feat(gui): select and validate OpenCode from the installer
Add an 'OpenCode agent' choice with server/password/provider/model fields, a Test connection action, and a secret-free frontend state line the harness asserts. Require exactly one installer session and assert the current step and AI state instead of inferring from a screenshot. Add a live-OpenCode acceptance make target and document the adapter, transport policy, states and workflows (ADR 0011 updated).
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10 changed files with 499 additions and 139 deletions
13
Makefile
13
Makefile
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@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
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SHELL := /bin/bash
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.PHONY: help context doctor test test-rust test-vm fmt fmt-check clippy check build static vm hooks commit publish backup forgejo-init public private protect release clean
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.PHONY: help context doctor test test-rust test-vm opencode-acceptance fmt fmt-check clippy check build static vm hooks commit publish backup forgejo-init public private protect release clean
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help:
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@printf 'Phoebus OS targets:\n'
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@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ help:
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@printf ' make test run the Rust and VM-harness test suites\n'
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@printf ' make test-rust cargo test --workspace\n'
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@printf ' make test-vm python3 installer/tests/vm/test_vmsafety.py\n'
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@printf ' make opencode-acceptance live-model acceptance (needs PHOEBUS_OPENCODE_LIVE_*)\n'
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@printf ' make fmt cargo fmt --all\n'
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@printf ' make check fmt-check + clippy + tests\n'
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@printf ' make build release Rust installer\n'
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@ -44,6 +45,16 @@ test-rust:
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test-vm:
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python3 installer/tests/vm/test_vmsafety.py
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# A real-model acceptance run. Fails (BLOCKED) when the live server is not
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# configured, so it can never pass by silently not running.
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opencode-acceptance:
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@if [ -z "$$PHOEBUS_OPENCODE_LIVE_URL" ] || [ -z "$$PHOEBUS_OPENCODE_LIVE_PROVIDER" ] || [ -z "$$PHOEBUS_OPENCODE_LIVE_MODEL" ]; then \
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echo "BLOCKED: set PHOEBUS_OPENCODE_LIVE_URL, PHOEBUS_OPENCODE_LIVE_PROVIDER and PHOEBUS_OPENCODE_LIVE_MODEL"; \
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exit 2; \
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fi
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cd installer-rs && PHOEBUS_OPENCODE_REQUIRE_LIVE=1 \
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cargo test -p phoebus-executor --test opencode_live -- --nocapture
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fmt:
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cd installer-rs && cargo fmt --all
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@ -7,6 +7,56 @@ Format: Keep a Changelog. Dates are UTC.
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## Unreleased
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### Added
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- **Real OpenCode agent-server adapter.** `phoebus-executor::opencode_client`
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implements the OpenCode session/message protocol over the project's curl
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transport and the `ModelTransport` trait, so the strict proposal parser,
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evidence review, bounded facts and executor are reused unchanged. The GUI
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("OpenCode agent"), the installer CLI (`--ai-backend opencode`,
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`--opencode-server/-provider/-model/-password-file`) and `sys ask` all use it.
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It creates a transient session per request, accepts only the completed
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assistant text parts, disables tools per message, and deletes the session.
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A JSON schema output mode is available in the protocol but is not used: the
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shipped DeepSeek models reject it, and the prompt carries an explicit change
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shape instead. The `opencode 1.18.32` contract was verified directly: session
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creation rejects a `model` field, `/provider` metadata can contain a
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credential and is reduced to ids/model names, and auth is HTTP Basic
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(`opencode` / `OPENCODE_SERVER_PASSWORD`).
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- **`--opencode-test`** obtains and validates a real model response (exit
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nonzero on failure), distinct from the read-only `--opencode-probe`. A live
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acceptance test (`make opencode-acceptance`) fails as BLOCKED when no server
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is configured, so it cannot pass by not running.
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- **Truthful OpenCode connection states** (`insecure_transport`, `unreachable`,
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`authentication_required`, `authentication_rejected`, `incompatible`,
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`reachable`, `model_catalog`, `selected_model_unavailable`); `ready` is
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reserved for a validated response and is never returned by the probe.
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- **GUI "Test connection"** and OpenCode connection controls, plus a backend
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selection (`ai.backend`) in canonical configuration.
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### Security
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- **The mandatory-AI gate now requires a validated interaction.** Both the GUI
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bridge and the installer CLI refuse to install when only a provider name is
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configured; a successful, validated model interaction bound to the current
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configuration (and credential) is required. Changing the model, endpoint,
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server or a secret invalidates it. A direct provider or `--no-ai` remains the
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fallback.
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- **OpenCode transport policy is enforced.** Plain `http://` is accepted only
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when the resolved destination is loopback and the connection is pinned to the
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checked address; remote access is `https://` with certificate verification or
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an authenticated tunnel to loopback. Redirects, unsafe schemes and oversized
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or trickled bodies are bounded, and credentials travel only on curl's stdin.
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- **Credentials never surface.** The catalog is reduced to ids/model names;
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server responses that echo credentials are not retained, and tests feed
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credential-bearing bodies and assert they do not appear in errors or state.
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### Fixed
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- **OpenCode client/probe defects found by testing:** the handwritten HTTP
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reader (no total deadline, UTF-8-unsafe chunk fallback) was removed in favour
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of the curl transport; the catalog is no longer parsed on a non-2xx status; a
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provider-shaped 500 can no longer look like a catalog; the duplicate-session
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harness check requires exactly one session; and GUI navigation is asserted
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from secret-free frontend state lines rather than inferred from a screenshot.
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### Added
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- **OpenCode connection workflow and capability probe.** New ADR 0011 and
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`docs/OPENCODE.md` separate the four components (client, server, model
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@ -3,27 +3,29 @@
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Rolling note between work sessions. **Update this file before you finish**, then
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commit it. It should be short and current; use `git log` for detail.
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- **Last updated:** this session (2026-09-22), harness + security + polish.
