fix(vm): provision Gentoo release key; truthful rollback gate
Live image ships gnupg plus the Gentoo release key, fingerprint-checked at build time against the published release-key fingerprints, so the fail-closed DIGESTS verification cannot be silently skipped. Rollback harness: authenticate sudo (unique end markers, verified timestamp, abort instead of hanging), run both guest phases as root, use explicit --legacy for snapshot/break/undo, fix the verify SYS path, emit the real systemd state, and preserve the phase-1 transcript.
This commit is contained in:
parent
95e0d05344
commit
744059b6a2
8 changed files with 176 additions and 19 deletions
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@ -38,7 +38,11 @@ The build runs entirely unprivileged and never touches a host disk:
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UEFI/BIOS boot path.
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UEFI/BIOS boot path.
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No `curl | sh`, no live/git packages, and signature verification is never
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No `curl | sh`, no live/git packages, and signature verification is never
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disabled. Debian packages are used only on the live medium.
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disabled. Debian packages are used only on the live medium. The live image
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ships `gnupg` plus the trusted Gentoo release key at
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`/usr/share/openpgp-keys/gentoo-release.asc` (provisioned by `build.sh` and
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checked against Gentoo's published release-key fingerprints), so the
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installer's signed-DIGESTS stage3 verification cannot be silently skipped.
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## Build
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## Build
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@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ say() { printf '\n== %s ==\n' "$*"; }
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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say "preflight"
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say "preflight"
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for c in mmdebstrap xorriso mksquashfs curl dpkg-deb unshare sha256sum; do
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for c in mmdebstrap xorriso mksquashfs curl dpkg-deb unshare sha256sum gpg; do
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command -v "$c" >/dev/null || { echo "missing tool: $c" >&2; exit 1; }
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command -v "$c" >/dev/null || { echo "missing tool: $c" >&2; exit 1; }
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done
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done
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if ! command -v magick >/dev/null 2>&1 \
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if ! command -v magick >/dev/null 2>&1 \
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@ -315,6 +315,52 @@ status=disabled
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EOF
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EOF
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fi
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fi
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# Provision the trusted Gentoo release key for stage3 DIGESTS verification.
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# The installer authenticates the signed DIGESTS with gpg against
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# /usr/share/openpgp-keys/gentoo-release.asc and refuses to install without
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# it, so the live image must ship that key. The key bundle is fetched once
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# here at build time (never unauthenticated at install time) and accepted
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# only when its fingerprint matches Gentoo's published release-key
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# information (https://www.gentoo.org/downloads/signatures/).
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gentoo_keydir="$rootfs/usr/share/openpgp-keys"
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gentoo_key="$gentoo_keydir/gentoo-release.asc"
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weekly_fp="13EBBDBEDE7A12775DFDB1BABB572E0E2D182910"
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signing_fp="D99EAC7379A850BCE47DA5F29E6438C817072058"
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keyring_tmp="$(mktemp -d)"
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curl -fsSL --retry 3 -o "$keyring_tmp/service-keys.gpg" \
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"https://qa-reports.gentoo.org/output/service-keys.gpg"
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GNUPGHOME="$keyring_tmp" gpg --batch --quiet \
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--import "$keyring_tmp/service-keys.gpg"
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if ! GNUPGHOME="$keyring_tmp" gpg --batch --with-colons \
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--list-keys "$weekly_fp" 2>/dev/null | grep -q "$weekly_fp"; then
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echo "Gentoo weekly release key $weekly_fp missing from the fetched bundle;" >&2
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echo "refusing to ship an untrusted stage3 verification key" >&2
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rm -rf "$keyring_tmp"
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exit 1
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fi
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install -d -m 0755 "$gentoo_keydir"
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if ! GNUPGHOME="$keyring_tmp" gpg --batch --quiet --armor \
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--export "$weekly_fp" "$signing_fp" > "$gentoo_key" 2>/dev/null; then
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GNUPGHOME="$keyring_tmp" gpg --batch --quiet --armor \
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--export "$weekly_fp" > "$gentoo_key"
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fi
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[[ -s "$gentoo_key" ]] || {
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echo "failed to provision the Gentoo release key" >&2
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rm -rf "$keyring_tmp"
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exit 1
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}
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chmod 0644 "$gentoo_key"
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verify_tmp="$(mktemp -d)"
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GNUPGHOME="$verify_tmp" gpg --batch --quiet --import "$gentoo_key"
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if ! GNUPGHOME="$verify_tmp" gpg --batch --with-colons \
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--list-keys "$weekly_fp" 2>/dev/null | grep -q "$weekly_fp"; then
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echo "provisioned Gentoo release key failed its fingerprint check" >&2
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rm -rf "$keyring_tmp" "$verify_tmp"
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exit 1
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fi
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rm -rf "$keyring_tmp" "$verify_tmp"
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echo "Gentoo release key provisioned and fingerprint-checked: $gentoo_key"
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# Branding: shared vector assets, the app icon and the live-only marker.
