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Author SHA1 Message Date
29d2cfd37a test(executor): synchronize PHOEBUS_AI_TIMEOUT test modifications with a mutex
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2026-09-30 04:59:28 -07:00
bed56cd52a fix(storage): harden Btrfs swapfile creation and lock drop ownership 2026-09-30 04:57:33 -07:00
5 changed files with 60 additions and 9 deletions

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@ -22,7 +22,11 @@ this file is the curated, human-readable summary.
- `phoebus-mcp`: Implemented standard JSON-RPC 2.0 error handling for malformed JSON frames (error code `-32700`, Parse Error) and missing/invalid tool params (error code `-32602`, Invalid Params), preventing server silent aborts or broken agent pipes.
4. Agent Containment Jail Hardening:
- `phoebus-executor::agent_jail`: Sanitized `extra_masked_subdirs` to reject directory traversal components (`..`) and leading slashes. Enabled mock/recording runner testability when `bwrap` is not present on the build host.
Gates: `cargo fmt --all -- --check`, `cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings`, `cargo test --workspace` (all passed: 54 adversarial tests, 39 CLI tests, 9 flaw tests, 4 MCP tests, 5 desktop config tests, 3 agent jail tests, 4 AI e2e tests).
5. Btrfs Swapfile Hardening:
- `phoebus-executor::storage`: Ensured `chattr +C` (NOCOW) is executed on the parent `@swap` directory and on the empty 0-byte file prior to truncation, avoiding Btrfs `EINVAL` on allocated extents. Enforced secure mode `0600` permissions on the swapfile.
6. Inter-Process Lock Drop Verification:
- `phoebus-executor::system_lock`: Validated lockfile PID ownership before unlinking on drop, guaranteeing that a dropping handle never unlinks a lock acquired by another process.
Gates: `cargo fmt --all -- --check`, `cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings`, `cargo test --workspace` (all passed: 54 adversarial tests, 39 CLI tests, 9 flaw tests, 4 MCP tests, 5 desktop config tests, 3 agent jail tests, 4 AI e2e tests, 4 storage tests, 2 system lock tests).
- **System stability & reliability hardening: Advisory Mutation Lock, Atomic Transactions, System Health & Context-Aware Guidance (2026-09-30).**
Hardened system operations against race conditions, database drift, and usability friction:

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@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ commit it. It should be short and current; use `git log` for detail.
4. Structured TOML serialization for MangoWM keybindings to prevent syntax breakage from unescaped quotes in actions.
5. JSON-RPC 2.0 error conformance for `phoebus-mcp` (handling parse errors and missing params with proper error frames).
6. Sanitized Bubblewrap `agent_jail` paths to filter out directory traversal (`..`) attacks.
7. Btrfs swapfile hardening: executed `chattr +C` on directory and on 0-byte file prior to truncation, avoiding Btrfs extent errors; enforced mode `0600`.
8. Inter-process lock drop safety: verified PID ownership prior to unlinking lockfile on drop.
Quality gates: `cargo fmt --all -- --check`, `cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings`, `cargo test --workspace` all passed cleanly with 0 warnings and 0 errors.
- **System stability & reliability hardening (2026-09-30, IMPLEMENTED + TESTED):**

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@ -394,10 +394,12 @@ mod tests {
);
}
/// Save, set, and restore PHOEBUS_AI_TIMEOUT around a check. Only this
/// module's tests touch the variable, and no other test asserts a
/// timeout value, so parallel execution stays deterministic.
static ENV_LOCK: std::sync::Mutex<()> = std::sync::Mutex::new(());
/// Save, set, and restore PHOEBUS_AI_TIMEOUT around a check.
/// Serialized via ENV_LOCK to keep parallel test execution deterministic.
fn with_ai_timeout(var: Option<&str>, check: impl FnOnce()) {
let _guard = ENV_LOCK.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner());
let prev = std::env::var("PHOEBUS_AI_TIMEOUT").ok();
match var {
Some(v) => std::env::set_var("PHOEBUS_AI_TIMEOUT", v),

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@ -371,6 +371,12 @@ pub fn create_swapfile(
_root_source: &str,
) -> Result<()> {
let swapdir = root.ensure_dir("swap")?;
// Ensure the swap directory itself has +C (NOCOW) so created files inherit it.
let _ = exec.run(
CommandSpec::new("storage_prepare", "disable CoW on swap directory", "chattr")
.arg("+C")
.arg(swapdir.to_string_lossy().to_string()),
);
let swapfile = swapdir.join("swapfile");
let size_mib = swap_size_mib(exec);
let spec = CommandSpec::new("storage_prepare", "create Btrfs swapfile", "btrfs")
@ -382,17 +388,29 @@ pub fn create_swapfile(
])
.arg(swapfile.to_string_lossy().to_string());
if exec.run(spec).is_ok() {
let _ = exec.run(
CommandSpec::new("storage_prepare", "secure swapfile permissions", "chmod")
.arg("0600")
.arg(swapfile.to_string_lossy().to_string()),
);
return Ok(());
}
// Fallback for older btrfs-progs.
// Fallback for older btrfs-progs:
// Create empty 0-byte file first, set +C (NOCOW), then truncate, chmod 0600, and mkswap.
let _ = std::fs::File::create(&swapfile);
let _ = exec.run(
CommandSpec::new("storage_prepare", "disable CoW on swapfile", "chattr")
.arg("+C")
.arg(swapfile.to_string_lossy().to_string()),
);
exec.run(
CommandSpec::new("storage_prepare", "create swapfile container", "truncate")
.args(["-s", &format!("{size_mib}M")])
.arg(swapfile.to_string_lossy().to_string()),
)?;
exec.run(
CommandSpec::new("storage_prepare", "disable CoW on swapfile", "chattr")
.arg("+C")
CommandSpec::new("storage_prepare", "secure swapfile permissions", "chmod")
.arg("0600")
.arg(swapfile.to_string_lossy().to_string()),
)?;
exec.run(
@ -567,4 +585,25 @@ mod tests {
let crypttab = std::fs::read_to_string(exec.root.join("etc/crypttab")).unwrap();
assert!(crypttab.contains("cryptroot UUID=1111-2222 none luks,discard"));
}
#[test]
fn swapfile_creation_secures_permissions_and_nocow() {
let runner = RecordingRunner::new();
let exec = make_exec(runner.clone());
let cfg = InstallConfig::default();
let root = exec.target();
create_swapfile(&exec, &cfg, &root, "/dev/mapper/cryptroot").unwrap();
let recorded = runner.recorded();
// Verify chattr +C was run on the swap directory
assert!(recorded.iter().any(|s| s.program == "chattr"
&& s.args.contains(&"+C".to_string())
&& s.args.iter().any(|a| a.contains("swap"))));
// Verify chmod 0600 was run on the swapfile
assert!(recorded.iter().any(|s| s.program == "chmod"
&& s.args.contains(&"0600".to_string())
&& s.args.iter().any(|a| a.contains("swapfile"))));
}
}

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@ -162,10 +162,14 @@ impl SystemLock {
impl Drop for SystemLock {
fn drop(&mut self) {
if self.lock_path.exists() {
if let Ok(content) = fs::read_to_string(&self.lock_path) {
if let Some(info) = LockInfo::parse(&content) {
if info.pid == std::process::id() {
let _ = fs::remove_file(&self.lock_path);
}
}
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]