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- **Current focus:** Hardened the VM harness (enforced qcow2/`/dev`/backing-chain
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safety, structured PASS/FAIL results, per-run OVMF+QMP, no `os.system`),
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fixed confirmed security defects (disk revalidation before partitioning,
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bridge replay/concurrency + input bounds, provider transport URL/size
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hardening, `TargetRoot` symlink escapes, and the `0 B` disk-size probe bug),
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added an OpenCode server capability probe + docs/ADR 0011, and fixed the
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welcome focus ring and the untruthful mid-install cancellation.
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- **Last updated:** this session (2026-09-22), OpenCode adapter.
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- **Current focus:** Implemented a real OpenCode agent-server adapter
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(`phoebus-executor::opencode_client`) that speaks the session/message protocol
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over curl and implements `ModelTransport`, wired into canonical config
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(`ai.backend = "opencode"`), the GUI ("OpenCode agent" + Test connection),
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the installer CLI (`--ai-backend opencode`, `--opencode-test`) and `sys ask`.
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The mandatory-AI gate now requires a validated interaction with invalidated
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state. The probe/transport were hardened (loopback/TLS policy, DNS pinning,
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status checks, auth), and the GUI harness gained exact-session and
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frontend-state assertions.
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- **Last verified (this session):**
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- `gui-driver.py gui` on the rebuilt ISO: **23/23 PASS**, exit 0. Welcome
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autostarts; Return launches the installer (focus fixed); duplicate sessions
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prevented; live medium protected; keyboard navigation reaches network + AI;
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advancing without a model is refused and starts nothing.
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- `make test` green (Rust + 16 harness unit tests); `cargo fmt --check`,
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`cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets` (no errors), release + static
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builds.
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- OpenCode probe: `ready` against `opencode 1.18.32`; `authentication_required`
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(exit 1) against an unauthenticated LAN bind.
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- ISO: `installer/live/phoebus-installer-amd64.iso` 1.6 GiB,
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`sha256 428dbd7547db8690596bf5c3a0d7a6fa8aee4c9f9eca1e926c216712dd050b36`;
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static binary `sha256 2f9cd4b36a12e469d2b6187166acaf8b11f7f382cc19f7ad08bb2a809c855591`.
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- 336 Rust tests + 16 harness tests green; fmt/clippy clean.
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- Real inference through `opencode 1.18.32` with `deepseek-v4-flash`;
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`--opencode-test` → `{"phoebus":"ok"}`; the GUI bridge `ai_check` applied 8
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reviewed changes; `sys ask` proposed and ran a read-only action.
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- Auth: none → `authentication_required`, wrong → `authentication_rejected`,
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correct → `model_catalog` + successful inference. Plain http to a LAN host
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→ `insecure_transport`, exit 1, no request sent.
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- 7 real-HTTP integration tests (status, chunked multibyte, oversize,
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redirect, disconnect, auth) and 2 env-gated live tests.
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- **Not yet verified this session:** the full graphical install through
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OpenCode in a VM, and a separate physical computer. The pinned manifest is
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`v1.18.31` while the tested binary is `1.18.32`.
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- **Public repo:** <https://git.phoebus.club/phoebus/phoebus_os>
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(remote `origin`, SSH port 2222).
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239
docs/OPENCODE.md
239
docs/OPENCODE.md
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@ -1,13 +1,9 @@
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# OpenCode connection workflow
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OpenCode is used in two clearly separated ways:
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1. **Developer workflow** — on this repository, inspecting sanitized evidence.
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Full tool access (shell, files, plugins) is fine because it runs as *you*,
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on *your* machine, against *your* checkout.
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2. **Phoebus assistant connection** — approved, bounded system facts and
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validated typed proposals. It must never inherit the developer tool
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permissions and never receives secrets.
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OpenCode is integrated as a **real agent-server connection**, not a renamed
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OpenAI-compatible endpoint. The adapter speaks OpenCode's session/message API
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and feeds the same strict proposal parser, evidence review and executor as the
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direct providers.
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Read [ADR 0011](adr/0011-opencode-connection-boundary.md) first.
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@ -16,84 +12,147 @@ Read [ADR 0011](adr/0011-opencode-connection-boundary.md) first.
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| Component | What it is | Where it runs |
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|-----------|------------|---------------|
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| OpenCode client | `opencode` TUI/CLI, or `opencode attach <url>` | your machine |
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| OpenCode server | `opencode serve` — an HTTP/JSON **agent** API, not a model API | usually the same machine as the client or the model |
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| Model inference service | DeepSeek/OpenAI, or a local OpenAI-compatible server (Ollama, llama.cpp, ...) | provider cloud or your LAN |
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| OpenCode server | `opencode serve` — an HTTP/JSON **agent** API, not a model API | same machine as the client or the model |
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| Model inference service | DeepSeek/OpenAI, or a local OpenAI-compatible server | provider cloud or your LAN |
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| Phoebus installer/broker | the typed, privileged, local executor | the target machine only |
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**An OpenCode server URL does not go in Phoebus's local-model endpoint field.**
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An OpenCode server is an agent application; it is not an OpenAI-compatible
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`/v1/chat/completions` endpoint. Pointing Phoebus's `local` provider at it will
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fail, and would be the wrong trust boundary even if it parsed.
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**An OpenCode server URL does not go in the direct-provider endpoint field.**
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Select the OpenCode backend instead; Phoebus speaks the agent protocol.
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## Capability probe (never assume compatibility)
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## Configuration
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```sh
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phoebus-installer --opencode-probe http://127.0.0.1:4096
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```toml
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[ai]
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enabled = true
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backend = "opencode" # "direct" (default) or "opencode"
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opencode_server = "http://127.0.0.1:4096"
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opencode_provider = "deepseek"
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opencode_model = "deepseek-chat"
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# The server password is a secret: supply it at runtime, never here.
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```
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It is read-only and prints a typed state, exiting nonzero unless a model is
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available:
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The server password is stored in protected runtime input (a 0600 file or the GUI
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secret pipe) and is **separate** from a direct provider API key.
