and launcher, notifications, polkit prompt, lock/unlock, idle/suspend and resume, display changes, clipboard/screenshots/terminal/file manager, a Flatpak app launch + file chooser + screen sharing, logout/reboot, the dwl fallback, shell restart, and idle memory/CPU versus dwl. Known prerequisites/limits: the installed `mango` transaction needs the GURU overlay (git) and compiles Quickshell/DMS/scenefx; the live build needs the signed Debian testing archive. A graphical VM must provide a real seat (for example `-device virtio-gpu-pci` with the serial console still attached); `-display none` alone is not sufficient evidence of a graphical session. 1. Live ISO boots to Mango + DMS (screenshot/`screendump` evidence, not just process names); panel, launcher and terminal work; "Install Phoebus" opens the installer UI without starting a destructive operation. 2. Live text-console recovery (serial and a spare VT) remains accessible. 3. Fresh install with the default profile reaches `systemctl is-system-running = running` with 0 failed units; `emerge --pretend` shows only the reviewed `~amd64` atoms. 4. Detached encrypted boot; LUKS unlock; **authenticated** login on a real seat; Mango is the default session. 5. `phoebus-mango.desktop` starts the session; exactly one compositor (mango), one shell (dms), one lock/idle (DMS) and one polkit agent run; no waybar/mako/swaybg/swayidle/swaylock processes. 6. Panel, launcher (Mod+Space), notifications, tray and the DMS settings panel; audio/network/Bluetooth controls; lock/unlock; idle/suspend and resume. 7. Display configuration/scaling and a second monitor if the VM supports one. 8. Clipboard history, screenshots, terminal, file manager, and `phoebus-assistant`. 9. An actual Flatpak app: launch, file chooser, and portal screen sharing. 10. Logout reaps session processes; reboot; select the `phoebus-dwl.desktop` fallback and confirm it still works. 11. Shell-failure handling (kill `dms`, compositor survives, locking still locks), and default-selection behaviour: omitting the profile selects Mango, explicit `none`/`dwl` are respected, and an existing explicit choice is not overwritten. 12. Idle memory/CPU and startup measured against the dwl session. Until results are recorded here, the default stands by owner decision but no stability is claimed. ## Graphical installer ISO and typed bridge (2026-09-21) A dedicated driver, `installer/tests/vm/gui-driver.py`, boots the built live ISO with a **graphical device** and a serial console, drives the graphical frontend through the compositor, and captures QEMU framebuffer screenshots. Artifact: `installer/live/phoebus-installer-amd64.iso`, 1.6 GiB, `sha256 2a52178c4b4a71bbc5c011b89533988ceb9aa95493160cb93c4335f03d9a1eee` (Mango 0.17.2 + DankMaterialShell 1.6.2). What was observed (`gui` mode): 1. The live session autologins into Mango + DMS; the branded `phoebus-welcome` window opens automatically. The DMS first-run greeter and changelog dialogs do **not** appear (markers pre-seeded). 2. The welcome shows the wordmark, emblem, wallpaper, ISO version (`0.1.0`) and readiness (network connected, UEFI, memory, cores), with "Install Phoebus OS" dominant and the secondary tools plus Advanced present. 3. Launching `phoebus-install` opens the wizard; running it again leaves the session count at 1 (`DUP n1=1 n2=1`), so duplicate installer sessions are prevented. 4. Keyboard navigation (Ctrl+Right / Enter / Tab) reaches step 2 (network and prerequisites, with real UEFI/memory/CPU/network values) and step 3 (AI model). Provider selection, the secret API-key field and the model field render; advancing without a connected model is refused with "Connect and validate an AI model before continuing." 5. A backend probe on the real guest lists `/dev/vda` as unprotected and selectable, and `/dev/sr0` as the `live_medium` installation medium, protected (the model tests cover the classification logic). 