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| 0b41781745 |
6 changed files with 310 additions and 22 deletions
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@ -3,6 +3,99 @@
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All notable changes are recorded here. The authoritative history is `git log`;
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this file is the curated, human-readable summary.
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## 2026-09-26 — Live ISO rebuilt from HEAD, interactive VM open
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- **New live ISO built from HEAD (`11c0ee0`).**
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`installer/live/phoebus-installer-amd64-20260926.iso` (1.6 GiB, SHA-256
|
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`250dbe9a…`, build id `20260926T041500Z`) was built with
|
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`PHOEBUS_REUSE_ROOTFS=1` after verifying the static `phoebus-installer`
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(`25741706…`) and `sys` (`3b331643…`) are fingerprint-fresh for HEAD. The
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Sep-24 ISO predates the stage3/boot-security hardening and is kept
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alongside, not overwritten. Filesystem-inspected (not just timestamped):
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the embedded binaries hash-match the fresh build, the provisioned Gentoo
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key carries both published fingerprints (`13EB…2910`, `D99E…2058`),
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`gpg`/`mango`/`dms`/quickshell welcome+installer UI are present, and
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`/etc/phoebus/version` + `/etc/phoebus/build` carry `0.1.0` and the build
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id.
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- **Interactive VM open for the owner.** A fresh unique 30 GiB qcow2 plus
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private OVMF vars boots the new ISO in a visible KVM/GTK window
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(`installer/tests/vm/run-vm.sh`); screenshot-verified at the branded
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welcome ("Install Phoebus OS", Live medium 0.1.0, network/UEFI/RAM/CPU
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chips). Left running, installer untouched, no passwords or model
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credentials entered.
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- **`run-vm.sh` is safer for user-facing launches:** new `--disk-name`
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(unique disk per run) and `--display` options, and a TCG fallback that
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switches `-cpu host` to `-cpu max` with a performance warning when
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`/dev/kvm` is not writable (the old `-cpu host` choice fails without
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KVM). The one `shellcheck` SC2054 warning on the QEMU array pre-existed
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at HEAD and is unchanged.
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- **Unpinned signed-DIGESTS install proof running.** `gui-driver.py
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install` boots the new ISO on a disposable disk and installs through the
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default unpinned stage3 path with the ISO-embedded fail-closed binary
|
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(empty `STAGE3_URL` resolves latest from Gentoo autobuilds; fixed trust
|
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anchor). Automated-harness `--no-ai` is test-only evidence, not the
|
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normal user path. Partitioning + LUKS2 + Btrfs stages already passed in
|
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the guest; completion and detached boot pending.
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- **Unpinned signed-DIGESTS install proof COMPLETED in a disposable VM.**
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`gui-driver.py install` run `gui-install-20260926T040728Z-f3ae68f4`
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booted the new ISO on disposable `disks/unpinned-accept-1.qcow2` (30
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GiB) with no `STAGE3_URL`/`STAGE3_SHA256` (latest stage3 resolved from
|
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Gentoo autobuilds, signed DIGESTS verified against the fixed provisioned
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key) and the ISO-embedded fail-closed binary: `INSTALL-RC=0`,
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`NO_SECRET_LEAK`, `installation complete` after ~165 min (mango desktop,
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174 packages). Detached boot: LUKS unlock, login, systemd `running`, 0
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failed units, networking, all Btrfs subvolumes, `sys history --legacy`
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showing the initial-known-good snapshot. A harness assertion fix
|
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(`gui-driver.py` boot check now uses `sys history --legacy`, since bare
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`sys history` is AI-first and truthfully refuses without a model) was
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needed to green the gate; the product was correct.
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- **Tamper refusal VM-verified** (new ISO, fail-closed binary, disposable
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4 GiB targets): a placeholder pin is refused before any network use (zero
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stage3 fetches) and a mismatched archive hash is refused after download
|
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with no extraction (`INSTALL-RC=1`, `NO_SECRET_LEAK` both runs). A
|
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tampered-*signature* VM case is infeasible without a network MITM (fixed
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key + authentic Gentoo DIGESTS); the bad-signature branch is unit-tested.
|
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- **Recovery-entry boot VERIFIED** (`Phoebus Recovery (known-good
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snapshot)` selected in the systemd-boot menu — keypresses provably freeze
|
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the 3 s timeout, selection screenshot-confirmed — with restricted
|
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networking and no model): cmdline + findmnt prove root is the read-only
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`@-20260926T064646-initial-known-good` snapshot with `rescue.target`,
|
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serial login works, `sys history`/`rollback status --legacy` work, `sys
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ask` fails truthfully offering the exact `--legacy` command, systemd
|
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`degraded` (rescue target, as designed). Method notes: video (tty1) keystrokes
|
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never reach the dracut LUKS prompt (`/dev/console` is serial); passphrases
|
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must be written to the serial pty with ONLCR/ICRNL neutralized or a `\r`
|
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is appended and the passphrase is rejected.
