diff --git a/docs/CHANGELOG.md b/docs/CHANGELOG.md index c3b808e..563a1d2 100644 --- a/docs/CHANGELOG.md +++ b/docs/CHANGELOG.md @@ -36,6 +36,60 @@ this file is the curated, human-readable summary. anchor). Automated-harness `--no-ai` is test-only evidence, not the normal user path. Partitioning + LUKS2 + Btrfs stages already passed in the guest; completion and detached boot pending. +- **Unpinned signed-DIGESTS install proof COMPLETED in a disposable VM.** + `gui-driver.py install` run `gui-install-20260926T040728Z-f3ae68f4` + booted the new ISO on disposable `disks/unpinned-accept-1.qcow2` (30 + GiB) with no `STAGE3_URL`/`STAGE3_SHA256` (latest stage3 resolved from + Gentoo autobuilds, signed DIGESTS verified against the fixed provisioned + key) and the ISO-embedded fail-closed binary: `INSTALL-RC=0`, + `NO_SECRET_LEAK`, `installation complete` after ~165 min (mango desktop, + 174 packages). Detached boot: LUKS unlock, login, systemd `running`, 0 + failed units, networking, all Btrfs subvolumes, `sys history --legacy` + showing the initial-known-good snapshot. A harness assertion fix + (`gui-driver.py` boot check now uses `sys history --legacy`, since bare + `sys history` is AI-first and truthfully refuses without a model) was + needed to green the gate; the product was correct. +- **Tamper refusal VM-verified** (new ISO, fail-closed binary, disposable + 4 GiB targets): a placeholder pin is refused before any network use (zero + stage3 fetches) and a mismatched archive hash is refused after download + with no extraction (`INSTALL-RC=1`, `NO_SECRET_LEAK` both runs). A + tampered-*signature* VM case is infeasible without a network MITM (fixed + key + authentic Gentoo DIGESTS); the bad-signature branch is unit-tested. +- **Recovery-entry boot VERIFIED** (`Phoebus Recovery (known-good + snapshot)` selected in the systemd-boot menu — keypresses provably freeze + the 3 s timeout, selection screenshot-confirmed — with restricted + networking and no model): cmdline + findmnt prove root is the read-only + `@-20260926T064646-initial-known-good` snapshot with `rescue.target`, + serial login works, `sys history`/`rollback status --legacy` work, `sys + ask` fails truthfully offering the exact `--legacy` command, systemd + `degraded` (rescue target, as designed). Method notes: video (tty1) keystrokes + never reach the dracut LUKS prompt (`/dev/console` is serial); passphrases + must be written to the serial pty with ONLCR/ICRNL neutralized or a `\r` + is appended and the passphrase is rejected. +- **Seat desktop PARTIAL with a precise blocker.** Seat VM (virgl, + `virtio-gpu-gl-pci`): seat0 + DRM card0 + greeter session verified, + tuigreet authenticates the correct password (journal-proven; earlier + "Authentication failed" readings were QMP-typing focus races, and `-` keys + arrive correctly). The Mango compositor exits in <1s: libseat `No backend + was able to open a seat` — no seatd in the image and the logind path does + not succeed under the tuigreet session. Kitty/DMS/lock/idle/polkit-agent/ + logout/reboot stay unverified behind this blocker. +- **Snap re-checked against the live Store:** `hello-world` is still 6.4 + rev 29 on every channel (install → `no updates available` → remove, all + clean); guest has no `aa-status`, confinement `partial`. Revision-changing + refresh and strict confinement stay blocked (Store revision + AppArmor + guest needed). +- **Nix GC findings:** the fresh unpinned install bootstraps Nix (store + populated, `default` link valid, `nix 2.24.9` runs) and `sys list --nix` + truthfully reports the base system profile has no manifest. + `nix-collect-garbage` is not on root's PATH; a user-level + install (`nixpkgs#hello`) + `nix-collect-garbage -d` (268 paths, 189 MB) + leaves the profile intact — the old dangling case did NOT reproduce. + **Coverage gap found:** `sys` enumerates `/nix/var/nix/profiles/ + {default,profile}` + `per-user/*/profile` but not the modern per-user + `~/.local/state/nix/profiles/profile`, so user-installed Nix packages are + invisible to the catalogue. Recorded as follow-up (design + tests + VM + proof needed), not fixed in this session. - **Release gates stay truthful:** `gates --execute` in an unconfigured shell reports 0 passed / 0 failed / 6 NotRun with exact missing prerequisites; nothing published. Quality gates green: `cargo fmt`, diff --git a/docs/HANDOFF.md b/docs/HANDOFF.md index 4c03ad8..903a232 100644 --- a/docs/HANDOFF.md +++ b/docs/HANDOFF.md @@ -3,23 +3,30 @@ Rolling note between work sessions. **Update this file before you finish**, then commit it. It should be short and current; use `git log` for detail. -- **ISO rebuild + interactive VM (2026-09-26, in progress):** new ISO - `installer/live/phoebus-installer-amd64-20260926.iso` (1.6 GiB, SHA-256 - `250dbe9a…`, build `20260926T041500Z`, from HEAD `11c0ee0`) built via - `PHOEBUS_REUSE_ROOTFS=1`; embedded `phoebus-installer`/`sys` hash-match - the fresh static build, Gentoo key has both fingerprints, UI payload - present. Interactive VM RUNNING (KVM/GTK, fresh - `phoebus-interactive-20260926.qcow2` + private vars in - `/var/tmp/phoebus-interactive/`, screenshot at welcome). Unpinned - signed-DIGESTS full install RUNNING (`gui-install-20260926T040728Z-f3ae68f4` - on `disks/unpinned-accept-1.qcow2`, guest past partitioning/LUKS/Btrfs; - `--no-ai` is test-only). `run-vm.sh` gained `--disk-name`/`--display` + - TCG `-cpu max` fallback. `gates --execute`: 0/0/6 NotRun, truthful, no - publish. Quality gates green (717/717, clippy -D warnings, vmsafety - 18/18). Old Sep-24 ISO kept alongside. Next: finish unpinned - install+detached boot, tamper refusals, recovery-entry boot, seat - desktop, live AI, snap revision/strict, nix GC recheck — then commit docs - evidence. +- **ISO rebuild + verification session (2026-09-26, DONE except seat-compositor):** + new ISO `installer/live/phoebus-installer-amd64-20260926.iso` (1.6 GiB, + `250dbe9a…`, build `20260926T041500Z`, HEAD `11c0ee0` + `0b41781`) built + via `PHOEBUS_REUSE_ROOTFS=1`, content-verified (embedded hashes match, + Gentoo key both fingerprints, UI payload present); old Sep-24 ISO kept. + Interactive VM RUNNING (KVM/GTK, `phoebus-interactive-20260926.qcow2` + + private vars in `/var/tmp/phoebus-interactive/`, screenshot at welcome, + undisturbed). Unpinned signed-DIGESTS full install PASSED + (`gui-install-20260926T040728Z-f3ae68f4`, `INSTALL-RC=0`, + `NO_SECRET_LEAK`, ~165 min) + detached boot (running, 0 failed units, + `sys --legacy` + snapshot). Tamper refusals PASSED (placeholder pin + pre-network, hash mismatch post-download, both `RC=1` + no leak). + Recovery-entry boot PASSED (snapshot cmdline/findmnt, login, `sys + --legacy`, truthful `ask` failure, systemd degraded). Seat desktop + PARTIAL: seat0/DRM/greeter/auth verified, Mango dies in <1s (libseat, no + seatd) — the blocker. Snap: no Store revision, still partial confinement. + Nix: GC-dangling NOT reproduced; **new gap: modern per-user Nix profiles + invisible to `sys`** (follow-up). Live AI: still no credential/model + (NotRun). `gui-driver.py` boot sys-check fixed (`--legacy`). + `gates --execute`: 0/0/6 NotRun, no publish. Quality gates green + (717/717, clippy -D, vmsafety 18/18). Evidence disk + `disks/unpinned-accept-1.qcow2` KEPT; scratch overlays removed. + Next: seatd-or-logind fix for Mango (design+rebuild+retest), per-user Nix + enumeration, live AI credential, snap revision/strict, NVIDIA. - **Security/readiness follow-up (2026-09-26):** trust anchor + executable gates + strengthened rollback PASS. diff --git a/docs/STATUS.md b/docs/STATUS.md index 00a98a3..4f7869c 100644 --- a/docs/STATUS.md +++ b/docs/STATUS.md @@ -57,8 +57,8 @@ Booting that recovery entry offline remains a manual gate. | LUKS2 format/open/close | yes | yes | yes | no | | Btrfs subvolumes + swapfile | yes | yes | yes | no | | fstab / crypttab generation | yes | yes | yes | no | -| stage3 fetch + verify (pinned SHA-256 or signed DIGESTS) + extract | yes | yes (both paths; every failure branch incl. missing verifier/key/DIGESTS/entry, nonzero exit, cannot-start) | yes (pinned path; unpinned path needs the live-image key) | n/a | -| stage3 trust anchor (fixed provisioned