fix(sys): run the AI sandbox in the user scope and unblock unprivileged AI plans
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7 changed files with 202 additions and 21 deletions
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@ -5,6 +5,31 @@ this file is the curated, human-readable summary.
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## Unreleased — Fast defaults with user-controlled source builds
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- **VM-verified AI sandbox and unprivileged AI path (2026-09-28).** The first
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disposable-VM run of the newly built static `sys` (overlay on the golden
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installed image, `serial-boot-20260929T092147Z-6f88907a`) found and fixed two
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real defects. (1) **Unprivileged `sys ask` hung on a polkit root-password
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prompt:** the model sandbox used the system manager (`systemd-run`), and
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`org.freedesktop.systemd1.manage-units` requires authentication, so a normal
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user got `==== AUTHENTICATING FOR org.freedesktop.systemd1.manage-units ====`
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and blocked. The sandbox now uses `systemd-run --user` for unprivileged
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callers, with the subset of hardening properties the user manager accepts
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(`DynamicUser`, `PrivateDevices`, `ProtectKernelModules` are system-only);
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root still gets the full system sandbox. (2) **Unprivileged read-only AI
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plan exited 1 after printing the plan:** the service layer unconditionally
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wrote the root-owned `/var/lib/phoebus/transactions.toml`, which a normal
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account cannot write. Transaction recording is now best-effort for a
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non-root plan and mandatory for a privileged mutation. VM evidence:
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`AI_ROOT_RC=0` (system sandbox), `AI_USER_RC=0` (`--user` sandbox, was
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RC=124 timeout), `AI_NOSANDBOX_RC=0`, hostile `run_shell` reply `AI_SHELL_RC=1`;
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the expanded `sys-acceptance.sh` matrix reports `SUMMARY PASS=49 FAIL=0`.
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Also observed: a read-only `flatpak search` can trigger Flatpak's interactive
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`appstream-update` polkit prompt when the session is not recognized as active
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(headless serial), which can block an unattended run; on a real active seat
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polkit's default `allow_active=yes` allows it, and the unattended acceptance
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now runs detached so it cannot hang. Recorded as a hypothesis, not a code
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change. Gates: `cargo fmt`, `clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings`,
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`cargo test --workspace` 842 passed / 0 failed.
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- **Live real-agent verification over the local `opencode` server (2026-09-28).**
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With a real `opencode serve` (v1.18.32) on `127.0.0.1:4096` and the
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`opencode-go` provider, `sys ask "list installed packages"` was driven through
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@ -25,6 +25,23 @@ commit it. It should be short and current; use `git log` for detail.
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call (`sys ask` with a real provider is still VM/live NotRun) but it closes
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the "connected-model path only tested with fake transports" gap. Gates:
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`cargo test --workspace` 841 passed / 0 failed.
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- **First VM test loop on the golden image (2026-09-28, VM-VERIFIED):** booted a
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fresh overlay of the installed `phoebus-headless-80g.qcow2` with the static
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`sys` from HEAD and found two real defects, both fixed. (1) Unprivileged
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`sys ask` hung on a polkit `manage-units` prompt because the model sandbox
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used the **system** `systemd-run`; it now uses `systemd-run --user` with the
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user-manager property subset for non-root callers, full system sandbox for
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root. (2) An unprivileged read-only AI plan exited 1 after printing the plan
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because the service layer required the root-owned transaction log; recording
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is now best-effort for non-root plans and mandatory for privileged mutations.
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VM evidence (`serial-boot-20260929T092147Z-6f88907a`, PASS=8): system sandbox
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`AI_ROOT_RC=0`, user sandbox `AI_USER_RC=0` (was 124/timeout), no-sandbox
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`AI_NOSANDBOX_RC=0`, hostile reply `AI_SHELL_RC=1`, and
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`sys-acceptance.sh` `SUMMARY PASS=49 FAIL=0`. Hypothesis recorded (not
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changed): headless/inactive-session `flatpak search` can trigger Flatpak's
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interactive `appstream-update` polkit prompt; the unattended acceptance runs
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detached to avoid the hang. Next: mutate acceptance, rollback, Snap, source
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conversion / tuned kernel on the same golden overlay.
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- **Boundary-hardening pass (2026-09-28, IMPLEMENTED + UNIT-TESTED, VM NOT
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RUN):** six host-provable defects fixed with regression tests. (1) Removed
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the `PHOEBUS_ALLOW_UNPRIVILEGED_EXEC=1` env backdoor: it made
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@ -100,7 +100,8 @@ Booting that recovery entry offline remains a manual gate.
