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@ -3,6 +3,99 @@
All notable changes are recorded here. The authoritative history is `git log`;
this file is the curated, human-readable summary.
## 2026-09-26 — Live ISO rebuilt from HEAD, interactive VM open
- **New live ISO built from HEAD (`11c0ee0`).**
`installer/live/phoebus-installer-amd64-20260926.iso` (1.6 GiB, SHA-256
`250dbe9a…`, build id `20260926T041500Z`) was built with
`PHOEBUS_REUSE_ROOTFS=1` after verifying the static `phoebus-installer`
(`25741706…`) and `sys` (`3b331643…`) are fingerprint-fresh for HEAD. The
Sep-24 ISO predates the stage3/boot-security hardening and is kept
alongside, not overwritten. Filesystem-inspected (not just timestamped):
the embedded binaries hash-match the fresh build, the provisioned Gentoo
key carries both published fingerprints (`13EB…2910`, `D99E…2058`),
`gpg`/`mango`/`dms`/quickshell welcome+installer UI are present, and
`/etc/phoebus/version` + `/etc/phoebus/build` carry `0.1.0` and the build
id.
- **Interactive VM open for the owner.** A fresh unique 30 GiB qcow2 plus
private OVMF vars boots the new ISO in a visible KVM/GTK window
(`installer/tests/vm/run-vm.sh`); screenshot-verified at the branded
welcome ("Install Phoebus OS", Live medium 0.1.0, network/UEFI/RAM/CPU
chips). Left running, installer untouched, no passwords or model
credentials entered.
- **`run-vm.sh` is safer for user-facing launches:** new `--disk-name`
(unique disk per run) and `--display` options, and a TCG fallback that
switches `-cpu host` to `-cpu max` with a performance warning when
`/dev/kvm` is not writable (the old `-cpu host` choice fails without
KVM). The one `shellcheck` SC2054 warning on the QEMU array pre-existed
at HEAD and is unchanged.
- **Unpinned signed-DIGESTS install proof running.** `gui-driver.py
install` boots the new ISO on a disposable disk and installs through the
default unpinned stage3 path with the ISO-embedded fail-closed binary
(empty `STAGE3_URL` resolves latest from Gentoo autobuilds; fixed trust
anchor). Automated-harness `--no-ai` is test-only evidence, not the
normal user path. Partitioning + LUKS2 + Btrfs stages already passed in
the guest; completion and detached boot pending.
- **Unpinned signed-DIGESTS install proof COMPLETED in a disposable VM.**
`gui-driver.py install` run `gui-install-20260926T040728Z-f3ae68f4`
booted the new ISO on disposable `disks/unpinned-accept-1.qcow2` (30
GiB) with no `STAGE3_URL`/`STAGE3_SHA256` (latest stage3 resolved from
Gentoo autobuilds, signed DIGESTS verified against the fixed provisioned
key) and the ISO-embedded fail-closed binary: `INSTALL-RC=0`,
`NO_SECRET_LEAK`, `installation complete` after ~165 min (mango desktop,
174 packages). Detached boot: LUKS unlock, login, systemd `running`, 0
failed units, networking, all Btrfs subvolumes, `sys history --legacy`
showing the initial-known-good snapshot. A harness assertion fix
(`gui-driver.py` boot check now uses `sys history --legacy`, since bare
`sys history` is AI-first and truthfully refuses without a model) was
needed to green the gate; the product was correct.
- **Tamper refusal VM-verified** (new ISO, fail-closed binary, disposable
4 GiB targets): a placeholder pin is refused before any network use (zero
stage3 fetches) and a mismatched archive hash is refused after download
with no extraction (`INSTALL-RC=1`, `NO_SECRET_LEAK` both runs). A
tampered-*signature* VM case is infeasible without a network MITM (fixed
key + authentic Gentoo DIGESTS); the bad-signature branch is unit-tested.
- **Recovery-entry boot VERIFIED** (`Phoebus Recovery (known-good
snapshot)` selected in the systemd-boot menu — keypresses provably freeze
the 3 s timeout, selection screenshot-confirmed — with restricted
networking and no model): cmdline + findmnt prove root is the read-only
`@-20260926T064646-initial-known-good` snapshot with `rescue.target`,
serial login works, `sys history`/`rollback status --legacy` work, `sys
ask` fails truthfully offering the exact `--legacy` command, systemd
`degraded` (rescue target, as designed). Method notes: video (tty1) keystrokes
never reach the dracut LUKS prompt (`/dev/console` is serial); passphrases
must be written to the serial pty with ONLCR/ICRNL neutralized or a `\r`
is appended and the passphrase is rejected.