|
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- **Seat desktop PARTIAL with a precise blocker.** Seat VM (virgl,
|
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`virtio-gpu-gl-pci`): seat0 + DRM card0 + greeter session verified,
|
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tuigreet authenticates the correct password (journal-proven; earlier
|
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"Authentication failed" readings were QMP-typing focus races, and `-` keys
|
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arrive correctly). The Mango compositor exits in <1s: libseat `No backend
|
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was able to open a seat` — no seatd in the image and the logind path does
|
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not succeed under the tuigreet session. Kitty/DMS/lock/idle/polkit-agent/
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logout/reboot stay unverified behind this blocker.
|
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- **Snap re-checked against the live Store:** `hello-world` is still 6.4
|
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rev 29 on every channel (install → `no updates available` → remove, all
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clean); guest has no `aa-status`, confinement `partial`. Revision-changing
|
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refresh and strict confinement stay blocked (Store revision + AppArmor
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guest needed).
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- **Nix GC findings:** the fresh unpinned install bootstraps Nix (store
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populated, `default` link valid, `nix 2.24.9` runs) and `sys list --nix`
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truthfully reports the base system profile has no manifest.
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`nix-collect-garbage` is not on root's PATH; a user-level
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install (`nixpkgs#hello`) + `nix-collect-garbage -d` (268 paths, 189 MB)
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leaves the profile intact — the old dangling case did NOT reproduce.
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**Coverage gap found:** `sys` enumerates `/nix/var/nix/profiles/
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{default,profile}` + `per-user/*/profile` but not the modern per-user
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`~/.local/state/nix/profiles/profile`, so user-installed Nix packages are
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invisible to the catalogue. Recorded as follow-up (design + tests + VM
|
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proof needed), not fixed in this session.
|
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- **Release gates stay truthful:** `gates --execute` in an unconfigured
|
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shell reports 0 passed / 0 failed / 6 NotRun with exact missing
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prerequisites; nothing published. Quality gates green: `cargo fmt`,
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`clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings`, `cargo test
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--workspace` 717/717, `test_vmsafety.py` 18/18, release + static builds.
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## 2026-09-26 — Security and release-readiness: trust anchor, executable gates, strengthened rollback
|
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|
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- **Stage3 trust anchor is fixed in code.** `release_key_path()` no longer
|
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@ -3,6 +3,31 @@
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Rolling note between work sessions. **Update this file before you finish**, then
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commit it. It should be short and current; use `git log` for detail.
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- **ISO rebuild + verification session (2026-09-26, DONE except seat-compositor):**
|
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new ISO `installer/live/phoebus-installer-amd64-20260926.iso` (1.6 GiB,
|
||||
`250dbe9a…`, build `20260926T041500Z`, HEAD `11c0ee0` + `0b41781`) built
|
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via `PHOEBUS_REUSE_ROOTFS=1`, content-verified (embedded hashes match,
|
||||
Gentoo key both fingerprints, UI payload present); old Sep-24 ISO kept.
|
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Interactive VM RUNNING (KVM/GTK, `phoebus-interactive-20260926.qcow2` +
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private vars in `/var/tmp/phoebus-interactive/`, screenshot at welcome,
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undisturbed). Unpinned signed-DIGESTS full install PASSED
|
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(`gui-install-20260926T040728Z-f3ae68f4`, `INSTALL-RC=0`,
|
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`NO_SECRET_LEAK`, ~165 min) + detached boot (running, 0 failed units,
|
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`sys --legacy` + snapshot). Tamper refusals PASSED (placeholder pin
|
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pre-network, hash mismatch post-download, both `RC=1` + no leak).
|
||||
Recovery-entry boot PASSED (snapshot cmdline/findmnt, login, `sys
|
||||
--legacy`, truthful `ask` failure, systemd degraded). Seat desktop
|
||||
PARTIAL: seat0/DRM/greeter/auth verified, Mango dies in <1s (libseat, no
|
||||
seatd) — the blocker. Snap: no Store revision, still partial confinement.
|
||||
Nix: GC-dangling NOT reproduced; **new gap: modern per-user Nix profiles
|
||||
invisible to `sys`** (follow-up). Live AI: still no credential/model
|
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(NotRun). `gui-driver.py` boot sys-check fixed (`--legacy`).
|
||||
`gates --execute`: 0/0/6 NotRun, no publish. Quality gates green
|
||||
(717/717, clippy -D, vmsafety 18/18). Evidence disk
|
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`disks/unpinned-accept-1.qcow2` KEPT; scratch overlays removed.
|
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Next: seatd-or-logind fix for Mango (design+rebuild+retest), per-user Nix
|
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enumeration, live AI credential, snap revision/strict, NVIDIA.