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# Branding: shared vector assets, the app icon and the live-only marker.
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install_asset brand-emblem /usr/share/phoebus/branding/emblem.svg
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install_asset brand-emblem /usr/share/phoebus/branding/emblem.svg
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install_asset brand-wordmark /usr/share/phoebus/branding/wordmark.svg
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install_asset brand-wordmark /usr/share/phoebus/branding/wordmark.svg
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@ -32,6 +32,9 @@ dosfstools
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btrfs-progs
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btrfs-progs
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util-linux
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util-linux
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e2fsprogs
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e2fsprogs
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# gpg authenticates the Gentoo stage3 DIGESTS signature at install time.
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# Without it the installer refuses to install (fail closed).
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gnupg
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# --- GPU detection and the NVIDIA accelerated driver --------------------------
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# --- GPU detection and the NVIDIA accelerated driver --------------------------
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# The live medium bundles NVIDIA's accelerated stack so a supported GPU boots
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# The live medium bundles NVIDIA's accelerated stack so a supported GPU boots
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@ -72,13 +72,22 @@ embed a console via `KERNEL_CONSOLE` (`GENTOO_KERNEL_CONSOLE` equivalent).
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**already-installed** disposable disk:
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**already-installed** disposable disk:
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1. boot the installed disk, unlock LUKS and log in;
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1. boot the installed disk, unlock LUKS and log in;
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2. fetch `sys` and `rollback-guest.sh` from the host (the target does not yet
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2. fetch `sys` and `rollback-guest.sh` from the host (the installed system
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install `sys`; see `docs/HANDOFF.md`), record the `/var/db/pkg` fingerprint
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carries `/usr/local/bin/sys`; the host copy is a fallback), authenticate
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and a `/home` marker, create a recovery point with `sys snapshot`, install a
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`sudo` (the password is sent only at sudo's own no-echo prompt, never on a
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small package (a controlled, reversible update) and run `sys undo`;
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command line), record the `/var/db/pkg` fingerprint and a `/home` marker,
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3. power off, boot the disk detached, and run `rollback-verify.sh`, comparing
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create a recovery point with `sys snapshot`, install a small package (a
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the package fingerprint and the `/home` marker, checking kernel modules, and
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controlled, reversible update) and run `sys undo` — all as root, because
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reading the snapshot recovery entry and `sys rollback status`.
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unprivileged runs would be refused and prove nothing;
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3. power off, boot the disk detached, and run `rollback-verify.sh` (also as
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root), comparing the package fingerprint and the `/home` marker, checking
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kernel modules, systemd state, and reading the snapshot recovery entry and
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`sys rollback status`.
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Both transcripts are kept (`serial-phase1.log`, `serial.log`). The guest
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scripts refuse to run unprivileged (`ROLLBACK-NEEDS-ROOT` /
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`AFTER-NEEDS-ROOT`) so a lost `sudo` timestamp fails loudly instead of
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recording vacuous passes.
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Serve the fixtures as well as the installer:
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Serve the fixtures as well as the installer:
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@ -12,6 +12,14 @@
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# real installed command path, not a mock.
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# real installed command path, not a mock.
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set -uo pipefail
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set -uo pipefail
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# The snapshot/break/undo steps mutate the system and must run as root. The
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# driver authenticates sudo before invoking this script; fail fast rather
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# than recording vacuous "success" markers as an unprivileged user.
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if [ "$(id -u)" != "0" ]; then
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echo "===ROLLBACK-NEEDS-ROOT id=$(id -u)==="
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exit 1
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fi
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SERVE="${SERVE_URL:-http://10.0.2.2:8000}"
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SERVE="${SERVE_URL:-http://10.0.2.2:8000}"
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if [[ -n "${SYS_BIN:-}" ]]; then
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if [[ -n "${SYS_BIN:-}" ]]; then
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SYS="$SYS_BIN"
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SYS="$SYS_BIN"
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@ -38,8 +46,10 @@ printf '%s\n' "$HOME_MARKER" > "/home/$USER_NAME/rollback-marker.txt"
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PKGS_BEFORE="$(pkg_fingerprint)"
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PKGS_BEFORE="$(pkg_fingerprint)"
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echo "===ROLLBACK-KNOWN-GOOD pkgs=$PKGS_BEFORE kernel=$KERNEL home=$HOME_MARKER==="
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echo "===ROLLBACK-KNOWN-GOOD pkgs=$PKGS_BEFORE kernel=$KERNEL home=$HOME_MARKER==="
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# 2. Create the recovery point through the supported interface.