- **Seat desktop PARTIAL with a precise blocker.** Seat VM (virgl,
`virtio-gpu-gl-pci`): seat0 + DRM card0 + greeter session verified,
tuigreet authenticates the correct password (journal-proven; earlier
"Authentication failed" readings were QMP-typing focus races, and `-` keys
arrive correctly). The Mango compositor exits in <1s: libseat `No backend
was able to open a seat` — no seatd in the image and the logind path does
not succeed under the tuigreet session. Kitty/DMS/lock/idle/polkit-agent/
logout/reboot stay unverified behind this blocker.
- **Snap re-checked against the live Store:** `hello-world` is still 6.4
rev 29 on every channel (install → `no updates available` → remove, all
clean); guest has no `aa-status`, confinement `partial`. Revision-changing
refresh and strict confinement stay blocked (Store revision + AppArmor
guest needed).
- **Nix GC findings:** the fresh unpinned install bootstraps Nix (store
populated, `default` link valid, `nix 2.24.9` runs) and `sys list --nix`
truthfully reports the base system profile has no manifest.
`nix-collect-garbage` is not on root's PATH; a user-level
install (`nixpkgs#hello`) + `nix-collect-garbage -d` (268 paths, 189 MB)
leaves the profile intact — the old dangling case did NOT reproduce.
**Coverage gap found:** `sys` enumerates `/nix/var/nix/profiles/
{default,profile}` + `per-user/*/profile` but not the modern per-user
`~/.local/state/nix/profiles/profile`, so user-installed Nix packages are
invisible to the catalogue. Recorded as follow-up (design + tests + VM
proof needed), not fixed in this session.
- **Release gates stay truthful:** `gates --execute` in an unconfigured
shell reports 0 passed / 0 failed / 6 NotRun with exact missing
prerequisites; nothing published. Quality gates green: `cargo fmt`,
`clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings`, `cargo test
--workspace` 717/717, `test_vmsafety.py` 18/18, release + static builds.
## 2026-09-26 — Security and release-readiness: trust anchor, executable gates, strengthened rollback
- **Stage3 trust anchor is fixed in code.** `release_key_path()` no longer

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@ -3,6 +3,31 @@
Rolling note between work sessions. **Update this file before you finish**, then
commit it. It should be short and current; use `git log` for detail.
- **ISO rebuild + verification session (2026-09-26, DONE except seat-compositor):**
new ISO `installer/live/phoebus-installer-amd64-20260926.iso` (1.6 GiB,
`250dbe9a…`, build `20260926T041500Z`, HEAD `11c0ee0` + `0b41781`) built
via `PHOEBUS_REUSE_ROOTFS=1`, content-verified (embedded hashes match,
Gentoo key both fingerprints, UI payload present); old Sep-24 ISO kept.
Interactive VM RUNNING (KVM/GTK, `phoebus-interactive-20260926.qcow2` +
private vars in `/var/tmp/phoebus-interactive/`, screenshot at welcome,
undisturbed). Unpinned signed-DIGESTS full install PASSED
(`gui-install-20260926T040728Z-f3ae68f4`, `INSTALL-RC=0`,
`NO_SECRET_LEAK`, ~165 min) + detached boot (running, 0 failed units,
`sys --legacy` + snapshot). Tamper refusals PASSED (placeholder pin
pre-network, hash mismatch post-download, both `RC=1` + no leak).
Recovery-entry boot PASSED (snapshot cmdline/findmnt, login, `sys
--legacy`, truthful `ask` failure, systemd degraded). Seat desktop
PARTIAL: seat0/DRM/greeter/auth verified, Mango dies in <1s (libseat, no
seatd) — the blocker. Snap: no Store revision, still partial confinement.
Nix: GC-dangling NOT reproduced; **new gap: modern per-user Nix profiles
invisible to `sys`** (follow-up). Live AI: still no credential/model
(NotRun). `gui-driver.py` boot sys-check fixed (`--legacy`).
`gates --execute`: 0/0/6 NotRun, no publish. Quality gates green
(717/717, clippy -D, vmsafety 18/18). Evidence disk
`disks/unpinned-accept-1.qcow2` KEPT; scratch overlays removed.
Next: seatd-or-logind fix for Mango (design+rebuild+retest), per-user Nix
enumeration, live AI credential, snap revision/strict, NVIDIA.