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||||
|
||||
- **Security/readiness follow-up (2026-09-26):** trust anchor + executable
|
||||
gates + strengthened rollback PASS.
|
||||
1. **Stage3 trust anchor (fixed):** `release_key_path()` ignores
|
||||
|
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@ -57,8 +57,8 @@ Booting that recovery entry offline remains a manual gate.
|
|||
| LUKS2 format/open/close | yes | yes | yes | no |
|
||||
| Btrfs subvolumes + swapfile | yes | yes | yes | no |
|
||||
| fstab / crypttab generation | yes | yes | yes | no |
|
||||
| stage3 fetch + verify (pinned SHA-256 or signed DIGESTS) + extract | yes | yes (both paths; every failure branch incl. missing verifier/key/DIGESTS/entry, nonzero exit, cannot-start) | yes (pinned path; unpinned path needs the live-image key) | n/a |
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| stage3 trust anchor (fixed provisioned key) | yes | yes (`release_key_path` ignores `PHOEBUS_GENTOO_RELEASE_KEY`; test-only injection only via explicit `verify_digests_with_key`) | no (unpinned VM proof needs a rebuilt live ISO + disposable install; host-level Good-signature check of the real DIGESTS noted below, not VM evidence) | n/a |
|
||||
| stage3 fetch + verify (pinned SHA-256 or signed DIGESTS) + extract | yes | yes (both paths; every failure branch incl. missing verifier/key/DIGESTS/entry, nonzero exit, cannot-start) | yes (pinned path; **unpinned path now VM-verified**: default unpinned install from the rebuilt 20260926 ISO completed 12 stages + detached boot; placeholder-pin and archive-hash-mismatch refusals VM-verified on disposable targets with the fail-closed binary) | n/a |
|
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| stage3 trust anchor (fixed provisioned key) | yes | yes (`release_key_path` ignores `PHOEBUS_GENTOO_RELEASE_KEY`; test-only injection only via explicit `verify_digests_with_key`) | yes (20260926 live ISO carries the fingerprint-checked key — both Gentoo fingerprints verified inside the shipped squashfs; the unpinned VM install verified the real signed DIGESTS + archive hash against it; tampered inputs refused) | n/a |
|
||||
| Portage config + sync + getuto | yes | yes | yes | n/a |
|
||||
| Signed Gentoo binary install | yes | yes | yes | n/a |
|
||||
| Source package compilation | yes | yes | yes | n/a |
|
||||
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|
@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ Booting that recovery entry offline remains a manual gate.
|
|||
| Btrfs snapshots + history | yes | yes | yes | no |
|
||||
| Coordinated snapshot sets (`@` + `@var`) | yes | yes | no | no |
|
||||
| Btrfs rollback (`sys undo`) | yes | yes | yes (rollback acceptance `serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386` PASS=11 FAIL=0) | no |
|
||||
| Recovery/known-good BLS entry | yes | yes | present + snapshot-based (asserted in the rollback run; selecting it offline with no network/model is a distinct manual acceptance gate with its own procedure and evidence, see `docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`) | no |
|
||||
| Recovery/known-good BLS entry | yes | yes | yes: entry present + snapshot-based (rollback runs) **and the recovery entry itself was booted** (`Phoebus Recovery (known-good snapshot)` selected in the systemd-boot menu with restricted networking and no model: cmdline + findmnt prove root is the read-only `@-20260926T064646-initial-known-good` snapshot with `rescue.target`, serial login works, `sys history/rollback status --legacy` work, `sys ask` fails truthfully with the `--legacy` fallback) | no |
|
||||
| Snapshot retention + free-space gate | yes | yes | no | no |
|
||||
| AI typed proposals + evidence review | yes | yes | fixture end-to-end | n/a |
|
||||
| AI guided install (DeepSeek/OpenAI) | yes | yes | fixture path only (no live call) | n/a |
|
||||
|
|
@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ Booting that recovery entry offline remains a manual gate.
|
|||
| Transaction log (outcomes, protective snapshots) | yes | yes | read-only in installed VM; write path needs root | no |
|
||||
| Flatpak/Nix bounded typed actions | yes | yes | no | no |
|
||||
| Shared hardware-aware source selection (all lanes) | yes | yes | no | no |
|
||||
| Snap lane (detect/install/list/remove/refresh/connections) | yes (reviewed first-use setup) | yes (incl. exact revisions and confinement) | partial (VM: Portage snapd, active socket, `hello-world` install/list/refresh/remove; partial confinement; refresh had no newer revision; connections not exercised) | no |
|
||||
| Snap lane (detect/install/list/remove/refresh/connections) | yes (reviewed first-use setup) | yes (incl. exact revisions and confinement) | partial (VM: Portage snapd, active socket, `hello-world` install/list/refresh/remove; partial confinement; refresh had no newer revision; connections not exercised. **Re-checked 2026-09-26 against the live Store**: `hello-world` still 6.4 rev 29 on every channel, refresh reports no updates; guest has no `aa-status`, confinement still `partial`. A revision-changing refresh and strict confinement stay blocked on a Store revision + AppArmor-ready guest) | no |
|
||||
| AppImage lane (import/acquire/integrity/desktop/remove) | yes | yes | yes (VM: acquire with pinned SHA, list, launch fixture, remove; tampered SHA refused) | no |
|
||||
| Custom ebuild overlay (stage/approve/build/remove) | yes | yes | yes (VM: stage → build/install → VDB+file present → remove) | no |
|
||||
| `sys` installed into the target + verified in chroot | yes | yes (unit) | yes (detached boot verified) | no |
|
||||
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|
@ -127,16 +127,16 @@ Booting that recovery entry offline remains a manual gate.