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# 2. Create the recovery point through the supported interface. Explicit
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"$SYS" -y snapshot "rollback acceptance" > "$WORK/snapshot.out" 2>&1
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# `--legacy` selects deterministic handling (no model); without it the
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# request would enter the AI workflow and stop with no provider.
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"$SYS" -y snapshot "rollback acceptance" --legacy > "$WORK/snapshot.out" 2>&1
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SNAP_ID="$(sed -n 's/^protective snapshot: //p' "$WORK/snapshot.out" | tail -1)"
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SNAP_ID="$(sed -n 's/^protective snapshot: //p' "$WORK/snapshot.out" | tail -1)"
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echo "===ROLLBACK-SNAPSHOT id=$SNAP_ID==="
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echo "===ROLLBACK-SNAPSHOT id=$SNAP_ID==="
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# update: it changes both the root subvolume and /var/db/pkg, and a snapshot
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# update: it changes both the root subvolume and /var/db/pkg, and a snapshot
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# can restore it. A root marker proves the root generation too.
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# can restore it. A root marker proves the root generation too.
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printf 'broken by rollback acceptance\n' > /etc/phoebus/rollback-broken.txt 2>/dev/null || true
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printf 'broken by rollback acceptance\n' > /etc/phoebus/rollback-broken.txt 2>/dev/null || true
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"$SYS" -y install app-editors/nano > "$WORK/break.out" 2>&1
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"$SYS" -y install app-editors/nano --legacy --portage > "$WORK/break.out" 2>&1
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echo "===ROLLBACK-BROKEN pkgs=$(pkg_fingerprint)==="
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echo "===ROLLBACK-BROKEN pkgs=$(pkg_fingerprint)==="
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# 4. Invoke the real sys undo path.
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# 4. Invoke the real sys undo path.
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"$SYS" -y undo > "$WORK/undo.out" 2>&1
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"$SYS" -y undo --legacy > "$WORK/undo.out" 2>&1
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RC=$?
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RC=$?
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echo "===ROLLBACK-UNDO rc=$RC==="
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echo "===ROLLBACK-UNDO rc=$RC==="
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"$SYS" rollback status > "$WORK/status.out" 2>&1 || true
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"$SYS" rollback status --legacy > "$WORK/status.out" 2>&1 || true
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sed -n '1,40p' "$WORK/status.out"
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sed -n '1,40p' "$WORK/status.out"
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echo "===ROLLBACK-DONE==="
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echo "===ROLLBACK-DONE==="
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@ -8,7 +8,23 @@
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# alone would not prove package-state consistency.
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# alone would not prove package-state consistency.
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set -uo pipefail
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set -uo pipefail
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SYS="${SYS_BIN:-/tmp/sys}"
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# Verification reads the system state (subvolumes, ESP entries) and must run
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# as root; the driver authenticates sudo before invoking this script.
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if [ "$(id -u)" != "0" ]; then
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echo "===AFTER-NEEDS-ROOT id=$(id -u)==="
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echo "===AFTER-DONE==="
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exit 1
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fi
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# `sys` is installed into the target by the installer; fall back to the host
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# copy only if it is somehow absent.
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if [[ -n "${SYS_BIN:-}" ]]; then
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SYS="$SYS_BIN"
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elif [[ -x /usr/local/bin/sys ]]; then
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SYS=/usr/local/bin/sys
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else
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SYS=/tmp/sys
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fi
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USER_NAME="${USERNAME:-phoebus}"
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USER_NAME="${USERNAME:-phoebus}"
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pkg_fingerprint() {
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pkg_fingerprint() {
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@ -18,6 +34,7 @@ pkg_fingerprint() {
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HOME_MARKER="$(cat "/home/$USER_NAME/rollback-marker.txt" 2>/dev/null || echo missing)"
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HOME_MARKER="$(cat "/home/$USER_NAME/rollback-marker.txt" 2>/dev/null || echo missing)"
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echo "===AFTER-KNOWN-GOOD pkgs=$(pkg_fingerprint) kernel=$(uname -r) home=$HOME_MARKER==="
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echo "===AFTER-KNOWN-GOOD pkgs=$(pkg_fingerprint) kernel=$(uname -r) home=$HOME_MARKER==="
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echo "===AFTER-SYSTEMD $(systemctl is-system-running 2>&1)==="
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if [ -e /etc/phoebus/rollback-broken.txt ]; then
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if [ -e /etc/phoebus/rollback-broken.txt ]; then
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echo "===AFTER-BROKEN-MARKER present==="
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echo "===AFTER-BROKEN-MARKER present==="
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else
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else
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@ -48,6 +65,6 @@ cat /efi/loader/entries/phoebus-recovery.conf \
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/boot/efi/loader/entries/phoebus-recovery.conf 2>/dev/null || true
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/boot/efi/loader/entries/phoebus-recovery.conf 2>/dev/null || true
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echo "===AFTER-STATUS==="
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echo "===AFTER-STATUS==="
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"$SYS" rollback status 2>&1 || true
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"$SYS" rollback status --legacy 2>&1 || true
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echo "===AFTER-DONE==="
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echo "===AFTER-DONE==="
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results.assert_true(f"{tag}-login", logged_in, f"{tag}: could not log in")
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results.assert_true(f"{tag}-login", logged_in, f"{tag}: could not log in")
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def _sudo_auth(child, results, tag):
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"""Authenticate sudo for the rollback acceptance guest scripts.