- **Security/readiness follow-up (2026-09-26):** trust anchor + executable
gates + strengthened rollback PASS.
1. **Stage3 trust anchor (fixed):** `release_key_path()` ignores

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@ -57,8 +57,8 @@ Booting that recovery entry offline remains a manual gate.
| LUKS2 format/open/close | yes | yes | yes | no |
| Btrfs subvolumes + swapfile | yes | yes | yes | no |
| fstab / crypttab generation | yes | yes | yes | no |
| stage3 fetch + verify (pinned SHA-256 or signed DIGESTS) + extract | yes | yes (both paths; every failure branch incl. missing verifier/key/DIGESTS/entry, nonzero exit, cannot-start) | yes (pinned path; unpinned path needs the live-image key) | n/a |
| stage3 trust anchor (fixed provisioned key) | yes | yes (`release_key_path` ignores `PHOEBUS_GENTOO_RELEASE_KEY`; test-only injection only via explicit `verify_digests_with_key`) | no (unpinned VM proof needs a rebuilt live ISO + disposable install; host-level Good-signature check of the real DIGESTS noted below, not VM evidence) | n/a |
| stage3 fetch + verify (pinned SHA-256 or signed DIGESTS) + extract | yes | yes (both paths; every failure branch incl. missing verifier/key/DIGESTS/entry, nonzero exit, cannot-start) | yes (pinned path; **unpinned path now VM-verified**: default unpinned install from the rebuilt 20260926 ISO completed 12 stages + detached boot; placeholder-pin and archive-hash-mismatch refusals VM-verified on disposable targets with the fail-closed binary) | n/a |
| stage3 trust anchor (fixed provisioned key) | yes | yes (`release_key_path` ignores `PHOEBUS_GENTOO_RELEASE_KEY`; test-only injection only via explicit `verify_digests_with_key`) | yes (20260926 live ISO carries the fingerprint-checked key — both Gentoo fingerprints verified inside the shipped squashfs; the unpinned VM install verified the real signed DIGESTS + archive hash against it; tampered inputs refused) | n/a |
| Portage config + sync + getuto | yes | yes | yes | n/a |
| Signed Gentoo binary install | yes | yes | yes | n/a |
| Source package compilation | yes | yes | yes | n/a |
@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ Booting that recovery entry offline remains a manual gate.
| Btrfs snapshots + history | yes | yes | yes | no |
| Coordinated snapshot sets (`@` + `@var`) | yes | yes | no | no |
| Btrfs rollback (`sys undo`) | yes | yes | yes (rollback acceptance `serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386` PASS=11 FAIL=0) | no |
| Recovery/known-good BLS entry | yes | yes | present + snapshot-based (asserted in the rollback run; selecting it offline with no network/model is a distinct manual acceptance gate with its own procedure and evidence, see `docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`) | no |
| Recovery/known-good BLS entry | yes | yes | yes: entry present + snapshot-based (rollback runs) **and the recovery entry itself was booted** (`Phoebus Recovery (known-good snapshot)` selected in the systemd-boot menu with restricted networking and no model: cmdline + findmnt prove root is the read-only `@-20260926T064646-initial-known-good` snapshot with `rescue.target`, serial login works, `sys history/rollback status --legacy` work, `sys ask` fails truthfully with the `--legacy` fallback) | no |
| Snapshot retention + free-space gate | yes | yes | no | no |
| AI typed proposals + evidence review | yes | yes | fixture end-to-end | n/a |
| AI guided install (DeepSeek/OpenAI) | yes | yes | fixture path only (no live call) | n/a |
@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ Booting that recovery entry offline remains a manual gate.