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## Command line
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```sh
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# Read-only: classify the server. Exits nonzero unless a model catalog exists.
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phoebus-installer --opencode-probe http://127.0.0.1:4096 \
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--opencode-provider deepseek --opencode-model deepseek-chat
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# Acceptance: obtain and validate a real model response. Exits nonzero on any
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# failure. This is the inference check, not a reachability check.
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phoebus-installer --opencode-test http://127.0.0.1:4096 \
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--opencode-provider deepseek --opencode-model deepseek-chat \
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--opencode-password-file /path/to/server.pw
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# Installer guidance through OpenCode (a real proposal is reviewed and applied).
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phoebus-installer --ai-backend opencode \
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--opencode-server http://127.0.0.1:4096 \
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--opencode-provider deepseek --opencode-model deepseek-chat \
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--install --ai
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# The installed assistant uses the same adapter.
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sys ask --ai-backend opencode --opencode-server http://127.0.0.1:4096 \
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--opencode-provider deepseek --opencode-model deepseek-chat \
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"show the transaction history"
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```
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`--opencode-password-file` must be mode 0600, like the direct provider key file.
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## Graphical installer
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On the **AI model** step choose **OpenCode agent**, then fill in the server URL,
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the server password (if the server has one), the provider and the model. Two
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actions are available:
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- **Test connection** obtains and validates a real model response
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(`ai_test`); it does not change the installation plan.
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- **Connect and validate** obtains a real proposal through OpenCode and runs the
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strict review (`ai_check`). Only then does the wizard allow continuing, and
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only then does the backend accept the AI prerequisite for installation.
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Changing the server, provider, model or password — or editing the configuration
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— invalidates the validated state.
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## Connection states
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`phoebus-installer --opencode-probe` prints one of:
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| State | Meaning |
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|-------|---------|
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| `disconnected` | TCP connect failed; the service is down |
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| `authentication_required` | the server answered 401/403; supply the password/tunnel |
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| `incompatible` | a health response arrived but the API shape is not the expected one |
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| `reachable_no_model` | healthy server, no model configured |
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| `ready` | reachable, healthy, API-compatible, and ≥1 model configured |
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| `insecure_transport` | the destination failed the transport policy |
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| `unreachable` | the server could not be reached |
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| `authentication_required` | the server returned 401 and no credential was supplied |
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| `authentication_rejected` | a credential was supplied and rejected |
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| `incompatible` | a response arrived but was not the expected API/JSON |
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| `reachable` | healthy server with no model catalog |
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| `model_catalog` | healthy server with a model catalog |
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| `selected_model_unavailable` | the chosen provider/model is not in the catalog |
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| `ready` | reserved for a real, validated model response (not the probe) |
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`ready` still does **not** prove the model can emit a valid Phoebus proposal;
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that requires a real prompt round-trip and proposal parse. A health check or an
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HTTP 200 is not that proof.
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A model catalog is not readiness. The probe never returns `ready`; only a real
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inference that validates the response does.
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The probe reads `/global/health` and `/config/providers`, keeps only counts from
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the latter, and never returns the provider credentials that upstream includes in
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that response.
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## Transport policy
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- Plain `http://` is accepted **only** when the resolved destination is
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loopback. The host is resolved and the connection is pinned to the checked
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address, so a DNS answer that changes after the check cannot move the target.
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- Remote access is `https://` (curl verifies the certificate; verification is
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never disabled) **or** an authenticated encrypted tunnel terminating on
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loopback (SSH `-L`, WireGuard, ...).
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- Redirects are disabled, the protocol is restricted to `http,https`, and
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connect time, total time, header/body sizes and response size are bounded.
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- A URL with userinfo, a path or a control character is rejected.
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## Security
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- The server the assistant talks to should run unprivileged with a restricted
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configuration. OpenCode permission settings are not an OS sandbox: run the
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Phoebus-facing server with a dedicated directory, no plugins, and no
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developer sessions, and keep the model credentials out of its reach where the
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deployment allows.
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- The adapter requests **no tools** per message (`"tools": {...false}`) as
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defence in depth, but that is not a substitute for process isolation.
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- Destructive product actions remain in the local typed broker with local human
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approval. The agent never receives a shell, root, credentials or private-file
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access, and disk/account passphrases are never sent to it.
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- The adapter creates a transient session per request, accepts only the
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completed assistant text parts (never user, tool or reasoning parts) and
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deletes the session afterwards, so installation facts are not retained.
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## A. OpenCode on the development/VM host
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```sh
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# 1. Set a provider credential through the environment (never a file in git).
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export DEEPSEEK_API_KEY="$(cat ~/.config/phoebus/deepseek.key)" # 0600 file
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# 2. Start the server on loopback only. Upstream warns when it is unsecured.
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opencode serve --hostname 127.0.0.1 --port 4096
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# 3. In another terminal, attach a client to it.
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opencode attach http://127.0.0.1:4096
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```
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Keep the server on `127.0.0.1`. Do not pass `--mdns` and do not bind `0.0.0.0`
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without authentication: the server's configuration API can expose provider
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credentials.
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## B. OpenCode on a separate user-controlled computer
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Run the server on that computer, bound to **loopback**, and reach it through an
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authenticated encrypted tunnel. SSH port-forwarding is the simplest approved
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transport:
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```sh
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# On the remote computer:
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opencode serve --hostname 127.0.0.1 --port 4096
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# From your machine (tunnel local 127.0.0.1:4096 -> remote loopback:4096):
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ssh -N -L 127.0.0.1:4096:127.0.0.1:4096 you@remote.example
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# Then, locally:
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opencode attach http://127.0.0.1:4096
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opencode attach http://127.0.0.1:4096 # interactive client
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phoebus-installer --opencode-probe http://127.0.0.1:4096
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```
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The probe now sees a loopback endpoint and the tunnel supplies transport
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authentication and encryption. If you cannot use a tunnel, set
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`OPENCODE_SERVER_PASSWORD` and terminate TLS in front of the server; never
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expose an unauthenticated plaintext service.