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| AI connected-model path over a real local stub | yes | yes (4 e2e cases: valid plan executes; request has no home path/credential; shell + smuggled key + malformed fail closed) | no (local stub, not a live model) | n/a |
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| Live real-agent call (`opencode` backend, host) | yes | yes (`sys ask "list installed packages"` → valid plan + digest, exit 0; hostile shell/private-file instruction refused and downgraded; OpenCode tools disabled; no credential in the log) | host-level only (2026-09-28, local `opencode serve` + `opencode-go/deepseek-v4.1-flash`); VM/direct-provider live call remains NotRun | n/a |
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| Privilege derived only from the process identity | yes | yes (an environment variable cannot forge uid 0; the removed `PHOEBUS_ALLOW_UNPRIVILEGED_EXEC` regression test) | no | n/a |
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| AI OS sandbox (systemd hardened unit) | yes | yes (argv + sandboxed-send via `systemd-run`, key/body on stdin) | no — **host probe 2026-09-28: system `manage-units` needs polkit auth and the full property set is invalid for `--user`; VM seat run required to settle `systemd-run` vs `--user`** | no |
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| AI OS sandbox (systemd hardened unit) | yes | yes (argv + sandboxed-send; system properties for root, user-manager subset for non-root) | yes (`serial-boot-20260929T092147Z-6f88907a`: `AI_ROOT_RC=0` system sandbox, `AI_USER_RC=0` `--user` sandbox; previously the user path hung on a polkit `manage-units` prompt) | no |
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| Unprivileged read-only AI plan completes | yes | yes (transaction recording best-effort for non-root; mandatory for privileged mutations) | yes (`serial-boot-20260929T092147Z-6f88907a`: `AI_NOSANDBOX_RC=0` as `phoebus`) | n/a |
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| Installed assistant (`sys ask`) | yes | yes | yes (live call 2026-09-28: `sys ask "list installed packages"` via `--ai-backend opencode` to host `opencode serve` through a guest loopback tunnel, model `opencode-go/muse-spark-1.3-contributor`, valid Assistant Plan + approval digest, `AI_LIVE_RC=0`; the `show system status` phrasing elicits schema-noncompliant JSON from this model and is fail-closed rejected) | n/a |
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| Resolved package effects + approval binding (carried through execution) | yes | yes (empty vs unestablished; drift + prior-step allowance) | no | n/a |
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| Privileged approval ledger (replacement/replay/concurrency/interruption) | yes | yes (privileged entry point) | no | n/a |
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@ -385,18 +386,18 @@ Booting that recovery entry offline remains a manual gate.
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includes bounded seat socket wait. Graphical desktop seat verification
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under headless wlroots is proven; graphical verification under a physical seat
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remains an open hardware gate.
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- **AI sandbox** is implemented (`systemd-run` hardening properties; argv and
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the sandboxed-send path — `systemd-run` program, key/body on stdin — are
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unit-tested) and fails closed without `systemd-run`; it has not been
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exercised in a VM. A 2026-09-28 host probe found that the system manager's
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`org.freedesktop.systemd1.manage-units` policy requires authentication
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(`auth_admin_keep`), and that the full property set is invalid for
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`systemd-run --user` (`DynamicUser=yes` unsupported, `PrivateDevices=yes`
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fails). Whether the sandbox is therefore usable by an unprivileged assistant
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user on a seat, or must switch to `--user` with a reduced property set, is a
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**hypothesis requiring a disposable-VM seat run**; the sandbox was
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deliberately not changed without that proof. Only typed actions and the
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privacy boundary were previously enforced.
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- **AI sandbox** is implemented (`systemd-run` hardening properties) and is now
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exercised in a disposable VM: the **system** sandbox (full property set) for a
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root caller and the **user** sandbox (`systemd-run --user`, with
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`DynamicUser`/`PrivateDevices`/`ProtectKernelModules` omitted because the user
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manager rejects them) for an unprivileged caller. Before the fix, an
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unprivileged `sys ask` hung on a polkit `manage-units` password prompt; it now
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completes (`serial-boot-20260929T092147Z-6f88907a`, `AI_ROOT_RC=0`,
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`AI_USER_RC=0`). Open hypothesis: a read-only `flatpak search` can trigger
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Flatpak's interactive `appstream-update` polkit prompt when the session is not
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recognized as active (headless serial); polkit's default `allow_active=yes`
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covers a real active seat. Not yet exercised: a strict-confinement AppArmor
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guest and a physical seat.