| Transaction log (outcomes, protective snapshots) | yes | yes | read-only in installed VM; write path needs root | no |
| Flatpak/Nix bounded typed actions | yes | yes | no | no |
| Shared hardware-aware source selection (all lanes) | yes | yes | no | no |
| Snap lane (detect/install/list/remove/refresh/connections) | yes (reviewed first-use setup) | yes (incl. exact revisions and confinement) | partial (VM: Portage snapd, active socket, `hello-world` install/list/refresh/remove; partial confinement; refresh had no newer revision; connections not exercised) | no |
| Snap lane (detect/install/list/remove/refresh/connections) | yes (reviewed first-use setup) | yes (incl. exact revisions and confinement) | partial (VM: Portage snapd, active socket, `hello-world` install/list/refresh/remove; partial confinement; refresh had no newer revision; connections not exercised. **Re-checked 2026-09-26 against the live Store**: `hello-world` still 6.4 rev 29 on every channel, refresh reports no updates; guest has no `aa-status`, confinement still `partial`. A revision-changing refresh and strict confinement stay blocked on a Store revision + AppArmor-ready guest) | no |
| AppImage lane (import/acquire/integrity/desktop/remove) | yes | yes | yes (VM: acquire with pinned SHA, list, launch fixture, remove; tampered SHA refused) | no |
| Custom ebuild overlay (stage/approve/build/remove) | yes | yes | yes (VM: stage → build/install → VDB+file present → remove) | no |
| `sys` installed into the target + verified in chroot | yes | yes (unit) | yes (detached boot verified) | no |
@ -127,16 +127,16 @@ Booting that recovery entry offline remains a manual gate.
| Installed-package inventory (`sys list`, all lanes, `--legacy`) | yes | yes (VDB/Flatpak/Snap/AppImage; **Nix active-profile packages** vs generations/store; custom ebuild never double-counted) | yes (VM read-only group) | no |
| Package information (`sys info`, `--legacy`) | yes | yes (installed/available, version/deps/size/provenance; ambiguity flagged) | yes (VM read-only group) | no |
| Cross-source update check/apply (`sys updates`, `apply updates`) | yes | yes (exact per-source transactions with full Flatpak commits/snap revisions, pinned and revalidated; manual/project-specific refused) | Flatpak verified in VM (reviewed ref+commit, pinned update, verified); direct Snap refresh with no newer revision VM-verified, exact Snap apply-updates transaction unit-tested only; Portage verified | no |
| Nix active-profile inventory (`sys list --nix`) | yes | yes (manifest v1/v2/v3; scope; generations vs store) | yes (NIX_ENABLED=yes install: real `nodejs-slim` profile listed and filtered; a re-run correctly reported a dangling profile) | no |
| Nix active-profile inventory (`sys list --nix`) | yes | yes (manifest v1/v2/v3; scope; generations vs store) | yes (NIX_ENABLED=yes install: real `nodejs-slim` profile listed and filtered; a re-run correctly reported a dangling profile. **2026-09-26 on the fresh unpinned install**: bootstrap present (`/nix/store` populated, `default` link valid, `nix 2.24.9` runs); `sys list --nix` truthfully reports the base system profile has no package manifest. GC-dangling repro: `nix-collect-garbage` is not on root's PATH; user-level install/GC repro attempted — see VM evidence) | no |
| Catalogue maintenance (`depclean`, `clean cache`, `owners`, `deps`/`rdeps`) | yes | yes (structured depclean effects; cache-cleanup dry-run review + failure propagation; VDB dependency metadata) | yes (VM: depclean + cache-cleanup journeys; deps read-only) | no |
| AI-default catalogue routing (source flags constrain, never bypass) | yes | yes (investigation loop, full backend classification + optional-backend rewrite, fallback offers exact `--legacy` command) | yes (read-only routing cases) | no |
| Alternate-root catalogue/update/maintenance rooting | yes | yes (chroot for Portage/Flatpak/Nix; Snap refused; recording-runner no-host-command tests) | yes (VM: alternate-root Snap refused) | no |
| Service start/stop/restart + flatpak/nix/snapshot commands | yes | yes | no | no |
| Desktop session helpers (DMS bar/launcher/lock/idle) | yes | yes | functional test (stubs) | no |
| Mango + DankMaterialShell profile | yes | yes | live VM yes; installed desktop_install yes (174 pkgs) | no |
| Mango + DankMaterialShell profile | yes | yes | live VM yes; installed desktop_install yes (174 pkgs); **installed graphical session under a seat: compositor start FAILS** — Mango exits in <1s with libseat `No backend was able to open a seat` (no seatd in the image; the logind path does not succeed under the tuigreet session). Greeter, seat, DRM, PAM authentication and `sys --legacy` are verified; kitty/DMS spotlight/lock/idle/polkit-agent/logout/reboot remain unverified | no |
| Mango is the canonical desktop | yes | yes | live VM yes; installed default session configured | no |
| greetd login (Mango + DarkMaterial) | yes | yes | yes (tuigreet verified on detached boot) | no |
| Live desktop ISO (Mango + DMS) | yes | guards tested | graphical VM + GUI journey + detached boot | no |
| greetd login (Mango + DarkMaterial) | yes | yes | yes (tuigreet verified on detached boot; **graphical authentication verified under a seat VM**: seat0 + DRM card0 + greeter session, correct password authenticates per the journal) | no |
| Live desktop ISO (Mango + DMS) | yes | guards tested | graphical VM + GUI journey + detached boot + interactive welcome (20260926 ISO, screenshot) | no |
| Live welcome autostart + duplicate prevention | yes | guards tested | live graphical VM | no |
| Welcome primary action keyboard-focus | yes | guards tested | live graphical VM | no |
| VM harness disk safety + structured results | yes | yes (16 tests) | n/a | n/a |
@ -288,8 +288,17 @@ Booting that recovery entry offline remains a manual gate.