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Keep the server on `127.0.0.1`; do not enable `--mdns` or bind `0.0.0.0`
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without authentication.
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## B. OpenCode on a separate user-controlled computer
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Run the server on that computer bound to **loopback** and reach it through an
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authenticated encrypted tunnel:
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```sh
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# remote:
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opencode serve --hostname 127.0.0.1 --port 4096
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# local:
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ssh -N -L 127.0.0.1:4096:127.0.0.1:4096 you@remote.example
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phoebus-installer --opencode-probe http://127.0.0.1:4096
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```
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If a tunnel is impossible, set `OPENCODE_SERVER_PASSWORD` and terminate TLS in
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front of the server; never expose an unauthenticated plaintext service.
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### VM networking is not one thing
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Inside a VM these are different endpoints and must not be confused:
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| Endpoint | Meaning |
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|----------|---------|
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| `guest 127.0.0.1` | the guest's own loopback |
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@ -101,36 +160,28 @@ Inside a VM these are different endpoints and must not be confused:
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| `10.0.2.2` | the QEMU user-net gateway to the host |
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| `192.168.x.y` | a real LAN address, reachable by other machines |
|
||||
|
||||
## C. Phoebus assistant boundary
|
||||
A VM guest cannot name the host's loopback directly, and plain `http` to the
|
||||
gateway is refused by policy. The supported pattern is a host-local relay bound
|
||||
to the **guest's** loopback (the same shape as an SSH tunnel); the VM harness
|
||||
uses a tiny TCP forwarder for exactly this.
|
||||
|
||||
When a Phoebus assistant uses OpenCode:
|
||||
## Verified evidence (2026-09-22)
|
||||
|
||||
- Run the service unprivileged, with restricted filesystem access.
|
||||
- Disable tools you do not need. OpenCode permission settings are *not* an
|
||||
operating-system security boundary; enforce isolation outside the prompt.
|
||||
- Keep the destructive execution path in Phoebus's local broker with local human
|
||||
approval. The agent is never given a shell, root, credentials or private-file
|
||||
access.
|
||||
- Keep credentials in protected runtime storage (0600, outside model context).
|
||||
Never forward disk passphrases or account passwords to OpenCode.
|
||||
- Changing the model or connection invalidates any approval whose meaning
|
||||
depends on it; a reconnect must never replay an installation command.
|
||||
|
||||
## Developer workflow note
|
||||
|
||||
For work on this repository, the developer OpenCode session may use full tools,
|
||||
but only against a checkout and against **sanitized** test evidence. Do not feed
|
||||
it VM disks, serial transcripts with credentials, `*.pw` files, or the
|
||||
`PHOEBUS_OPENCODE_*` runtime inputs.
|
||||
|
||||
## Verified evidence
|
||||
|
||||
- `phoebus-installer --opencode-probe http://127.0.0.1:41999` against the
|
||||
installed `opencode 1.18.32` returned `ready` (3 providers, 27 models).
|
||||
- The same probe through a forwarded second loopback endpoint returned `ready`.
|
||||
- A server deliberately bound to a LAN address **without** authentication
|
||||
returned `authentication_required` and exit status 1: the probe refuses to
|
||||
treat an unauthenticated service as usable.
|
||||
- Physical second-computer verification is **BLOCKED** in this environment (no
|
||||
second machine / no passwordless SSH); the forwarded-hop test is labelled as a
|
||||
host-local transport test, not a second computer.
|
||||
- `opencode 1.18.32` (pinned manifest: `v1.18.31`; version mismatch noted).
|
||||
- `--opencode-probe` → `model_catalog`, 223 providers / 7915 models, 26
|
||||
connected; the selected `deepseek:deepseek-v4-flash` present.
|
||||
- `--opencode-test` → `validated model response: {"phoebus":"ok"}` (real
|
||||
inference), exit 0.
|
||||
- The GUI bridge `ai_check` over OpenCode applied 8 reviewed changes from a real
|
||||
`deepseek-v4-flash` proposal.
|
||||
- `sys ask` over OpenCode proposed a read-only `history` action and executed it
|
||||
deterministically.
|
||||
- Authentication: no credential → `authentication_required`; wrong →
|
||||
`authentication_rejected`; correct → `model_catalog` and a successful real
|
||||
inference.
|
||||
- Transport policy: plain `http` to a LAN/global address →
|
||||
`insecure_transport`, exit 1, no request sent.
|
||||
- Real-HTTP integration tests cover status preservation, chunked multibyte
|
||||
bodies, oversized bodies, redirects, abrupt disconnects and authentication.
|
||||
- A separate physical computer remains **unverified**; a second server bound to
|
||||
the LAN address reached through a loopback tunnel is the remote-topology test.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -99,7 +99,10 @@ still not VM-verified.
|
|||
| Bridge replay/concurrency + input bounds | yes | yes | no | n/a |
|
||||
| Provider transport endpoint/size hardening | yes | yes | no | n/a |
|
||||
| `TargetRoot` symlink-escape guard | yes | yes | n/a | n/a |
|
||||
| OpenCode server capability probe | yes | yes | real host probe (`ready`) | n/a |
|
||||
| OpenCode server capability probe | yes | yes | real host probe + auth + policy | n/a |
|
||||
| OpenCode proposal adapter (real inference) | yes | yes | real model (`deepseek-v4-flash`) | n/a |
|
||||
| OpenCode in GUI / CLI / `sys ask` | yes | yes | bridge + `sys ask` live | n/a |
|
||||
| Mandatory AI requires a validated interaction | yes | yes | bridge + CLI | n/a |
|
||||
| GURU packaging (scoped keywords) | yes | yes | no (build/install unverified) | no |
|
||||
| Release gates + atomic publish | yes | yes | no | n/a |
|
||||
| `sys` verbs | yes | yes | yes | no |
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -4,6 +4,32 @@ Companion to `docs/STATUS.md`. The machine-readable per-run results live outside
|
|||
git under `/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/<run-id>/results.json`; this file is the
|
||||
human-readable register of what was found, fixed and still unverified.