|
|||
| Installed-package inventory (`sys list`, all lanes, `--legacy`) | yes | yes (VDB/Flatpak/Snap/AppImage; **Nix active-profile packages** vs generations/store; custom ebuild never double-counted) | yes (VM read-only group) | no |
|
||||
| Package information (`sys info`, `--legacy`) | yes | yes (installed/available, version/deps/size/provenance; ambiguity flagged) | yes (VM read-only group) | no |
|
||||
| Cross-source update check/apply (`sys updates`, `apply updates`) | yes | yes (exact per-source transactions with full Flatpak commits/snap revisions, pinned and revalidated; manual/project-specific refused) | Flatpak verified in VM (reviewed ref+commit, pinned update, verified); direct Snap refresh with no newer revision VM-verified, exact Snap apply-updates transaction unit-tested only; Portage verified | no |
|
||||
| Nix active-profile inventory (`sys list --nix`) | yes | yes (manifest v1/v2/v3; scope; generations vs store) | yes (NIX_ENABLED=yes install: real `nodejs-slim` profile listed and filtered; a re-run correctly reported a dangling profile) | no |
|
||||
| Nix active-profile inventory (`sys list --nix`) | yes | yes (manifest v1/v2/v3; scope; generations vs store) | yes (NIX_ENABLED=yes install: real `nodejs-slim` profile listed and filtered; a re-run correctly reported a dangling profile. **2026-09-26 on the fresh unpinned install**: bootstrap present (`/nix/store` populated, `default` link valid, `nix 2.24.9` runs); `sys list --nix` truthfully reports the base system profile has no package manifest. GC-dangling repro: `nix-collect-garbage` is not on root's PATH; user-level install/GC repro attempted — see VM evidence) | no |
|
||||
| Catalogue maintenance (`depclean`, `clean cache`, `owners`, `deps`/`rdeps`) | yes | yes (structured depclean effects; cache-cleanup dry-run review + failure propagation; VDB dependency metadata) | yes (VM: depclean + cache-cleanup journeys; deps read-only) | no |
|
||||
| AI-default catalogue routing (source flags constrain, never bypass) | yes | yes (investigation loop, full backend classification + optional-backend rewrite, fallback offers exact `--legacy` command) | yes (read-only routing cases) | no |
|
||||
| Alternate-root catalogue/update/maintenance rooting | yes | yes (chroot for Portage/Flatpak/Nix; Snap refused; recording-runner no-host-command tests) | yes (VM: alternate-root Snap refused) | no |
|
||||
| Service start/stop/restart + flatpak/nix/snapshot commands | yes | yes | no | no |
|
||||
| Desktop session helpers (DMS bar/launcher/lock/idle) | yes | yes | functional test (stubs) | no |
|
||||
| Mango + DankMaterialShell profile | yes | yes | live VM yes; installed desktop_install yes (174 pkgs) | no |
|
||||
| Mango + DankMaterialShell profile | yes | yes | live VM yes; installed desktop_install yes (174 pkgs); **installed graphical session under a seat: compositor start FAILS** — Mango exits in <1s with libseat `No backend was able to open a seat` (no seatd in the image; the logind path does not succeed under the tuigreet session). Greeter, seat, DRM, PAM authentication and `sys --legacy` are verified; kitty/DMS spotlight/lock/idle/polkit-agent/logout/reboot remain unverified | no |
|
||||
| Mango is the canonical desktop | yes | yes | live VM yes; installed default session configured | no |
|
||||
| greetd login (Mango + DarkMaterial) | yes | yes | yes (tuigreet verified on detached boot) | no |
|
||||
| Live desktop ISO (Mango + DMS) | yes | guards tested | graphical VM + GUI journey + detached boot | no |
|
||||
| greetd login (Mango + DarkMaterial) | yes | yes | yes (tuigreet verified on detached boot; **graphical authentication verified under a seat VM**: seat0 + DRM card0 + greeter session, correct password authenticates per the journal) | no |
|
||||
| Live desktop ISO (Mango + DMS) | yes | guards tested | graphical VM + GUI journey + detached boot + interactive welcome (20260926 ISO, screenshot) | no |
|
||||
| Live welcome autostart + duplicate prevention | yes | guards tested | live graphical VM | no |
|
||||
| Welcome primary action keyboard-focus | yes | guards tested | live graphical VM | no |
|
||||
| VM harness disk safety + structured results | yes | yes (16 tests) | n/a | n/a |
|
||||
|
|
@ -288,8 +288,17 @@ Booting that recovery entry offline remains a manual gate.
|
|||
completion (`gui-install-completes` passed). The installed system then booted
|
||||
**with the ISO detached** (LUKS2 decrypt, systemd running, 0 failed units,
|
||||
all Btrfs subvolumes mounted, `sys` CLI operational, and `tuigreet` greeter
|
||||
active). The **installed** Mango session (graphical user login into DMS)
|
||||
remains to be verified under a physical seat / DRM compositor backend.