completion (`gui-install-completes` passed). The installed system then booted
**with the ISO detached** (LUKS2 decrypt, systemd running, 0 failed units,
all Btrfs subvolumes mounted, `sys` CLI operational, and `tuigreet` greeter
active). The **installed** Mango session (graphical user login into DMS)
remains to be verified under a physical seat / DRM compositor backend.
active). (That paragraph describes the Sep-24 evidence run; the 2026-09-26
unpinned rerun from the rebuilt ISO is recorded in
`docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`.) The **installed** Mango session was
attempted under a real seat on 2026-09-26 (seat0 + DRM card0 + greeter
session + successful PAM authentication, all verified in a virgl seat
VM): the compositor exits in <1s because libseat opens no backend (no
seatd in the image; the logind path does not succeed under the tuigreet
session). Greeter login works; kitty, DMS spotlight, lock/idle, the
polkit agent, logout, reboot and the compositor itself stay unverified —
the libseat failure is the blocker, with the exact error recorded in
`docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`.
- **AI sandbox** is implemented (`systemd-run` hardening properties, tested at
the argv level) and fails closed without `systemd-run`; it has not been
exercised in a VM. Only typed actions and the privacy boundary were previously
@ -320,11 +329,16 @@ Booting that recovery entry offline remains a manual gate.
- `sys undo` is implemented with the default-subvolume, fstab, kernel-cmdline
and BLS handling described in ADR 0007; its destructive VM acceptance gate
passed in this session (`serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386`).
- **Stage3 signed-DIGESTS mechanism (host-level, not VM evidence).** The
parser fixture matches the real current DIGESTS byte-for-byte, and the real
DIGESTS for `stage3-amd64-systemd-20260920T170055Z.tar.xz` verifies with a
Good signature from Gentoo's Automated Weekly Release Key at host level.
The full VM proof (rebuilt live ISO carrying the provisioned key, default
unpinned install, tampered signature/digest/archive refusal) still needs a
disposable install run and is recorded as blocked in
`docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`.
- **Stage3 signed-DIGESTS mechanism is now VM-verified, not just host-level.**
The parser fixture matches the real current DIGESTS byte-for-byte; on
2026-09-26 the default unpinned install from the rebuilt live ISO (which
ships the fingerprint-checked provisioned key) completed all 12 stages
plus a detached boot (`INSTALL-RC=0`, `NO_SECRET_LEAK`), which proves the
real signed DIGESTS and the downloaded archive hash verified against the
fixed trust anchor — `fetch()` must return `Ok` before `extract()` runs,
and the run demonstrably extracted. Tampered inputs are refused in the VM:
a placeholder pin is refused before any network use (zero stage3 fetches)
and a mismatched archive hash is refused after download with no extraction.
A tampered-*signature* VM case is not feasible without a network MITM (the
key is fixed and Gentoo serves authentic DIGESTS); the bad-signature
branch is unit-tested.

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@ -831,6 +831,144 @@ detached boot verification with the live ISO removed.
partial-confinement/no-op-refresh evidence stays labeled as such); NVIDIA
needs a GPU or authorized passthrough (see below).
## 2026-09-26 — Live ISO rebuild from HEAD + unpinned install proof (COMPLETED)
- **Rebuilt ISO.** `installer/live/phoebus-installer-amd64-20260926.iso`
(1.6 GiB, SHA-256
`250dbe9ad780408a40b7b7f0757791fadcc1e4309b932e98f6059c7baf93e2e5`,
build id `20260926T041500Z`) built from HEAD `11c0ee0` with
`PHOEBUS_REUSE_ROOTFS=1` (cached `livefs.tar` reused for the Debian
rootfs; payload, binaries, key and branding re-installed fresh — reuse
does not carry stale binaries, UI or keys). The Sep-24
(`827bf843…`) ISO predates the stage3 fail-closed + trust-anchor +
boot-security commits and is kept alongside.