key) | yes | yes (`release_key_path` ignores `PHOEBUS_GENTOO_RELEASE_KEY`; test-only injection only via explicit `verify_digests_with_key`) | no (unpinned VM proof needs a rebuilt live ISO + disposable install; host-level Good-signature check of the real DIGESTS noted below, not VM evidence) | n/a | +| stage3 fetch + verify (pinned SHA-256 or signed DIGESTS) + extract | yes | yes (both paths; every failure branch incl. missing verifier/key/DIGESTS/entry, nonzero exit, cannot-start) | yes (pinned path; **unpinned path now VM-verified**: default unpinned install from the rebuilt 20260926 ISO completed 12 stages + detached boot; placeholder-pin and archive-hash-mismatch refusals VM-verified on disposable targets with the fail-closed binary) | n/a | +| stage3 trust anchor (fixed provisioned key) | yes | yes (`release_key_path` ignores `PHOEBUS_GENTOO_RELEASE_KEY`; test-only injection only via explicit `verify_digests_with_key`) | yes (20260926 live ISO carries the fingerprint-checked key — both Gentoo fingerprints verified inside the shipped squashfs; the unpinned VM install verified the real signed DIGESTS + archive hash against it; tampered inputs refused) | n/a | | Portage config + sync + getuto | yes | yes | yes | n/a | | Signed Gentoo binary install | yes | yes | yes | n/a | | Source package compilation | yes | yes | yes | n/a | @@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ Booting that recovery entry offline remains a manual gate. | Btrfs snapshots + history | yes | yes | yes | no | | Coordinated snapshot sets (`@` + `@var`) | yes | yes | no | no | | Btrfs rollback (`sys undo`) | yes | yes | yes (rollback acceptance `serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386` PASS=11 FAIL=0) | no | -| Recovery/known-good BLS entry | yes | yes | present + snapshot-based (asserted in the rollback run; selecting it offline with no network/model is a distinct manual acceptance gate with its own procedure and evidence, see `docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`) | no | +| Recovery/known-good BLS entry | yes | yes | yes: entry present + snapshot-based (rollback runs) **and the recovery entry itself was booted** (`Phoebus Recovery (known-good snapshot)` selected in the systemd-boot menu with restricted networking and no model: cmdline + findmnt prove root is the read-only `@-20260926T064646-initial-known-good` snapshot with `rescue.target`, serial login works, `sys history/rollback status --legacy` work, `sys ask` fails truthfully with the `--legacy` fallback) | no | | Snapshot retention + free-space gate | yes | yes | no | no | | AI typed proposals + evidence review | yes | yes | fixture end-to-end | n/a | | AI guided install (DeepSeek/OpenAI) | yes | yes | fixture path only (no live call) | n/a | @@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ Booting that recovery entry offline remains a manual gate. | Transaction log (outcomes, protective snapshots) | yes | yes | read-only in installed VM; write path needs root | no | | Flatpak/Nix bounded typed actions | yes | yes | no | no | | Shared hardware-aware source selection (all lanes) | yes | yes | no | no | -| Snap lane (detect/install/list/remove/refresh/connections) | yes (reviewed first-use setup) | yes (incl. exact revisions and confinement) | partial (VM: Portage snapd, active socket, `hello-world` install/list/refresh/remove; partial confinement; refresh had no newer revision; connections not exercised) | no | +| Snap lane (detect/install/list/remove/refresh/connections) | yes (reviewed first-use setup) | yes (incl. exact revisions and confinement) | partial (VM: Portage snapd, active socket, `hello-world` install/list/refresh/remove; partial confinement; refresh had no newer revision; connections not exercised. **Re-checked 2026-09-26 against the live Store**: `hello-world` still 6.4 rev 29 on every channel, refresh reports no updates; guest has no `aa-status`, confinement still `partial`. A revision-changing refresh and strict confinement stay blocked on a Store revision + AppArmor-ready guest) | no | | AppImage lane (import/acquire/integrity/desktop/remove) | yes | yes | yes (VM: acquire with pinned SHA, list, launch fixture, remove; tampered SHA refused) | no | | Custom ebuild overlay (stage/approve/build/remove) | yes | yes | yes (VM: stage → build/install → VDB+file present → remove) | no | | `sys` installed into the target + verified in chroot | yes | yes (unit) | yes (detached boot verified) | no | @@ -127,16 +127,16 @@ Booting that recovery entry offline remains a manual gate. | Installed-package inventory (`sys list`, all lanes, `--legacy`) | yes | yes (VDB/Flatpak/Snap/AppImage; **Nix active-profile packages** vs generations/store; custom ebuild never double-counted) | yes (VM read-only group) | no | | Package information (`sys info`, `--legacy`) | yes | yes (installed/available, version/deps/size/provenance; ambiguity flagged) | yes (VM read-only group) | no | | Cross-source update check/apply (`sys updates`, `apply updates`) | yes | yes (exact per-source transactions with full Flatpak commits/snap revisions, pinned and revalidated; manual/project-specific refused) | Flatpak verified in VM (reviewed ref+commit, pinned update, verified); direct Snap refresh with no newer revision VM-verified, exact Snap apply-updates transaction unit-tested only; Portage verified | no | -| Nix active-profile inventory (`sys list --nix`) | yes | yes (manifest v1/v2/v3; scope; generations vs store) | yes (NIX_ENABLED=yes install: real `nodejs-slim` profile listed and filtered; a re-run correctly reported a dangling profile) | no | +| Nix active-profile inventory (`sys list --nix`) | yes | yes (manifest v1/v2/v3; scope; generations vs store) | yes (NIX_ENABLED=yes install: real `nodejs-slim` profile listed and filtered; a re-run correctly reported a dangling profile. **2026-09-26 on the fresh unpinned install**: bootstrap present (`/nix/store` populated, `default` link valid, `nix 2.24.9` runs); `sys list --nix` truthfully reports the base system profile has no package manifest. GC-dangling repro: `nix-collect-garbage` is not on root's PATH; user-level install/GC repro attempted — see VM evidence) | no | | Catalogue maintenance (`depclean`, `clean cache`, `owners`, `deps`/`rdeps`) | yes | yes (structured depclean effects; cache-cleanup dry-run review + failure propagation; VDB dependency metadata) | yes (VM: depclean + cache-cleanup journeys; deps read-only) | no | | AI-default catalogue routing (source flags constrain, never bypass) | yes | yes (investigation loop, full backend classification + optional-backend rewrite, fallback offers exact `--legacy` command) | yes (read-only routing cases) | no | | Alternate-root catalogue/update/maintenance rooting | yes | yes (chroot for Portage/Flatpak/Nix; Snap refused; recording-runner no-host-command tests) | yes (VM: alternate-root Snap refused) | no | | Service start/stop/restart + flatpak/nix/snapshot commands | yes | yes | no | no | | Desktop session helpers (DMS bar/launcher/lock/idle) | yes | yes | functional test (stubs) | no | -| Mango + DankMaterialShell profile | yes | yes | live VM yes; installed desktop_install yes (174 pkgs) | no | +| Mango + DankMaterialShell profile | yes | yes | live VM yes; installed desktop_install yes (174 pkgs); **installed graphical session under a seat: compositor start FAILS** — Mango exits in <1s with libseat `No backend was able to open a seat` (no seatd in the image; the logind path does not succeed under the tuigreet session). Greeter, seat, DRM, PAM authentication and `sys --legacy` are verified; kitty/DMS spotlight/lock/idle/polkit-agent/logout/reboot remain unverified | no | | Mango is the canonical desktop | yes | yes | live VM yes; installed default session configured | no | -| greetd login (Mango + DarkMaterial) | yes | yes | yes (tuigreet verified on detached boot) | no | -| Live desktop ISO (Mango + DMS) | yes | guards tested | graphical VM + GUI journey + detached boot | no | +| greetd login (Mango + DarkMaterial) | yes | yes | yes (tuigreet verified on detached boot; **graphical authentication verified under a seat VM**: seat0 + DRM card0 + greeter session, correct password authenticates per the