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The snapshot/break/undo/verify steps mutate the system and must run as
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root. The password is sent only at sudo's own prompt (terminal echo
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disabled, like the login password), so it never lands in the serial
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transcript the way a command-line credential would. Returns True when the
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timestamp stuck; the caller must abort the phase otherwise, or every
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later `sudo` would block on a prompt nobody answers.
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"""
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try:
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# Unique markers, never a bare `[$#] ` alternative: the buffer still
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# holds the previous shell prompt when this runs, and a generic
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# prompt pattern would match that stale text immediately — skipping
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# the password while sudo is still starting (the next typed line
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# would then be consumed as the password and rejected).
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child.sendline("sudo -v; echo SUDO-V-$(printf DONE)")
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idx = child.expect([r"[Pp]assword(?: for [^:]+)?:", "SUDO-V-DONE"], timeout=60)
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if idx == 0:
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child.sendline(USER_PW)
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child.expect("SUDO-V-DONE", timeout=60)
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# Prove the timestamp stuck: without it every later `sudo` would block
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# on a password prompt nobody answers, hanging the run until timeout.
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child.sendline("sudo -n true && echo SUDO-OK-$(printf READY)")
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idx = child.expect(["SUDO-OK-READY", r"[Pp]assword"], timeout=30)
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except (pexpect.TIMEOUT, pexpect.EOF):
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idx = -1
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if idx != 0:
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results.fail(f"{tag}-sudo", "sudo authentication did not stick")
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return False
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return True
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def _fetch_sys(child):
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def _fetch_sys(child):
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# The installed system should already carry /usr/local/bin/sys; only fall
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# The installed system should already carry /usr/local/bin/sys; only fall
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# back to fetching the host build when it is absent.
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# back to fetching the host build when it is absent.
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try:
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try:
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_unlock_and_login(child, results, "rollback-before")
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_unlock_and_login(child, results, "rollback-before")
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_fetch_sys(child)
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_fetch_sys(child)
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child.sendline(f"curl -fsSL {ROLLBACK_URL} -o /tmp/rb.sh && bash /tmp/rb.sh")
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if not _sudo_auth(child, results, "rollback-before"):
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return
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child.sendline(f"curl -fsSL {ROLLBACK_URL} -o /tmp/rb.sh && sudo bash /tmp/rb.sh")
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child.expect(
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child.expect(
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["===ROLLBACK-DONE===", "curl:", pexpect.TIMEOUT, pexpect.EOF],
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["===ROLLBACK-DONE===", "curl:", pexpect.TIMEOUT, pexpect.EOF],
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timeout=int(os.environ.get("ROLLBACK_TIMEOUT", "7200")),
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timeout=int(os.environ.get("ROLLBACK_TIMEOUT", "7200")),
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@ -239,8 +274,15 @@ def do_rollback(results, paths, disks):
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results.fail("rollback-known-good", "the guest did not record the known-good state")
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results.fail("rollback-known-good", "the guest did not record the known-good state")
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if undo is None or undo.get("rc") != "0":
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if undo is None or undo.get("rc") != "0":
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results.fail("rollback-undo", f"sys undo did not succeed: {undo}")
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results.fail("rollback-undo", f"sys undo did not succeed: {undo}")
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# No rollback happened: a detached "verify" would compare identical
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# states and report vacuous passes. Stop instead of pretending.
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return
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# Phase 2: boot the disk detached and verify the restored generation.
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# Phase 2: boot the disk detached and verify the restored generation.