|
||||
|
||||
## OpenCode adapter (2026-09-22, second pass)
|
||||
|
||||
Implemented a real OpenCode adapter (not just a probe), integrated through
|
||||
canonical configuration (`ai.backend = "opencode"`), the GUI bridge, the
|
||||
installer CLI and `sys ask`. Defects found while implementing and testing:
|
||||
|
||||
| ID | Defect | Fix | Test |
|
||||
|----|--------|-----|------|
|
||||
| O1 | No OpenCode proposal adapter; the GUI used the OpenAI-compatible transport | `phoebus-executor::opencode_client` implements the real session/message protocol as a `ModelTransport` | live + bridge end-to-end |
|
||||
| O2 | `POST /session` was sent a `model` field per the OpenAPI schema | the shipped 1.18.32 rejects it (BadRequest); the model is selected on the message | real-HTTP integration |
|
||||
| O3 | The probe had no credential input | `ProbeRequest.auth` + basic-auth header via stdin | auth integration test |
|
||||
| O4 | The probe did not enforce the connection destination | `Endpoint::checked_target` resolves and requires loopback for plain http; the connection is pinned | `transport_policy_enforces_loopback_for_plain_http`, insecure-destination test |
|
||||
| O5 | Handwritten HTTP read had no total deadline and a UTF-8-unsafe chunk decoder that fell back on malformed input | removed the handwritten parser; the established curl transport is used and bounds time, protocol, redirects and size | real-HTTP chunked/oversize/redirect/disconnect tests |
|
||||
| O6 | The catalog was parsed without checking the HTTP status; a providers-shaped 500 could look like a catalog | status is checked before parsing; non-2xx is `incompatible` | `a_misleading_success_shaped_500_does_not_produce_a_catalog` |
|
||||
| O7 | Catalog presence counted as readiness | `ready` is reserved for a validated response; the probe returns `model_catalog`/`reachable` | `an_empty_catalog_is_reachable_not_ready` |
|
||||
| O8 | `probe_live_server_when_configured` passed when its env var was absent and only asserted reachability | replaced by env-gated `opencode_live` tests that assert a real inference; `PHOEBUS_OPENCODE_REQUIRE_LIVE=1` fails when the live run cannot happen | `make opencode-acceptance` |
|
||||
| O9 | The credential test built an already-sanitised struct | tests feed credential-bearing server bodies and assert errors/catalogs never contain them | `one_shot_rejects_a_non_assistant_or_errored_reply`, `catalog_never_reads_provider_keys` |
|
||||
| O10 | A provider name satisfied the mandatory-AI gate | both the bridge and the CLI require a validated interaction bound to the current configuration; config/secret changes invalidate it | `a_provider_name_alone_does_not_satisfy_the_ai_requirement`, `an_unreachable_provider_does_not_satisfy_the_ai_gate` |
|
||||
| O11 | The proposal prompt allowed the model to key the change by action name | prompt now requires exactly `action` + `value` with explicit examples | live bridge `ai_check` |
|
||||
| O12 | The GUI duplicate-session assertion accepted two pre-existing sessions | requires exactly one session before and after | harness |
|
||||
| O13 | GUI navigation was inferred from a surviving process/screenshot | the frontend emits secret-free `phoebus-state` lines; the harness asserts the current step and AI state | harness |
|
||||
|
||||
OpenCode protocol/transport tests: 26 executor unit tests + 7 real-HTTP
|
||||
integration tests + 2 live tests (skipped offline, real inference when
|
||||
configured). Bridge gate tests: 5. Full suite: 336 Rust tests.
|
||||
|
||||
## Run matrix (this session, 2026-09-22)
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -44,10 +44,35 @@ Two facts shape the decision:
|
|||
product actions still go through the local typed broker and local human
|
||||
approval. The OpenCode configuration is written mode 0600 and carries no
|
||||
credentials.
|
||||
5. **The installer's AI step keeps using its own bounded transport.** OpenCode
|
||||
is an optional operator workflow, not a replacement for the typed proposal
|
||||
transport; a future adapter must perform a real prompt round-trip and parse a
|
||||
versioned proposal before it may claim compatibility.
|
||||
5. **The installer's AI step uses a real OpenCode adapter** (implemented after
|
||||
this ADR was first written). `phoebus-executor::opencode_client` speaks the
|
||||
OpenCode session/message API over the project's curl transport and implements
|
||||
the same `ModelTransport` trait as the direct providers, so the strict
|
||||
proposal parser, evidence review, facts and executor are reused unchanged.
|
||||
The adapter creates a transient session per request, accepts only the
|
||||
completed assistant `TextPart`s (never user/tool/reasoning parts), disables
|
||||
tools per message, and deletes the session on every path. The GUI, the
|
||||
installer CLI and `sys ask` all select it through canonical configuration
|
||||
(`ai.backend = "opencode"`).
|
||||
6. **A provider name is not a validated interaction.** Both the GUI bridge and
|
||||
the installer CLI require a successful, validated model interaction bound to
|
||||
the current configuration (and credential) before installation; changing the
|
||||
model, endpoint, server or credential invalidates it. `Ready` is reserved for
|
||||
a real, validated response.
|
||||
|
||||
### Protocol notes (verified against the shipped `opencode 1.18.32`)
|
||||
|
||||
- Health: `GET /global/health`. Catalog: `GET /provider` (metadata; upstream may
|
||||
include a credential `key`, so only ids and model names are kept).
|
||||
- `POST /session` rejects a `model` field (BadRequest) despite the OpenAPI
|
||||
schema; the model is selected on the message.
|
||||
- `POST /session/{id}/message` returns the assistant reply synchronously;
|
||||
`format: json_schema` is rejected by the DeepSeek models in use ("Thinking
|
||||
mode does not support this tool_choice"), so the prompt carries an explicit
|
||||
change-object shape instead.