journal) | no | +| Live desktop ISO (Mango + DMS) | yes | guards tested | graphical VM + GUI journey + detached boot + interactive welcome (20260926 ISO, screenshot) | no | | Live welcome autostart + duplicate prevention | yes | guards tested | live graphical VM | no | | Welcome primary action keyboard-focus | yes | guards tested | live graphical VM | no | | VM harness disk safety + structured results | yes | yes (16 tests) | n/a | n/a | @@ -288,8 +288,17 @@ Booting that recovery entry offline remains a manual gate. completion (`gui-install-completes` passed). The installed system then booted **with the ISO detached** (LUKS2 decrypt, systemd running, 0 failed units, all Btrfs subvolumes mounted, `sys` CLI operational, and `tuigreet` greeter - active). The **installed** Mango session (graphical user login into DMS) - remains to be verified under a physical seat / DRM compositor backend. + active). (That paragraph describes the Sep-24 evidence run; the 2026-09-26 + unpinned rerun from the rebuilt ISO is recorded in + `docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`.) The **installed** Mango session was + attempted under a real seat on 2026-09-26 (seat0 + DRM card0 + greeter + session + successful PAM authentication, all verified in a virgl seat + VM): the compositor exits in <1s because libseat opens no backend (no + seatd in the image; the logind path does not succeed under the tuigreet + session). Greeter login works; kitty, DMS spotlight, lock/idle, the + polkit agent, logout, reboot and the compositor itself stay unverified — + the libseat failure is the blocker, with the exact error recorded in + `docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`. - **AI sandbox** is implemented (`systemd-run` hardening properties, tested at the argv level) and fails closed without `systemd-run`; it has not been exercised in a VM. Only typed actions and the privacy boundary were previously @@ -320,11 +329,16 @@ Booting that recovery entry offline remains a manual gate. - `sys undo` is implemented with the default-subvolume, fstab, kernel-cmdline and BLS handling described in ADR 0007; its destructive VM acceptance gate passed in this session (`serial-rollback-20260926T030237Z-912f6386`). -- **Stage3 signed-DIGESTS mechanism (host-level, not VM evidence).** The - parser fixture matches the real current DIGESTS byte-for-byte, and the real - DIGESTS for `stage3-amd64-systemd-20260920T170055Z.tar.xz` verifies with a - Good signature from Gentoo's Automated Weekly Release Key at host level. - The full VM proof (rebuilt live ISO carrying the provisioned key, default - unpinned install, tampered signature/digest/archive refusal) still needs a - disposable install run and is recorded as blocked in - `docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md`. +- **Stage3 signed-DIGESTS mechanism is now VM-verified, not just host-level.** + The parser fixture matches the real current DIGESTS byte-for-byte; on + 2026-09-26 the default unpinned install from the rebuilt live ISO (which + ships the fingerprint-checked provisioned key) completed all 12 stages + plus a detached boot (`INSTALL-RC=0`, `NO_SECRET_LEAK`), which proves the + real signed DIGESTS and the downloaded archive hash verified against the + fixed trust anchor — `fetch()` must return `Ok` before `extract()` runs, + and the run demonstrably extracted. Tampered inputs are refused in the VM: + a placeholder pin is refused before any network use (zero stage3 fetches) + and a mismatched archive hash is refused after download with no extraction. + A tampered-*signature* VM case is not feasible without a network MITM (the + key is fixed and Gentoo serves authentic DIGESTS); the bad-signature + branch is unit-tested. diff --git a/docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md b/docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md index 9f3af43..e03ea94 100644 --- a/docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md +++ b/docs/VM-BOOT-VERIFICATION.md @@ -831,7 +831,102 @@ detached boot verification with the live ISO removed. partial-confinement/no-op-refresh evidence stays labeled as such); NVIDIA needs a GPU or authorized passthrough (see below). -## 2026-09-26 — Live ISO rebuild from HEAD + unpinned install proof (IN PROGRESS) +## 2026-09-26 — Live ISO rebuild from HEAD + unpinned install proof (COMPLETED) + +- **Rebuilt ISO.