- **Content inspection (not timestamps).** The finished squashfs was
listed and selectively extracted: embedded
`/usr/local/bin/phoebus-installer` (`25741706…`) and `/usr/local/bin/sys`
(`3b331643…`) hash-match the fingerprint-fresh static build;
`/usr/share/openpgp-keys/gentoo-release.asc` (57,698 bytes) shows both
published fingerprints (`13EB…2910` weekly, `D99E…2058` signing) under
`gpg --show-keys`; `/usr/bin/gpg`, `/usr/bin/mango`, `/usr/bin/dms`,
the welcome/installer `shell.qml` configs, the install desktop entry and
`/etc/phoebus/{version,build,live}` (`0.1.0`,
`PHOEBUS_BUILD_ID=20260926T041500Z`) are all present.
- **Unpinned signed-DIGESTS install PASSED.**
`gui-driver.py install` run `gui-install-20260926T040728Z-f3ae68f4`
booted the new ISO on disposable
`disks/unpinned-accept-1.qcow2` (30 GiB) and installed with the
ISO-embedded fail-closed binary and a served `test.conf` with **no**
`STAGE3_URL`/`STAGE3_SHA256` (empty URL resolves latest-stage3 from
Gentoo autobuilds; signed DIGESTS verified against the fixed provisioned
key): `INSTALL-RC=0`, `NO_SECRET_LEAK`, `installation complete` after
~165 min (full mango desktop, 174 packages). Detached boot (ISO
detached): LUKS unlock, login, `systemctl is-system-running = running`,
`0 loaded units listed`, networking, all Btrfs subvolumes mounted, `sys
history --legacy` showing `@-20260926T064646-initial-known-good`. The
harness `--no-ai` flag is **test-only** evidence and is not the normal
user path (the wizard requires a connected model; the interactive VM is
left for the owner to drive by hand).
- **Harness fix (real defect, fixed):** `gui-driver.py do_boot` asserted
bare `sys history` output, but bare `sys history` is AI-first and
truthfully refuses without a model — the check now uses
`sys history --legacy`. The product was correct (`/usr/local/bin/sys`
present and working); the gate was stale. Re-run detached boots pass
`boot-sys-installed`. (The driver's `detached-boot-login` flag is
timing-sensitive to PAM OSC noise on the serial line even when the login
succeeds and checks run; login itself works — 1/4 flag-pass with 4/4
substantive checks green.)
- **Tamper refusals PASSED** (new ISO, fail-closed binary, disposable 4
GiB targets, `INSTALL-RC=1` + `NO_SECRET_LEAK` both): placeholder pin
refused before any network use (zero stage3 fetches on the serve log);
mismatched archive hash refused after download with no extraction.
Method note: `appliance-guest-gui.sh` ignores the driver's `SERVE_URL`
env and always uses the default port 8000 — tamper variants were served
by swapping the port-8000 `test.conf` (the main run had long since
fetched its copy). A tampered-*signature* VM case is infeasible without
a network MITM; the bad-signature branch is unit-tested.
- **Recovery-entry boot PASSED** (distinct manual gate, now verified).
Visible QEMU on the installed disk with restricted networking
(`-netdev user,restrict=y`) and no model: keypresses provably freeze the
3 s systemd-boot timeout (screenshot), `Phoebus Recovery (known-good
snapshot)` selected with Down+Enter (screenshot), kernel cmdline
`rootflags=subvol=@snapshots/@-20260926T064646-initial-known-good` with
`ro` + `systemd.unit=rescue.target`, findmnt confirms the read-only
snapshot root, serial login as `phoebus` works, `sys history` /
`rollback status --legacy` work, `sys ask` fails truthfully offering the
exact `--legacy` command, systemd `degraded` (rescue target, as
designed). Method notes: video-console (tty1) keystrokes never reach the
dracut LUKS prompt (`/dev/console` is serial here) — the passphrase must
be written to the serial pty with ONLCR/ICRNL neutralized, otherwise a
`\r` is appended and a correct passphrase is rejected; a `down`+`ret`
pair landing at LUKS burns attempts as `**` (escape remnant) and three
failures drop to the dracut emergency shell (root, no cryptsetup binary
present). Transcript of the proof session kept under
`/var/tmp/phoebus-recovery/rec-entry-proof.log`.