|
||||
- `POST /session/{id}/abort` and `DELETE /session/{id}` clean up.
|
||||
- Authentication is HTTP Basic with username `opencode` and the
|
||||
`OPENCODE_SERVER_PASSWORD` value; Bearer is not accepted.
|
||||
|
||||
## Consequences
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -62,5 +87,9 @@ Two facts shape the decision:
|
|||
|
||||
## Status
|
||||
|
||||
Accepted. The probe and its tests are implemented; end-to-end installation does
|
||||
not depend on OpenCode.
|
||||
Accepted and implemented. The probe, the adapter and the connection states are
|
||||
implemented with unit, real-HTTP integration, live-model and bridge tests; the
|
||||
graphical installer can select OpenCode and obtain a real validated proposal.
|
||||
End-to-end installation still does not *depend* on OpenCode: a direct provider
|
||||
or the deterministic `sys` path remains available, and an installed system works
|
||||
without a model.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -128,6 +128,9 @@ Singleton {
|
|||
function aiCheck(cb) {
|
||||
call("ai_check", {}, cb);
|
||||
}
|
||||
function aiTest(cb) {
|
||||
call("ai_test", {}, cb);
|
||||
}
|
||||
function approve(eraseText, finalConfirmed, cb) {
|
||||
call("approve", { erase: eraseText, final_confirm: finalConfirmed }, cb);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -28,11 +28,19 @@ ShellRoot {
|
|||
property string luksPw: ""
|
||||
property string luksPw2: ""
|
||||
property string apiKey: ""
|
||||
// OpenCode server password (basic auth), distinct from a provider API key.
|
||||
property string opencodePassword: ""
|
||||
|
||||
property bool aiConnected: false
|
||||
property bool aiChecking: false
|
||||
property string aiError: ""
|
||||
property var aiApplied: []
|
||||
// "Test connection" state: a real, validated model response was obtained.
|
||||
property bool aiTesting: false
|
||||
property bool aiTested: false
|
||||
property string aiTestMessage: ""
|
||||
|
||||
readonly property bool isOpenCode: shell.cfg && shell.cfg.ai.backend === "opencode"
|
||||
|
||||
property var stageStatus: ({})
|
||||
property var stageOrder: []
|
||||
|
|
@ -69,6 +77,21 @@ ShellRoot {
|
|||
return JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(o));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// A compact, secret-free state line for the harness. It lets a test assert
|
||||
// the actual current step and AI connection state instead of inferring them
|
||||
// from a screenshot or the mere survival of the process.
|
||||
function logState(tag) {
|
||||
console.log("phoebus-state " + tag
|
||||
+ " step=" + shell.step
|
||||
+ " phase=" + shell.phase
|
||||
+ " aiConnected=" + shell.aiConnected
|
||||
+ " aiError=" + shell.aiError.replace(/\n/g, " ").slice(0, 200));
|
||||
}
|
||||
onStepChanged: logState("step")
|
||||
onPhaseChanged: logState("phase")
|
||||
onAiConnectedChanged: logState("ai")
|
||||
onAiErrorChanged: logState("error")
|
||||
|
||||
// QML `var` properties do not emit change signals for nested assignments,
|
||||
// so bindings that read `cfg.*` would not update. Reassigning a clone
|
||||
// re-evaluates them. Used after a choice/toggle changes the configuration.
|
||||
|
|
@ -92,6 +115,10 @@ ShellRoot {
|
|||
modelField.inputItem.text = shell.cfg.ai.model;
|
||||
endpointField.inputItem.text = shell.cfg.ai.endpoint;
|
||||
keyField.inputItem.text = shell.apiKey;
|
||||
opencodeServerField.inputItem.text = shell.cfg.ai.opencode_server;
|
||||
opencodeProviderField.inputItem.text = shell.cfg.ai.opencode_provider;
|
||||
opencodeModelField.inputItem.text = shell.cfg.ai.opencode_model;
|
||||
opencodePasswordField.inputItem.text = shell.opencodePassword;
|
||||
pwField.inputItem.text = shell.userPw;
|
||||
pw2Field.inputItem.text = shell.userPw2;
|
||||
luksField.inputItem.text = shell.luksPw;
|
||||
|
|
@ -230,7 +257,7 @@ ShellRoot {
|
|||
shell.status = "";
|
||||
const s = shell.step;
|
||||
if (s === 2) {
|
||||
if (!shell.cfg.ai.provider || shell.cfg.ai.provider === "none") {
|
||||
if (!shell.isOpenCode && (!shell.cfg.ai.provider || shell.cfg.ai.provider === "none")) {
|
||||
shell.cfg.ai.provider = "deepseek";
|
||||
shell.cfg.ai.enabled = true;
|
||||
if (!shell.cfg.ai.model)
|
||||
|
|
@ -278,22 +305,65 @@ ShellRoot {
|
|||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function configureProvider(value) {
|
||||
shell.cfg.ai.provider = value;
|
||||
shell.cfg.ai.enabled = value !== "none";
|
||||
shell.aiConnected = false;
|
||||
shell.aiTested = false;
|
||||
shell.aiTestMessage = "";
|
||||
shell.aiError = "";
|
||||
shell.aiApplied = [];
|
||||
if (value === "deepseek")
|
||||
shell.cfg.ai.model = "deepseek-chat";
|
||||
else if (value === "openai")
|
||||
shell.cfg.ai.model = "gpt-4o-mini";
|
||||
else if (value === "local")
|
||||
shell.cfg.ai.model = shell.cfg.ai.model || "llama3.1";
|
||||
modelField.inputItem.text = shell.cfg.ai.model;
|
||||
endpointField.inputItem.text = shell.cfg.ai.endpoint;
|
||||
if (value === "opencode") {
|
||||
// OpenCode is an agent server with its own protocol; it is not an
|
||||
// OpenAI-compatible endpoint, so it has its own backend and fields.