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# The phase-1 transcript is preserved under its own name first: reopening
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# the same log would destroy the evidence for why phase 1 passed/failed.
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phase1_log = paths.serial_log.with_name("serial-phase1.log")
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paths.serial_log.rename(phase1_log)
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env, args = _installed_args(paths, disks)
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env, args = _installed_args(paths, disks)
|
||||||
log = open(paths.serial_log, "w")
|
log = open(paths.serial_log, "w")
|
||||||
child = spawn(args, env, log)
|
child = spawn(args, env, log)
|
||||||
|
|
@ -248,11 +290,13 @@ def do_rollback(results, paths, disks):
|
||||||
try:
|
try:
|
||||||
_unlock_and_login(child, results, "rollback-after")
|
_unlock_and_login(child, results, "rollback-after")
|
||||||
_fetch_sys(child)
|
_fetch_sys(child)
|
||||||
child.sendline(f"curl -fsSL {ROLLBACK_VERIFY_URL} -o /tmp/rbv.sh && bash /tmp/rbv.sh")
|
if not _sudo_auth(child, results, "rollback-after"):
|
||||||
|
return
|
||||||
|
child.sendline(f"curl -fsSL {ROLLBACK_VERIFY_URL} -o /tmp/rbv.sh && sudo bash /tmp/rbv.sh")
|
||||||
child.expect("===AFTER-DONE===",
|
child.expect("===AFTER-DONE===",
|
||||||
timeout=int(os.environ.get("ROLLBACK_VERIFY_TIMEOUT", "900")))
|
timeout=int(os.environ.get("ROLLBACK_VERIFY_TIMEOUT", "900")))
|
||||||
phase2 = paths.serial_log.read_text(errors="replace")
|
phase2 = paths.serial_log.read_text(errors="replace")
|
||||||
results.assert_true("rollback-systemd-running", "running" in phase2,
|
results.assert_true("rollback-systemd-running", "===AFTER-SYSTEMD running===" in phase2,
|
||||||
"systemd did not report running after rollback")
|
"systemd did not report running after rollback")
|
||||||
after = _parse_marker(phase2, "AFTER-KNOWN-GOOD")
|
after = _parse_marker(phase2, "AFTER-KNOWN-GOOD")
|
||||||
if before is None or after is None:
|
if before is None or after is None:
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -247,6 +247,30 @@ class HarnessScriptsTest(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||||
driver = (self.VM_DIR / "serial-driver.py").read_text()
|
driver = (self.VM_DIR / "serial-driver.py").read_text()
|
||||||
self.assertIn('"rollback"', driver)
|
self.assertIn('"rollback"', driver)
|
||||||
self.assertIn("do_rollback", driver)
|
self.assertIn("do_rollback", driver)
|
||||||
|
# The acceptance mutates the system: the driver must authenticate sudo
|
||||||
|
# (password only at sudo's own prompt) and run both guest phases as
|
||||||
|
# root, or every privileged step would fail as the login user.
|
||||||
|
self.assertIn("_sudo_auth", driver)
|
||||||
|
self.assertIn("sudo bash /tmp/rb.sh", driver)
|
||||||
|
self.assertIn("sudo bash /tmp/rbv.sh", driver)
|
||||||
|
# The sudo handshake must use unique end markers: a bare `[$#] `
|
||||||
|
# alternative would match the stale prompt left by the previous
|
||||||
|
# command and skip the password while sudo is still starting.
|
||||||
|
auth = driver.split("def _sudo_auth", 1)[1].split("\ndef ", 1)[0]
|
||||||
|
self.assertIn("SUDO-V-DONE", auth)
|
||||||
|
self.assertNotIn('r"[$#] "', auth)
|
||||||
|
# The timestamp is verified before use, and a failed phase 1 aborts
|
||||||
|
# instead of reporting vacuous phase-2 passes.
|
||||||
|
self.assertIn("SUDO-OK-READY", driver)
|
||||||
|
self.assertIn("vacuous", driver)
|
||||||
|
# Phase 1 evidence must survive phase 2.
|
||||||
|
self.assertIn("serial-phase1.log", driver)
|
||||||
|
for name in ("rollback-guest.sh", "rollback-verify.sh"):
|
||||||
|
text = (self.VM_DIR / name).read_text()
|
||||||
|
self.assertIn('id -u', text, f"{name} must refuse to run unprivileged")
|
||||||
|
verify = (self.VM_DIR / "rollback-verify.sh").read_text()
|
||||||
|
self.assertIn("/usr/local/bin/sys", verify)
|
||||||
|
self.assertIn("AFTER-SYSTEMD", verify)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
Loading…
Add table
Reference in a new issue