|
||||
active). (That paragraph describes the Sep-24 evidence run; the 2026-09-26
|
||||
unpinned rerun from the rebuilt ISO is recorded in
|
||||
`docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`.) The **installed** Mango session was
|
||||
attempted under a real seat on 2026-09-26 (seat0 + DRM card0 + greeter
|
||||
session + successful PAM authentication, all verified in a virgl seat
|
||||
VM): the compositor exits in <1s because libseat opens no backend (no
|
||||
seatd in the image; the logind path does not succeed under the tuigreet
|
||||
session). Greeter login works; kitty, DMS spotlight, lock/idle, the
|
||||
polkit agent, logout, reboot and the compositor itself stay unverified —
|
||||
the libseat failure is the blocker, with the exact error recorded in
|
||||
`docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`.
|
||||
- **AI sandbox** is implemented (`systemd-run` hardening properties, tested at
|
||||
the argv level) and fails closed without `systemd-run`; it has not been
|
||||
exercised in a VM. Only typed actions and the privacy boundary were previously
|
||||
|
|
@ -320,11 +329,16 @@ Booting that recovery entry offline remains a manual gate.
|
|||
- `sys undo` is implemented with the default-subvolume, fstab, kernel-cmdline
|
||||
and BLS handling described in ADR 0007; its destructive VM acceptance gate
|
||||
passed in this session (`serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386`).
|
||||
- **Stage3 signed-DIGESTS mechanism (host-level, not VM evidence).** The
|
||||
parser fixture matches the real current DIGESTS byte-for-byte, and the real
|
||||
DIGESTS for `stage3-amd64-systemd-20260920T170055Z.tar.xz` verifies with a
|
||||
Good signature from Gentoo's Automated Weekly Release Key at host level.
|
||||
The full VM proof (rebuilt live ISO carrying the provisioned key, default
|
||||
unpinned install, tampered signature/digest/archive refusal) still needs a
|
||||
disposable install run and is recorded as blocked in
|
||||
`docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`.
|
||||
- **Stage3 signed-DIGESTS mechanism is now VM-verified, not just host-level.**
|
||||
The parser fixture matches the real current DIGESTS byte-for-byte; on
|
||||
2026-09-26 the default unpinned install from the rebuilt live ISO (which
|
||||
ships the fingerprint-checked provisioned key) completed all 12 stages
|
||||
plus a detached boot (`INSTALL-RC=0`, `NO_SECRET_LEAK`), which proves the
|
||||
real signed DIGESTS and the downloaded archive hash verified against the
|
||||
fixed trust anchor — `fetch()` must return `Ok` before `extract()` runs,
|
||||
and the run demonstrably extracted. Tampered inputs are refused in the VM:
|
||||
a placeholder pin is refused before any network use (zero stage3 fetches)
|
||||
and a mismatched archive hash is refused after download with no extraction.
|
||||
A tampered-*signature* VM case is not feasible without a network MITM (the
|
||||
key is fixed and Gentoo serves authentic DIGESTS); the bad-signature
|
||||
branch is unit-tested.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -831,6 +831,144 @@ detached boot verification with the live ISO removed.
|
|||
partial-confinement/no-op-refresh evidence stays labeled as such); NVIDIA
|
||||
needs a GPU or authorized passthrough (see below).
|
||||
|
||||
## 2026-09-26 — Live ISO rebuild from HEAD + unpinned install proof (COMPLETED)
|
||||
|
||||
- **Rebuilt ISO.** `installer/live/phoebus-installer-amd64-20260926.iso`
|
||||
(1.6 GiB, SHA-256
|
||||
`250dbe9ad780408a40b7b7f0757791fadcc1e4309b932e98f6059c7baf93e2e5`,
|
||||
build id `20260926T041500Z`) built from HEAD `11c0ee0` with
|
||||
`PHOEBUS_REUSE_ROOTFS=1` (cached `livefs.tar` reused for the Debian
|
||||
rootfs; payload, binaries, key and branding re-installed fresh — reuse
|
||||
does not carry stale binaries, UI or keys). The Sep-24
|
||||
(`827bf843…`) ISO predates the stage3 fail-closed + trust-anchor +
|
||||
boot-security commits and is kept alongside.
|
||||
- **Content inspection (not timestamps).** The finished squashfs was
|
||||
listed and selectively extracted: embedded
|
||||
`/usr/local/bin/phoebus-installer` (`25741706…`) and `/usr/local/bin/sys`
|
||||
(`3b331643…`) hash-match the fingerprint-fresh static build;
|
||||
`/usr/share/openpgp-keys/gentoo-release.asc` (57,698 bytes) shows both
|
||||
published fingerprints (`13EB…2910` weekly, `D99E…2058` signing) under
|
||||
`gpg --show-keys`; `/usr/bin/gpg`, `/usr/bin/mango`, `/usr/bin/dms`,
|
||||
the welcome/installer `shell.qml` configs, the install desktop entry and
|
||||
`/etc/phoebus/{version,build,live}` (`0.1.0`,
|
||||
`PHOEBUS_BUILD_ID=20260926T041500Z`) are all present.