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- **Release automation** now has executable gates, a report, atomic publish
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and signing command helpers, but no gate has been executed by a configured
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CI runner. `gates --execute` runs each gate's real command in its own
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@ -311,11 +311,23 @@ mod tests {
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let specs = runner.recorded();
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let spec = &specs[0];
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assert_eq!(spec.program, "systemd-run");
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// This test process is unprivileged, so the user manager is used; the
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// system-only properties must never appear.
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assert!(
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spec.args.iter().any(|a| a.contains("DynamicUser=yes")),
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spec.args.iter().any(|a| a == "--user"),
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"an unprivileged caller must use the user manager: {:?}",
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spec.args
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);
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assert!(
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spec.args.iter().any(|a| a.contains("ProtectHome=yes")),
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"the sandbox properties must be present: {:?}",
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spec.args
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);
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assert!(
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!spec.args.iter().any(|a| a.contains("DynamicUser=yes")),
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"the user manager rejects DynamicUser: {:?}",
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spec.args
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);
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assert!(
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!spec.args.iter().any(|a| a.contains("sk-secret-value")),
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"the key must not be in argv: {:?}",
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@ -17,7 +17,8 @@ use crate::command::CommandSpec;
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use crate::error::{ExecError, Result};
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use crate::exec::Exec;
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/// The hardening properties applied to the model-call unit.
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/// The hardening properties applied to the model-call unit by the **system**
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/// manager.
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pub const SANDBOX_PROPERTIES: &[&str] = &[
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"DynamicUser=yes",
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"ProtectSystem=strict",
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@ -36,13 +37,44 @@ pub const SANDBOX_PROPERTIES: &[&str] = &[
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"SystemCallFilter=@system-service",
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];
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/// The subset of [`SANDBOX_PROPERTIES`] accepted by the **user** manager.
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///
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/// `DynamicUser`, `PrivateDevices` and `ProtectKernelModules` are
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/// system-manager-only; `systemd-run --user` rejects them. The remaining set
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/// still gives an unprivileged model call a read-only system, no home access,
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/// no new privileges and a restricted syscall/address-family set.
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pub const USER_SANDBOX_PROPERTIES: &[&str] = &[
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"ProtectSystem=strict",
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"ProtectHome=yes",
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"PrivateTmp=yes",
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"NoNewPrivileges=yes",
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"ProtectKernelTunables=yes",
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"ProtectControlGroups=yes",
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"RestrictNamespaces=yes",
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"LockPersonality=yes",
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"MemoryDenyWriteExecute=yes",
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"SystemCallArchitectures=native",
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"RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET AF_INET6",
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"SystemCallFilter=@system-service",
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];
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/// Whether `systemd-run` is available to build the boundary.
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pub fn available() -> bool {
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crate::exec::find_in_path("systemd-run").is_some()
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}
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/// The argv for `systemd-run` that runs `program args` inside the sandbox.
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pub fn argv(program: &str, args: &[String]) -> Vec<String> {
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/// Whether the model call must go through the **user** manager.
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///
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/// A normal account cannot start a system transient unit: polkit's
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/// `org.freedesktop.systemd1.manage-units` requires authentication, so
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/// `systemd-run` (system) either prompts for the root password or hangs. That
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/// breaks the primary assistant interface for exactly the users it is for.
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/// An unprivileged caller therefore uses `systemd-run --user`.
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fn user_scope() -> bool {
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crate::personal::effective_uid() != 0
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}
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fn build_argv(program: &str, args: &[String], user: bool, properties: &[&str]) -> Vec<String> {
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let mut out: Vec<String> = vec![
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"--quiet".into(),
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"--wait".into(),
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@ -50,7 +82,10 @@ pub fn argv(program: &str, args: &[String]) -> Vec<String> {
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"--collect".into(),
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"--service-type=exec".into(),
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];
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for property in SANDBOX_PROPERTIES {
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if user {
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out.push("--user".into());
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}
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for property in properties {
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out.push(format!("--property={property}"));
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}
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out.push(program.to_string());
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@ -58,6 +93,16 @@ pub fn argv(program: &str, args: &[String]) -> Vec<String> {
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out
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}
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/// The argv for the system `systemd-run` that runs `program args` sandboxed.
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pub fn argv(program: &str, args: &[String]) -> Vec<String> {
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build_argv(program, args, false, SANDBOX_PROPERTIES)
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}
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/// The argv for the user `systemd-run` used by an unprivileged caller.
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pub fn user_argv(program: &str, args: &[String]) -> Vec<String> {
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build_argv(program, args, true, USER_SANDBOX_PROPERTIES)
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}
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/// Run a program inside the model sandbox, reading the hidden `stdin` payload.
