fix(installer): do not discard the validated AI state on unrelated edits

A fully-validated OpenCode install was refused at the final step because
selecting a disk or setting the account/LUKS secrets cleared the AI
validation. Bind the validation to a digest of only the AI connection
settings: non-AI config changes preserve it, while an AI provider/model/
endpoint/server or AI-credential change invalidates it. Add regression
tests and password-length placeholder hints.
This commit is contained in:
Phoebus 2026-09-22 04:13:31 -07:00
parent 39c69d59cf
commit b4935578ac
3 changed files with 115 additions and 14 deletions

View file

@ -63,9 +63,14 @@ Observed while a user drove the live ISO by hand (run
| U3 | An invalid model produced only `OpenCode message failed: HTTP 500` — opaque. | **Fixed in source**: the error now names `provider/model` and says to check the model exists and the credentials are valid. (Needs the next ISO.) |
| U4 | At first boot the DMS app-launcher/overview overlay was open on top of the welcome window, hiding the primary action until dismissed. | **Open**: reproduced once; investigating whether it is a DMS first-run behaviour or a focus race. |
| U5 | The OpenCode model default `deepseek-chat` is not present on every server, so the first attempt failed. | **Mitigated**: the picker now lists only real models. Considering defaulting the model to unset and requiring a pick. |
| U6 | **Showstopper.** A fully-validated OpenCode install was refused at the final step with *"installing Phoebus requires a successful, validated AI interaction"*. The validated state was cleared by **unrelated** configuration and secret changes (selecting a disk, typing the account password, setting the LUKS passphrase). | **Fixed**: the AI validation is now bound to a digest of only the AI connection settings; non-AI config changes preserve it, and only an AI provider/model/endpoint/server change or an AI credential change invalidates it. Regression tests: `a_non_ai_config_change_keeps_the_validated_interaction`, `an_account_secret_does_not_invalidate_but_an_ai_key_does`. |
| U7 | The account/encryption step required several attempts; the password/passphrase minimum was only revealed as a red error after pressing Next, and the offending fields could be scrolled off-screen. | **Mitigated**: password/passphrase fields now carry an "At least 8 characters" / "Repeat …" placeholder hint before submission. |
None of these blocked the installer; they are usability defects. U1–U3 are
implemented; U4–U5 are tracked.
U6 blocked a real install; U1–U3 and U6–U7 are implemented, U4 remains open.
The user's session reached the AI step, obtained and applied a validated
OpenCode proposal, selected the disk, completed the account step and the
review — and only then hit U6. Evidence: `/var/tmp/phoebus-vm/user-session3/`
(`shots/0008`–`0016`, `observations.log`).
OpenCode protocol/transport tests: 26 executor unit tests + 7 real-HTTP
integration tests + 2 live tests (skipped offline, real inference when

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@ -523,11 +523,15 @@ impl Bridge {
// backend concerns and not user-selectable from the GUI.
config.runtime.dry_run = self.installer.config.runtime.dry_run;
let ai_before = ai_digest(&self.installer.config);
self.installer.reconfigure(config);
self.approved_digest = None;
// A configuration change (provider, model, endpoint, server) invalidates
// any previous AI validation.
// Only a change to the AI connection settings invalidates the AI
// validation. Choosing a disk, typing a hostname or similar must not
// throw away a successful model interaction.
if ai_digest(&self.installer.config) != ai_before {
self.validated_ai = None;
}
let issues = self.installer.validate();
Ok(json!({
"accepted": true,
@ -574,18 +578,24 @@ impl Bridge {
self.installer.exec.register_secret(&s);
self.root_password = Some(s);
}
let mut ai_credential_changed = false;
if let Some(v) = &patch.ai_api_key {
let s = SecretString::new(v.clone());
self.installer.exec.register_secret(&s);
self.api_key = Some(s);
ai_credential_changed = true;
}
if let Some(v) = &patch.opencode_password {
let s = SecretString::new(v.clone());
self.installer.exec.register_secret(&s);
self.opencode_password = Some(s);
ai_credential_changed = true;
}
// A credential change invalidates any previous AI validation.
// Only an AI credential change invalidates the AI validation; account
// and disk secrets do not.
if ai_credential_changed {
self.validated_ai = None;
}
// Report only presence, never values.
Ok(json!({
"luks_set": self.luks.is_some(),
@ -620,7 +630,7 @@ impl Bridge {
self.approved_digest = None;
// Bind the validated interaction to the exact configuration it was
// validated against; any later change clears it.
self.validated_ai = Some(self.plan_digest());
self.validated_ai = Some(ai_digest(&self.installer.config));
Ok(value)
}
@ -700,7 +710,7 @@ impl Bridge {
review_proposal(config, exec.redactor(), facts, api_key_present, transport)?
};
self.approved_digest = None;
self.validated_ai = Some(self.plan_digest());
self.validated_ai = Some(ai_digest(&self.installer.config));
Ok(value)
}
@ -772,7 +782,8 @@ impl Bridge {
let break_glass = std::env::var("PHOEBUS_NO_AI")
.map(|v| matches!(v.to_ascii_lowercase().as_str(), "1" | "yes" | "true"))
.unwrap_or(false);
let validated = self.validated_ai.as_deref() == Some(current.as_str());
let validated =
self.validated_ai.as_deref() == Some(ai_digest(&self.installer.config).as_str());
if !validated && !break_glass {
return Err(
"installing Phoebus requires a successful, validated AI interaction for \
@ -1297,6 +1308,29 @@ fn review_opencode(
)
}
/// A deterministic digest of only the AI connection settings. The mandatory-AI
/// validation is bound to this, so choosing a disk or typing an account
/// password does not discard a successful model interaction, while changing the
/// provider, model, endpoint or server does.
fn ai_digest(config: &InstallConfig) -> String {
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
let ai = &config.ai;
let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
for field in [
ai.backend.as_str(),
ai.provider.as_str(),
ai.model.as_str(),
ai.endpoint.as_str(),
ai.opencode_server.as_str(),
ai.opencode_provider.as_str(),
ai.opencode_model.as_str(),
] {
hasher.update(field.as_bytes());
hasher.update([0u8]);
}
format!("{:x}", hasher.finalize())
}
/// Parse the direct provider from the configuration, validate the connection
/// and apply the reviewed proposal. This is the same `ai_guide` path the TUI
/// uses.
@ -1934,6 +1968,68 @@ mod tests {
.contains("validated AI interaction"));
}
#[test]
fn a_non_ai_config_change_keeps_the_validated_interaction() {
// Choosing a disk or editing the account must not discard a successful
// model interaction: this was the bug that refused a fully-validated
// install at the final step.
let mut bridge = test_bridge_non_dry();
set_valid_config(&mut bridge);
arm_ai(&mut bridge);
let mut c = config_json(&bridge);
c["system"]["hostname"] = json!("renamed-box");
let _ = call(
&mut bridge,
&json!({ "id": 60, "op": "set_config", "config": c }).to_string(),
);
let (digest, _) = approve(&mut bridge);
let resp = start(&mut bridge, &digest);
assert!(
!resp["error"]
.as_str()
.unwrap_or("")
.contains("validated AI interaction"),
"a non-AI change wrongly invalidated the interaction: {}",
resp["error"]
);
}
#[test]
fn an_account_secret_does_not_invalidate_but_an_ai_key_does() {
let mut bridge = test_bridge_non_dry();
set_valid_config(&mut bridge);
arm_ai(&mut bridge);
let _ = call(
&mut bridge,
r#"{"id":61,"op":"set_secrets","secrets":{"user_password":"secret-pass-1","luks":"luks-pass-1234"}}"#,
);
let (digest, _) = approve(&mut bridge);
let resp = start(&mut bridge, &digest);
assert!(
!resp["error"]
.as_str()
.unwrap_or("")
.contains("validated AI interaction"),
"an account secret wrongly invalidated the interaction: {}",
resp["error"]
);
// A changed AI credential must invalidate it.
let mut bridge = test_bridge_non_dry();
set_valid_config(&mut bridge);
arm_ai(&mut bridge);
let _ = call(
&mut bridge,
r#"{"id":62,"op":"set_secrets","secrets":{"ai_api_key":"a-different-key"}}"#,
);
let (digest, _) = approve(&mut bridge);
let resp = start(&mut bridge, &digest);
assert!(resp["error"]
.as_str()
.unwrap()
.contains("validated AI interaction"));
}
#[test]
fn a_secret_change_invalidates_the_validated_interaction() {
let mut bridge = test_bridge_non_dry();