|
||||
- **Unpinned signed-DIGESTS install PASSED.**
|
||||
`gui-driver.py install` run `gui-install-20260926T040728Z-f3ae68f4`
|
||||
booted the new ISO on disposable
|
||||
`disks/unpinned-accept-1.qcow2` (30 GiB) and installed with the
|
||||
ISO-embedded fail-closed binary and a served `test.conf` with **no**
|
||||
`STAGE3_URL`/`STAGE3_SHA256` (empty URL resolves latest-stage3 from
|
||||
Gentoo autobuilds; signed DIGESTS verified against the fixed provisioned
|
||||
key): `INSTALL-RC=0`, `NO_SECRET_LEAK`, `installation complete` after
|
||||
~165 min (full mango desktop, 174 packages). Detached boot (ISO
|
||||
detached): LUKS unlock, login, `systemctl is-system-running = running`,
|
||||
`0 loaded units listed`, networking, all Btrfs subvolumes mounted, `sys
|
||||
history --legacy` showing `@-20260926T064646-initial-known-good`. The
|
||||
harness `--no-ai` flag is **test-only** evidence and is not the normal
|
||||
user path (the wizard requires a connected model; the interactive VM is
|
||||
left for the owner to drive by hand).
|
||||
- **Harness fix (real defect, fixed):** `gui-driver.py do_boot` asserted
|
||||
bare `sys history` output, but bare `sys history` is AI-first and
|
||||
truthfully refuses without a model — the check now uses
|
||||
`sys history --legacy`. The product was correct (`/usr/local/bin/sys`
|
||||
present and working); the gate was stale. Re-run detached boots pass
|
||||
`boot-sys-installed`. (The driver's `detached-boot-login` flag is
|
||||
timing-sensitive to PAM OSC noise on the serial line even when the login
|
||||
succeeds and checks run; login itself works — 1/4 flag-pass with 4/4
|
||||
substantive checks green.)
|
||||
- **Tamper refusals PASSED** (new ISO, fail-closed binary, disposable 4
|
||||
GiB targets, `INSTALL-RC=1` + `NO_SECRET_LEAK` both): placeholder pin
|
||||
refused before any network use (zero stage3 fetches on the serve log);
|
||||
mismatched archive hash refused after download with no extraction.
|
||||
Method note: `appliance-guest-gui.sh` ignores the driver's `SERVE_URL`
|
||||
env and always uses the default port 8000 — tamper variants were served
|
||||
by swapping the port-8000 `test.conf` (the main run had long since
|
||||
fetched its copy). A tampered-*signature* VM case is infeasible without
|
||||
a network MITM; the bad-signature branch is unit-tested.
|
||||
- **Recovery-entry boot PASSED** (distinct manual gate, now verified).
|
||||
Visible QEMU on the installed disk with restricted networking
|
||||
(`-netdev user,restrict=y`) and no model: keypresses provably freeze the
|
||||
3 s systemd-boot timeout (screenshot), `Phoebus Recovery (known-good
|
||||
snapshot)` selected with Down+Enter (screenshot), kernel cmdline
|
||||
`rootflags=subvol=@snapshots/@-20260926T064646-initial-known-good` with
|
||||
`ro` + `systemd.unit=rescue.target`, findmnt confirms the read-only
|
||||
snapshot root, serial login as `phoebus` works, `sys history` /
|
||||
`rollback status --legacy` work, `sys ask` fails truthfully offering the
|
||||
exact `--legacy` command, systemd `degraded` (rescue target, as
|
||||
designed). Method notes: video-console (tty1) keystrokes never reach the
|
||||
dracut LUKS prompt (`/dev/console` is serial here) — the passphrase must
|
||||
be written to the serial pty with ONLCR/ICRNL neutralized, otherwise a
|
||||
`\r` is appended and a correct passphrase is rejected; a `down`+`ret`
|
||||
pair landing at LUKS burns attempts as `**` (escape remnant) and three
|
||||
failures drop to the dracut emergency shell (root, no cryptsetup binary
|
||||
present). Transcript of the proof session kept under
|
||||
`/var/tmp/phoebus-recovery/rec-entry-proof.log`.
|
||||
- **Seat desktop PARTIAL (blocker found).** Seat VM (`virtio-gpu-gl-pci`,
|
||||
virgl present, overlay of the installed disk): logind seat0 with DRM
|
||||
card0 (`[MASTER]`), keyboard, mouse; `/dev/dri/card0` (no render node);
|
||||
tuigreet active with `--cmd /usr/local/bin/phoebus-session-mango`;
|
||||
tuigreet PAM authentication of the correct password verified in the
|
||||
journal (earlier "Authentication failed" readings were QMP-typing
|
||||
focus races; `-` keys arrive correctly, proven by visible echo).
