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Author SHA1 Message Date
29d2cfd37a test(executor): synchronize PHOEBUS_AI_TIMEOUT test modifications with a mutex
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2026-09-30 04:59:28 -07:00
bed56cd52a fix(storage): harden Btrfs swapfile creation and lock drop ownership 2026-09-30 04:57:33 -07:00
5 changed files with 60 additions and 9 deletions

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@ -22,7 +22,11 @@ this file is the curated, human-readable summary.
- `phoebus-mcp`: Implemented standard JSON-RPC 2.0 error handling for malformed JSON frames (error code `-32700`, Parse Error) and missing/invalid tool params (error code `-32602`, Invalid Params), preventing server silent aborts or broken agent pipes. - `phoebus-mcp`: Implemented standard JSON-RPC 2.0 error handling for malformed JSON frames (error code `-32700`, Parse Error) and missing/invalid tool params (error code `-32602`, Invalid Params), preventing server silent aborts or broken agent pipes.
4. Agent Containment Jail Hardening: 4. Agent Containment Jail Hardening:
- `phoebus-executor::agent_jail`: Sanitized `extra_masked_subdirs` to reject directory traversal components (`..`) and leading slashes. Enabled mock/recording runner testability when `bwrap` is not present on the build host. - `phoebus-executor::agent_jail`: Sanitized `extra_masked_subdirs` to reject directory traversal components (`..`) and leading slashes. Enabled mock/recording runner testability when `bwrap` is not present on the build host.
Gates: `cargo fmt --all -- --check`, `cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings`, `cargo test --workspace` (all passed: 54 adversarial tests, 39 CLI tests, 9 flaw tests, 4 MCP tests, 5 desktop config tests, 3 agent jail tests, 4 AI e2e tests). 5. Btrfs Swapfile Hardening:
- `phoebus-executor::storage`: Ensured `chattr +C` (NOCOW) is executed on the parent `@swap` directory and on the empty 0-byte file prior to truncation, avoiding Btrfs `EINVAL` on allocated extents. Enforced secure mode `0600` permissions on the swapfile.
6. Inter-Process Lock Drop Verification:
- `phoebus-executor::system_lock`: Validated lockfile PID ownership before unlinking on drop, guaranteeing that a dropping handle never unlinks a lock acquired by another process.
Gates: `cargo fmt --all -- --check`, `cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings`, `cargo test --workspace` (all passed: 54 adversarial tests, 39 CLI tests, 9 flaw tests, 4 MCP tests, 5 desktop config tests, 3 agent jail tests, 4 AI e2e tests, 4 storage tests, 2 system lock tests).
- **System stability & reliability hardening: Advisory Mutation Lock, Atomic Transactions, System Health & Context-Aware Guidance (2026-09-30).** - **System stability & reliability hardening: Advisory Mutation Lock, Atomic Transactions, System Health & Context-Aware Guidance (2026-09-30).**
Hardened system operations against race conditions, database drift, and usability friction: Hardened system operations against race conditions, database drift, and usability friction:

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@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ commit it. It should be short and current; use `git log` for detail.
4. Structured TOML serialization for MangoWM keybindings to prevent syntax breakage from unescaped quotes in actions. 4. Structured TOML serialization for MangoWM keybindings to prevent syntax breakage from unescaped quotes in actions.
5. JSON-RPC 2.0 error conformance for `phoebus-mcp` (handling parse errors and missing params with proper error frames). 5. JSON-RPC 2.0 error conformance for `phoebus-mcp` (handling parse errors and missing params with proper error frames).
6. Sanitized Bubblewrap `agent_jail` paths to filter out directory traversal (`..`) attacks. 6. Sanitized Bubblewrap `agent_jail` paths to filter out directory traversal (`..`) attacks.
7. Btrfs swapfile hardening: executed `chattr +C` on directory and on 0-byte file prior to truncation, avoiding Btrfs extent errors; enforced mode `0600`.
8. Inter-process lock drop safety: verified PID ownership prior to unlinking lockfile on drop.
Quality gates: `cargo fmt --all -- --check`, `cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings`, `cargo test --workspace` all passed cleanly with 0 warnings and 0 errors. Quality gates: `cargo fmt --all -- --check`, `cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings`, `cargo test --workspace` all passed cleanly with 0 warnings and 0 errors.
- **System stability & reliability hardening (2026-09-30, IMPLEMENTED + TESTED):** - **System stability & reliability hardening (2026-09-30, IMPLEMENTED + TESTED):**