View file

@ -1014,15 +1014,15 @@ ShellRoot {
PhoebusField { id: fullnameField; label: "Full name"; onEdited: value => shell.cfg.user.fullname = value; Component.onCompleted: inputItem.text = shell.cfg ? shell.cfg.user.fullname : "" }
PhoebusField { id: userField; label: "Username"; placeholder: "lowercase"; error: shell.issueFor("username"); onEdited: value => shell.cfg.user.username = value; Component.onCompleted: inputItem.text = shell.cfg ? shell.cfg.user.username : "" }
PhoebusField { id: hostField; label: "Computer name"; placeholder: "phoebus"; error: shell.issueFor("hostname"); onEdited: value => shell.cfg.system.hostname = value; Component.onCompleted: inputItem.text = shell.cfg ? shell.cfg.system.hostname : "" }
PhoebusField { id: pwField; label: "Password"; secret: true; error: shell.issueFor("password"); onEdited: value => shell.userPw = value }
PhoebusField { id: pw2Field; label: "Confirm password"; secret: true; error: shell.issueFor("password_confirm"); onEdited: value => shell.userPw2 = value }
PhoebusField { id: pwField; label: "Password"; secret: true; placeholder: "At least 8 characters"; error: shell.issueFor("password"); onEdited: value => shell.userPw = value }
PhoebusField { id: pw2Field; label: "Confirm password"; secret: true; placeholder: "Repeat the password"; error: shell.issueFor("password_confirm"); onEdited: value => shell.userPw2 = value }
}
PhoebusCard {
width: parent.width
Text { width: parent.width; text: "Disk encryption"; color: Theme.warmWhite; font.family: Theme.family; font.pixelSize: Theme.fontHeading; font.weight: Font.DemiBold }
Text { width: parent.width; text: "LUKS2 whole-disk encryption protects your data at rest. Keep this passphrase safe: without it the disk cannot be unlocked."; color: Theme.muted; font.family: Theme.family; font.pixelSize: Theme.fontSmall; wrapMode: Text.WordWrap }
PhoebusField { id: luksField; label: "Encryption passphrase"; secret: true; error: shell.issueFor("passphrase"); onEdited: value => shell.luksPw = value }
PhoebusField { id: luks2Field; label: "Confirm passphrase"; secret: true; error: shell.issueFor("passphrase_confirm"); onEdited: value => shell.luksPw2 = value }
PhoebusField { id: luksField; label: "Encryption passphrase"; secret: true; placeholder: "At least 8 characters"; error: shell.issueFor("passphrase"); onEdited: value => shell.luksPw = value }
PhoebusField { id: luks2Field; label: "Confirm passphrase"; secret: true; placeholder: "Repeat the passphrase"; error: shell.issueFor("passphrase_confirm"); onEdited: value => shell.luksPw2 = value }
}
PhoebusCard {
width: parent.width