|
||||
The Mango compositor exits in <1s after every successful authentication:
|
||||
`libseat: No backend was able to open a seat`, `Failed to start a DRM
|
||||
session` (captured by running the session script from a shell). No seatd
|
||||
in the image and the logind path does not succeed under the tuigreet
|
||||
session — this is the precise blocker for kitty/DMS/lock/idle/polkit/
|
||||
logout/reboot. Session transcript and journal excerpts kept under
|
||||
`/var/tmp/phoebus-seat/`.
|
||||
- **Interactive VM (open).** The new ISO boots a KVM/GTK VM with a fresh
|
||||
unique disk (`phoebus-interactive-20260926.qcow2`) and private OVMF vars
|
||||
in `/var/tmp/phoebus-interactive/`; screenshots show the Mango top bar
|
||||
and the branded welcome (`Install Phoebus OS`, Live medium 0.1.0,
|
||||
network/UEFI/RAM/CPU chips). Left running for the owner; installer
|
||||
untouched, no passwords or model credentials entered.
|
||||
- Evidence disk `disks/unpinned-accept-1.qcow2` KEPT; scratch overlays
|
||||
(`unpinned-tamper-*`, `nix-gc-*`, `seat-accept-1`) removed after their
|
||||
run logs were kept. Host free space ~16 GiB at the end (watched, nothing
|
||||
deleted without identification).
|
||||
|
||||
- **Rebuilt ISO.** `installer/live/phoebus-installer-amd64-20260926.iso`
|
||||
(1.6 GiB, SHA-256
|
||||
`250dbe9ad780408a40b7b7f0757791fadcc1e4309b932e98f6059c7baf93e2e5`,
|
||||
build id `20260926T041500Z`) built from HEAD `11c0ee0` with
|
||||
`PHOEBUS_REUSE_ROOTFS=1` (cached `livefs.tar` reused for the Debian
|
||||
rootfs; payload, binaries, key and branding re-installed fresh — reuse
|
||||
does not carry stale binaries, UI or keys). The Sep-24
|
||||
(`827bf843…`) ISO predates the stage3 fail-closed + trust-anchor +
|
||||
boot-security commits and is kept alongside.
|
||||
- **Content inspection (not timestamps).** The finished squashfs was
|
||||
listed and selectively extracted: embedded
|
||||
`/usr/local/bin/phoebus-installer` (`25741706…`) and `/usr/local/bin/sys`
|
||||
(`3b331643…`) hash-match the fingerprint-fresh static build;
|
||||
`/usr/share/openpgp-keys/gentoo-release.asc` (57,698 bytes) shows both
|
||||
published fingerprints (`13EB…2910` weekly, `D99E…2058` signing) under
|
||||
`gpg --show-keys`; `/usr/bin/gpg`, `/usr/bin/mango`, `/usr/bin/dms`,
|
||||
the welcome/installer `shell.qml` configs, the install desktop entry and
|
||||
`/etc/phoebus/{version,build,live}` (`0.1.0`,
|
||||
`PHOEBUS_BUILD_ID=20260926T041500Z`) are all present.
|
||||
- **Unpinned signed-DIGESTS install (running).**
|
||||
`gui-driver.py install` run `gui-install-20260926T040728Z-f3ae68f4`
|
||||
boots the new ISO on disposable
|
||||
`disks/unpinned-accept-1.qcow2` (30 GiB) and installs with the
|
||||
ISO-embedded fail-closed binary and a served `test.conf` with **no**
|
||||
`STAGE3_URL`/`STAGE3_SHA256` (empty URL resolves latest-stage3 from
|
||||
Gentoo autobuilds; signed DIGESTS verified against the fixed provisioned
|
||||
key). Guest progress: live login passed, partitioning/LUKS2/Btrfs
|
||||
complete, install stages running. The harness `--no-ai` flag is
|
||||
**test-only** evidence and is not the normal user path (the wizard
|
||||
requires a connected model; the interactive VM below is left for the
|
||||
owner to drive by hand).
|
||||
- **Interactive VM (open).** The new ISO boots a KVM/GTK VM with a fresh
|
||||
unique disk (`phoebus-interactive-20260926.qcow2`) and private OVMF vars
|
||||
in `/var/tmp/phoebus-interactive/`; screenshot shows the Mango top bar
|
||||
and the branded welcome ("Install Phoebus OS", Live medium 0.1.0).
|
||||
- Still open after this run: installed compositor session (libseat
|
||||
blocker above), live AI provider call (no credential/model available),
|
||||
revision-changing Snap refresh + strict confinement (no Store revision /
|
||||
AppArmor guest), per-user Nix profile enumeration (new coverage gap),
|
||||
NVIDIA hardware. Secure Boot/UKI stays a separate opt-in milestone.
