# Handoff Rolling note between work sessions. **Update this file before you finish**, then commit it. It should be short and current; use `git log` for detail. - **Last updated:** this session (2026-09-25), the three remaining administration defects from the latest review: (1) bind privileged execution to the actual approved plan via a broker-controlled approval ledger, (2) make personal settings work from a normal desktop account in user-owned storage, and (3) carry reviewed effects through execution and finish every started transaction truthfully. See ADR 0014. - **Current focus:** 1. **Approval ledger (`phoebus_installer::approval`, ADR 0014):** - The plan's integrity seal (actions, per-step effects, candidate, target root, initiating uid, expiry) is the binding fingerprint and the `O_EXCL` consumption key in a **root-owned** ledger (`/var/lib/phoebus/approvals`, 0700 / 0600). - `execute_plan_privileged` now takes the reviewed digest and passes it to `validate_prepared_plan(..., Some(expected_digest), ...)`. The digest travels across authentication independently of the plan file (`sys --broker --execute-plan --plan-uid --approval-digest --root `). - Replacement under the same identifier is refused even when resealed with a valid checksum; replay is refused even after the user deletes every file in their own plan directory; concurrent submissions allow one execution; a crash leaves a reconciled `interrupted` record. `reconcile_interrupted` runs at broker startup. - The initiator is derived from `PKEXEC_UID` (`approval::broker_initiator_uid`); `--plan-uid` is untrusted input. Authentication precedes the ledger claim, so refusal consumes nothing. 2. **User-owned personal settings (`phoebus_executor::personal`):** - `UserStorage` resolves the initiating user (`PHOEBUS_UID` → `SUDO_UID` → `PKEXEC_UID` → effective uid; home from `/etc/passwd`) and writes 0600 in 0700 atomically. - Personal preferences → `~/.config/phoebus/package-preferences.toml`; proactive snooze/dismiss → `~/.local/state/phoebus/proactive-state.toml` (bounded). System defaults remain `/etc/phoebus/...`, changed only via `set_package_preference { system_wide: true }` through the broker. - `chooser::load_preferences` merges system < personal (personal wins, per-app union); proactive reads the legacy root-owned file only as a migration fallback. Bridge failures are surfaced; the QML notifies on failure and the profile combo now uses the exact serde values. 3. **Reviewed effects + terminal transactions (`service::execute_prepared`):** - Reviewed per-step effects are carried forward; `resolve_effects` is now only evidence compared with `phoebus_core::effects::approval_holds` (earlier-step-introduced targets are the only allowance). A material change aborts with `stale plan`; only Portage actions are compared (other lanes are validated by `validate_prepared_plan`). - Every path after `transaction::begin` reaches a terminal result; effect resolution failure, stale plan, action failure and verification failure are recorded with per-action outcomes and the snapshot retained. - **Last verified (this session):** - `cargo fmt --all -- --check` clean. - `cargo test --workspace`: 582 passed, 0 failed, including new privileged entry-point regressions: replacement during authentication, recomputed checksum, deleted user plan+claim replay, concurrent execution, wrong caller/root, expiry, interruption reconciliation, effect drift, effect resolution failure after `begin`, and later-step failure after an earlier success. - `cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets` runs (exit 0; only the pre-existing `result_large_err`, one arg-count and one `DiskPhase` lints remain). - Static `sys` (`crt-static`) builds (`static-pie`, 6.4 MiB). - Host-level `sys` CLI tests: system-wide preference refused without root; personal preference saved to user storage without touching `/etc`. - **Not yet verified this session (BLOCKED):** - Installed-VM journey and the 12-step acceptance list. The existing disposable installed disk (`/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/disks/test-disk.qcow2`) reaches the LUKS prompt but **no passphrase in this environment opens it**: the harness default (`phoebus-luks-test`, which is also the content of `/home/dominic/vmlab/serve/luks.pw`) is rejected, and no other credential is available. Do not guess or brute-force. - No AI provider credential is present; do not invent one. - A fresh disposable VM install would verify the installed journey but takes ~2 h (disk space is tight, 24 GiB free), so it was not attempted in this pass. - **Public repo:** (remote `origin`, SSH port 2222). ## Next actions (in order) 1. **Unlock or rebuild the installed VM (blocker).** The installed disk reaches the LUKS prompt but its passphrase is unknown; the committed harness default is rejected. Either supply the real passphrase or perform a fresh disposable install (~2 h) to obtain an installed system, then run the full 12-step acceptance list below. 2. **Installed `sys` acceptance** on the booted disk: ```sh # serve the static sys first: cp installer-rs/target/x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/release/sys /home/dominic/vmlab/serve/ env DISK=/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/disks/.qcow2 \ OVMF_CODE=/usr/share/OVMF/OVMF_CODE_4M.fd \ OVMF_VARS=/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/OVMF_VARS.fd \ BOOT_CHECKS='... curl .../sys ...; SYS_BIN=/tmp/sys bash .../sys-acceptance.sh ...' \ python3 installer/tests/vm/serial-driver.py boot ``` The new broker behaviour (replacement during authentication, replay after deleting user plan state, cancellation) is already covered by `phoebus-installer` unit tests; the installed run confirms the sealed elevation path and the personal-preference acceptance case. 3. **AI-selected install journey (needs an authorised provider)**: boot the installed disk, serve the built `sys` and a 0600 key file, then: ```sh sudo sys --ai-provider deepseek --ai-api-key-file /run/phoebus/ai.key \ install # and the no-model control in the same run: PHOEBUS_AI_PROVIDER= sudo sys install ``` Confirm the model requests evidence, the resolver confirms the candidate, the plan is presented before approval, and the transaction is recorded. No credential is available here; do not invent one. 4. **Rollback VM acceptance** (`serial-driver.py rollback`) on a cloned disposable image of the installed system. 5. **NVIDIA hardware acceptance (BLOCKED)**: needs an NVIDIA GPU. 6. **Interactive graphical user session** login into Mango / DankMaterialShell under a physical seat or nested Wayland compositor. ## Known blockers / risks - **A full VM install still takes hours** (base stage ~116 min). Use the already installed disposable disk (clone it) for `sys install` journeys rather than a fresh install. - **No NVIDIA GPU** (and no authorised passthrough). - **Snap needs network and AppArmor** for meaningful confinement; the lane detects confinement honestly. - **AppImage provides no sandbox**; do not describe it as one. - **Custom ebuilds remain separately reviewed, untrusted artifacts**; the install workflow never builds one during investigation. - **OpenCode transport** concatenates messages, so multi-turn investigation is best-effort there; the direct providers carry the full conversation. - Harness artifacts live under `/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/` (outside git). ## Environment notes - Dev host: Ubuntu 26.04. QEMU/OVMF/xorriso/rustfmt/clippy/ImageMagick/visudo present. `flatpak` and `snap` clients are present on the host (not proof of the VM lanes). - VM harnesses: `installer/tests/vm/{gui-driver,serial-driver,appliance-driver,live-driver}.py` and `sys-acceptance.sh`. `DISK` must be a disposable qcow2; never `/dev/*`. - Serve fixtures from `/home/dominic/vmlab/serve` with `python3 -m http.server 8000 --bind 127.0.0.1` (reachable as `10.0.2.2:8000`). - The static binaries for the VM: `make static` builds `phoebus-installer` and `sys` under `installer-rs/target/x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/release/`. ## Definition of a good stopping point - `make test` passes; `docs/STATUS.md` and `docs/CHANGELOG.md` updated; `docs/HANDOFF.md` updated; committed (via `scripts/agent-commit.sh`) and pushed (`scripts/publish.sh`).