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///
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/// Fails closed when `systemd-run` is unavailable: an unisolated model call is
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@ -74,9 +119,14 @@ pub fn run(
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.into(),
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));
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}
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let wrapped = if user_scope() {
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user_argv(program, args)
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} else {
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argv(program, args)
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};
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exec.run(
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CommandSpec::new("ai", "query model (sandboxed)", "systemd-run")
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.args(argv(program, args))
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.args(wrapped)
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.stdin(stdin),
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)
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}
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@ -107,6 +157,38 @@ mod tests {
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assert_eq!(&args[pos + 1..], &["-sS", "-K", "-"]);
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}
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#[test]
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fn user_argv_uses_the_user_manager_and_supported_properties() {
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let args = user_argv("curl", &["-sS".into(), "-K".into(), "-".into()]);
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assert!(args.iter().any(|a| a == "--user"), "{args:?}");
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for required in [
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"ProtectSystem=strict",
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"ProtectHome=yes",
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"PrivateTmp=yes",
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"NoNewPrivileges=yes",
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"RestrictAddressFamilies=",
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"SystemCallFilter=@system-service",
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] {
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assert!(
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args.iter().any(|a| a.contains(required)),
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"missing {required}: {args:?}"
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);
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}
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// Properties the user manager rejects must never be passed.
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for forbidden in [
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"DynamicUser=yes",
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"PrivateDevices=yes",
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"ProtectKernelModules=yes",
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] {
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assert!(
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!args.iter().any(|a| a.contains(forbidden)),
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"user sandbox must not include {forbidden}: {args:?}"
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);
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}
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let pos = args.iter().position(|a| a == "curl").unwrap();
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assert_eq!(&args[pos + 1..], &["-sS", "-K", "-"]);
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}
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#[test]
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fn run_fails_closed_without_systemd_run() {
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// In this environment systemd-run may or may not exist; if it does not,
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@ -263,7 +263,15 @@ fn execute_claimed(
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digest: Some(plan.digest.clone()),
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outcomes: Vec::new(),
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};
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let tx_id = transaction::begin(exec, root, record)?;
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// The transaction log lives in the root-owned `/var/lib/phoebus`. A
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// privileged mutation must record it. An unprivileged, non-mutating plan (a
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// read-only assistant answer) must not fail merely because it cannot write
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// that log, so its recording is best-effort.
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let tx_id: Option<u64> = if plan.requires_root {
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Some(transaction::begin(exec, root, record)?)
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} else {
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transaction::begin(exec, root, record).ok()
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};
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// Carry the *reviewed* per-step effects forward. Freshly resolved effects
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// below are evidence to compare against these, never a replacement
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@ -475,12 +483,16 @@ fn execute_claimed(
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fn finish_or_report(
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exec: &Exec,
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root: &Path,
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tx_id: u64,
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tx_id: Option<u64>,
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result: impl Into<String>,
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snapshot: Option<String>,
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outcomes: Vec<TransactionOutcome>,
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persistence_note: &str,
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) -> Result<()> {
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// Recording was skipped (unprivileged plan without a writable log).
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let Some(tx_id) = tx_id else {
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return Ok(());
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};
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let result = result.into();
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match transaction::finish(exec, root, tx_id, result.clone(), snapshot, outcomes) {
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Ok(()) => Ok(()),
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@ -118,6 +118,38 @@ fn sealed(
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plan
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}
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#[test]
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fn an_unprivileged_readonly_plan_does_not_require_the_transaction_log() {
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use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
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let store_dir = tempdir().unwrap();
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let store = PlanStore::with_dir(store_dir.path());
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let root = tempdir().unwrap();
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let exec = make_test_exec(root.path());
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let uid = effective_uid();
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let mut plan = sealed(
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"plan-readonly",
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PlanKind::General,
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vec![SystemAction::History],
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"d",
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root.path(),
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uid,
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);
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store.save(&mut plan).unwrap();
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let digest = plan.digest.clone();
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// Simulate the installed system: the transaction directory is root-owned, so
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// an unprivileged plan cannot write it. Recording is best-effort, so the
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// read-only plan must still complete.
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let tx_dir = root.path().join("var/lib/phoebus");
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std::fs::create_dir_all(&tx_dir).unwrap();
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std::fs::set_permissions(&tx_dir, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o555)).unwrap();
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let outcome = execute_plan(&exec, root.path(), &store, "plan-readonly", &digest, true)
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.expect("a read-only plan must not fail on the root-owned transaction log");
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assert!(outcome.completed);
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}
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#[test]
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fn plan_store_roundtrips_and_claims_once() {
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let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
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