|
||||
shell.cfg.ai.backend = "opencode";
|
||||
shell.cfg.ai.provider = "opencode";
|
||||
shell.cfg.ai.opencode_server = shell.cfg.ai.opencode_server || "http://127.0.0.1:4096";
|
||||
shell.cfg.ai.opencode_provider = shell.cfg.ai.opencode_provider || "deepseek";
|
||||
shell.cfg.ai.opencode_model = shell.cfg.ai.opencode_model || "deepseek-chat";
|
||||
opencodeServerField.inputItem.text = shell.cfg.ai.opencode_server;
|
||||
opencodeProviderField.inputItem.text = shell.cfg.ai.opencode_provider;
|
||||
opencodeModelField.inputItem.text = shell.cfg.ai.opencode_model;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
shell.cfg.ai.backend = "direct";
|
||||
shell.cfg.ai.provider = value;
|
||||
if (value === "deepseek")
|
||||
shell.cfg.ai.model = "deepseek-chat";
|
||||
else if (value === "openai")
|
||||
shell.cfg.ai.model = "gpt-4o-mini";
|
||||
else if (value === "local")
|
||||
shell.cfg.ai.model = shell.cfg.ai.model || "llama3.1";
|
||||
modelField.inputItem.text = shell.cfg.ai.model;
|
||||
endpointField.inputItem.text = shell.cfg.ai.endpoint;
|
||||
}
|
||||
shell.touchConfig();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// A lightweight real interaction used by "Test connection": it obtains and
|
||||
// validates a model response without proposing installation changes.
|
||||
function testAi() {
|
||||
shell.aiTesting = true;
|
||||
shell.aiTested = false;
|
||||
shell.aiTestMessage = "";
|
||||
shell.aiError = "";
|
||||
const secrets = {};
|
||||
if (shell.opencodePassword.length > 0)
|
||||
secrets.opencode_password = shell.opencodePassword;
|
||||
if (shell.apiKey.length > 0)
|
||||
secrets.ai_api_key = shell.apiKey;
|
||||
Bridge.setSecrets(secrets, () => {
|
||||
applyConfig(() => {
|
||||
Bridge.aiTest(reply => {
|
||||
shell.aiTesting = false;
|
||||
if (reply.ok) {
|
||||
shell.aiTested = true;
|
||||
shell.aiTestMessage = "Model responded";
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
shell.aiTestMessage = reply.error;
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function connectAi() {
|
||||
shell.aiChecking = true;
|
||||
shell.aiError = "";
|
||||
|
|
@ -302,6 +372,8 @@ ShellRoot {
|
|||
const secrets = {};
|
||||
if (shell.apiKey.length > 0)
|
||||
secrets.ai_api_key = shell.apiKey;
|
||||
if (shell.opencodePassword.length > 0)
|
||||
secrets.opencode_password = shell.opencodePassword;
|
||||
Bridge.setSecrets(secrets, () => {
|
||||
applyConfig(() => {
|
||||
Bridge.aiCheck(reply => {
|
||||
|
|
@ -709,17 +781,19 @@ ShellRoot {
|
|||
options: [
|
||||
{ value: "deepseek", label: "DeepSeek" },
|
||||
{ value: "openai", label: "OpenAI" },
|
||||
{ value: "local", label: "Local model" }
|
||||
{ value: "local", label: "Local model" },
|
||||
{ value: "opencode", label: "OpenCode agent" }
|
||||
]
|
||||
value: shell.cfg ? shell.cfg.ai.provider : "deepseek"
|
||||
value: shell.isOpenCode ? "opencode" : (shell.cfg ? shell.cfg.ai.provider : "deepseek")
|
||||
onSelected: value => shell.configureProvider(value)
|
||||
}
|
||||
// -- direct providers ----------------------------------
|
||||
PhoebusField {
|
||||
id: keyField
|
||||
label: "API key"
|
||||
placeholder: "Paste your provider key"
|
||||
secret: true
|
||||
visible: shell.cfg && (shell.cfg.ai.provider === "deepseek" || shell.cfg.ai.provider === "openai")
|
||||
visible: shell.cfg && !shell.isOpenCode && (shell.cfg.ai.provider === "deepseek" || shell.cfg.ai.provider === "openai")
|
||||
onEdited: value => shell.apiKey = value
|
||||
}
|
||||
PhoebusField {
|
||||
|
|
@ -727,6 +801,7 @@ ShellRoot {
|
|||
label: "Model"
|
||||
placeholder: "model name"
|
||||
error: ""
|
||||
visible: shell.cfg && !shell.isOpenCode
|
||||
onEdited: value => shell.cfg.ai.model = value
|
||||
Component.onCompleted: inputItem.text = shell.cfg && shell.cfg.ai.model ? shell.cfg.ai.model : ""
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -734,21 +809,70 @@ ShellRoot {
|
|||
id: endpointField
|
||||
label: "Endpoint (local models)"
|
||||
placeholder: "http://127.0.0.1:11434/v1/chat/completions"
|
||||
visible: shell.cfg && shell.cfg.ai.provider === "local"
|
||||
visible: shell.cfg && !shell.isOpenCode && shell.cfg.ai.provider === "local"
|
||||
onEdited: value => shell.cfg.ai.endpoint = value
|
||||
Component.onCompleted: inputItem.text = shell.cfg && shell.cfg.ai.endpoint ? shell.cfg.ai.endpoint : ""
|
||||
}
|
||||
// -- OpenCode agent server -----------------------------
|
||||
Text {
|
||||
width: parent.width
|
||||
visible: shell.isOpenCode
|
||||
text: "OpenCode is an agent server, not a model endpoint. Phoebus connects to it over its own protocol. Bind it to loopback and reach a remote server through an authenticated tunnel; plain http to a non-loopback address is refused."