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@ -394,10 +394,12 @@ mod tests {
); );
} }
/// Save, set, and restore PHOEBUS_AI_TIMEOUT around a check. Only this static ENV_LOCK: std::sync::Mutex<()> = std::sync::Mutex::new(());
/// module's tests touch the variable, and no other test asserts a
/// timeout value, so parallel execution stays deterministic. /// Save, set, and restore PHOEBUS_AI_TIMEOUT around a check.
/// Serialized via ENV_LOCK to keep parallel test execution deterministic.
fn with_ai_timeout(var: Option<&str>, check: impl FnOnce()) { fn with_ai_timeout(var: Option<&str>, check: impl FnOnce()) {
let _guard = ENV_LOCK.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner());
let prev = std::env::var("PHOEBUS_AI_TIMEOUT").ok(); let prev = std::env::var("PHOEBUS_AI_TIMEOUT").ok();
match var { match var {
Some(v) => std::env::set_var("PHOEBUS_AI_TIMEOUT", v), Some(v) => std::env::set_var("PHOEBUS_AI_TIMEOUT", v),

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@ -371,6 +371,12 @@ pub fn create_swapfile(
_root_source: &str, _root_source: &str,
) -> Result<()> { ) -> Result<()> {
let swapdir = root.ensure_dir("swap")?; let swapdir = root.ensure_dir("swap")?;
// Ensure the swap directory itself has +C (NOCOW) so created files inherit it.
let _ = exec.run(
CommandSpec::new("storage_prepare", "disable CoW on swap directory", "chattr")
.arg("+C")
.arg(swapdir.to_string_lossy().to_string()),
);
let swapfile = swapdir.join("swapfile"); let swapfile = swapdir.join("swapfile");
let size_mib = swap_size_mib(exec); let size_mib = swap_size_mib(exec);
let spec = CommandSpec::new("storage_prepare", "create Btrfs swapfile", "btrfs") let spec = CommandSpec::new("storage_prepare", "create Btrfs swapfile", "btrfs")
@ -382,17 +388,29 @@ pub fn create_swapfile(
]) ])
.arg(swapfile.to_string_lossy().to_string()); .arg(swapfile.to_string_lossy().to_string());
if exec.run(spec).is_ok() { if exec.run(spec).is_ok() {
let _ = exec.run(
CommandSpec::new("storage_prepare", "secure swapfile permissions", "chmod")
.arg("0600")
.arg(swapfile.to_string_lossy().to_string()),
);
return Ok(()); return Ok(());
} }
// Fallback for older btrfs-progs. // Fallback for older btrfs-progs:
// Create empty 0-byte file first, set +C (NOCOW), then truncate, chmod 0600, and mkswap.
let _ = std::fs::File::create(&swapfile);
let _ = exec.run(
CommandSpec::new("storage_prepare", "disable CoW on swapfile", "chattr")
.arg("+C")
.arg(swapfile.to_string_lossy().to_string()),
);
exec.run( exec.run(
CommandSpec::new("storage_prepare", "create swapfile container", "truncate") CommandSpec::new("storage_prepare", "create swapfile container", "truncate")
.args(["-s", &format!("{size_mib}M")]) .args(["-s", &format!("{size_mib}M")])
.arg(swapfile.to_string_lossy().to_string()), .arg(swapfile.to_string_lossy().to_string()),
)?; )?;
exec.run( exec.run(
CommandSpec::new("storage_prepare", "disable CoW on swapfile", "chattr") CommandSpec::new("storage_prepare", "secure swapfile permissions", "chmod")
.arg("+C") .arg("0600")
.arg(swapfile.to_string_lossy().to_string()), .arg(swapfile.to_string_lossy().to_string()),
)?; )?;
exec.run( exec.run(
@ -567,4 +585,25 @@ mod tests {
let crypttab = std::fs::read_to_string(exec.root.join("etc/crypttab")).unwrap(); let crypttab = std::fs::read_to_string(exec.root.join("etc/crypttab")).unwrap();
assert!(crypttab.contains("cryptroot UUID=1111-2222 none luks,discard")); assert!(crypttab.contains("cryptroot UUID=1111-2222 none luks,discard"));
} }
#[test]
fn swapfile_creation_secures_permissions_and_nocow() {
let runner = RecordingRunner::new();
let exec = make_exec(runner.clone());
let cfg = InstallConfig::default();
let root = exec.target();
create_swapfile(&exec, &cfg, &root, "/dev/mapper/cryptroot").unwrap();
let recorded = runner.recorded();
// Verify chattr +C was run on the swap directory
assert!(recorded.iter().any(|s| s.program == "chattr"
&& s.args.contains(&"+C".to_string())
&& s.args.iter().any(|a| a.contains("swap"))));
// Verify chmod 0600 was run on the swapfile
assert!(recorded.iter().any(|s| s.program == "chmod"
&& s.args.contains(&"0600".to_string())
&& s.args.iter().any(|a| a.contains("swapfile"))));
}
} }

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@ -162,10 +162,14 @@ impl SystemLock {
impl Drop for SystemLock { impl Drop for SystemLock {
fn drop(&mut self) { fn drop(&mut self) {
if self.lock_path.exists() { if let Ok(content) = fs::read_to_string(&self.lock_path) {
if let Some(info) = LockInfo::parse(&content) {
if info.pid == std::process::id() {
let _ = fs::remove_file(&self.lock_path); let _ = fs::remove_file(&self.lock_path);
} }
} }
}
}
} }
#[cfg(test)] #[cfg(test)]