** `installer/live/phoebus-installer-amd64-20260926.iso` + (1.6 GiB, SHA-256 + `250dbe9ad780408a40b7b7f0757791fadcc1e4309b932e98f6059c7baf93e2e5`, + build id `20260926T041500Z`) built from HEAD `11c0ee0` with + `PHOEBUS_REUSE_ROOTFS=1` (cached `livefs.tar` reused for the Debian + rootfs; payload, binaries, key and branding re-installed fresh — reuse + does not carry stale binaries, UI or keys). The Sep-24 + (`827bf843…`) ISO predates the stage3 fail-closed + trust-anchor + + boot-security commits and is kept alongside. +- **Content inspection (not timestamps).** The finished squashfs was + listed and selectively extracted: embedded + `/usr/local/bin/phoebus-installer` (`25741706…`) and `/usr/local/bin/sys` + (`3b331643…`) hash-match the fingerprint-fresh static build; + `/usr/share/openpgp-keys/gentoo-release.asc` (57,698 bytes) shows both + published fingerprints (`13EB…2910` weekly, `D99E…2058` signing) under + `gpg --show-keys`; `/usr/bin/gpg`, `/usr/bin/mango`, `/usr/bin/dms`, + the welcome/installer `shell.qml` configs, the install desktop entry and + `/etc/phoebus/{version,build,live}` (`0.1.0`, + `PHOEBUS_BUILD_ID=20260926T041500Z`) are all present. +- **Unpinned signed-DIGESTS install PASSED.** + `gui-driver.py install` run `gui-install-20260926T040728Z-f3ae68f4` + booted the new ISO on disposable + `disks/unpinned-accept-1.qcow2` (30 GiB) and installed with the + ISO-embedded fail-closed binary and a served `test.conf` with **no** + `STAGE3_URL`/`STAGE3_SHA256` (empty URL resolves latest-stage3 from + Gentoo autobuilds; signed DIGESTS verified against the fixed provisioned + key): `INSTALL-RC=0`, `NO_SECRET_LEAK`, `installation complete` after + ~165 min (full mango desktop, 174 packages). Detached boot (ISO + detached): LUKS unlock, login, `systemctl is-system-running = running`, + `0 loaded units listed`, networking, all Btrfs subvolumes mounted, `sys + history --legacy` showing `@-20260926T064646-initial-known-good`. The + harness `--no-ai` flag is **test-only** evidence and is not the normal + user path (the wizard requires a connected model; the interactive VM is + left for the owner to drive by hand). +- **Harness fix (real defect, fixed):** `gui-driver.py do_boot` asserted + bare `sys history` output, but bare `sys history` is AI-first and + truthfully refuses without a model — the check now uses + `sys history --legacy`. The product was correct (`/usr/local/bin/sys` + present and working); the gate was stale. Re-run detached boots pass + `boot-sys-installed`. (The driver's `detached-boot-login` flag is + timing-sensitive to PAM OSC noise on the serial line even when the login + succeeds and checks run; login itself works — 1/4 flag-pass with 4/4 + substantive checks green.) +- **Tamper refusals PASSED** (new ISO, fail-closed binary, disposable 4 + GiB targets, `INSTALL-RC=1` + `NO_SECRET_LEAK` both): placeholder pin + refused before any network use (zero stage3 fetches on the serve log); + mismatched archive hash refused after download with no extraction. + Method note: `appliance-guest-gui.sh` ignores the driver's `SERVE_URL` + env and always uses the default port 8000 — tamper variants were served + by swapping the port-8000 `test.conf` (the main run had long since + fetched its copy). A tampered-*signature* VM case is infeasible without + a network MITM; the bad-signature branch is unit-tested. +- **Recovery-entry boot PASSED** (distinct manual gate, now verified). + Visible QEMU on the installed disk with restricted networking + (`-netdev user,restrict=y`) and no model: keypresses provably freeze the + 3 s systemd-boot timeout (screenshot), `Phoebus Recovery (known-good + snapshot)` selected with Down+Enter (screenshot), kernel cmdline + `rootflags=subvol=@snapshots/@-20260926T064646-initial-known-good` with + `ro` + `systemd.unit=rescue.target`, findmnt