6. Screenshots: `docs/screenshots/01-welcome.png` … `05-ai-blocked.png`. The destination-disk, review and confirmation screens (`06`–`08`) were rendered from the same QML against a dry-run backend because a real provider call was not available in this environment. What was **not** possible: a live AI provider call (no key/model in this environment). The AI step is verified as a blocked prerequisite and in unit tests with a fixture transport; it is **not** a passed live call. Real install + detached boot on the same ISO (`install` then `boot` modes): - Guest install used the same deterministic backend as the GUI (`phoebus-installer --install --yes --no-ai`): `INSTALL-RC=0`, `installation complete`, `NO_SECRET_LEAK`. - Detached boot (no ISO, `-boot order=c`): systemd PID 1, `running`, **0 failed units**, `systemd-boot` menu shows **Gentoo Linux first**, LUKS2 unlocked, `/dev/vda1 -> /efi`, `cryptroot` Btrfs with `/ /home /var /.snapshots /swap`, network up. Bug found and fixed during this work: the snapshot recovery BLS entry shared the kernel's `sort-key`, and the specification's final filename tie-break (decreasing) made it first when the random machine-id sorted low; with `default *` the installed system booted `systemd.unit=rescue.target`. Fixed by pinning `loader.conf` to the newest real kernel entry and giving the recovery entry `sort-key zzzz-phoebus-recovery`; unit tests pin both. ## 2026-09-22 — automated graphical journey (gui-driver) and hardened harness The graphical live ISO was rebuilt and driven automatically by `installer/tests/vm/gui-driver.py gui` in a graphical, seat-providing QEMU/OVMF VM with a disposable qcow2 disk directory and a per-run OVMF variable file. - Source revision: `7e9fa9c` plus uncommitted work; build id recorded in `/etc/phoebus/build` (`7e9fa9c+dirty…`). - Static installer: `sha256 2f9cd4b3…` (4,716,544 bytes, static-pie). - ISO: `installer/live/phoebus-installer-amd64.iso`, `sha256 428dbd75…`, 1.6 GiB, built with `PHOEBUS_REUSE_ROOTFS=1` (Mango 0.17.2 + DankMaterialShell 1.6.2). - Result: **23/23 checks PASS**, exit status 0 (`/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/gui-gui-20260922T025537Z-69f754cf/`). Asserted: welcome autostart; live/branding payload markers from command output (not the echoed command); the live medium protected; "Install Phoebus OS" launched the installer from a Return keypress; duplicate sessions prevented (`n1=n2=1`); the frontend reported no bridge errors; keyboard navigation reached the network and AI steps; advancing without a connected model was refused and started no installation. - Screenshots at every page (welcome focus, language, network, AI model, AI blocked, final state) plus a `screenshot-manifest.json`; `report.py` builds a browsable `report.html`. All artifacts stay under `/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/` (outside git). Harness safety verified in the same work: the drivers reject `/dev/*`, block and character devices, raw images, symlinks escaping the disposable directory, and outside backing chains, with a nonzero exit (`make test-vm`, 16 unit tests). Screenshots use structured QMP and argument arrays; there is no shell interpolation. A host-local OpenCode transport test also ran: `phoebus-installer --opencode-probe` returned `ready` against `opencode 1.18.32` through a forwarded second loopback endpoint, and `authentication_required` (exit 1) against a deliberately unauthenticated LAN bind. ## Known remaining work - The graphical session was verified with the **headless** wlroots backend (no logind seat in the serial harness). A physical VT / seat path is architected (`phoebus-session`) but was not exercised on real hardware. - NVIDIA proprietary support is architecturally allowed but **NOT VERIFIED**. - UKI is deferred (BLS is used). - The installer rebuilds `sys-apps/systemd` from source because boot/policykit/cryptsetup USE differ from the binhost. Shipping a matching systemd binpkg is a future optimization. - Desktop USE still does not match the signed binhost, so the desktop transaction compiles a large amount from source (~26 minutes for the desktop package set on 8 vCPUs in the test VM). - **The full graphical install past the AI step is NOT verified.** No live provider key and no downloadable local model were available in this environment, and normal installation requires a connected model by design; the automated journey stops at (and verifies) the blocked AI prerequisite. Two fresh-disk graphical installations from the final candidate remain unrun. The deterministic noninteractive install + detached boot remains the proven boot path. - **A separate physical computer for the OpenCode transport test is NOT available**; that check is BLOCKED. The forwarded-hop and unauthenticated-LAN-refusal tests are host-local.