|
||||
color: Theme.muted
|
||||
font.family: Theme.family
|
||||
font.pixelSize: Theme.fontSmall
|
||||
wrapMode: Text.WordWrap
|
||||
}
|
||||
PhoebusField {
|
||||
id: opencodeServerField
|
||||
label: "OpenCode server"
|
||||
placeholder: "http://127.0.0.1:4096"
|
||||
visible: shell.isOpenCode
|
||||
onEdited: value => shell.cfg.ai.opencode_server = value
|
||||
}
|
||||
PhoebusField {
|
||||
id: opencodePasswordField
|
||||
label: "Server password (if set)"
|
||||
placeholder: "OPENCODE_SERVER_PASSWORD"
|
||||
secret: true
|
||||
visible: shell.isOpenCode
|
||||
onEdited: value => shell.opencodePassword = value
|
||||
}
|
||||
PhoebusField {
|
||||
id: opencodeProviderField
|
||||
label: "Provider"
|
||||
placeholder: "deepseek"
|
||||
visible: shell.isOpenCode
|
||||
onEdited: value => shell.cfg.ai.opencode_provider = value
|
||||
}
|
||||
PhoebusField {
|
||||
id: opencodeModelField
|
||||
label: "Model"
|
||||
placeholder: "deepseek-chat"
|
||||
visible: shell.isOpenCode
|
||||
onEdited: value => shell.cfg.ai.opencode_model = value
|
||||
}
|
||||
Row {
|
||||
spacing: 12
|
||||
PhoebusButton {
|
||||
label: shell.aiTesting ? "Testing…" : "Test connection"
|
||||
actionEnabled: !shell.aiTesting && !shell.aiChecking
|
||||
onClicked: shell.testAi()
|
||||
}
|
||||
PhoebusButton {
|
||||
label: shell.aiChecking ? "Checking…" : "Connect and validate"
|
||||
primary: true
|
||||
actionEnabled: !shell.aiChecking
|
||||
actionEnabled: !shell.aiChecking && !shell.aiTesting
|
||||
onClicked: shell.connectAi()
|
||||
}
|
||||
PhoebusChip {
|
||||
visible: shell.aiConnected
|
||||
text: "Connected"
|
||||
text: "Validated"
|
||||
tone: Theme.success
|
||||
}
|
||||
PhoebusChip {
|
||||
visible: shell.aiTested && !shell.aiConnected
|
||||
text: "Model responded"
|
||||
tone: Theme.success
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -761,6 +885,15 @@ ShellRoot {
|
|||
font.pixelSize: Theme.fontSmall
|
||||
wrapMode: Text.WordWrap
|
||||
}
|
||||
Text {
|
||||
width: parent.width
|
||||
visible: shell.aiTestMessage.length > 0 && shell.aiError.length === 0
|
||||
text: shell.aiTestMessage
|
||||
color: shell.aiTested ? Theme.success : Theme.danger
|
||||
font.family: Theme.family
|
||||
font.pixelSize: Theme.fontSmall
|
||||
wrapMode: Text.WordWrap
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
PhoebusCard {
|
||||
width: parent.width
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -474,8 +474,10 @@ class Driver:
|
|||
label="duplicate-launch",
|
||||
)
|
||||
n1, n2 = int(self.last_group(1)), int(self.last_group(2))
|
||||
# Exactly one session before and after: two pre-existing sessions must
|
||||
# not pass as "no duplicate".
|
||||
self.results.assert_true(
|
||||
"duplicate-sessions-prevented", n1 == n2 and n1 >= 1,
|
||||
"exactly-one-installer-session", n1 == 1 and n2 == 1,
|
||||
f"n1={n1} n2={n2}",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -501,8 +503,58 @@ class Driver:
|
|||
"ai-step-blocks-install", blocked,
|
||||
"the AI step allowed advancement without a connected model",
|
||||
)
|
||||
# Behavioral evidence from the frontend's own state lines: the wizard is
|
||||
# still on the AI step (index 2) and has not reported a connection, and
|
||||
# it shows an inline error. A surviving process or a screenshot would
|
||||
# not prove any of this.
|
||||
state = self._frontend_state()
|
||||
if state is None:
|
||||
self.results.fail("ai-page-remains", "no frontend state line found")
|
||||
else:
|
||||
self.results.assert_true(
|
||||
"ai-page-remains", state["step"] == 2 and not state["aiConnected"],
|
||||
f"last state: {state}",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.results.assert_true(
|
||||
"ai-error-shown", bool(state["aiError"]),
|
||||
f"the AI step showed no inline error: {state}",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.results.pass_("gui-walk-completed")
|
||||
|
||||
def _frontend_state(self) -> dict | None:
|
||||
"""Read the frontend's last secret-free state line.
|
||||
|
||||
The pattern is built from a variable so the shell echo of the command
|
||||
cannot be mistaken for a real state line.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
assert self.child is not None
|
||||
self.child.sendline(
|
||||
'P=phoebus-; grep -ah "${P}state " '
|
||||
"/run/user/1000/quickshell/by-id/*/log.qslog 2>/dev/null | tail -1; "
|
||||
"echo STATE-$(printf END)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
self.child.expect("STATE-END", timeout=30)
|
||||
except (pexpect.TIMEOUT, pexpect.EOF):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
step = ai = None
|
||||
err = ""
|
||||
for line in (self.child.before or "").splitlines():
|
||||
if "phoebus-state" not in line:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
match = re.search(r"step=(\d+)", line)
|
||||
if match:
|
||||
step = int(match.group(1))
|
||||
match = re.search(r"aiConnected=(true|false)", line)
|
||||
if match:
|
||||
ai = match.group(1) == "true"
|
||||
match = re.search(r"aiError=(.*)$", line)
|
||||
if match:
|
||||
err = match.group(1).strip()
|
||||
if step is None:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
return {"step": step, "aiConnected": bool(ai), "aiError": err}
|
||||
|
||||
def _installer_alive(self) -> bool:
|
||||
assert self.child is not None
|
||||
self.child.sendline(
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Add table
Reference in a new issue