|
||||
|
||||
## Known remaining work
|
||||
|
||||
- The graphical session was verified with the **headless** wlroots backend
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1321,7 +1321,7 @@ class Driver:
|
|||
"echo ===CHECKS-$(printf START)===; "
|
||||
"echo COMM_CHECK:$(cat /proc/1/comm 2>&1); "
|
||||
"echo SYSTEMD_STATUS:$(systemctl is-system-running 2>&1); "
|
||||
"echo SYS_CLI_CHECK:$(which sys 2>&1 && sys history 2>&1 | grep -o 'no transactions recorded' || echo missing); "
|
||||
"echo SYS_CLI_CHECK:$(which sys 2>&1 && sys history --legacy 2>&1 | grep -o 'no transactions recorded' || echo missing); "
|
||||
"systemctl --failed --no-pager; ip -brief addr; "
|
||||
"lsblk -o NAME,SIZE,TYPE,FSTYPE,MOUNTPOINTS; echo ===CHECKS-$(printf END)===",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -12,10 +12,12 @@ set -euo pipefail
|
|||
|
||||
ISO=""
|
||||
DISK_SIZE="32G"
|
||||
DISK_NAME="phoebus-test"
|
||||
WORKDIR="${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/phoebus-vm"
|
||||
MEM="4096"
|
||||
CPUS="4"
|
||||
BOOT="d"
|
||||
DISPLAY_OPT="gtk"
|
||||
EXTRA=()
|
||||
|
||||
usage() {
|
||||
|
|
@ -25,9 +27,13 @@ Usage: run-vm.sh --iso PATH [options]
|
|||
Options:
|
||||
--iso PATH Live ISO to boot (required)
|
||||
--disk-size SIZE Scratch disk size (default 32G)
|
||||
--disk-name NAME Scratch disk file name inside the workdir
|
||||
(default phoebus-test; the file is NAME.qcow2, so each
|
||||
interactive or automated run can use a unique disk)
|
||||
--workdir DIR Directory for the scratch disk (default /tmp/phoebus-vm)
|
||||
--mem MiB RAM in MiB (default 4096)
|
||||
--cpus N vCPUs (default 4)
|
||||
--display OPT QEMU display (default gtk; use none for headless)
|
||||
--disk-boot Boot from the scratch disk instead of the ISO
|
||||
--help Show this help
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -39,9 +45,11 @@ while (($#)); do
|
|||
case "$1" in
|
||||
--iso) shift; ISO="${1:-}" ;;
|
||||
--disk-size) shift; DISK_SIZE="${1:-}" ;;
|
||||
--disk-name) shift; DISK_NAME="${1:-}" ;;
|
||||
--workdir) shift; WORKDIR="${1:-}" ;;
|
||||
--mem) shift; MEM="${1:-}" ;;
|
||||
--cpus) shift; CPUS="${1:-}" ;;
|
||||
--display) shift; DISPLAY_OPT="${1:-}" ;;
|
||||
--disk-boot) BOOT="c" ;;
|
||||
--help|-h) usage; exit 0 ;;
|
||||
*) echo "unknown option: $1" >&2; usage; exit 2 ;;
|
||||
|
|
@ -75,7 +83,7 @@ done
|
|||
[[ -n "$OVMF_CODE" ]] || { echo "error: OVMF firmware not found" >&2; exit 1; }
|
||||
|
||||
mkdir -p "$WORKDIR"
|
||||
DISK="$WORKDIR/phoebus-test.qcow2"
|
||||
DISK="$WORKDIR/${DISK_NAME}.qcow2"
|
||||
VARS="$WORKDIR/OVMF_VARS.fd"
|
||||
|
||||
if [[ ! -f "$DISK" ]]; then
|
||||
|
|
@ -86,8 +94,17 @@ if [[ ! -f "$VARS" ]]; then
|
|||
cp "$OVMF_VARS_SRC" "$VARS"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# KVM needs a writable /dev/kvm; without it `-cpu host` fails under TCG, so
|
||||
# fall back to `-cpu max` and warn. TCG is roughly an order of magnitude
|
||||
# slower than KVM: the live desktop still works but the installer stages
|
||||
# (especially package compilation) take much longer.
|
||||
ACCEL=()
|
||||
if [[ -w /dev/kvm ]]; then ACCEL=(-enable-kvm); fi
|
||||
CPU="host"
|
||||
if [[ -w /dev/kvm ]]; then ACCEL=(-enable-kvm); else
|
||||
CPU="max"
|
||||
echo "warning: /dev/kvm is not writable; using TCG emulation (-cpu max)." >&2
|
||||
echo "warning: expect roughly 5-10x slower execution than with KVM." >&2
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
echo "ISO: $ISO"
|
||||
echo "Disk: $DISK"
|
||||
|
|
@ -102,7 +119,8 @@ QEMU=(qemu-system-x86_64
|
|||
"${ACCEL[@]}"
|
||||
-m "$MEM"
|
||||
-smp "$CPUS"
|
||||
-cpu host
|
||||
-cpu "$CPU"
|
||||
-display "$DISPLAY_OPT"
|
||||
-drive if=pflash,format=raw,readonly=on,file="$OVMF_CODE"
|
||||
-drive if=pflash,format=raw,file="$VARS"
|
||||
-drive file="$DISK",if=virtio,format=qcow2
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Add table
Reference in a new issue