- **Seat desktop PARTIAL (blocker found).** Seat VM (`virtio-gpu-gl-pci`,
virgl present, overlay of the installed disk): logind seat0 with DRM
card0 (`[MASTER]`), keyboard, mouse; `/dev/dri/card0` (no render node);
tuigreet active with `--cmd /usr/local/bin/phoebus-session-mango`;
tuigreet PAM authentication of the correct password verified in the
journal (earlier "Authentication failed" readings were QMP-typing
focus races; `-` keys arrive correctly, proven by visible echo).
The Mango compositor exits in <1s after every successful authentication:
`libseat: No backend was able to open a seat`, `Failed to start a DRM
session` (captured by running the session script from a shell). No seatd
in the image and the logind path does not succeed under the tuigreet
session — this is the precise blocker for kitty/DMS/lock/idle/polkit/
logout/reboot. Session transcript and journal excerpts kept under
`/var/tmp/phoebus-seat/`.
- **Interactive VM (open).** The new ISO boots a KVM/GTK VM with a fresh
unique disk (`phoebus-interactive-20260926.qcow2`) and private OVMF vars
in `/var/tmp/phoebus-interactive/`; screenshots show the Mango top bar
and the branded welcome (`Install Phoebus OS`, Live medium 0.1.0,
network/UEFI/RAM/CPU chips). Left running for the owner; installer
untouched, no passwords or model credentials entered.
- Evidence disk `disks/unpinned-accept-1.qcow2` KEPT; scratch overlays
(`unpinned-tamper-*`, `nix-gc-*`, `seat-accept-1`) removed after their
run logs were kept. Host free space ~16 GiB at the end (watched, nothing
deleted without identification).
- **Rebuilt ISO.** `installer/live/phoebus-installer-amd64-20260926.iso`
(1.6 GiB, SHA-256
`250dbe9ad780408a40b7b7f0757791fadcc1e4309b932e98f6059c7baf93e2e5`,
build id `20260926T041500Z`) built from HEAD `11c0ee0` with
`PHOEBUS_REUSE_ROOTFS=1` (cached `livefs.tar` reused for the Debian
rootfs; payload, binaries, key and branding re-installed fresh — reuse
does not carry stale binaries, UI or keys). The Sep-24
(`827bf843…`) ISO predates the stage3 fail-closed + trust-anchor +
boot-security commits and is kept alongside.
- **Content inspection (not timestamps).** The finished squashfs was
listed and selectively extracted: embedded
`/usr/local/bin/phoebus-installer` (`25741706…`) and `/usr/local/bin/sys`
(`3b331643…`) hash-match the fingerprint-fresh static build;
`/usr/share/openpgp-keys/gentoo-release.asc` (57,698 bytes) shows both
published fingerprints (`13EB…2910` weekly, `D99E…2058` signing) under
`gpg --show-keys`; `/usr/bin/gpg`, `/usr/bin/mango`, `/usr/bin/dms`,
the welcome/installer `shell.qml` configs, the install desktop entry and
`/etc/phoebus/{version,build,live}` (`0.1.0`,
`PHOEBUS_BUILD_ID=20260926T041500Z`) are all present.
- **Unpinned signed-DIGESTS install (running).**
`gui-driver.py install` run `gui-install-20260926T040728Z-f3ae68f4`
boots the new ISO on disposable
`disks/unpinned-accept-1.qcow2` (30 GiB) and installs with the
ISO-embedded fail-closed binary and a served `test.conf` with **no**
`STAGE3_URL`/`STAGE3_SHA256` (empty URL resolves latest-stage3 from
Gentoo autobuilds; signed DIGESTS verified against the fixed provisioned
key). Guest progress: live login passed, partitioning/LUKS2/Btrfs
complete, install stages running. The harness `--no-ai` flag is
**test-only** evidence and is not the normal user path (the wizard
requires a connected model; the interactive VM below is left for the
owner to drive by hand).
- **Interactive VM (open).** The new ISO boots a KVM/GTK VM with a fresh
unique disk (`phoebus-interactive-20260926.qcow2`) and private OVMF vars
in `/var/tmp/phoebus-interactive/`; screenshot shows the Mango top bar
and the branded welcome ("Install Phoebus OS", Live medium 0.1.0).
- Still open after this run: installed compositor session (libseat
blocker above), live AI provider call (no credential/model available),
revision-changing Snap refresh + strict confinement (no Store revision /
AppArmor guest), per-user Nix profile enumeration (new coverage gap),
NVIDIA hardware. Secure Boot/UKI stays a separate opt-in milestone.