confirms the read-only + snapshot root, serial login as `phoebus` works, `sys history` / + `rollback status --legacy` work, `sys ask` fails truthfully offering the + exact `--legacy` command, systemd `degraded` (rescue target, as + designed). Method notes: video-console (tty1) keystrokes never reach the + dracut LUKS prompt (`/dev/console` is serial here) — the passphrase must + be written to the serial pty with ONLCR/ICRNL neutralized, otherwise a + `\r` is appended and a correct passphrase is rejected; a `down`+`ret` + pair landing at LUKS burns attempts as `**` (escape remnant) and three + failures drop to the dracut emergency shell (root, no cryptsetup binary + present). Transcript of the proof session kept under + `/var/tmp/phoebus-recovery/rec-entry-proof.log`. +- **Seat desktop PARTIAL (blocker found).** Seat VM (`virtio-gpu-gl-pci`, + virgl present, overlay of the installed disk): logind seat0 with DRM + card0 (`[MASTER]`), keyboard, mouse; `/dev/dri/card0` (no render node); + tuigreet active with `--cmd /usr/local/bin/phoebus-session-mango`; + tuigreet PAM authentication of the correct password verified in the + journal (earlier "Authentication failed" readings were QMP-typing + focus races; `-` keys arrive correctly, proven by visible echo). + The Mango compositor exits in <1s after every successful authentication: + `libseat: No backend was able to open a seat`, `Failed to start a DRM + session` (captured by running the session script from a shell). No seatd + in the image and the logind path does not succeed under the tuigreet + session — this is the precise blocker for kitty/DMS/lock/idle/polkit/ + logout/reboot. Session transcript and journal excerpts kept under + `/var/tmp/phoebus-seat/`. +- **Interactive VM (open).** The new ISO boots a KVM/GTK VM with a fresh + unique disk (`phoebus-interactive-20260926.qcow2`) and private OVMF vars + in `/var/tmp/phoebus-interactive/`; screenshots show the Mango top bar + and the branded welcome (`Install Phoebus OS`, Live medium 0.1.0, + network/UEFI/RAM/CPU chips). Left running for the owner; installer + untouched, no passwords or model credentials entered. +- Evidence disk `disks/unpinned-accept-1.qcow2` KEPT; scratch overlays + (`unpinned-tamper-*`, `nix-gc-*`, `seat-accept-1`) removed after their + run logs were kept. Host free space ~16 GiB at the end (watched, nothing + deleted without identification). - **Rebuilt ISO.** `installer/live/phoebus-installer-amd64-20260926.iso` (1.6 GiB, SHA-256 @@ -868,9 +963,11 @@ detached boot verification with the live ISO removed. unique disk (`phoebus-interactive-20260926.qcow2`) and private OVMF vars in `/var/tmp/phoebus-interactive/`; screenshot shows the Mango top bar and the branded welcome ("Install Phoebus OS", Live medium 0.1.0). -- Still pending on this run: install completion + detached boot, tampered - signature/digest/archive refusal on disposable targets, recovery-entry - boot, seat desktop, live AI, snap revision/strict, nix GC recheck. +- Still open after this run: installed compositor session (libseat + blocker above), live AI provider call (no credential/model available), + revision-changing Snap refresh + strict confinement (no Store revision / + AppArmor guest), per-user Nix profile enumeration (new coverage gap), + NVIDIA hardware. Secure Boot/UKI stays a separate opt-in milestone. ## Known remaining work diff --git a/installer/tests/vm/gui-driver.py b/installer/tests/vm/gui-driver.py index 83e3a03..37fbe66 100644 --- a/installer/tests/vm/gui-driver.py +++ b/installer/tests/vm/gui-driver.py @@ -1321,7 +1321,7 @@ class Driver: "echo ===CHECKS-$(printf START)===; " "echo COMM_CHECK:$(cat /proc/1/comm 2>&1); " "echo SYSTEMD_STATUS:$(systemctl is-system-running 2>&1); " - "echo SYS_CLI_CHECK:$(which sys 2>&1 && sys history 2>&1 | grep -o 'no transactions recorded' || echo missing); " + "echo SYS_CLI_CHECK:$(which sys 2>&1 && sys history --legacy 2>&1 | grep -o 'no transactions recorded' || echo missing); " "systemctl --failed --no-pager; ip -brief addr; " "lsblk -o NAME,SIZE,TYPE,FSTYPE,MOUNTPOINTS; echo ===CHECKS-$(printf END)===", )