## Known remaining work
- The graphical session was verified with the **headless** wlroots backend

View file

@ -1321,7 +1321,7 @@ class Driver:
"echo ===CHECKS-$(printf START)===; "
"echo COMM_CHECK:$(cat /proc/1/comm 2>&1); "
"echo SYSTEMD_STATUS:$(systemctl is-system-running 2>&1); "
"echo SYS_CLI_CHECK:$(which sys 2>&1 && sys history 2>&1 | grep -o 'no transactions recorded' || echo missing); "
"echo SYS_CLI_CHECK:$(which sys 2>&1 && sys history --legacy 2>&1 | grep -o 'no transactions recorded' || echo missing); "
"systemctl --failed --no-pager; ip -brief addr; "
"lsblk -o NAME,SIZE,TYPE,FSTYPE,MOUNTPOINTS; echo ===CHECKS-$(printf END)===",
)

View file

@ -12,10 +12,12 @@ set -euo pipefail
ISO=""
DISK_SIZE="32G"
DISK_NAME="phoebus-test"
WORKDIR="${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/phoebus-vm"
MEM="4096"
CPUS="4"
BOOT="d"
DISPLAY_OPT="gtk"
EXTRA=()
usage() {
@ -25,9 +27,13 @@ Usage: run-vm.sh --iso PATH [options]
Options:
--iso PATH Live ISO to boot (required)
--disk-size SIZE Scratch disk size (default 32G)
--disk-name NAME Scratch disk file name inside the workdir
(default phoebus-test; the file is NAME.qcow2, so each
interactive or automated run can use a unique disk)
--workdir DIR Directory for the scratch disk (default /tmp/phoebus-vm)
--mem MiB RAM in MiB (default 4096)
--cpus N vCPUs (default 4)
--display OPT QEMU display (default gtk; use none for headless)
--disk-boot Boot from the scratch disk instead of the ISO
--help Show this help
@ -39,9 +45,11 @@ while (($#)); do
case "$1" in
--iso) shift; ISO="${1:-}" ;;
--disk-size) shift; DISK_SIZE="${1:-}" ;;
--disk-name) shift; DISK_NAME="${1:-}" ;;
--workdir) shift; WORKDIR="${1:-}" ;;
--mem) shift; MEM="${1:-}" ;;
--cpus) shift; CPUS="${1:-}" ;;
--display) shift; DISPLAY_OPT="${1:-}" ;;
--disk-boot) BOOT="c" ;;
--help|-h) usage; exit 0 ;;
*) echo "unknown option: $1" >&2; usage; exit 2 ;;
@ -75,7 +83,7 @@ done
[[ -n "$OVMF_CODE" ]] || { echo "error: OVMF firmware not found" >&2; exit 1; }
mkdir -p "$WORKDIR"
DISK="$WORKDIR/phoebus-test.qcow2"
DISK="$WORKDIR/${DISK_NAME}.qcow2"
VARS="$WORKDIR/OVMF_VARS.fd"
if [[ ! -f "$DISK" ]]; then
@ -86,8 +94,17 @@ if [[ ! -f "$VARS" ]]; then
cp "$OVMF_VARS_SRC" "$VARS"
fi
# KVM needs a writable /dev/kvm; without it `-cpu host` fails under TCG, so
# fall back to `-cpu max` and warn. TCG is roughly an order of magnitude
# slower than KVM: the live desktop still works but the installer stages
# (especially package compilation) take much longer.
ACCEL=()
if [[ -w /dev/kvm ]]; then ACCEL=(-enable-kvm); fi
CPU="host"
if [[ -w /dev/kvm ]]; then ACCEL=(-enable-kvm); else
CPU="max"
echo "warning: /dev/kvm is not writable; using TCG emulation (-cpu max)." >&2
echo "warning: expect roughly 5-10x slower execution than with KVM." >&2
fi
echo "ISO: $ISO"
echo "Disk: $DISK"
@ -102,7 +119,8 @@ QEMU=(qemu-system-x86_64
"${ACCEL[@]}"
-m "$MEM"
-smp "$CPUS"
-cpu host
-cpu "$CPU"
-display "$DISPLAY_OPT"
-drive if=pflash,format=raw,readonly=on,file="$OVMF_CODE"
-drive if=pflash,format=raw,file="$VARS"
-drive file="$DISK",if=virtio,format=qcow2